SAINT-JEAN v. HOLLAND

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

FERNANDO SAINT-JEAN,

Plaintiff,

Civ. No. 19 -10680 (ES) (MAH)

v.

OPINION

COUNTY OF BERGEN, et al.,

Defendants.

MCNULTY, DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is a motion (DE 29) to dismiss the complaint filed by

defendants Palisades Interstate Park Commission (“PIPC”), Palisades Interstate

Parkway Police Department (“PIPPD”); Andrew Samson (“Prosecutor Samson”);

and four police officers, Michael Holland, Fabricio M. Salazar, Peter Wojckik,

and Richard Dey (the “Officer Defendants”). The matter has been reassigned

from Judge Salas to me for purposes of deciding this motion. Having

considered the relevant submissions, I decide the motion without oral

argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); L. Civ. R. 78.1(b). For the reasons stated

below, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED as to defendants PIPC, PIPPD, and

Prosecutor Samson. As to the Officer Defendants, the motion is GRANTED IN

PART and DENIED IN PART.1

1 The County of Bergen, also named as a defendant, has been voluntarily

dismissed from this action (DE 5).

The plaintiff, who was arrested, handcuffed, and detained for a period of

hours, does not seem to have been guilty of anything at all. The police made a

mistake here, as officers going about the difficult business of law enforcement

inevitably will. On the facts as alleged in the complaint, they erred inexcusably;

on the facts that the police seemingly plan to adduce at the proper time, they

did so excusably. Accepting, as I must, the truth of the facts as alleged in the

complaint, I must withhold a finding of qualified immunity and deny in part the

motion to dismiss as to the Officer Defendants.

I. BACKGROUND2

The plaintiff, Fernando Saint-Jean, identifies himself as a black male of

Haitian descent, a U.S. citizen, and a resident of Massachusetts, facts relevant

to certain of his claims. (Complaint ¶ 17).

On May 6, 2018, defendant Officer Holland pulled Mr. Saint-Jean over

while he was driving back to Massachusetts after visiting relatives in New

Jersey. (Id. ¶¶ 19–24). Officer Holland allegedly requested identification from

both Mr. Saint-Jean and his passenger, his uncle. (Id. ¶¶ 20 & 24). Officer

Holland asked the men what country they were from; they responded that they

were from Haiti but were United States citizens and residents of

Massachusetts. (Id. ¶ 25). Officer Holland informed Mr. Saint-Jean that he was

2 Citations to documents in the record will be abbreviated as follows:

Complaint = Plaintiff’s complaint, DE 1

Mov. Br. = Defendants’ brief in support of their motion to dismiss, DE 29-3

Opp. Br. = Plaintiff’s brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss, DE 32

Reply Br. = Defendants’ reply in support of their motion to dismiss, DE 35

pulled over for driving too slowly and for having tinted windows, allegedly in

violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:3-75.1. (Id. ¶ 26).

During this exchange, defendant Officer Salazar pulled up alongside

Officer Holland. (Id. 28). Officers Holland and Salazar then instructed Mr.

Saint-Jean and his uncle to step out of the vehicle. (Id. ¶ 29). Holland brought

Saint-Jean behind his police vehicle and conducted a pat-down search. (Id.

¶ 30). During the pat-down of Saint-Jean, a third officer, defendant Officer

Wojckik, arrived on the scene to aid in the investigation of Saint-Jean and his

uncle. (Id. ¶ 31).

Mr. Saint-Jean alleges that he inquired as to why an investigation of

tinted windows required three police vehicles, but he received no answer. (Id.

¶¶ 32 & 33). By this point, Saint-Jean says, he “was mentally distressed and

visibly shaking because he was nervous and stressed about being pulled over,

being asked to get out of the vehicle, and being patted down . . . .” (Id. ¶ 32).

Officers Holland, Salazar, and Wojckik then requested consent to search

Mr. Saint-Jean’s car, and Saint-Jean signed a consent-to-search form.3 (Id. ¶¶

33–34). During a search of the console storage compartment between the

driver’s and passenger’s seats, the officers discovered “zip lock bags containing

Valentine’s Day sugar candies that Saint-Jean had received from his co-

worker.” (Id. ¶ 36). The officers then questioned Saint-Jean as to the contents

of the bags. (Id. ¶¶ 37–38). Saint-Jean responded that they were Valentine’s

3 The basis, if any, for the officers’ request to search the car is not revealed by the

complaint.

Day candies and offered to provide the officers with the telephone number of

the co-worker so that she could confirm the contents. (Id. ¶ 38). The officers

declined Saint-Jean’s offer, and instead arrested Saint-Jean for possession of a

controlled substance in the third degree, in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-

10a(1), and for the motor vehicle violation of having tinted windows,

supposedly in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:3-75.1. (Id.).

Mr. Saint-Jean was taken to the police station, where he was handcuffed

to a bench and interviewed by Officer Salazar. (Id. ¶ 44). He was fingerprinted,

photographed, and charged with possession of MDMA/Ecstasy4 and issued a

traffic summons for improperly tinted windows. (Id. ¶ 45). The officers allegedly

reassured Saint-Jean that the charge would be dismissed if he stayed out of

trouble for six months. (Id. ¶ 46). Saint-Jean was released at approximately

3:50 p.m., without being required to post bail. He was given a criminal

complaint summons to appear at the Bergen County Superior Court on May

22, 2018. (Id. ¶ 47).

On May 16, 2018, Mr. Saint-Jean’s charge was downgraded to use or

possession with intent to use drug paraphernalia, in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann.

§ 2C:36-2. (Id. ¶ 58). Then, on July 27, 2018, the New Jersey State Police Office

of Forensic Sciences completed a chemical analysis of the candies that were

found in Saint-Jean’s vehicle. The result was that there was “no controlled

dangerous substance detected.” (Id. ¶ 59). Saint-Jean received that lab report

4 Formally, 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine.

on August 17, 2018, and immediately requested that Municipal Prosecutor

Samson, defendant here, dismiss the charge. (Id. ¶ 60).

The prosecution of Mr. Saint-Jean nevertheless continued for several

months after the drug analysis report confirmed that the candies were not

drugs. (Id. ¶¶ 61 & 63). Saint-Jean was required to appear in court

approximately two or three more times thereafter. (Id. ¶ 65). On or about

November 14, 2018, all charges were dismissed. (Id. ¶ 66–67).5

Based on this set of facts, Mr. Saint-Jean brings federal claims against

all Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest (Count I); malicious

prosecution (Count II); failure to supervise (Count III); violation of substantive

due process (Count V); and violation of procedural due process (Count VI).

Against PIPC only, Saint-Jean asserts a § 1983 Monell municipal-liability claim.

(Count IV). Saint-Jean also brings pendent state law claims against all

Defendants for false imprisonment (Count VII) and malicious abuse of

process/malicious prosecution (Count VIII).6

5 Saint-Jean alleges that on or about November 14, 2018, his case proceeded to

trial and that he was not guilty. The wording of the Complaint, however, is somewhat

inconsistent, and seems to admit the possibility that the charges were dismissed at

some point before trial. (Mov. Br. at 6 & n.3). This fact, which does not affect the

substance of this motion, should be ascertainable via discovery or public records.

6 The individual defendants are being sued in their individual capacities only.

(See Complaint ¶¶ 8–11 & 13).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Defendants move to dismiss all claims against them pursuant to Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). They assert, inter alia, sovereign

immunity as to PIPC and PIPPD, prosecutorial immunity as to Prosecutor

Samson, and qualified immunity as to the Officer Defendants.

A. Rule 12(b)(1) Standard

Because “[t]he Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional bar which

deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction,” Defendants’ motion is, in

part, a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1). See Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 693

n.2 (3d Cir. 1996).

