Opinion

BROWN v. WARDEN OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY JAIL

Court
District Court, D. New Jersey
Filed
Jun 7, 2021
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 25.3%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

DAVID BROWN, No. 19-cv-21965 (NLH) (MJS)

Plaintiff,

OPINION

v.

JOHN DOE CORRECTIONS OFFICERS

1-5, et al.,

Defendants.

APPEARANCES:

David Brown

1353 S. 46th Street

Philadelphia, PA 19143

Plaintiff Pro se

Gregg L. Zeff, Esq.

Law Firm of Gregg L. Zeff

100 Century Parkway

Suite 305

Mt. Laurel, NJ 08054

Attorneys for Defendant Richard Smith

Todd J. Gelfand, Esq.

Barker, Gelfand, James & Sarvas

Linwood Greene, Suite 12

210 New Road

Linwood, NJ 08221

Attorneys for Defendants Officer Gary Lowell and Detective

Michael Minniti

HILLMAN, District Judge

Defendant Richard Smith, former warden of the Cumberland

County Jail, moves to dismiss Plaintiff David Brown’s amended

complaint. ECF No. 24. Defendants Officer Gary Lowell and

Detective Michael Minniti also move to dismiss the amended

complaint. ECF No. 20. Plaintiff opposes the motions. ECF

No. 25.

For the reasons stated herein, the Court will grant the

motions to dismiss and dismiss Defendants without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging

that he was assaulted by inmates while incarcerated in the

Cumberland County Jail:

In May of 2018 I was arrested in New Jersey for

aggravated assault 2nd degree and held without bail at

Cumberland County Jail for several months before the

charges were eventually dropped and I was released

before that I was being held illegally in a high custody

area of the jail with inmates charged with crimes ranging

form [sic] murder, robbery, rape, and even institutional

rape[.] [O]ne day I was on the tier I was assaulted by

several inmates while officer watched outside the gate

before breaking it up 2 of the inmates involved in the

assault were on trial for murder in the first degree and

should not have been housed with me for my misdemeanor

charges.

ECF No. 1 at 4. Plaintiff was hospitalized as a result. Id. at

7. He added that the assault was done at the officers’ command

and they “stood by and watched for entertainment.” Id.

The Court screened the opinion under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and

permitted the complaint to proceed in part. ECF No. 8. The

Court dismissed Plaintiff’s false arrest and false imprisonment

claims without prejudice. ECF No. 7 at 4-5. It permitted the

complaint to proceed on Plaintiff’s claim that unidentified

Cumberland County Jail corrections officers failed to protect

Plaintiff when they directed other inmates to assault Plaintiff

and watched the assault for their entertainment. Id. at 5. A

failure to intervene claim was also permitted to proceed. Id.

at 6. The Court dismissed the claims against Warden Smith

because Plaintiff did not allege enough facts for the Court to

reasonably infer that Warden Smith had personal involvement in

Plaintiff’s assault. Id. at 7. The Court directed Plaintiff to

file either an amended complaint naming the John Doe corrections

officers or a request for a subpoena. ECF No. 8 at 1-2.

Plaintiff moved to amend his complaint on May 1, 2020. ECF

No. 9. The amended complaint alleged Officer Lowell responded

to a call on April 21, 2018 that two men were fighting in

Paulsboro. Id. at 1. “Officer Lowell spoke with one of the

males then contacts Detective Michael Minnitti [sic] who told

him to prepare charges for aggravated assault 2nd degree for the

arrest of . . . David Brown . . . .” Id. Plaintiff was

arrested on May 11, 2018. Id.

According to the amended complaint, Plaintiff appeared

before Judge Kevin Smith in Gloucester County for a probable

cause hearing within 7 days of his arrest. Id. Judge Smith

“determines from the evidence presented at the [probable] cause

hearing that there was no [probable] cause for the issuance of a

warrant for 2nd degree aggravated assault charges cause there was

no evidence presented to the officers as to the extent of the

injury and there was no use of a weapon.” Id. at 1-2.

