PRATTS v. HAMMONTON POLICE DEPARTMENT

[Docket Nos. 5 and 6]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CAMDEN VICINAGE

ANTONIO PRATTS, JR.,

Plaintiff,

Civil No. 21-6470 (RMB/KMW)

v.

HAMMONTON POLICE DEPARTMENT, et. OPINION AND ORDER

al.,

Defendants.

BUMB, United States District Judge:

THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon the filing of a

Complaint and application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) by

Plaintiff Antonio Pratts, Jr. (“Plaintiff” or “Pratts”). [Docket

Nos. 5 and 6.]1 For the reasons stated herein, the Court will grant

Plaintiff’s application to proceed IFP and dismiss Plaintiff’s

claims against the Hammonton Police Department, Detective Russel,

and the unnamed Responding Officers.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s claims arise from two separate incidents. First,

Plaintiff alleges that on October 13, 2019, two unnamed men

1 Plaintiff filed four Complaints [Docket Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5] and two IFP

applications [Docket Nos. 3, 6]. There are no substantial differences between

the different versions of these documents. As such, the Court will rely on

Plaintiff’s most recently filed Complaint [Docket No. 5] and IFP application

[Docket No. 6].

kidnapped him after a home invasion, held him at knifepoint, and

forced him to withdraw cash from an ATM at a 7-Eleven store.

[Docket No. 5 at 5.] Then, Plaintiff alleges, an unnamed police

officer intervened and pursued the kidnappers on foot. [Id.]

Although the unnamed officer apprehended the kidnappers, Plaintiff

claims that the officer released them because he recognized one

kidnapper as the nephew of a candidate running for an unspecified

political office. [Id.] Plaintiff claims he was evaluated and

treated by EMS while the unnamed officer filed a report. [Id.]

According to Plaintiff, the officer then advised Plaintiff to file

a formal complaint at the Police Station. [Id. at 6.]

Plaintiff alleges that for the next three days, he went to

the Police Station to file a formal complaint. [Id.] But Plaintiff

suggests that the dispatcher at the Police Station lied to him

about Detective Russel’s2 whereabouts, such that Plaintiff was

unable to file a formal complaint. [Id.] The Complaint does not

clearly explain why Plaintiff was unable to file a complaint at

the Police Station in the absence of Detective Russel. Nonetheless,

Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he responding officers purposefully

failed to take [the kidnappers] into custody.” [Id. at 8.]

Second, Plaintiff alleges that on March 23, 2020, he was

wrongfully arrested for distribution of a controlled dangerous

2 In his Complaint, Plaintiff does not explain who Detective Russel is or

Detective Russel’s significance to Plaintiff’s case.

substance. [Id. at 6.] Again, the Complaint does not clearly

identify which officer arrested Plaintiff. But Plaintiff claims

that his alleged kidnapper, whose uncle was running for political

office, from the October 13, 2019 incident was the actual culprit

of the crime for which Plaintiff was arrested. [Id.] That,

Plaintiff alleges, was the motivation for his arrest. [Id.]

Plaintiff further alleges that the arresting officers profiled him

based on his criminal record, and as a result, he experienced “pain

and suffering, mental anguish, [and] wrongful incarceration.”

[Id.]

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. IFP Application

When a non-prisoner seeks permission to proceed IFP under 28

U.S.C. § 1915, the applicant must submit an affidavit that includes

a complete list of the applicant’s assets and establishes that the

applicant is unable to pay the requisite fees. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a); Roy v. Penn. Nat’l Ins. Co., No. 14-4277, 2014 WL

4104979, at *1 n.1 (D.N.J. Aug. 19, 2014) (internal citations

omitted). The decision to grant or deny an IFP application is based

solely upon the economic eligibility of the applicant. See Sinwell

v. Shapp, 536 F.2d 15, 19 (3d Cir. 1976).

B. Sua Sponte Dismissal

A complaint filed by a litigant proceeding IFP is subject to

sua sponte dismissal by the Court if the case is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). In determining the

sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the Court must be mindful to

construe it liberally in favor of the pro se party. Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants

still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support

a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d

Cir. 2013) (internal citation omitted). “The legal standard for

dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a

complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”

Schreane v. Seana, 506 F.App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing

Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)).

To survive a court’s sua sponte screening, a complaint must

allege “sufficient factual matter to show that the claim is

facially plausible.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210

(3d Cir. 2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d

Cir. 2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

“[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

III. ANALYSIS

A. IFP Application

Plaintiff qualifies for permission to proceed IFP. In his

affidavit, Plaintiff indicates that he has no income, is

unemployed, and has no assets other than his prison account.