Typically, once a Rule 12(b)(1) challenge is raised, the burden shifts to

the plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. See

McCann v. Newman Irrevocable Trust, 458 F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 2006).

“However, because ‘Eleventh Amendment immunity can be expressly waived by

a party, or forfeited through non-assertion, it does not implicate federal subject

matter jurisdiction in the ordinary sense,’ and therefore, a party asserting

Eleventh Amendment immunity bears the burden of proving its applicability.”

Garcia v. Knapp, No. 19-17946, 2020 WL 2786930, at *3 (D.N.J. May 29, 2020)

(quoting Christy v. PA Tpk. Comm., 54 F.3d 1140, 1144 (3d Cir. 1994)).

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, “a court must first determine whether

the party presents a facial or factual attack because the distinction determines

how the pleading is reviewed.” Leadbeater v. JPMorgan Chase, N.A., No. 16-

7655, 2017 WL 4790384, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 24, 2017). “When a party moves to

dismiss prior to answering the complaint . . . the motion is generally

considered a facial attack.” Id.; see also Garcia, 2020 WL 2786930, at *4

(“Defendants, by asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity, raise a facial

12(b)(1) challenge.”). In reviewing a facial attack, the Court should consider

only the allegations in the complaint, along with documents referenced therein

and attached thereto, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See

Constitution Party of Pennsylvania v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 358 (3d Cir. 2014).

Thus, a facial motion is handled much like a 12(b)(6) motion, and

allegations in the complaint are accepted as true. Leadbeater, 2017 WL

4790384, at *3.

B. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard

To withstand a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The

plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for

more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.

“When reviewing a motion to dismiss, all allegations in the complaint

must be accepted as true, and the plaintiff must be given the benefit of every

favorable inference to be drawn therefrom.” Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560,

563 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court is not

required to accept as true “legal conclusions,” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do

not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Finally, “[i]n deciding a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion, a court must consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the

complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic

documents if the complainant’s claims are based upon these documents.”

Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010).

III. FEDERAL CLAIMS (COUNTS I– VI)

A. PIPC and PIPPD

Defendants argue that all federal claims against PIPC and PIPPD must be

dismissed because they enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity and because

they are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983. (Mov. Br. at 32–42). Mr.

Saint-Jean concedes that the federal claims against PIPC and PIPPD should be

dismissed. (Opp. Br. at 28).

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against a person who, while

acting under color of law, “subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of

the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution

and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The purpose of § 1983 is, in part, “to deter state

actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their

federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence

fails.” Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992). While on its face § 1983 affords

no immunities, the Supreme Court has “accorded certain government officials

either absolute or qualified immunity.” Id. at 163–64.

The Eleventh Amendment protects non-consenting states from suits

brought in federal court by private citizens seeking money damages. Pennhurst

State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); U.S. CONST.

amend. XI. Eleventh Amendment immunity can extend to state agencies and

instrumentalities acting as arms of the state. Regents of the University of

California v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997). An entity is characterized as an

arm of the state when the state is the “real party in interest,” and a judgment

against it “would have essentially the same practical consequences as a

judgment against the State itself.” Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 475

F.3d 524, 546 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Fitchik v. N.J. Transit Rail

Operations, 873 F.2d 655, 659 (3d Cir.1989)).7

Separately, but along the same lines, only “persons” are subject to suit

under § 1983. States and governmental entities that are considered “‘arms of

the state’ for Eleventh Amendment purposes” are not persons subject to suit

under § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989).

For these reasons, and as conceded by Saint-Jean, the federal claims

against PIPC and PIPPD are barred. The § 1983 claims and the Monell claim

7 To make this determination in disputed cases, the Third Circuit considers three

factors: “(1) whether the money to pay for the judgment would come from the state; (2)

the status of the agency under state law; and (3) what degree of autonomy the agency

has.” Estate of Lagano v. Bergen Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 769 F.3d 850, 857 (3d Cir.

2014) (citing Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 659).

alleged against PIPC and PIPPD in Counts I through VI of the Complaint are

therefore dismissed.

B. Prosecutor Samson

Defendants argue that all of the federal claims against Prosecutor

Samson should be dismissed based on prosecutorial immunity or,

alternatively, qualified immunity. (Mov. Br. at 27–31). Mr. Saint-Jean responds

that absolute immunity does not apply here, citing to certain exceptions in New

Jersey state law, and further argues that Samson is not entitled to qualified

immunity. (Opp. Br. at 25–27). Because I agree with Defendants that the

claims against Samson should be dismissed based on absolute prosecutorial

immunity, I do not address the qualified immunity issue.

As to these federal § 1983 claims, the Court applies federal, not state,

standards in analyzing prosecutorial immunity. Prosecutors “are immune from

suit under § 1983 when ‘act[ing] within the scope of [their] duties in initiating

and pursuing a criminal prosecution.’” LeBlanc v. Stedman, 483 F. App’x 666,

669 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422–23 (1976)).

Prosecutorial immunity “is based upon the same considerations that underlie

the common-law immunities of judges and grand jurors acting within the scope

of their duties.” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 422–23. The prosecutor bears the burden of

demonstrating entitlement to absolute immunity. Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202,

207 (3d Cir. 2008).

Absolute prosecutorial immunity applies when a prosecutor is working

within the judicial process, thereby functioning as the state’s advocate. Id. at

430; Odd, 538 F.3d at 208. Initiating a prosecution and presenting the state’s

case are core advocacy functions; when performing them, prosecutors are

absolutely immune from § 1983 claims. Id. at 431. That immunity extends

somewhat farther, to other activities “intimately associated with the judicial

phase of the criminal process.” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991)

(quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430).

A prosecutor is not entitled to absolute immunity, however, for actions

that fall outside of those essential prosecutorial functions. See, e.g., Buckley v.

Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 276–78 (1993) (prosecutor not entitled to absolute

immunity when holding press conference or fabricating evidence during a

preliminary investigation); see also Yarris v. Cty. of Delaware, 465 F.3d 129,

137 (3d Cir. 2006) (prosecutor not entitled to immunity for deliberately

destroying exculpatory evidence).

It is not enough, then, simply to identify the defendant as a prosecutor.

The court must take a functional approach, analyzing the nature of the

conduct complained of and its relation to the judicial and prosecutorial

process. Schrob v. Catterson, 948 F.2d 1402, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991).

Ordinarily, the Court assesses absolute immunity as to each claim

asserted against a prosecutor. Fogle v. Sokol, 957 F.3d 148, 161 (3d Cir. 2020).

Here, however, Mr. Saint-Jean pleads most of the counts in the Complaint in

blanket fashion, against prosecutors and non-prosecutors alike, and does not

always specify how the conduct of each individual defendant is relevant to each

claim. I have, however, selected the claims (or parts of claims) which, by their

nature, appear to be directed against Prosecutor Samson. I conclude that they

are subject to prosecutorial immunity.

One such claim might be based on the initiation of the prosecution. Mr.

Saint-Jean does not clearly allege that Prosecutor Samson was involved in

initiating the prosecution against him. (Complaint ¶¶ 57 & 86 (alleging that the

prosecution was initiated against Saint-Jean “by Defendants” with malice); id.

¶ 87 (alleging generally that “Plaintiff’s race was the motivating factor behind

the decision to prosecute Plaintiff”); id. ¶ 88 (alleging that when the prosecution

was commenced “Defendants had knowledge that Plaintiff . . . was innocent of

the charges alleged against him.”). Assuming such an allegation was intended,

it would fall squarely within the scope of absolute prosecutorial immunity.