Plaintiff also alleged that he was detained together with

“inmates charged with murder in the first degree rapes even

prison rapes with a misdemeanor level offense because of a

policy and practice of Warden Richard Smith of Cumberland County

Jail to house Gloucester County inmates at the Cumberland County

Jail . . . .” Id. at 2. He states “correctional officers used

Cumberland County inmates to assault Gloucester County inmates.”

Id.

Magistrate Judge Joel Schneider granted the motion to

amend. ECF No. 12. Defendants now move to dismiss the amended

complaint for failure to state claim.1

1 Officer Lowell and Detective Minniti alternatively request

summary judgment. ECF No. 20. “Rule 12 does not authorize a

motion for summary judgment or a motion to dismiss and for

summary judgment, as made in this case, to be filed in lieu of

an answer.” Visintine v. Zickefoose, No. 11–4678, 2012 WL

6691783, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 21, 2012). In an action where the

plaintiff is pro se like Plaintiff, a district court may not

convert a motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for

failure to state a claim, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court

must accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as

true and view them in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party. A motion to dismiss may be granted only if the plaintiff

has failed to set forth fair notice of what the claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests that make such a claim plausible on

its face. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).

Although Rule 8 does not require “detailed factual allegations,”

it requires “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-

harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

without notice to the plaintiff consisting of at a minimum “a

paper copy of the conversion Order, as well as a copy of Rule 56

and a short summary explaining its import that highlights the

utility of a Rule 56(f) affidavit.” Renchenski v. Williams, 622

F.3d 315, 340 (3d Cir. 2010). “In this case, without having

filed an answer, a hybrid motion like the one filed here, does

not comply with the above described requirements of Rules 12 and

56 or satisfy the Renchenski court’s directive to provide clear

notice to pro se prisoners regarding what they must do to avoid

losing a summary judgment motion. It follows from Renchenski

and Rule 12 that a defendant should avoid filing a hybrid motion

to dismiss and/or for summary judgment of the sort filed here,

which creates unnecessary confusion for a pro se litigant.”

Visintine, 2012 WL 6691783, at *3. The Court declines to

convert the motion into a summary judgment motion and will only

consider the complaint in connection with Defendants’ Rule

12(b)(6) motion.

In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court must

“tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state

a claim. Second, it should identify allegations that, because

they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the

assumption of truth. Finally, [w]hen there are well-pleaded

factual allegations, [the] court should assume their veracity

and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an

entitlement to relief.” Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d

780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (alterations in original) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted). “[A] complaint’s

allegations of historical fact continue to enjoy a highly

favorable standard of review at the motion-to-dismiss stage of

proceedings.” Id. at 790.

III. DISCUSSION

A. False Arrest and False Imprisonment

Plaintiff asserts Officer Lowell and Detective Minniti

falsely arrested him for aggravated assault. “To state a claim

for false arrest under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must

establish: (1) that there was an arrest; and (2) that the arrest

was made without probable cause.” James v. City of Wilkes-

Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d Cir. 2012). “Probable cause to

arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the

arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient in themselves to

warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been

or is being committed by the person to be arrested.” Orsatti v.

New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995).

“[W]here the police lack probable cause to make an arrest, the

arrestee has a claim under § 1983 for false imprisonment based

on a detention pursuant to that arrest.” O’Connor v. City of

Phila., 233 F. App’x 161, 164 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted).

Plaintiff alleges he was arrested for aggravated assault

after Officer Lowell spoke with the other man involved in the

fight. ECF No. 13 at 1. At the subsequent probable cause

hearing, Judge Smith concluded there was inefficient evidence of

injury to proceed with aggravated assault charges.2 Id.

“Evidence that may prove insufficient to establish guilt at

trial may still be sufficient to find the arrest occurred within

the bounds of the law.” Barna v. City of Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d

809, 819, (3d Cir. 1994). “As long as the officers had some

reasonable basis to believe [Plaintiff] had committed a crime,

the arrest is justified as being based on probable cause.

Probable cause need only exist as to any offense that could be

charged under the circumstances.” Id.

2 As is relevant here, second-degree aggravated assault occurs

when a person “[a]ttempts to cause serious bodily injury to

another, or causes injury purposely or knowingly or under

circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of

human life recklessly causes such injury.” N.J.S.A. § 2C:12-

1(b)(1).

The amended complaint indicates Plaintiff was arrested

after Officer Lowell spoke with the alleged victim of the

assault; the later dismissal of the aggravated assault charge

does not mean the officers lacked probable cause to arrest

Plaintiff in the first place. Plaintiff does not allege that he

was not involved in the fight, only that he should not have been

charged with aggravated assault. On the facts alleged by

Plaintiff, Officer Lowell and Detective Minniti had a reasonable

basis to believe Plaintiff committed a crime based on the

interview with the victim. Therefore, the Court will grant

Officer Lowell’s and Detective Minniti’s motion to dismiss. The

claims will be dismissed without prejudice, meaning Plaintiff

may move to amend his complaint again.

B. Fourteenth Amendment Claims

The Court will also grant Defendant Richard Smith’s motion

to dismiss. ECF No. 24.

The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim

against Cumberland County Jail Warden Smith during its review

under § 1915 because Plaintiff did not provide facts indicating

Warden Smith’s personal involvement. A plaintiff cannot hold a

supervisor liable for the actions of his employees solely on a

respondeat superior theory under § 1983. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 676 (2009). “[L]iability under § 1983 may be imposed

on an official with final policymaking authority if that

official establishes an unconstitutional policy that, when

implemented, injures a plaintiff.” Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of

Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 223 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Sample v.

Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989)). “[T]o establish a

claim against a policymaker under § 1983 a plaintiff must allege

... that the official established or enforced policies and

practices directly causing the constitutional violation.” Id.

Plaintiff must plead facts that suggest “(1) the existence

of a policy or practice that created an unreasonable risk of [a

Fourteenth Amendment] violation; (2) the supervisor’s awareness

of the creation of the risk; (3) the supervisor’s indifference

to the risk; and (4) that the plaintiff’s injury resulted from

this policy or practice.” Estate of Chance ex rel. Humphreys v.

First Corr. Med., Inc., 329 F. App’x 340, 343 (3d Cir. 2009).

Plaintiff cursorily asserts there was “a policy and practice of

Warden Richard Smith of Cumberland County Jail to house

Gloucester County inmates at the Cumberland County Jail which

put me in a hostile and dangerous situation on several occasions

where correctional officers used Cumberland County inmates to

assault Gloucester County inmates.” ECF No. 13 at 2. This is

insufficient to state a claim of policy or practice liability.

Plaintiff has provided no facts suggesting that Warden Smith

knew that housing Cumberland County and Gloucester County

inmates together would cause corrections officers to pit inmates

against each other for their entertainment or that he was

indifferent to the danger caused by the housing policy. The

Court will grant the motion to dismiss, but the dismissal shall

be without prejudice. Plaintiff may move to amend his complaint

with more facts in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 15.

Plaintiff has requested five subpoenas to be issued so that

he may identify the John Doe defendants against whom the Court

permitted the Fourteenth Amendment claim to proceed. ECF No. 13

at 3. The Court will instruct the Clerk to send Plaintiff a

blank subpoena form. Plaintiff should return the completed form

to the Clerk’s Office.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Warden Smith’s motion to

dismiss will be granted without prejudice. Officer Lowell’s and

Detective Minniti’s motion to dismiss will also be granted

without prejudice. The Clerk shall send Plaintiff a blank

subpoena duces tecum form, AO 88B, to be filled out and returned

to the Clerk’s Office.

An appropriate order follows.

Dated: _June 7, 2021 ___s/ Noel L. Hillman ___

At Camden, New Jersey NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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