CASTRO v. ATLANTIC COUNTY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MICHAEL CASTRO,

1:15-cv-02041-NLH-JS

Plaintiff,

OPINION

v.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, MICHAEL

MATTIOLI, JAMES RAUCH, BRUCE

DESHIELDS, DARREN DOOLEY, and

MULLICA TOWNSHIP,

Defendants.

APPEARANCES:

DOUGLAS L. CODY

CODY & CODY, ESQS.

653 WHITE HORSE PIKE

HAMMONTON, NJ 08037

MARTIN P. DUFFEY

COZEN AND O'CONNOR

LIBERTY VIEW BLDG.

457 HADDONFIELD RD - SUITE 300

CHERRY HILL, NJ 08002

On behalf of Plaintiff

ROBERT J. MCGUIRE

NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

25 MARKET STREET

P.O. BOX 116

TRENTON, NJ 08625

On behalf of Defendants State of New Jersey, Michael

Mattioli, James Rauch, Bruce DeShields, and Darren Dooley

THOMAS B. REYNOLDS

REYNOLDS & HORN, P.C.

750 ROUTE 73 SOUTH -SUITE 202A

MARLTON, NJ 08053

On behalf of Defendant Mullica Township

HILLMAN, District Judge

This matter concerns constitutional and state law claims by

Plaintiff arising out of his arrests and grand jury indictments

for murder and other charges, all of which were ultimately

dismissed. Presently before the Court are Defendants’ motions

for summary judgment. For the reasons expressed below, the

State Defendants’ motion will be denied, and Mullica Township’s

motion will be granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Michael Castro, was arrested on April 9, 2013

and indicted by a grand jury on July 3, 2013 for the February 5,

2012 murder of John Kingsbury in Mullica Township, Atlantic

County, New Jersey. On June 30, 2014, the New Jersey Superior

Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the indictment,

finding that the Grand Jury did not have “an entirely accurate

presentation of the evidence in order to determine whether there

was reason to believe that the crimes alleged were committed by

[Castro].” After having been incarcerated for sixteen months,

Plaintiff was released from custody on August 8, 2014 because

the Atlantic County Prosecutor’s Office did not re-indict him

within the 45 days afforded by the Superior Court.

On March 20, 2015, Plaintiff filed the instant case against

the Atlantic County Prosecutor’s Office (ACPO), Mullica

Township, and Atlantic County, as well as numerous actors

involved in the investigation of the Kingsbury murder, including

the ACPO prosecutors, the ACPO investigators, and the Mullica

Township police officer who assisted in the ACPO’s

investigation. On May 29, 2015, Plaintiff filed an amended

complaint, and simultaneously filed a similar complaint in New

Jersey Superior Court.

The ACPO Defendants, hereinafter referred to as the State

Defendants,1 removed Plaintiff’s state court complaint, which was

later consolidated with this case. The State Defendants and

Atlantic County filed motions to dismiss.2

While those motions were pending, on January 26, 2016, an

Atlantic County Grand Jury again indicted Plaintiff on nine

counts, including a count for the first-degree murder of

Kingsbury. Pursuant to a warrant on indictment, Plaintiff was

arrested on January 27, 2016. Plaintiff was released on

$250,000 bail. On March 31, 2016, this Court administratively

terminated the case until Plaintiff’s criminal case had reached

its final resolution. (Docket No. 53.)

On February 22, 2017, Plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss

the second indictment. A hearing on the motion to dismiss the

1 When county prosecutors perform their law enforcement function,

they act as agents of the State. Wright v. State, 778 A.2d 443,

462 (N.J. 2001).

2 The motions were ultimately mooted by Plaintiff’s filing of a

second amended complaint.

indictment was scheduled for May 25, 2017, but in advance of

that hearing, the ACPO moved to dismiss the case on its own

accord. On May 23, 2017, the Atlantic County Superior Court

entered an Amended Order dismissing the indictment, discharging

the bail, and ordering the release of Plaintiff from custody.

This Court reopened the matter on May 31, 2017. Plaintiff

filed a second amended complaint on September 11, 2017, while

again simultaneously filing an almost identical complaint in New

Jersey Superior Court. The State Defendants removed that case,

which was then consolidated with this action. The Mullica

Township Defendants filed their answer on November 10, 2017, and

the State Defendants and Atlantic County moved to dismiss

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint on November 13, 2017. On

June 25, 2018, the Court granted in part and denied in part the

motions to dismiss. (Docket No. 99, 100.)

On December 2, 2019, the Mullica Township Defendants and

the State of New Jersey Defendants filed motions for summary

judgment. On December 4, 2019, the Magistrate Judge granted

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a third amended complaint.

On December 9, 2019, Plaintiff filed his third amended

complaint, which re-added as a Defendant Joseph Rauch, a

detective for the Atlantic County Prosecutor’s Office who had

previously been dismissed as a defendant. On June 2, 2020,

Rauch filed a motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s

claims against him in Plaintiff’s third amended complaint.3

In his 229-page, 1228-paragraph third amended complaint,

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants willfully, recklessly, and

callously disregarded his rights under federal and state law by

blatantly ignoring evidence pointing to other suspects,

fabricating evidence and misrepresenting the actual facts

adduced through investigation, and failing to obtain and

preserve critical evidence, including evidence that likely would

have exculpated him and exposed third parties who actually

committed or participated in the homicide. Plaintiff has

asserted nine counts for violations of his rights under the

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, the

New Jersey Civil Rights Act, and for the common law torts of

false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, civil

conspiracy, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional

distress, and negligent hiring.

All Defendants have moved for summary judgment on various

bases. Plaintiff has opposed Defendants’ motions.4 In support

3 The Court directed the State Defendants and Mullica Township

Defendants to inform the Court as to whether Plaintiff’s third

amended complaint impacted their pending motions for summary

judgment filed relative to Plaintiff’s second amended complaint.

Those parties agreed that the only substantive difference

between the two complaints is the addition of Rauch and

allegations directed at him.

4 Plaintiff agrees that all of his claims against Defendant

Police Officer Jake O’Hara, and his claims under 42 U.S.C. §

of their positions, the parties have submitted voluminous

briefing and thousands of pages of exhibits. The State

Defendants have succinctly framed the focus of the viability of

Plaintiff’s claims: Has Plaintiff demonstrated genuine issues

of material fact that his constitutional and state law rights

were violated by an arrest and prosecution without probable

cause, and with deliberate indifference or malice, or has he

merely shown that Defendants could have performed a better

investigation, which, even if true, is insufficient to support

Plaintiff’s claims?

The Court finds that Plaintiff has met his burden to defeat

the State Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. However, the

Court will grant Mullica Township’s motion for summary judgment

on a basis different from the underlying substance of

Plaintiff’s claims against it.

1983 against Mullica Township, Mullica Township Department of

Public Safety and the Mullica Township Police Department may be

dismissed. Plaintiff opposes Mullica Township’s motion with

regard to his New Jersey Tort Claims Act claims. The Court

notes that municipal police departments or departments of public

safety are not separate entities from the municipalities.

Henderson v. Voorhees Tp., 2007 WL 2177354, at *2 (D.N.J. 2007)

(citing N.J.S.A. 40A:14–118 (police departments are created as

executive and enforcement branches of the municipal government;

whether as divisions, departments or agencies of the

municipalities)). Thus, because Mullica Township is considered

a single entity with the Mullica Township Department of Public

Safety and the Mullica Township Police Department, the Court

will refer to these parties as Mullica Township.

DISCUSSION

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

This Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s federal claims

under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s state law claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

B. Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate where the Court is satisfied

that the materials in the record, including depositions,

documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or

declarations, stipulations, admissions, or interrogatory answers,

demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 (1986); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a).

An issue is “genuine” if it is supported by evidence such

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in the nonmoving

party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986). A fact is “material” if, under the governing

substantive law, a dispute about the fact might affect the

outcome of the suit. Id. In considering a motion for summary

judgment, a district court may not make credibility

determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence;

instead, the non-moving party's evidence “is to be believed and

all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”

Marino v. Industrial Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir.

2004)(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).

Initially, the moving party has the burden of demonstrating

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party has

met this burden, the nonmoving party must identify, by

affidavits or otherwise, specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial. Id. Thus, to withstand a properly

supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must

identify specific facts and affirmative evidence that contradict

those offered by the moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-

57. A party opposing summary judgment must do more than just

rest upon mere allegations, general denials, or vague

statements. Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir.

2001).

C. Analysis

1. State Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

The State Defendants consist of: Darren Dooley, a member of

the ACPO and a captain in the Major Crimes Unit who supervised

the investigation of the Kingsbury murder; Bruce DeShields, a

member of the ACPO and the chief of the Major Crimes Unit who

supervised the investigation of the Kingsbury murder; Michael

Mattioli, a member of the ACPO and a sergeant in the Major

Crimes Unit who was the lead detective in the investigation of

the Kingsbury murder; and Joseph Rauch, a member of the ACPO and

a detective assigned to the Major Crimes Unit who assisted in

the investigation of the Kingsbury murder.5

The assessment of Plaintiff’s claims against these

Defendants must be broken down into two categories – (1) claims

for the violations of Plaintiff’s rights under the U.S.

Constitution and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6–

2(c), and (2) Plaintiff’s other state law claims.

(1) Plaintiff’s U.S. Constitution and

NJCRA violation claims

Plaintiff claims that the State Defendants violated his

right to be free from unlawful arrest and detention, false

imprisonment, and malicious prosecution without probable cause.

Plaintiff claims that these violations were perpetrated by the

investigators. Plaintiff also claims that the investigators’

supervisors are liable for failing to properly supervise and

train the investigators.

Plaintiff has brought these claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983, as well as the NJCRA, which was modeled after § 1983 and

is interpreted analogously with § 1983.6 Section 1983 provides

5 Defendant Rauch filed a separate motion for summary judgment

because the other State Defendants filed their motion prior to

Plaintiff re-adding Rauch to his third amended complaint. The

Court will consider his motion in tandem with the other State

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

6 “By its terms, of course, [§ 1983] creates no substantive

in pertinent part, “Every person who, under color of any

statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State

or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen

of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable

to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or

other proper proceeding for redress.”

Constitutional claims may only be asserted against a

“person” and not the State. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding that neither a State nor

its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons”

rights; it merely provides remedies for deprivations of rights

established elsewhere.” City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471

U.S. 808, 816 (1985). Thus, “[t]o establish a claim under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, [a plaintiff] must demonstrate a violation of a

right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United

States [and] that the alleged deprivation was committed by a

person acting under color of state law.” Moore v. Tartler, 986

F.2d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 1993). Like § 1983, NJCRA is a means of

vindicating substantive rights and is not a source of rights

itself. Gormley v. Wood–El, 93 A.3d 344, 358 (N.J. 2014).

Because the NJCRA was modeled after § 1983, and creates a

private cause of action for violations of civil rights secured

under either the United States or New Jersey Constitutions, the

NJCRA is interpreted analogously to § 1983. See Norman v.

Haddon Township, 2017 WL 2812876, at *4 (D.N.J. 2017).

In contrast to § 1983, which provides remedies for the

deprivation of both procedural and substantive rights, N.J.S.A.

10:6–2(c) provides remedies only for the violation of

substantive rights. Tumpson v. Farina, 95 A.3d 210, 225 (N.J.

2014). Because Plaintiff has alleged substantive violations of

his rights, both provisions provide potential vehicles for

relief.

under § 1983); Roberts v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority, 2016 WL

6407276, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016) (citations

omitted) (“We affirm neither the State nor its officials acting

in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under the [NJCRA].”);

Grohs v. Yatauro, 984 F. Supp. 2d 273, 280 (D.N.J. 2013) (citing

Will, 491 U.S. at 65–66) (“The state’s sovereign immunity [] is

preserved under Section 1983; a state is therefore not a

“person” who may be sued under Section 1983.”).

A state actor may be afforded qualified immunity.

“Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil

damages liability unless the official violated a statutory or

constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of

the challenged conduct.” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664

(2012). In order to determine whether a government official is

entitled to qualified immunity, two questions are to be asked:

(1) has the plaintiff alleged or shown a violation of a

constitutional right, and (2) is the right at issue “clearly

established” at the time of the defendant's alleged misconduct?

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

“[T]he Third Circuit has held that the general right to be

free from arrest or prosecution absent probable cause was

clearly established by 1994.” Dorval v. State, 2021 WL 236625,

at *6 (D.N.J. Jan. 25, 2021) (citing Orsatti v. N.J. State

Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 1995) (arrest); Gallo v. City

of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 220 n.4 (3d Cir. 1998)

(prosecution)). Depending on the circumstances of the case, the

Third Circuit has also held that the general right to be free

from arrest or prosecution absent probable cause is sufficiently

specific for qualified immunity purposes. Id. (citing Andrews

v. Scuilli, 853 F.3d 690, 705 (3d Cir. 2017)); see also

Schneider v. Simonini, 749 A.2d 336, 350 (N.J. 2000) (“Based

upon a long line of state and federal cases, we have concluded

that under both the United States and the New Jersey

Constitutions, the law of probable cause was clearly established

by January 1981.” (internal citation omitted)).

Thus, in cases such as this one that involve claims for

unlawful arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution,

the qualified immunity analysis turns on whether the police

officers reasonably but mistakenly concluded that probable cause

existed to arrest, detain, and initiate the criminal

prosecution. Garlanger v. Verbeke, 223 F. Supp. 2d 596, 608

(D.N.J. 2002) (citing Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 483) (other citations

omitted). Here, the viability of Plaintiff’s claims against the

State Defendants boils down to whether probable cause existed to

arrest Plaintiff for Kingsbury’s murder.

In Dempsey v. Bucknell University, 834 F.3d 457, 467–68 (3d

Cir. 2016), The Third Circuit set forth the law governing the

analysis of probable cause in the context of summary judgment:

The Fourth Amendment prohibits police from making an arrest

except “upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation.”

U.S. Const. amend. IV. Far from demanding proof of guilt beyond

a reasonable doubt, “[p]robable cause exists if there is a ‘fair

probability’ that the person committed the crime at

issue.” Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 789 (3d Cir. 2000)

(quoting Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 401 (3d Cir.

1997)).

Put another way, “probable cause to arrest exists when the

facts and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge

are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to

believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the

person to be arrested.” Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d

480, 483 (3d Cir. 1995). The probable cause standard thus

provides individuals protection “against unreasonable searches

and seizures,” U.S. Const. amend. IV, while simultaneously

enabling investigating officers to act quickly - before

necessarily obtaining evidence sufficient to prove guilt beyond

a reasonable doubt - to effect an arrest. “[T]he standard does

not require that officers correctly resolve conflicting evidence

or that their determinations of credibility, were, in

retrospect, accurate.” Wright v. City of Phila., 409 F.3d 595,

603 (3d Cir. 2005).

As the Supreme Court has observed, “[i]n dealing with

probable cause, . . . as the very name implies, we deal with

probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual

and practical considerations of everyday life on which

reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.”

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983) (quoting Brinegar v.

United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (alteration in

original)). For this reason, the Court has eschewed “any rigid

demand that specific ‘tests’ be satisfied” and has instead

prescribed a “totality-of-the-circumstances approach” to the

probable cause determination. Id. at 230-31.

That determination is necessarily fact-intensive, and it

will usually be appropriate for a jury to determine whether

probable cause existed. See Sherwood, 113 F.3d at 401

(“Typically, the existence of probable cause in a section 1983

action is a question of fact.” (citing Groman v. Twp. of

Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 635 (3d Cir. 1995)). Nevertheless,

summary judgment may be granted on the question of probable

cause if a court concludes that “the evidence, viewed most

favorably to [the nonmoving party], reasonably would not support

a contrary factual finding.” Id.

There is a tension inherent in evaluating probable cause at

the summary judgment stage. On the one hand, the summary

judgment standard asks whether there is a “genuine dispute as to

any material fact,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), viewing the evidence

“in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,” Reedy,

615 F.3d at 210. On the other hand, the probable cause standard

by definition allows for the existence of conflicting, even

irreconcilable, evidence. See, e.g., Wright, 409 F.3d at 603.

“[W]e view all [] facts and assess whether any reasonable

jury could conclude that those facts, considered in their

totality in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, did

not demonstrate a ‘fair probability’ that a crime occurred,” and

“only then would the existence of conflicting evidence rise to

the level of a ‘genuine dispute as to any material fact’ such

that summary judgment would be inappropriate.” Dempsey, 834

F.3d at 468. The “summary judgment standard must tolerate

conflicting evidence to the extent it is permitted by the

probable cause standard.” Id.

In this case, as demonstrated by the more than 1150 fact

allegations in Plaintiff’s third amended complaint and the

thousands of pages of evidence presented by the parties’

motions, this case presents the quintessential fact-intensive

assessment of whether probable cause existed to charge Plaintiff

with Kingsbury’s murder. The State Defendants present what they

contend are undisputed facts that lay a solid foundation to meet

the “fair probability” threshold of probable cause, and the

State Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s disputes with the

caliber of the murder investigation do not undermine that

probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff. In contrast,

Plaintiff argues that the State Defendants’ own witnesses refute

the individual “building blocks” upon which the State

Defendants’ “Jenga tower of probable cause stands,” and that the

State Defendants cherry-pick their “facts,” ignoring completely

the totality of circumstances showing that the State Defendants

were anything but objectively reasonable.

Each side has presented a summary of the purported facts

that supports their positions. The State Defendants contend

that the following facts sufficiently evidence probable cause to

arrest Plaintiff for murdering Kingsbury: (1) Castro knew the

victim (who was the adoptive father of Glenn Kingsbury and who

lived with Glenn); (2) Castro owed money to Glenn; (3)

defendants had evidence that Castro knew that large sums of

money were kept in the victim’s home; (4) the person whose gun

was used to kill John Kingsbury, Lauren Kohl, was a friend and

employee of Castro; (5) Kohl had permitted Castro access to her

home (and therefore provided Castro with access to Kohl’s gun)

while Kohl was away; (5) witnesses had reported seeing a stocky,

Asian-looking male (which corresponds with Castro’s physical

description) near the Kingsbury house on the date of the murder;

(6) witnesses had stated they had seen an unfamiliar “bright”

blue or “metallic” blue or “midnight blue” car in the area near

the Kingsbury house in the period around the murder; (7) at the

time, Castro owned a blue KIA Forte; and (8) Castro was invited

to – and turned down – the opportunity to play paintball with

Glenn and others on the date of the murder; and (9) Castro

called and texted Karen Drew (whom Castro knew was at the

Kingsbury home on the date of the murder) numerous times on the

date of the murder, and Drew reported to police that she

believed the purpose of these repeated communications was to see

if she whether she had left the Kingsbury home on the date of

the murder.

Plaintiff presents a different set of facts to demonstrate

numerous holes in the State Defendants’ purported basis for

probable cause:7 (1) falsely characterizing the text messages

between Castro and Karen Drew;8 (2) falsely characterizing the

evidence describing the unfamiliar male seen in the neighborhood

on the date of the homicide;9 (3) falsely describing witness

7 In his briefs, Plaintiff details all of these points. The

Court annotates only a few to provide examples of disputed

issues of material fact sufficient to defeat the State

Defendants’ summary judgment motion.

8 In her interview with Rauch, Plaintiff points out that Karen

Drew did not say that Castro asked her, in either telephone

conversation, when she was leaving Glenn Kingsbury’s residence

or whether she had left the Kingsbury home.

9 Plaintiff points out that neighbor Randazzo described the male

as having visible “puck marks” on his face. He also said the

man had sparse facial hair – a mustache and a “little bit of

hair over here [indicating].” The individual who Randazzo

indicated parked the blue 4-door vehicle had sparse facial hair

and ACPO had possession of Wawa surveillance video showing that

accounts of a vehicle seen in the neighborhood;10 (4) failing to

conduct any meaningful investigation of third parties; (5)

falsely describing Castro’s alleged “access” to the weapon

allegedly used in the homicide and that of others;11 (6) making

Plaintiff was entirely clean shaven on that day. Plaintiff

further points out that Mattioli had told Chris Ricca during his

interview on February 24, 2012 that the neighbors’ descriptions

matched Chris Ricca, and not Castro: “You know right now I have

a very detailed description [of] his face structure. You have a

rather unique facial structure. You have a rather pronounced jaw

line. You have pock marks. You have a spotty beard, just like a

16-year-old kid can grow. And when I talked to Castro (and that

information came in prior to us going to talk to Mike), when I

went there and looked at him, I was like, he ain’t the guy he’s

talking about.”

10 To further elaborate on this point, Plaintiff argues that the

State Defendants’ reliance on neighborhood witnesses describing

a blue car in the area on the day of the homicide is without any

merit since (1) Mr. Randazzo said that he noticed that the

unfamiliar male (who had facial hair) parked his car at the end

of the block, (2) Mattioli’s principal, undated, 8-page

Investigation Report indicates that the unfamiliar male “. . .

was observed to exit the blue vehicle and walk North on Woodland

Avenue toward Nesco Road,” (3) Randazzo, the only neighbor to

describe the number of doors on the vehicle, clearly said he saw

a 4-door car, and Mr. Castro drove a 2-door KIA Forte, (4)

Randazzo believed the vehicle was a Dodge Avenger and said he

was “pretty savvy” when it came to automobiles, (5) Castro’s car

had two large stickers on the back window (a Power Athletics

sticker and a Castro Marital Arts sticker) and no witness

reported seeing any such identifying marks.