[Docket No. 6.] Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff

established that he lacks the financial ability to pay the filing

fee. Accordingly, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s IFP

Application.

B. Section 1983 Claims

Plaintiff’s claims arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983

provides that:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory

or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States or other

person within the jurisdiction thereof to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to

the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,

or other proper proceeding for redress[.]

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

To establish a § 1983 claim, “a plaintiff must demonstrate a

violation of a right protected by the Constitution or laws of the

United States that was committed by a person acting under the color

of state law.” Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (3d Cir. 2000).

The Court begins its analysis of a plaintiff’s § 1983 claims by

identifying “the exact contours of the underlying right said to

have been violated,” and determining “whether the plaintiff has

alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at all.” Id.

(quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 (1998)).

1. Pratts’s Claims Against the Hammonton Police

Department

The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the

Hammonton Police Department. Plaintiff alleges that the Hammonton

Police Department violated § 1983 by wrongfully arresting him,

profiling him based on his criminal record, and failing to

investigate his kidnapping. [Docket No. 5 at 6.] But a plaintiff

cannot assert a § 1983 claim against a police department because,

although municipalities and townships may be liable under § 1983,

a police department is “merely an arm of the Township” in which it

is located. Padilla v. Township of Cherry Hill, 110 F.App’x 272,

278 (3d Cir. 2004), overruled on other grounds by Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).

Ordinarily, this Court will interpret a pro se complaint to

state a § 1983 claim against a municipality, even where a plaintiff

failed to name that municipality as a defendant but has otherwise

sufficiently alleged a § 1983 claim against an arm of that

municipality. See Mikhaeil v. Santos, 646 F.App’x 158, 160 (3d

Cir. 2016) (giving a pro se litigant the benefit of “construing

[the] complaint liberally to allege a claim against [the

municipality]” where the plaintiff named the police department as

a defendant). The Court will not do so here, however, because

Plaintiff has not otherwise stated a valid § 1983 claim against

the Town of Hammonton.

Here, Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory and lack any

factual basis. To support his claim that officers profiled him

during his arrest, Plaintiff baldly alleges that “[he] was profiled

because of [his] criminal record.” [Docket No. 6 at 6.] Such

conclusory allegations will not suffice. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678; Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210 (stating that a complaint must allege

“sufficient factual matter to show that the claim is facially

plausible”). Plaintiff also vaguely suggests-- again without any

factual basis-- that his arrest was motivated by political

corruption. [Docket No. 6 at 5–6.] This too is insufficient.

Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff alleges that the Hammonton

Police Department failed to investigate his claims, Plaintiff does

not provide sufficient facts. [See id.] Accordingly, the Court

will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the Hammonton Police

Department for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted.

2. Pratts’s Claims Against Detective Russel and

Unnamed Responding Officers

The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Detective

Russel and the unnamed Responding Officers for failure to state a

claim. Indeed, Plaintiff again baldly asserts that Detective

Russel profiled Plaintiff based on his criminal record and arrested

Plaintiff because of a political corruption conspiracy.

Furthermore, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts against the

unnamed Responding Officers that would form the basis for § 1983

liability.

C. Plaintiff’s Pending State Court Matter

Finally, Pratts is a defendant in a pending state court

criminal matter, which arises from the same set of facts as his

Complaint here. Federal district courts have “discretion to

abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a particular claim where

resolution of that claim in federal court would offend principles

of comity by interfering with an ongoing state proceeding.”

Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 408

(3d Cir. 2005) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)).

Younger abstention “applies rarely, in only three exceptional

classes of cases: (1) state criminal prosecutions, (2) civil

enforcement proceedings, and (3) civil proceedings involving

certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state

courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.” Gonzalez v.

Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 755 F.3d 176, 180 (3d Cir. 2014)

(citing Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69 (2013))

(cleaned up). Because Plaintiff has a pending state criminal

prosecution, this Court will abstain from exercising jurisdiction

over Plaintiff’s claims to avoid interfering with an ongoing state

proceeding.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, IT IS on this 15th day of July

2021, hereby

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s IFP Application [Docket No. 6] is

GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED that the claims against the Hammonton Police

Department are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a

claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1); and it is further

ORDERED that the claims against Detective Russel and the

Responding Officers are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to

state a claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1); Plaintiff may

refile his Complaint after resolution of his state court criminal

proceeding if Plaintiff believes he can, in good faith, cure the

pleading deficiencies identified above; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of the court shall ADMINISTRATIVELY

TERMINATE this matter, subject to reopening upon this Court’s

screening of a timely filed amended complaint; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall serve Plaintiff

with copies of this Order via regular mail.

s/Renée Marie Bumb

RENÉE MARIE BUMB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE