RHODES v. CAMDEN REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CARLA RHODES, No. 1: 20-cv-20337-NLH-KMW

Plaintiff,

v.

OPINION

CAMDEN REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY,

Defendant.

APPEARANCES:

CARLA RHODES

221 DOUGLAS AVENUE

HADDONFIELD, NJ 08033

PRO SE

Plaintiff appearing pro se.

HILLMAN, District Judge

This case arises from Plaintiff Carla Rhodes’ allegation

that she has suffered discrimination on the basis of her race,

color, and sex while working for her employer, Defendant Camden

Redevelopment Agency. The matter is presently before the Court

because Plaintiff, appearing pro se, has applied to proceed in

forma pauperis (“IFP”) and the Court must screen this complaint

before allowing the case to proceed. The Court will grant

Plaintiff's IFP application, and will dismiss certain of

Plaintiff's claims without prejudice but let her remaining claim

proceed.

Background

Plaintiff is an African American woman who is employed by

the Camden Redevelopment Agency. Plaintiff alleges that, while

working there, she has suffered a series of “hostile acts

committed by [her] co-workers.” (ECF No. 1 at 7). While

Plaintiff alludes to multiple such acts having occurred, she

describes only one with specificity. Plaintiff alleges that, in

October 2015, she was “physically charged by a white male . . .

co-worker while sitting in her private office at work.” Id.

She alleges that, despite having been the one assaulted, she was

then “placed on administrative leave for a prolonged period of

time and, then, was suspended while the male was not similarly

punished.” She further alleges that she was “escorted from the

office by a police officer,” after which the co-worker who had

charged her had circulated rumors that she had been handcuffed

and was no longer employed by the Camden Redevelopment Agency.

Id.

Plaintiff further alleges that “an executive who had nearly

physically assaulted [her] in the past [was chosen] to lead the

investigation into the October 2015 incident.” Id. According

to Plaintiff, her requests for assistance from that executive

“fell on deaf ears” due to her cooperation with an investigation

into the executive’s own behavior by members of the Board of

Commissioners. Id.

Plaintiff then filed charges with the New Jersey Department

of Law and Public Safety’s Division on Civil Rights and then the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. On September 28, 2020,

the EEOC issued her a Dismissal and Notice of Rights, stating

that it was closing its file on Plaintiff’s charge because it

had adopted the findings of the state agency — which had

apparently decided not to pursue any action based on Plaintiff’s

allegations. The EEOC therefore issued Plaintiff a “right to

sue” letter on that same date. (ECF No. 1 at 11). Finally, on

December 29, 2020, Plaintiff filed this complaint. The

complaint specifically asserts Title VII claims for unequal

terms and conditions of employment, hostile work environment,

failure to promote, and retaliation on the basis of her race,

color, and sex. Plaintiff simultaneously filed an application

to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (ECF No. 1-1).

Discussion

I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as Plaintiff has asserted her

claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

II. Plaintiff’s IFP Application

Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 54.3, the Clerk shall not be

required to enter any suit, file any paper, issue any process,

or render any other service for which a fee is prescribed,

unless the fee is paid in advance. Under certain circumstances,

however, this Court may permit an indigent plaintiff to proceed

in forma pauperis.

A pro se plaintiff wishing to proceed in forma pauperis

must fill out form “AO 239 (Rev. 01/15) Application to Proceed

in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs.” The form

requires the plaintiff to “[c]omplete all questions in this

application,” and “[d]o not leave any blanks.” In addition, “if

the answer to a question is ‘0,’ ‘none,’ or ‘not applicable

(N/A),’ write that response.” The form contains twelve

questions, and many questions contain numerous subparts, which

are utilized by the Court to determine a plaintiff's indigency.

Finally, as part of the application, the plaintiff must swear

under penalty of perjury that the information contained in the

application is true.

In this action, Plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma

pauperis. As Plaintiff’s IFP application states, under penalty

of perjury, that her monthly expenses are greater than her total

monthly income, (ECF No. 1-1), and that she otherwise lacks

sufficient liquid assets to pay the filing fee, the Court finds

that Plaintiff may proceed in forma pauperis and therefore

grants her IFP application.