11 In contrast to the State Defendants’ representation that

Plaintiff was the only one who had access to Lauren Kohl’s home

and the guns kept there while she was on vacation, Kohl’s co-

worker and daily dog walker both had access. Plaintiff relates

the investigators never asked for their names or followed up

with them. Additionally, during the time Kohl was away, the

rear sliding door had been unlocked. Plaintiff also presents

Kohl’s text messages and testimony regarding her inability to

locate her guns or recall where she had left them when she went

false statements to prosecutors about whether Susan Danson was

interviewed and withholding her interview and statements from

prosecutors and the defense; (7) fabricating evidence by

way of filing a false police report regarding Mattioli’s alleged

contact with a “video company” (that did not exist) in order to

cover up and explain his suppression of exculpatory evidence;

(8) failing to preserve critical evidence; (9) falsely

characterizing location information for Castro’s cellular

telephone, even after Special Agent Scott D. Eicher, Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Cellular Analysis Survey Team

(C.A.S.T.) informed ACPO that Castro’s Call Detail Records did

not provide any location information between 12:28 p.m. and 2:15

p.m. on the day of the homicide; (10) failing to write timely

investigative reports and neglect of duty in the conduct of the

investigation; (11) engaging in an undocumented ticket-fixing

scheme to confer a benefit on a State witness; (12) failing to

provide sufficient facts to support probable cause in obtaining

an arrest warrant, and failing to document, in any way, what

facts were provided to the issuing judge; (13) failing to

investigate and ignoring medical evidence and evidence of the

victim’s movements on the day of the homicide that would have

on vacation, and that she was “going with stolen.”

exonerated Castro;12 (14) conducting the investigation in such a

grossly incompetent manner as to demonstrate conclusively a lack

of objective reasonableness; (15) willfully ignoring strong

evidence of Desmond Walker’s culpability for the murder;13 and

(16) willfully tampering with, suppressing, and hiding evidence

(victim’s cellular telephone) in response to a subpoena served

in this civil litigation.

The State Defendants contend that Plaintiff merely seeks

recovery because he thinks he can prove that a “better”

investigation was possible, but the cogent legal question is not

12 Plaintiff presents medical and electronic evidence which he

contends reasonably shows that Kingsbury was alive at 2:07 p.m.

and shot minutes before 2:37 p.m., and Plaintiff was in

Hammonton during this time, which is 10-15 minute drive from

Kingsbury’s residence.

13 Plaintiff provides evidence to show that Kingsbury was shot

minutes before 2:37 p.m., when Lauren Kohl’s jeep was captured

on the Nesco Liquors surveillance video driving away from the

crime scene. A memo by the ACPO relates that Kohl and Desmond

Walker had a personal relationship; Walker was unemployed, lived

with his mother and sister, had long-standing and ongoing money

problems, and did not own a vehicle that operated; Kohl made

contradictory statements to Detective Rauch about Walker having

been to her residence in Sicklerville, New Jersey; Walker had

potential access to the alleged murder weapon by virtue of his

relationship with Kohl and as shown through his Call Detail

Records; Walker had borrowed Kohl’s red-orange Jeep Wrangler for

a period of at least several months beginning on the day prior

to the homicide; surveillance video shows Kohl’s jeep driving

toward the crime scene at 1:16 p.m. on the day of the homicide

and driving away from the crime scene at 2:37 p.m. and these

times accord with weight of the evidence, including the medical

evidence, as to when the homicide likely occurred.

whether defendants conducted a “thorough” investigation, a

“good” investigation, a “fair” investigation, or even a “grossly

negligent” investigation with respect to the Kingsbury murder.

Instead, the State Defendants contend, even if they performed a

grossly negligent investigation, Plaintiff has not demonstrated

disputed issues of material fact that negate: (1) the

“significantly lower” evidentiary standard for probable cause

than the standard which is required for conviction, and (2) the

above-outlined facts and circumstances that were within the

State Defendants’ knowledge, which were “reasonably trustworthy

information [] sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing”

that Plaintiff had murdered Kingsbury. See Wright v. City of

Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 602 (3d. 2005).

The Court does not agree that Plaintiff’s evidence

presented in opposition to the State Defendants’ motion only

challenges the skill level of the investigation rather than cast

doubt on the objective reasonableness of facts to support his

arrest. The Court accepts the proposition that even if an

investigation is, for example, a hypothetical 2 out of 10

performance rating, so long as “the facts and circumstances

within the arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient in

themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe that an

offense has been or is being committed by the person to be

arrested,” Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 483, then probable cause may

still be properly established. However, when viewed in a light

most favorable to Plaintiff, and if believed by a jury,

Plaintiff has presented evidence showing that the facts and

circumstances were not sufficient, and the foundation for

probable cause was based on intentional or deliberatively

indifferent conduct by the State investigators, such that a

reasonable person would not believe that Plaintiff murdered

Kingsbury.