Imbler, 424 U.S. at 422–23; Schrob, 948 F. 2d at 1411 (“A prosecutor’s alleged

failure to properly investigate before initiating a prosecution is also conduct

within the scope of absolute immunity.”).

The other claim that potentially applies to Prosecutor Samson would be

based on the decision to continue to prosecute Mr. Saint-Jean, even after

forensics laboratory test results came back negative for any controlled

substance. (Complaint ¶¶ 6–61, 89 & 99). But decisions to continue

prosecutions, like decisions to initiate prosecutions, are covered by

prosecutorial immunity. Davis v. Grusemeyer, 996 F.2d 617, 629 (3d Cir. 1993)

(“[T]he decision whether to continue a prosecution through to trial is at the

heart of the prosecutorial decision making process and should not be chilled by

fear of civil sanction.”); Henderson v. Union Cty., N.J., No. 14-7708, 2017 WL

4861622, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 27, 2017) (finding that prosecutors had immunity

for “their actions in initiating and continuing [p]laintiff’s prosecution”).

Accordingly, Prosecutor Samson is entitled to absolute immunity under

federal law. The federal claims against him are dismissed.8

C. Officer Defendants

The remaining federal claims are those alleged against the Officer

Defendants. The Officer Defendants claim qualified immunity, and also argue

in overlapping fashion that certain allegations fail to state a claim. (Mov. Br. at

8–26).

Qualified immunity is not just immunity from liability, but also

“immunity from suit.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). It protects

all government officials “but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly

violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). Because the

“driving force” behind the creation of qualified immunity was to ensure “that

‘insubstantial claims’ against government officials will be resolved prior to

discovery,” it is important that the immunity question be resolved “at the

earliest possible stage in litigation.” Id. at 231–32 (citations omitted); see also

Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 (“Unless the plaintiff’s allegations state a claim of

8 Plaintiff’s arguments regarding malice, fraud and willful misconduct are

grounded in New Jersey state law (see Opp. Br. at 26), not federal law, see Cresci v.

Gyess, No. 17-2342, 2018 WL 4961466, at *5 (D.N.J. Oct. 15, 2018), aff’d sub nom.

Cresci v. Gyss, 792 F. App’x 226 (3d Cir. 2020) (“But it is the prosecutorial function,

not the rightful or wrongful exercise of that function, which gives rise to immunity.”);

Jennings v. Shuman, 567 F.2d 1213, 1221–22 (3d Cir. 1977) (absolute immunity

applies even where a prosecutor is motivated by “a corrupt or illegal intention”). I

address these arguments in more detail in my analysis of the state law claims against

Prosecutor Samson. (See Section IV.B, infra.)

violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is

entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery.”).

Whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity involves a two-

pronged analysis: the court must determine whether (i) the defendant “violated

a constitutional right,” and (ii) “the right that was violated was clearly

established.” Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 206–07 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)). Courts should exercise “sound

discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity

analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the

particular case at hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

Here, I elect to consider first the constitutional merits—essentially,

whether the Officer Defendants arrested or prosecuted Mr. Saint-Jean without

probable cause. That analysis substantially overlaps with the Rule 12(b)(6)

analysis of whether the complaint states a claim on which relief may be

granted. I then consider whether any such constitutional violation was clearly

established.

1. False Arrest and Malicious Prosecution

To state a claim for false arrest under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff

must establish that (i) there was an arrest (ii) made without probable cause.

James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d Cir. 2012). If probable

cause existed for the arrest, there has been no constitutional violation and

therefore no cognizable § 1983 claim. Startzell v. City of Philadelphia, 533 F.3d

183, 204 & n.14 (3d Cir. 2008).

A claim of malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment guise,

requires a plaintiff to establish the following elements:

(1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the

criminal proceeding ended in [the plaintiff's] favor; (3) the

defendant initiated the proceeding without probable

cause; (4) the defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose

other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the

plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the

concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.

Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 296–97 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Johnson v.

Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 82 (3d Cir. 2007)). “Although prosecutors are the ones who

typically initiate criminal proceedings, a law enforcement officer may be liable

for malicious prosecution where the officer ‘influenced or participated in the

decision to institute criminal proceedings.’” Evans v. City of Newark, No. 14-

00120, 2016 WL 2742862, at *14 (D.N.J. May 10, 2016) (quoting Halsey, 750

F.3d at 297). And as with a false arrest claim, “the sine qua non of malicious

prosecution is that the defendants have instituted a criminal proceeding

without probable cause.” Evans, 2016 WL 2742862, at *14.

Defendants argue that both of these claims must be dismissed because

the Officer Defendants had probable cause to arrest and charge Saint-Jean

with possession of a controlled substance and having illegally tinted

automobile windows. (Mov. Br. at 10). Plaintiff demurs. (Opp. Br. at 10–22).

a. Probable cause

“Probable cause to arrest requires more than mere suspicion; however, it

does not require that the officer have evidence sufficient to prove guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482–83 (3d

Cir. 1995). “To determine whether an officer had probable cause for an arrest,

‘we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide “whether

these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable

police officer, amount to” probable cause.’” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138

S. Ct. 577, 586 (2018) (quoting Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003)

(quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996))). “[T]he relevant

inquiry is not whether particular conduct is ‘innocent’ or ‘guilty,’ but the degree

of suspicion that attaches to particular types of non-criminal acts.” Illinois v.

Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 n.13 (1983).

i. Possession of CDS

Mr. Saint-Jean alleges that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him

for possession of a controlled dangerous substance based on (i) his truthful

explanation that the items found in the plastic bag were Valentine candies; (ii)

his offer, which the police declined, to provide his coworker’s phone number for

verification of that fact; and (iii) the officers’ failure to conduct field tests or

employ any other method to test the candies. (Complaint ¶¶ 37–38, 49 & 51).

Defendants, on the other hand, argue that the candies in a plastic zipper

storage bag in the center console of Saint-Jean’s vehicle, when combined with

Saint-Jean’s admitted nervousness during the search, were sufficient for a

reasonable officer to conclude that Saint-Jean possessed illicit drugs. (Mov. Br.

at 15–17). Defendants also argue that the police were not required to accept

Saint-Jean’s proffered explanation or accept his offer to telephone his coworker

to verify that these were Valentine candies. They add that the explanation was

inherently suspicious because the traffic stop occurred in the month of May,

some three months after St. Valentine’s Day.9 (Id. at 16).

Defendants may or may not ultimately be correct; what is clear now is

that their contentions in rebuttal cannot be established from the face of the

Complaint. Defendants seize on Mr. Saint-Jean’s limited use of the word

“tablets” to describe the items he generally describes as candies, and in their

briefing Defendants state that, to the police, the items “appear[ed] similar to

ecstasy pills.” (Reply Br. at 6). The Complaint, however, describes the

purported drugs as “Valentine’s day sugar candies.” (Complaint ¶ 36). In his

briefing, plaintiff adds that the candies were heart-shaped. (Opp. Br. at 3).

Neither side’s elaboration on the appearance of the candies can be gleaned

from the Complaint, however. The Complaint does not describe the candies’

appearance, smell, or taste. There is also no indication of how many candies

were in the bag, or how big the bag was.10 The bag was not concealed in a

9 The Court has not been anyone’s valentine for some years, but my recollection

is that hard candies, like young love, may abide unspoiled for months, so the

significance of the May date may not be great.

10 Defendants argue that “the case law is replete with examples of illicit pills being

stored in plastic bags in vehicles.” (Mov. Br. at 15). That argument assumes, rather

than establishes, that the bags contained pills. If extended, this argument would

encompass some absurd results, given the wide range of legal uses of such bags. The

cases cited, moreover, do not help answer the question presented here. See Safford

Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 390 (2009) (evaluating whether a

school principal had a reasonable suspicion to justify a strip search of a student and

briefly mentioning a case in which a plastic bag containing pink and orange pills was

concealed in undergarments); United States v. Pojilenko, No. 09-112, 2012 WL

1392362, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 2012) (explaining that the officers had probable

cause to search a vehicle once they saw what appeared to be a bag containing drugs

sticking out of the glove compartment and petitioner attempted to shield the drugs

from view); United States v. Gooch, 915 F. Supp. 2d 690, 717 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (holding

that an officer’s observation of a loose trunk liner and a piece of plastic bag would lead

a reasonable officer to conclude that the vehicle contained a hidden compartment and

manner indicative of drug transportation. In other words, there is no indication

as to what it was about the candies that could lead a reasonable officer to

believe they contained the illegal drug MDMA/Ecstasy.

One factor contributing to a finding of probable cause may be an officer’s

“specialized training and experience.” United States v. Yusuf, 4461 F.3d 374,

390 (3d Cir. 2006). Here, however, there is no available information about the

officers’ training or experience with respect to detection of MDMA/Ecstasy, or

the reasonable steps they could have taken to confirm or dispel their

suspicions.

Cases upholding a finding of probable cause based on the officers’

mistaken identification of a controlled substance have generally involved some

more substantial reason to believe the substance was contraband. Factors have

included plants, powders, or crystals that resembled controlled substances;

possession by an intoxicated person of an item that resembled an illegal drug;

field test results which later turned out to be wrong; or the like.11 Simply

hypothesizing that candies might contain drugs is not sufficient.

that the hidden compartment, in conjunction with other facts of the case, gave the

officer probable cause to search); Nieves v. Ortiz, No. 06-5206, 2008 WL 4004940, at

*9 (D.N.J. Aug. 20, 2008) (discussing whether officers had probable cause to charge

inmate with possession of contraband pills found in a plastic bag and concluding that

issues of fact precluded such a determination); Selby v. Wenerowicz, No. 14-4904,

2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176549, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 2, 2015) (officers saw in plain

view a plastic baggie with a white powdery substance in it and another with a green

leafy substance).

11 Fincher v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Commissioners, No. 18- 00424, 2020 WL 1518625

(M.D. Ga. Mar. 30, 2020) (finding probable cause on full summary judgment record

where, after traffic stop for tinted windows, officers conducted a consent search and

field test of blue cotton candy produced a false positive result); Zien-Al-Abedeen v.

Teolis, No. 17-12063, 2018 WL 3861712 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 14, 2018) (finding probable

Brian v. Patrick, No. 15-541, 2016 WL 394002 (M.D. La. Feb. 1, 2016), if

not precisely on point, is close. There, the plaintiff was stopped and searched in

a grocery store by the defendant officer. In his front pocket was a bag

containing what looked like Halloween candy. The plaintiff explained that he

had purchased the candy from a CVS after Halloween, and three bystanders

confirmed that it was Halloween candy. The officer, without conducting a field

test, declared that the substance was Ecstasy. He sent a photo to a lieutenant

in the narcotics division, who said he had never seen Ecstasy that resembled

the item in the photo. The officer nevertheless arrested plaintiff and charged

him with possession and distribution of an illegal drug. Unfortunately, that

plaintiff, unlike Mr. Saint-Jean, spent some 90 days in jail before a lab test

revealed the substance was indeed candy, and the charges were dismissed.

The plaintiff sued the officer for, inter alia, false arrest under § 1983. On

a motion to dismiss, the Brian court concluded that the complaint adequately

set forth a lack of probable cause for the arrest. (It also rejected the officer’s

assertion of qualified immunity, finding that he had violated a clearly

established right. See Section III.C.1.b, infra.)

cause where, during DWI arrest, police seized from car a pill bottle containing a

crystalline substance that field-tested positive for crystal methamphetamine, although

later laboratory testing was negative); Waltman v. Payne, 535 F.3d 342 (5th Cir. 2008)

(finding probable cause to seize and destroy crop where, despite negative field test,

police and DEA concluded that plants were marijuana, based on appearance, location,

and concealment).

Defendants are correct that there is no “requirement” of field testing. The

requirement is one of probable cause. Field testing might be one means, but surely is

not the only one, of establishing probable cause.

Defendants ask me to supplement the Complaint’s allegations with their

own facts, assess the totality of the circumstances, and conclude that the

officers possessed probable cause for an arrest based on Valentine’s day

candies found in a plastic bag. That I cannot do. See Yusuf, 461 F.3d at 390;

Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 635 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Generally, the

existence of probable cause is a factual issue.”); see also Whitlow v. City of

Sumiton, No. 12-1077, 2012 WL 4479269, at *6 n. 3 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 31, 2012)

(comparing cases in which courts evaluated probable cause in the context or

unidentified pills), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Whitlow v. City

of Sumiton, Ala., No. 12-1077, 2012 WL 4476674 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 20, 2012).

Thus, I cannot rule that Defendants had probable cause for the arrest

based on possession of CDS — or rather, I cannot dismiss a claim that they did

not have probable cause — at this stage of the litigation.12

ii. Tinted windows

I turn to the issue of probable cause to arrest or charge Mr. Saint-Jean

with the petty offense of illegally tinted windows. Whether he would have been,

12 Plaintiff bases his malicious prosecution claim, in part, on Defendants’ decision

to continue to prosecute Plaintiff once forensics confirmed that the candies did not

contain MDMA/Ecstasy. (Complaint ¶¶ 89 & 94). The Third Circuit has not considered

whether a malicious prosecution claim can be based upon such a theory, although

other circuits have implicitly authorized such a claim. Geness v. Cox, 902 F.3d 344,

359 n.12 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Under our case law to date, a malicious prosecution claim

fails so long as ‘the proceeding was initiated . . . with[ ] probable cause.’” (quoting

Zimmerman v. Corbett, 873 F.3d 414, 418 (3d Cir. 2017)). In any event, however, there

are no allegations in the Complaint that the Officer Defendants (as opposed to the

already-dismissed State and prosecutorial defendants) “influenced or participated in

the decision” to continue (as opposed to initiate) this prosecution. See Evans, 2016 WL

2742862, at *14.

arrested based on the tinted windows offense alone may be doubted. It suffices

for now that, as to the tinted windows offense, Mr. Saint-Jean has adequately

alleged a lack of probable cause.

The Complaint is not a model of clarity. It alleges, without further

explanation, that the window tints on Saint-Jean’s vehicle were legal, and that

the Officer Defendants therefore lacked probable cause. (See Complaint ¶¶ 78

& 89). The Officer Defendants argue that the windows were indeed tinted, as

they observed at the time. Thus, they assert that they had probable cause to

believe the windows violated statutory standards,13 giving rise to probable

cause to arrest and issue a summons. (Mov. Br. at 18).

13 The stated basis for the tinted glass charge fails the test of transparency. The

Defendants’ briefing is not much help.

The summons issued by the officers here cited N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:3-75.1. The

Defendants uncritically report this section as defining the crime for which Saint-Jean

was properly arrested. Actually, section 75.1 is phrased as an exception to laws

regarding darkening or tinting of automobile glass:

39:3-75.1. Certain tinting materials on windshields, windows of motor

vehicles, permitted for medical reasons

1.Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law to the contrary, the owner or

lessee of a motor vehicle that is driven by or is used to regularly transport a

person who has a medical condition involving ophthalmic or dermatologic

photosensitivity may apply to the director for permission to have the windshield

and windows of that vehicle covered by or treated with a product or material

that increases its light reflectance or reduces its light transmittance.

The application shall be in a form and manner prescribed by the director and

shall include, but not be limited to, a written certification by a certified

ophthalmologist or a physician with a plenary license to practice medicine and

surgery in this State or a bordering state that the person for whom the

application is submitted has a medical condition involving ophthalmic or

dermatologic photosensitivity. For the purposes of this act, medical conditions

involving ophthalmic or dermatologic photosensitivity shall include:

[listing various medical conditions]

A mere error by the police in the statutory citation, however, would not detract

from probable cause. See Barna v. City of Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 809, 819 (3d

Cir. 1994) (“Probable cause need only exist as to any offense that could be

charged under the circumstances.”).

The officers may have intended to cite N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:3-75, but that

section appears to address only the subject of “safety glazing,” and in any event is less

than clear about what level of tint would violate it:

39:3-75. Safety glass

The term "safety glass" shall be construed as meaning glass so treated or

combined with other materials as to reduce, in comparison with ordinary

sheet glass or plate glass, the likelihood of injury to persons by objects

from exterior sources or by glass when the glass is cracked or broken.

The term "safety glazing material" shall be construed as meaning "safety

glass"; or other glazing materials, such as plastics, produced for the

purpose of safety in glazing; or a combination of safety glass and other

safety glazing material. The term "approved safety glazing material" shall

be construed as meaning safety glazing material of a type approved by

the director. In the approving of safety glazing materials, the director is

hereby given authority to make use of recognized standards to confine

the use of certain types of safety glazing materials to a specific location in

or on the vehicle, or to a certain purpose.

No person shall drive any motor vehicle manufactured on or after July

first, nineteen hundred and thirty-five and registered in this State unless

such vehicle is equipped with approved safety glazing material wherever

glazing is used in doors, windows and windshields. The term

"windshield" shall be construed to include wings, deflectors and side

shields; also front corner lights adjoining windshields.

Every section of safety glazing material shall be legibly and permanently

marked with the manufacturers' distinctive designations, under which

the safety glazing material was approved, so as to be visible when

installed.

No person shall drive any motor vehicle equipped with safety glazing

material which causes undue or unsafe distortion of visibility or

equipped with unduly fractured, discolored or deteriorated safety glazing

material, and the director may revoke the registration of any such

vehicle.

Closer to the mark would have been the ban on obstructions to the

driver’s vision which is contained in N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:3-74:

39:3-74. Windshields must be unobstructed and equipped with

cleaners

Every motor vehicle having a windshield shall be equipped with at least

one device in good working order for cleaning rain, snow or other

moisture from the windshield so as to provide clear vision for the driver,

and all such devices shall be so constructed and installed as to be

operated or controlled by the driver.

The Officer Defendants focus on the facts that they observed, but in

doing so they miss the plaintiff’s point. Now it is true that an officer’s

observation of tinted windows on a New Jersey-registered automobile may give

rise to probable cause. Judging solely by eye, an officer might reasonably

conclude that the windows are so opaque as to violate our State’s equipment

No person shall drive any motor vehicle with any sign, poster, sticker or

other non-transparent material upon the front windshield, wings,

deflectors, side shields, corner lights adjoining windshield or front side

windows of such vehicle other than a certificate or other article required

to be so displayed by statute or by regulations of the commissioner.

No person shall drive any vehicle so constructed, equipped or loaded as

to unduly interfere with the driver's vision to the front and to the sides.

Section 39:3-74 has been more frequently cited in the sparse case law regarding

tinted windows. See State v. Cohen, 790 A.2d 202, 205 (App. Div. 2002); State v.

Doyle, No. A-4074-16T2, 2018 WL 3117868, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.

June 26, 2018) (“Before the motion judge and on appeal, the State abandoned

any argument that the stop was justified based on a violation of the tinted-

windows statute, N.J.S.A. 39:3-74.”); State v. McLeod, No. A-0136-16T1, 2017

WL 2472360, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 8, 2017) (“The tinted

windows, themselves a violation of New Jersey's motor vehicle code, N.J.S.A.

39:3–74, warranted the stop without consideration of the other

circumstances.”).

Although no party says so, the State’s intent may be to incorporate the

regulatory standards of N.J.A.C. § 13:20-33.7:

(d) A motor vehicle, other than a police vehicle or a motor vehicle for

which a medical exemption certificate has been issued by the Motor

Vehicle Commission in accordance with N.J.S.A. 39:3–75.1 et seq., shall

not be certified which has tinted spray or plastic material added to

previously approved glazing in the front windshield or windows, vents,

wings, deflectors, or side shields to the immediate right or left of the

driver, because such condition changes the vision and light transmission

properties of the glazing in areas where driver visibility shall not be

obscured or obstructed; provided, however, tinted spray or plastic

material may be applied to previously approved glazing in the front

windshield if such spray or material extends no lower than six inches

from the top of the front windshield or such spray or material does not

extend below the AS–1 marking on the front windshield.

Note that the regulation completes the circle by incorporating the statutory

exception contained in N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:3-75.1, quoted above.

standards, even if a judge or fact finder might later disagree. See Edwards v.

New Jersey Human Servs., No. 12-5524, 2016 WL 7013464, at *7 (D.N.J. Nov.

30, 2016) (“[T]he Court finds the fact that Plaintiff's windows were tinted

constitutes probable cause and dismisses Count One as to the tinted windows

charge.”); Miller v. Waterford Twp., No. 11-3405, 2014 WL 345296, at *14

(D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2014) (“If the windows were visible to Lyons, probable cause

could be established, as Lyons would have seen the tinted windows.”).

Mr. Saint-Jean’s argument, however, is different. The windows on his

car, he says, could not have violated New Jersey law, because his car was

registered in Massachusetts (as the officers could plainly see), and he was a

Massachusetts resident (as the officers very quickly learned). (Opp. Br. at 18–

20). New Jersey does not purport to, and perhaps could not, bind the nation

regarding automobile equipment standards. New Jersey law, Mr. Saint-Jean

explains, exempts non-resident owners of vehicles duly registered in another

state from complying with the New Jersey equipment requirements. (Opp. Br.

at 19 (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:3–15)).14 Thus, Saint-Jean argues that he

14 A “nonresident owner of any motor vehicle or motor-drawn vehicle which has

been registered in accordance with the laws respecting the registration of motor vehicles

of the jurisdiction in which the nonresident resides, and which has conspicuously

displayed thereon the registration number thereof, may, without complying with the

provisions of this subtitle with respect to registration and equipment, operate or permit

the operation of such vehicle in this State . . . .” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:3–15 (emphasis

added).

These New Jersey officers did not purport to enforce Massachusetts law. Mr.

Saint-Jean adds, however, that in Massachusetts, “tints over visible light

transmittance of thirty-five percent is permitted.” (Opp. Br. at 19–20). It seems to be

an open question whether the statute’s reference to compliance with the foreign state’s

“laws respecting the registration of motor vehicles” also includes the foreign state’s

equipment regulations. At any rate, there are no facts or allegations as to whether the

was clearly exempt from the New Jersey law, and that therefore the officers

lacked probable cause as a matter of law to arrest or charge him with having

tinted windows.15

The probable cause issue, then, is not the usual one: i.e., whether the

officers mistakenly believed the facts rose to the level of establishing probable

cause regarding a state crime. Rather, the issue is whether the officers made a

mistake of law in believing that there was a New Jersey state law prohibiting

the acts they observed.

officers had a basis for believing that the windows did or did not comply with

Massachusetts standards.

I draw a distinction here between the reasonable suspicion required to pull over

Mr. Saint-Jean’s automobile, and the probable cause required to subsequently charge

him. When pulling the car over, the officers necessarily observed the automobile and

its windows. They presumably could also see that the car bore Massachusetts license

plates, but they could not then know that the owner was a Massachusetts resident

who had registered the car there. See State v. Forgione, 625 A.2d 557, 558–59 (App.