III. Standard for Screening Complaints Filed IFP

Although § 1915 refers to “prisoners,” federal courts apply

§ 1915 to non-prisoner IFP applications. See Hickson v. Mauro,

No. 11-6304, 2011 WL 6001088, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 30, 2011)

(citing Lister v. Dep't of Treasury, 408 F.3d 1309, 1312 (10th

Cir. 2005)); Lister, 408 F.3d at 1312 (“Section 1915(a) applies

to all persons applying for IFP status, and not just to

prisoners.”). Once IFP status has been granted, a court must

follow the screening provisions of the IFP statute. The

screening provisions of the IFP statute require a federal court

to dismiss an action sua sponte if, among other things, the

action is frivolous or malicious, or if it fails to comply with

the proper pleading standards. See 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d

Cir. 2013); Martin v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 17-3129,

2017 WL 3783702, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 30, 2017) (“Federal law

requires this Court to screen Plaintiff's Complaint for sua

sponte dismissal prior to service, and to dismiss any claim if

that claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and/or to dismiss any

defendant who is immune from suit.”).

As indicated, this Court must follow the Rule 12(b)(6)

standard in considering a pro se complaint. Pro se complaints

must be construed liberally, and all reasonable latitude must be

afforded the pro se litigant. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,

107, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). But, pro se litigants

“must still plead the essential elements of [their] claim and

[are] not excused from conforming to the standard rules of civil

procedure.” McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113, 113

S.Ct. 1980, 124 L.Ed.2d 21 (1993) (“[W]e have never suggested

that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be

interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed

without counsel.”); Sykes v. Blockbuster Video, 205 F. App'x

961, 963 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding that pro se plaintiffs are

expected to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).

When screening a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6), a court must accept all well-pleaded

allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d

347, 351 (3d Cir. 2005). It is well settled that a pleading is

sufficient if it contains “a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a

plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his

‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action will not do ....” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)

(alteration in original) (citations omitted) (citing Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957);

Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247,

251 (7th Cir. 1994); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106

S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986)).

A district court, in weighing a motion to dismiss, asks

“not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the

claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claim.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (quoting Scheuer v.

Rhoades, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90

(1974)); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (“Our

decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for ‘all

civil actions’ ....”); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,

210 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Iqbal ... provides the final nail in the

coffin for the ‘no set of facts’ standard that applied to

federal complaints before Twombly.”). “A motion to dismiss

should be granted if the plaintiff is unable to plead ‘enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Malleus, 641 F.3d at 563 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

570, 127 S.Ct. 1955).

IV. Analysis

The Court interprets Plaintiff’s complaint to essentially

assert four claims: (1) unequal terms of employment, (2) hostile

work environment, (3) failure to promote, and (4) retaliation.

For the purposes of the standard applied to Rule 12(b)(6)

motions, Plaintiff need not plead all of the prima facie

elements of her discrimination claims at this stage, but still

must “allege sufficient facts to raise a reasonable expectation

that discovery will uncover proof of her claims.” Connelly v.

Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016).

The Court turns first to Plaintiff’s claim for unequal

terms and conditions of employment. “To establish a claim for

unequal terms and conditions in employment, or disparate

treatment, [Plaintiff] must establish that she (1) is a member

of a protected class; (2) was qualified for the position; (3)

was negatively affected by Defendant's employment decisions; and

(4) was treated less favorably than employees not within her

protected class.” Dickerson v. New Jersey Institute of

Technology, No. 19-8344 (KM) (JBC), 2020 WL 7054156, at *6

(D.N.J. Dec. 2, 2020) (citing Murphy v. Hous. Auth. & Urban

Redevelopment Agency of City of Atl. City, 32 F. Supp. 2d 753,

763 (D.N.J. 1999), aff'd 208 F.3d 206 (3d Cir. 2000)). The

Court finds that, with these elements in mind, Plaintiff has put

forth sufficient factual allegations at this stage. Plaintiff

alleges that she is an African American woman that was already

employed by Defendant, that she suffered adverse employment

actions in the form of being suspended from work and escorted

out of the office in handcuffs, and alleges that she suffered

these actions despite her white male co-worker, who she alleges

was the aggressor in their interaction, suffering no similar

punishments. The Court finds that these allegations are

sufficient to survive its sua sponte screening at this stage.