The question of probable cause is generally one for a jury,

Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 1998);

Stolinski v. Pennypacker, 772 F. Supp. 2d 626, 638 (D.N.J. 2011)

(noting that probable cause is “a sufficiently fact-laden issue

as to typically be a question for the jury”), but “there are

easy cases where a complaint establishes that the officers

possessed a set of facts, and that set of facts establishes

probable cause as a matter of law,” Collick, 2016 WL 6824374 at

*1 (citing Baker v. Wittevrongel, 363 F. App’x 146, 150 (3d Cir.

2010). The Third Circuit has directed, however, that “Courts

should exercise caution before granting a defendant summary

judgment in a malicious prosecution case when there is a

question of whether there was probable cause for the initiation

of the criminal proceeding because, generally, the existence of

probable cause is a factual issue,” and it “certainly is

inappropriate for a court to grant a defendant officer's motion

for summary judgment in a malicious prosecution case if there

are underlying factual disputes bearing on the issue or if

reasonable minds could differ on whether he had probable cause

for the institution of the criminal proceedings based on the

information available to him.” Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d

273, 300 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotations and citations

omitted).

This is not an “easy case.” Plaintiff has presented

sufficient evidence to show underlying factual disputes, and to

show how reasonable minds could differ on the State Defendants’

purported basis for probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for

Kingsbury’s murder.14 On this record, a jury, and not this

Court, must resolve these issues.

Similarly, a jury must resolve Plaintiff’s claims against

the first-line investigators’ supervisors, Defendants Bruce

DeShields and Darren Dooley. Defendant Bruce DeShields

was a member and employee of ACPO and was, during the time of

the relevant events, assigned as a Lieutenant of the Major

Crimes Unit, with supervisory responsibility over its

investigations and Sergeant Mattioli. Chief Dooley was a member

and employee of ACPO and was, during the time of the events

described, assigned as Chief of County Detectives. Chief Dooley

14 In addition to documentary evidence, Plaintiff relies upon

testimony and opinions of several experts.

was and remains in command of the Detective Division of the

Atlantic County Prosecutor’s Office, with supervisory

responsibility over investigations by the Major Crimes Unit and

Sergeant Mattioli.

Plaintiff claims, with reference to deposition testimony

and expert opinions, that the failure by Dooley to require

Mattioli to write reports and to require DeShields to review

investigative reports or original evidence was a neglect of duty

and demonstrated a reckless indifference to the constitutional

rights of Plaintiff. Plaintiff contends that DeShields

indicated that his practice was (1) to rely only upon oral

briefings by Mattioli as to the status of the homicide

investigation, and (2) to not require Mattioli to write or

submit investigation reports to him. Plaintiff further contends

that Dooley failed to prevent or correct these practices

and failed generally in his duty to supervise the detectives

under his command. Plaintiff claims that these practices

directly led to and caused the arrest, detention, and

prosecutions of Plaintiff.

The supervisor Defendants argue that they are entitled to

summary judgment because (1) they had a very limited role in

overseeing the investigation into Kingsbury’s murder, (2) there

is no constitutional right to timely reports or reports of a

specific nature, (3) they cannot be held liable for purported

lies contained within the reports, and (4) they cannot be held

liable for the investigators’ actions on a respondeat superior

theory.

As for Defendants’ first argument, the lack of involvement

in the investigation by the investigators’ supervisors is

precisely the conduct Plaintiff contends violated his

constitutional rights. For Defendants’ last argument, Plaintiff

is not alleging that the supervisors are liable for the

investigators’ actions, but rather the supervisors themselves

were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s constitutional

rights, which are viable claims. See Davis v. Yates, 2020 WL

526129, at *10 n.3 (D.N.J. 2020) (discussing Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 62, 676 (2009) and Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc.,

766 F.3d 307, 319 (3d Cir. 2014), rev’d on other grounds, Taylor

v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822 (2015), and noting that a theory of

supervisory liability is viable if a plaintiff sufficiently

alleges that a defendant had personal involvement in the alleged

violation and was at least deliberately indifferent). As for

the other two arguments, Plaintiff does not assert those

specific claims.

Consequently, Plaintiff has provided sufficient disputed

issues of material fact regarding the investigation overall,

which includes evidence to support his claims as to the

investigators’ supervisors’ own alleged failures that led to the

faulty basis for probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for

Kingsbury’s murder. A jury must assess whether their actions

were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff.

Finally, the State Defendants argue that Plaintiff has

failed to prove their alleged actions proximately caused his

constitutional injuries, which is fatal to his constitutional

violation claims. “A § 1983 claim requires that the state actor

was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s harm.” Johnson v.

Provenzano, 646 F. App’x 279, 282 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing

Egervary v. Young, 366 F.3d 238, 246 (3d Cir. 2004)). The State

Defendants contend that because probable cause existed for his

arrest, any deficiencies in the investigation were not the

proximate cause of his arrest.15 The Court has already

determined that the issue of whether probable cause existed is

an issue that a jury must consider. Consequently, the issue of

proximate cause must be submitted to the jury as well. See

Rivas v. City of Passaic, 365 F.3d 181, 193 (3d Cir. 2004)

15 As an example, the State Defendants contend that “an alleged

deletion of texts between Glenn and John Kingsbury only caused

the charges against Castro if the deleted texts tended to

exonerate Castro, a showing that Castro cannot make.” The Court

questions how Plaintiff would be able to show how deleted texts

exonerated him when their deletion, and Defendants’ alleged

tampering with and mishandling of John Kingsbury’s cell phone,

is one of Plaintiff’s primary arguments as to Defendants’

recklessness in the probable cause determination. In other

words, the deletion of those text messages and the mishandling

of Kingsbury’s cell phone is the very reason Plaintiff claims he

cannot exonerate himself.