Div. 1993) (stating that the officers could permissibly stop a vehicle for an equipment

violation, even with visible out of state plates, because the New Jersey statute exempts

“non-residents,” and “a law enforcement officer cannot ascertain whether an out-of-

state licensed vehicle is owned by a resident of that state without checking the

registration credentials for the vehicle . . . . The only practical way for that

confirmation to occur is for the police officer involved to review the appropriate

credentials. Accordingly, N.J.S.A. 39:3-15 does not proscribe the officer from making a

stop or the officer from requiring the driver to produce registration and driving

credentials when a police officer observes an out-of-state licensed vehicle with an

equipment violation.”). Here, Mr. Saint-Jean did produce his Massachusetts

registration and driver’s license, apparently to no avail.

15 Of course, “asserting facts solely in an opposition brief is not a proper

substitute for alleging facts in a complaint” Sharif v. City of Hackensack, No. 17-

12410, 2018 WL 5619721, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 29, 2018). It is a natural inference from

the Complaint’s allegations, however, that the officers, in observing Mr. Saint-Jean’s

license, registration, and license plates, were on notice that he was a Massachusetts

resident, operating a vehicle registered in Massachusetts. Thus, I consider the brief

insofar as it adds arguments of law, not new facts.

The Defendants could perhaps be forgiven for failing to anticipate this

argument in their main brief, but their reply briefing, too, fails to address it.

For that reason alone, I could deem it conceded. I will nevertheless discuss it.

In Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 (2014), the U.S. Supreme Court

held that a mistake of law could support a finding of reasonable suspicion. As I

observed in a prior case, that holding has been extended to encompass

probable cause. See Aleynikov v. McSwain, No. 15-1170 (KM), 2016 WL

3398581, at *13 (D.N.J. June 15, 2016) (collecting cases). Heien put it this

way:

But reasonable men [sic] make mistakes of law, too, and such

mistakes are no less compatible with the concept of reasonable

suspicion. Reasonable suspicion arises from the combination of an

officer’s understanding of the facts and his understanding of the

relevant law. The officer may be reasonably mistaken on either

ground. Whether the facts turn out to be not what was thought, or

the law turns out to be not what was thought, the result is the

same: The facts are outside the scope of the law. There is no

reason, under the text of the Fourth Amendment or our

precedents, why this same result should be acceptable when

reached by way of a reasonable mistake of fact, but not when

reached by way of a similarly reasonable mistake of law.

574 U.S. at 61.

That is not to say, however, that factual and legal mistakes apply in the

same way. Factual mistakes tend to involve on-the-spot judgments, which may

be based on incomplete information. The reasonableness of legal mistakes,

however, must be judged in relation to what the public may expect an officer to

know as the result of his or her training:

Contrary to the suggestion of Heien and amici, our decision does

not discourage officers from learning the law. . . . [T]he [mistake of

law] inquiry is not as forgiving as the one employed in the distinct

context of deciding whether an officer is entitled to qualified

immunity for a constitutional or statutory violation. Thus, an

officer can gain no Fourth Amendment advantage through a sloppy

study of the laws he is duty-bound to enforce.

Id. at 66–67.

That “not as forgiving” standard requires that a mistake of law must be

assessed from the point of view of a “prudent, cautious, trained police officer.”

United States v. Romero, 935 F.3d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir. 2019) (emphasis

added) (quoting United States v. Snow, 82 F.3d 935, 942 (10th Cir. 1996)). And

when applied to an arrest or further pursuit of a criminal charge, as opposed to

a brief, reasonable-suspicion Terry stop, that standard may require even closer

scrutiny.

Of course, the police are not expected to perform a roadside resolution of

statutory ambiguities or conflicting legal precedent. Thus, in United States v.

Diaz, 854 F.3d 197, 204–05 (2d Cir. 2017), the court found that an officer’s

belief that an apartment-building stairwell is a “public place” for purposes of

New York’s open-container law was reasonable in light of conflicting

precedents. Similarly, in United States v. Hinton, 773 F. App’x 732, 734 (4th

Cir. 2019), the court agreed that police officers made a reasonable mistake of

law in pulling over a vehicle for having high beams on while passing a stopped

police vehicle, because courts had not agreed on whether the “oncoming

vehicle” may be stationary. See also United States v. Scott, 693 F. App’x 835,

838 (11th Cir. 2017) (upholding traffic stop based on failure to signal, because

a mistake of law as to whether turn signals are also required for lane changes

would have been reasonable).

On the other hand, the police are expected to be trained regarding the

laws they enforce. They cannot arrest people based on uninformed beliefs or

instincts about what conduct is prohibited. See Adelman v. Branch, 784 F.

App’x 261, 267 (5th Cir. 2019) (“But Branch’s mistake was not reasonable. She

didn't misinterpret an unclear policy or law; she simply failed to learn about

DART’s updated policy” permitting photography on premises of Dallas Area

Rapid Transit); United States v. Romero, 935 F.3d 1124, 1132 (10th Cir. 2019)

(mistake of law not reasonable because the resisting-arrest statute did not

cover a situation in which the defendant, while talking back to the officer,

offered no resistance and obeyed all commands).

No one can be expected to memorize the entirety of the New Jersey traffic

laws. This situation, however, was not a novel or surprising one. Traffic stops

for minor motor vehicle infractions appear to be a regular feature of the duties

of officers patrolling the highways of our Northeastern corridor state. Common

experience teaches that such stops are often followed by requests for consent

to search, often wholly unrelated to the basis for the stop. It is therefore not too

much to expect that the police should inform themselves as to the

technicalities of the laws pursuant to which they may—this bears repeating—

stop and even arrest in-state drivers, as well as out-of-state drivers just

passing through.16

The officers were aware that they were applying New Jersey law to the

equipment on an out-of-state car. Officers patrolling highways, like the

Palisades Parkway, which are traveled by out-of-state vehicles should be

trained in such issues, which recur. To the extent the law might be regarded as

complicated or uncertain, all of the uncertainty falls on the side of suggesting

that the windows were legal, not illegal. This situation should have at least

triggered a duty to check before arresting and detaining a driver.

* * *

In sum, probable cause to arrest Mr. Saint-Jean on the drug possession

charge remains murky at best. The allegations of the Complaint—that he

possessed what appeared to be, and were, Valentine’s Day candies—adequately

set forth a claim that Saint-Jean was arrested and charged in the absence of

probable cause. More facts, such as those regarding the appearance of the

candies and the officers’ training and experience, might alter the picture. For

now, however, the motion to dismiss the claim that the Officer Defendants

lacked probable cause to arrest Saint-Jean is denied.

16 Under federal constitutional law, even minor criminal offenses such as traffic

violations may permissibly form the basis for an arrest. Under New Jersey law,

however, whether the police may make an arrest solely for a minor motor-vehicle

offense remains an “open question.” See Brown v. Makofka, 644 F. App’x 139, 143 (3d

Cir. 2016). But for their belief that the candies contained drugs, the police here might

have simply issued a summons for the motor vehicle violation, but that scenario

remains speculative.

The thrust of the Fourth Amendment claims is surely the drug offense. I

find, however, that the tinted-windows component of the claim is adequately

alleged, and deserving of discovery and analysis; in any event, it is part of the

totality of the circumstances that might (or might not) have justified the

officers’ actions. There are, moreover, factual issues as to what the officers’

training and experience could or should have led them to believe about the

status of the tinted-windows offense with respect to an out-of-state automobile

and driver. I discuss these issues further in the following section.

b. Clearly Established Right

The issue then becomes whether any constitutional right alleged to have

been violated was a clearly established one.