Next, Plaintiff has asserted a claim for hostile work

environment. The elements of a Title VII hostile work

environment claim are “that 1) the employee suffered intentional

discrimination because of his/her [race, color, or sex], 2) the

discrimination was severe or pervasive, 3) the discrimination

detrimentally affected the plaintiff, 4) the discrimination

would detrimentally affect a reasonable person in like

circumstances, and 5) the existence of respondeat superior

liability.” Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 167

(3d Cir. 2013) (internal citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to

sustain a hostile work environment claim. While Plaintiff has

alleged that one of her co-workers physically assaulted her, she

does not allege that this incident occurred because of her race;

and while she alleges that she suffered from a hostile

environment and hostile actions taken by other employees over

the course of three years, she does not allege any specific

behavior or actions that contributed to creating a hostile

environment. As her complaint puts forth only generalized

allegations of a hostile work environment, the Court finds that

she has failed to state a claim.

Plaintiff’s third claim is for failure to promote. To

state a prima facie case of failure to promote in violation of

Title VII, a plaintiff must show “(i) that [s]he belongs to a

[protected category]; (ii) that [s]he applied and was qualified

for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii)

that, despite [her] qualifications, [s]he was rejected; and (iv)

that, after [her] rejection, the position remained open and the

employer continued to seek applicants from persons of

complainant’s qualifications.” Dickerson v. New Jersey

Institute of Tech., No. 19-8344 (KM) (JBC), 2019 WL 6032378, at

*6 (D.N.J. Nov. 14, 2019) (quoting Noel v. The Boeing Co., 622

F.3d 266, 274 (3d Cir. 2010)).

The Court further notes that, as to the second element,

“[a]lthough some courts have held that failure to apply for a

promotion is fatal to a failure to promote claim, many courts

have overlooked this failure in certain cases, such as when the

promotional system did not involve a formal application process

and when a plaintiff’s attempts to apply for a promotion have

been rebuffed.” Id. (quoting Khair v. Campbell Soup Co., 893 F.

Supp. 316, 331 (D.N.J. 1995), on reconsideration in part (July

3, 1995)).

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff has also failed to

sufficiently plead a claim for failure to promote. Plaintiff

alleges only that, due to having been placed on administrative

leave for a prolonged period of time, she missed out on

promotional opportunities. However, Plaintiff fails to plead

any specific promotional opportunities, whether she was

qualified for them, whether she applied for or attempted to

pursue them, or any specifics whatsoever about the alleged

promotions she claims to have missed out on. Without any

specific factual allegations, Plaintiff’s claims fail to meet

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)’s pleading standards, and

cannot survive this Court’s required screening.

Finally, the Court turns to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim.

“To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII

. . . [Plaintiff] must plead (1) that she engaged in a protected

activity; (2) that she suffered an adverse employment action;

and (3) that there was a causal connection between the protected

activity and the adverse employment action.” Davis v. City of

Newark, 417 F. App’x 201, 202 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Abramson v.

William Paterson Coll., 260 F.3d 265, 286 (3d Cir. 2001)).

Although Plaintiff has asserted a retaliation claim, she has not

specified on what basis. The only activity she alleges that

could plausibly appear to qualify as a protected activity is her

cooperation with the alleged investigation into the unnamed

executive’s prior behavior, which she may be alleging impacted

the executive’s investigation into the incident in which the

white male co-worker charged her. However, Plaintiff does not

provide any further factual allegations detailing this activity,

and fails to allege that her race, color, or sex was in any way

related to this alleged retaliation. Accordingly, the Court

finds that she has also failed to sufficiently state a Title VII

retaliation claim.

Conclusion

For the reasons expressed above, the Court will grant

Plaintiff’s IFP application (ECF No. 1-1). Plaintiff’s hostile

work environment, failure to promote, and retaliation claims

will be dismissed without prejudice, and her remaining Title VII

claim may proceed. If Plaintiff is able to able to assert

sufficient facts in the future to set forth a plausible claim as

to the claims dismissed without prejudice she may seek leave to

amend the complaint.

An appropriate Order will be entered.

Date: January 8, 2021 /s Noel L. Hillman

At Camden, New Jersey NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.