(citing Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284–85 (1980))

(other citation omitted) (explaining that even though a § 1983

“plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's actions were

the proximate cause of the violation of his federally protected

right, the presence of the requisite causation is normally a

question of fact for the jury”).

For the forgoing reasons, Plaintiff’s constitutional

violation claims may proceed against the State Defendants

because a jury must determine whether probable cause existed to

charge Plaintiff for Kingsbury’s murder, whether the

investigators’ supervisors were deliberately indifferent in

their supervisory duties over the Kingsbury murder

investigation, and whether the actions of the investigators and

their supervisors proximately caused Plaintiff’s constitutional

injuries.16

16 The determination of whether an officer acted in an

objectively reasonable manner and is thus entitled to qualified

immunity is a question of law that is properly answered by the

Court. Although in qualified immunity cases the Court is

especially cognizant of the need for resolution at the earliest

possible stage of litigation, the Court cannot do so until all

the material historical facts are no longer in dispute. Curley

v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 211, 211 n.12 (3d Cir. 2007). Once a

jury has resolved the issues of probable cause, supervisor

liability, and proximate cause, the Court will determine whether

the State Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. See

Phong Duong v. Telford Borough, 186 F. App’x at 216 (3d Cir.

2006) (quoting Curley, 298 F.3d at 278) (“When there is a

disputed question of material fact ‘relevant to the immunity

analysis,’ granting summary judgment for the defendant on the

basis of qualified immunity ‘will be premature.’”)).

(2) Plaintiff’s State Law Claims

In addition to his § 1983 and NJCRA claims, Plaintiff

asserts claims against the State Defendants under New Jersey

state law for the torts of false arrest, false imprisonment,

malicious prosecution, civil conspiracy, negligence, and

intentional infliction of emotional distress. The New Jersey

Tort Claims Act (NJTCA), N.J.S.A. 59:1–1 to 12–3, governs tort

claims against public employees. Under the NJTCA, “A public

employee is not liable if he acts in good faith in the execution

or enforcement of any law. Nothing in this section exonerates a

public employee from liability for false arrest or false

imprisonment.” N.J.S.A. 59:3-3. The NJTCA strips a public

employee of any immunity, however, if that employee is found to

have engaged in “willful misconduct.” N.J.S.A. 59:3-14(a).

Whether these defendants acted in good faith cannot be

determined at this time for the same reasons as Plaintiff’s

constitutional claims. This is because the same “objective

reasonableness” standard that is used to determine whether a

defendant enjoys qualified immunity from actions brought

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is used to determine questions of

good faith arising under N.J.S.A. 59:3-3. See Mantz v. Chain,

239 F. Supp. 2d 486, 507-08 (D.N.J. 2002) (citing Lear v.

Township of Piscataway, 566 A.2d 557 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.

1989)). Furthermore, willful misconduct is “the commission of a

forbidden act with actual (not imputed) knowledge that the act

is forbidden . . . . [I]t requires much more than an absence of

good faith and much more than negligence.” PBA Local No. 38 v.

Woodbridge Police Dep't, 832 F. Supp. 808, 830 (D.N.J. 1993)

(internal quotations omitted)).

Because there exists genuine issues of material fact

regarding whether the individual State Defendants engaged in

willful misconduct, the Court cannot determine as a matter of

law whether the NJTCA shields them from liability for their

actions as alleged by Plaintiff.17

2. Mullica Township’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Plaintiff has asserted claims based on New Jersey state law

against Mullica Township.18 Two Mullica Township police

officers, Paul Sarraf and Michael Keeping, who are not named

defendants, were the first to respond to Kingsbury’s house in

response to Glenn Kingsbury’s call to 911. Plaintiff alleges

17 The New Jersey Tort Claims Act expressly provides that the

State of New Jersey is liable for the tortious conduct of public

officials, which includes any “political subdivision or public

body in the State.” N.J.S.A. 59:2–2(a), 59:1–3. When a county

prosecutor’s office investigates, arrests, and prosecutes an

individual, the office is acting as an “arm of the State,” and

the State is vicariously liable under the NJTCA for the county

prosecutor’s office’s actions. Moncalvo v. City of Plainfield,

2016 WL 6662694, at *2 (D.N.J. 2016) (citing Wright v. State,

778 A.2d 443, 461 (N.J. 2001)).

18 As noted above, Plaintiff has not opposed Mullica Township’s

motion as to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against it and Defendant

Jake O’Hara.

the events as follows.

On February 5, 2012, John Kingsbury was shot twice in the

head while in his home at 2140 Woodland Avenue in Mullica

Township, New Jersey. His son, Glenn Kingsbury, was reportedly

the first person to find his father and called 911 at 3:09 p.m.

Mullica Township Police Officers Paul Sarraf and Michael Keeping

arrived at the scene at 3:14 p.m. and found John Kingsbury lying

face up on the floor struggling to breathe with blood around his

head and a large amount of bloody vomit on his face. Officers

Sarraf and Keeping failed to recognize that John Kingsbury had

bullet entry holes above his right eye and behind his left ear.

Officers Sarraf and Keeping failed to recognize that John

Kingsbury had stippling, or small dots, on his face which is

indicative of being shot in the face at close range.