The Third Circuit has found that “a right is clearly established for

qualified immunity purposes where its contours are ‘sufficiently clear that a

reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’”

Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 159 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S.

at 202); see also Williams v. Bitner, 455 F.3d 186, 191 (3d Cir. 2006). That is to

say, the right the official is alleged to have violated must have been “clearly

established” in a particularized way, and the court must define the right with

the appropriate level of specificity. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640

(1987); Williams, 455 F.3d at 191; Sharp, 669 F.3d at 159. Even if there is no

precedent directly on point, however, an action may still violate a clearly

established right where a general constitutional rule already identified in the

decisional law applies with “obvious clarity” to the specific conduct in question.

United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730,

741 (2002); see also El v. City of Pittsburgh, 975 F.3d 327, 341 (3d Cir. 2020).

In the Fourth Amendment context, “[a]rrest without probable cause is

certainly a clearly established constitutional violation in the abstract . . . . That

alone, however, does not end the inquiry.” Janowski v. City of N. Wildwood, 259

F. Supp. 3d 113, 122 (D.N.J. 2017) (internal citations omitted). The Court must

perform a more specific analysis of “the circumstances confronting the officer

to determine whether a reasonable state actor could have believed his conduct

was lawful.” Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 253 (3d Cir. 2010); See

Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590 (“The ‘clearly established’ standard also requires that

the legal principle clearly prohibit the officer’s conduct in the particular

circumstances before him.”) (emphasis added). “[I]f a reasonable officer might

not have known that the conduct was unlawful, then the officer is immune

from liability.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1867 (2017).

While early resolution of qualified immunity issues is desirable, factual

issues or factual uncertainty may make an assessment impossible at the

complaint stage. “[C]rucial to the resolution of any assertion of qualified

immunity is a careful examination of the record (preferably by the district

court) to establish . . . a detailed factual description of the actions of each

individual defendant (viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Grant v.

City of Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 116, 122 (3d Cir. 1996)). Indeed, some qualified

immunity issues may ultimately merge with trial on the merits: “[W]hile we

have recognized that it is for the court to decide whether an officer’s conduct

violated a clearly established constitutional right, we have also acknowledged

that the existence of disputed, historical facts material to the objective

reasonableness of an officer’s conduct will give rise to a jury issue.” Curley, 298

F.3d at 278; see also Harris v. Zyskowski, No. 12-7191, 2013 WL 6669186, at

*6 (D.N.J. Dec. 18, 2013) (“This Court is not prepared to hold, as a matter of

law, that [defendant’s] behavior was reasonable under the circumstances as

pled in the Complaint.”).

Assuming a lack of probable cause, the relevant qualified immunity

questions are as follows: (1) whether the officers were on sufficiently clear

notice that they lacked probable cause to arrest Saint-Jean for possession of

MDMA/Ecstasy, based on Valentine’s day candies found in a plastic bag in the

console storage compartment of his vehicle; (2) whether the officers were on

sufficiently clear notice that tinted windows on an out-of-state vehicle owned

by a nonresident did not violate the New Jersey equipment laws (and therefore

could not support probable cause). While the probable cause inquiry itself

makes room for reasonable mistakes, see supra, the qualified immunity inquiry

is distinct, and may afford some additional leeway.

As for the drug charge based on the candies, I cannot find on this

undeveloped record that the officers could have reasonably believed that they

possessed probable cause to arrest Mr. Saint-Jean for possession of

MDMA/Ecstasy. As Defendants point out, a body of relevant case law may

furnish a clear answer with respect to a particular probable cause issue. (Mov.

Br. at 21). We do not seem to have that here; Saint-Jean has not provided any

U.S. Supreme Court or Court of Appeals case that is factually on point, and I

have found none.

Even without such a body of factually on-point case law, however,

qualified immunity may be rejected where a more general constitutional

standard applies with “obvious clarity” to the specific conduct in question.

Hope, 536 U.S. at 741; cases cited at pp. 30–31, supra. Here, the standard

itself is unmistakable: it consists in the essential constitutional principle that

there can be no arrest without probable cause. I find that the probable-cause

requirement applies with “obvious clarity” to the facts as alleged in the

Complaint.

As noted above, the complaint describes the items as candies associated

with St. Valentine’s Day. Nothing further about their appearance, smell, taste,

or other physical qualities appears. The candies were contained in a plastic bag

in the console storage compartment, but were not otherwise concealed. Nothing

about the officers’ training or basis for thinking that the items contained

MDMA appears in this undeveloped record. I will not base a finding of qualified

immunity on Mr. Saint-Jean’s admitted nervousness, or “driving too slowly.”17

These I might treat as corroborating factors, but only if there were something

17 This was one of two stated bases for the car stop, although not the subject of a

summons. The Complaint alleges that Saint-Jean’s car was traveling “just under the

posted speed limit of 50 miles per hour.” (Complaint ¶ 21). Defending the

reasonableness of the stop, Defendants urge that Saint-Jean was “admittedly traveling

under the speed limit” and that this, in itself, was a “violation of the traffic code”

(which they do not identify). As such, they argue, it justified the stop, volunteering

that this would be so even if the stop was a “pretext” for investigation of crime. (Mov.

Br. at 15 n.6; Reply Br. at 7 n.1). I decline to accept a driver’s obedience to the speed

limit as a reasonable-suspicion or probable-cause factor.

more substantial for them to corroborate. That “something” may emerge in

discovery, but the Officer Defendants have not yet had the opportunity to

establish it.

In so holding, I agree with Brian v. Patrick, the Halloween candy case

analyzed at p. 19, supra. After holding that the officer had no sufficient basis to

conclude that a bag of candy contained MDMA/Ecstasy, that court held that

the arrest constituted such a clear violation of Fourth Amendment standards

as to preclude qualified immunity:

In this case the plaintiff has pled sufficient facts that, if true, allege

a plausible claim for false arrest under the Fourth Amendment.

First, the complaint alleges that the plaintiff was arrested. Second,

the facts, if true, establish that the defendant did not have

probable cause to arrest the plaintiff. Specifically, prior to the

arrest the defendant had no verification that the substance was

ecstasy. On the contrary, the plaintiff, two bystanders, and the

grocery store employee told the defendant that the substance was

Halloween candy. Additionally, an officer within the EBRSO

Narcotics Division viewed a picture of the substance that the

defendant sent him and stated that it did not look like any ecstasy

he had ever seen. Despite this information and without conducting

a field test, the defendant arrested the plaintiff for possession of

ecstasy. The defendant then submitted the substance to the State

Police Crime Lab for testing, which determined that it was, in fact,

candy.

Turning now to the defendant’s assertion of qualified immunity,

the forgoing analysis demonstrates that the plaintiff sufficiently

alleged a constitutional violation. There is no argument that the

alleged constitutional violation—arresting the plaintiff without

probable cause—if true, was unreasonable in light of the clearly

established law. The defendant has not established, at this time,

that he is entitled to qualified immunity.

Brian, 2016 WL 394002 at *3.18

I next discuss the “clearly established right” issue in relation to the tinted

window charge.

Of course, it clearly violates the Fourth Amendment to arrest someone

for, or charge someone with, something that is not a crime under state law. I

repeat that the existence of probable cause for the tinted windows arrest does

not really require interpretation of U.S. Constitutional law at all. It is simply a

matter of the State and its officers being familiar with what the State’s own

statutes say. While the U.S. Supreme Court is the ultimate arbiter of

constitutional law, the State and its officers are competent to read the State’s

motor vehicle statutes and familiarize themselves with their contents.