EMS personnel arrived at 3:22 p.m. and transported John

Kingsbury to the hospital at 3:56 p.m. Despite the fact that

his father was seriously injured, Glenn Kingsbury did not

accompany his father to the hospital but stayed behind to clean

up the blood. Officers Keeping and Sarraf checked the house for

evidence of foul play and reportedly found none and left the

scene at 3:58 p.m. Soon thereafter, Officers Keeping and Sarraf

returned to the scene in response to a call by Glenn Kingsbury

indicating that he found two bullet casings on the floor. By

that time, Glenn Kingsbury had substantially altered the scene

of the crime. In addition to handling the shell casings, Glenn

Kingsbury and/or Karen Drew had cleaned up the blood from

the floor, manipulated John Kingsbury’s cell phone and

manipulated a DVR which may have contained surveillance video

footage of the house at the time of the homicide. John

Kingsbury’s phone was not secured as evidence and went missing

for several years.

Plaintiff has retained Joseph Cipollini as his law

enforcement expert in this matter. Based on the foregoing

facts, it is Mr. Cipollini’s opinion that Mullica Township

Police Officers Keeping and Sarraf were negligent for their

failure to conduct a proper investigation, failure to discover

that John Kingsbury had suffered two gunshots to the head and

failing to secure the crime scene of the John Kingsbury

homicide. To the extent that the jury determines that the

conduct of Officers Keeping and Sarraf was negligent, then

Mullica Township is liable to Plaintiff pursuant to the doctrine

of respondeat superior.

In response, the Mullica Township elaborates on its view of

the events. Officers Sarraf and Keeping, who arrived at the

scene before Emergency Medical Service personnel, noted that the

victim’s son reported that his father had been having COPD and

other medical issues including difficulty walking, and that he

may have fallen and struck his head. At the scene, Officers

Keeping and Sarraf promptly attended to the victim by attempting

to clear his airway of significant amounts of blood, vomit, and

dentures, applied a bag valve mask to the victim to assist his

breathing, and continued to assist after medical technicians

arrived to provide emergency care.

Significantly, the facts are clear that while Officers

Keeping and Sarraf were at the scene, engaged in efforts to save

Mr. Kingsbury’s life, there were no reports, statements made, or

information provided to these officers to indicate that Mr.

Kingsbury had suffered gunshot wounds or that a crime of any

kind had taken place, and the EMS personnel did not make such a

determination at the scene. Indeed, Glenn Kingsbury’s 911 call

on the afternoon of February 5, 2012, was made to seek medical

assistance for his severely ill father, not to report that a

crime had occurred.

Mullica Township argues that the officers’ actions were not

negligent, they are entitled to good faith immunity, N.J.S.A.

59:3-3, and they are also entitled to immunity under New

Jersey’s Good Samaritan Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-1.1.

Plaintiff bases his claims against Mullica Township on

N.J.S.A. 59:2–2, which provides:

a. A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused

by an act or omission of a public employee within the scope

of his employment in the same manner and to the same extent

as a private individual under like circumstances.

N.J.S.A. 59:2–2(a) - Liability of public entity.

Plaintiff fails to reference subsection (b), which

provides:

b. A public entity is not liable for an injury resulting

from an act or omission of a public employee where the

public employee is not liable.

N.J.S.A. 59:2–2(b).

Subsection (b) is directly relevant here because the public

employees who allegedly acted negligently are Officers Keeping

and Sarraf, and in order to hold Mullica Township liable for

their actions, they must be found liable. Keeping and Sarraf,

however, are not named defendants in Plaintiff’s third amended

complaint. Without any mechanism to find Keeping and Sarraf

negligent, their employer, Mullica Township, cannot be liable.

Consequently, Mullica Township is entitled to summary judgment

on Plaintiff’s claims against it.19

19 Plaintiff filed his original complaint on March 20, 2015, and

he filed his fourth iteration on December 9, 2019. Plaintiff

has not requested leave to amend to add these Mullica Township

police officers to his complaint, and the Court declines to sua

sponte grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint for the

fifth time to assert state law claims against Keeping and

Sharraf. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete

Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 252-23 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting

that “we implicitly reject[] any argument that, outside of civil

rights cases, district courts must sua sponte grant leave to

amend before dismissing a complaint”).

CONCLUSION

In consideration of the claims the Court dismissed

previously20 (Docket No. 99, 100), and the Court’s findings

above, Plaintiff’s constitutional and state law claims regarding

the propriety of the probable cause determination by the

investigators (Mattioli and Rauch) and their supervisors (Dooley

and DeShields) survive the State Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment and may proceed to trial. Mullica Township is entitled

to summary judgment on all claims asserted against it and will

be dismissed from the case.

An appropriate Order will be entered.

Date: February 22, 2021 s/ Noel L. Hillman

At Camden, New Jersey NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

20 At the resolution of the Defendants’ motions to dismiss on

June 25, 2018, the Court did not require Plaintiff to file an

amended complaint to reflect the Court’s ruling, as the Court

had outlined which claims were dismissed and which claims

remained. (Docket No. 99, 100 at 34.) When Plaintiff was

granted leave to file his third amended complaint, which was

filed on December 9, 2019, Plaintiff, however, failed to remove

the claims and allegations that this Court had previously

dismissed. This Court’s instant Opinion and the accompanying

Order again set forth the remaining viable claims.