As the case progresses, the Court will consider any evidence placed

before it as to whether trained officers could have possessed an objectively

reasonable belief that an out-of-state vehicle was subject to the New Jersey

window tinting prohibition. I do not prejudge the issue, which is factually

undeveloped, for the reasons stated in the preceding section.

Defendants’ failure to brief the issue only adds to the difficulty of

resolving it at this stage. It is not even really clear that the officers are claiming

that they harbored, or could have harbored, such a belief. Nor do I have

evidence before me as to what an officer’s training regarding these motor

18 To be clear, I am not asserting that this district court case constitutes a

sufficient body of on-point case law on the probable cause question. Rather, I cite it as

persuasive authority to support my conclusion that these facts satisfy the alternative

test, i.e., that general Fourth Amendment standards of probable cause apply to these

facts with “obvious clarity.” See pp.30–31, supra.

vehicle infractions would or should include. Although I imagine that officers

encounter this situation with regularity, which would make a mistake of law

less reasonable, I do not know that to be the case, and would certainly

entertain a factual showing at the proper time. In short, there is not a clear

picture of the totality of the circumstances influencing this mistake-of-law

scenario. It is at this point premature to find that a reasonable officer might

reasonably have been unaware that the arrest and charge, overall, were not

valid under New Jersey law and hence could not furnish a basis for probable

cause. While it might or might not be established with a fuller record, qualified

immunity must now be denied as to the tinted windows charge.

2. Substantive Due Process Claim (Count V)

“A substantive due process violation is the deprivation of a protected

interest involving an abuse of official power that ‘shocks the conscience.’”

Prunkel v. Cty. of Bergen, No. 17-5154, 2018 WL 4043291, at *10 (D.N.J. Aug.

23, 2018) (citing United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 316

F.3d 393, 399 (3d Cir. 2003)). “One such protected interest is fundamental

rights, which include those guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, as well as certain

liberty and privacy interests implicitly protected by the Due Process Clause.”

Id. (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)).

Here, Mr. Saint-Jean broadly alleges that “Defendants abused process by

continuously depriving Plaintiff . . . of his substantive rights under the United

States Constitution when they had full knowledge that their actions were

unlawful and that Plaintiff . . . was innocent of the charge lodged against him.”

(Complaint ¶ 135). The Officer Defendants argue that Saint-Jean fails to plead

sufficient facts to support a violation of Saint-Jean’s substantive due process

rights. (Mov. Br. at 19 n.9). Saint-Jean does not address this argument. (See

generally Opp. Br.).

I agree with Defendants that the Complaint’s allegations fail to state a

claim for a substantive due process violation. To start, the allegations are

threadbare and conclusory: Saint-Jean does not allege which of his substantive

rights were violated, how they were violated, or which defendants violated

them. (See Complaint ¶¶ 133–136). Moreover, to the extent the claims arise

from Saint-Jean’s false arrest and prosecution, they are grounded not in the

general standards of substantive due process, but in the specific guarantees of

the Fourth Amendment. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994)

(“Where a particular Amendment ‘provides an explicit textual source of

constitutional protection’ against a particular sort of government behavior,

‘that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of “substantive due

process,” must be the guide for analyzing’ such a claim.” (quoting Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989))).

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the substantive due process

claim on these grounds is also granted.

3. Procedural Due Process Claim (Count VI)

Saint-Jean also pleads a procedural due process claim. (Complaint ¶¶

137–140). Specifically, he alleges that “Defendants initially detained and/or

continued the detention of Plaintiff Saint-Jean without a proper due process.”

(Complaint ¶ 138).

To plead a § 1983 claim for deprivation of procedural due process, a

plaintiff must allege that “(1) he was deprived of an individual interest included

within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of ‘life, liberty, or property,’ and

(2) the procedures available to him did not provide ‘due process of law.’”

Simmons v. Roxbury Police Dep’t, No. 17-2526, 2017 WL 5188060, at *8 (D.N.J.

Nov. 9, 2017) (quoting Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233–34 (3d

Cir. 2006)).

As Defendants argue, Saint-Jean’s threadbare assertion of a procedural

due process violation does not suffice. Saint-Jean does not plead “what process

he was owed [or] how that process was denied.” Washington v. Hanshaw, 552

F. App’x 169, 174 (3d Cir. 2014). Therefore, this claim is also dismissed for

failure to state a claim.

4. Failure to Supervise (Count III)

The last federal claim is one of “failure to supervise.” (Complaint ¶¶ 103–

114). Although Saint-Jean alleges this claim against “all Defendants,” there are

no factual allegations regarding any failure to supervise by any of the

individual defendant officers. (Mov. Br. at 41 n.13). Instead, the claim really

seems to be a claim against the County of Bergen (voluntarily dismissed from

this action) and PIPC (dismissed above).

Without any allegations related to the Officer Defendants’ failure to

supervise, this claim against them must also be dismissed. See Grieco v.

Lanigan, No. 15-7881, 2017 WL 384689, at *5 (D.N.J. Jan. 27, 2017).

IV. STATE LAW CLAIMS (COUNTS VII, VIII)

The federal law claims have all been dismissed against PIPC, PIPPD, and

Prosecutor Samson. As to them, I now consider the state law claims contained

in Counts VII and VIII. I hold that these state law claims against PIPC, PIPPD,

and Prosecutor Samson must be dismissed on grounds of sovereign immunity

and failure to state a claim. As for the Officer Defendants, the state law claims

parallel the federal claims, so the motion to dismiss Counts VII and VIII is

denied.

A. PIPC and PIPPD

Saint-Jean argues that PIPC and PIPPD do not enjoy sovereign immunity

from the pendent state law claims because the New Jersey Tort Claims Act

(“TCA”) allows suits against public entities and their employees. (Opp. Br. at

28–29). Defendants counter that the TCA does not abrogate sovereign

immunity as to the state law claims in federal court, and that no other waiver

of immunity applies. (Reply Br. at 12). In this important respect, the plaintiff’s

choice of a federal forum may have been ill-advised.

The Eleventh Amendment confers immunity from suit in a federal court.

Therefore, unless a state has waived immunity from suit in federal court, a

state-law cause of action cannot be maintained there. The Third Circuit has

stated, albeit in a non-precedential decision, that “[t]he [New Jersey] TCA,

which allows suits against public entities and their employees in state courts,

does not expressly consent to suit in federal courts and thus is not an Eleventh

Amendment waiver.” Hyatt v. Cty. of Passaic, 340 F. Appx 833, 837 (3d Cir.

2009) (emphasis added). And this district generally has followed the reasoning

of the Hyatt decision when confronted with this issue. See e.g., Doe v. New

Jersey Dep’t of Corr., No. 14-5284, 2015 WL 3448233, at *7 (D.N.J. May 29,

2015) (“Even when a state consents to a suit in its own courts, it does not

follow that a similar suit may be maintained against the state in federal

courts.”); NJSR Surgical Ctr., L.L.C. v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of New

Jersey, Inc., 979 F. Supp. 2d 513, 519 (D.N.J. 2013) (explaining that

“the TCA has repeatedly been held to authorize suit only in state court.”).

Accordingly, and because no other exception to sovereign immunity

applies (see Reply Br. at 12–13), PIPC and PIPPD are entitled to sovereign

immunity from the state law claims if they are asserted in federal court. On

this alternative ground, the motion to dismiss the state law claims against PIPC

and PIPPD is granted.

B. Prosecutor Samson

Prosecutor Samson does not enjoy the same scope of immunity under

New Jersey law as he does under federal law. See Section III.B, supra.

Nevertheless, the facts as pled do not suffice to pierce the prosecutor’s state-

law immunity.

Under New Jersey law, “prosecutorial immunity is not absolute like its

federal counterpart.” Newsome v. City of Newark, No. 13- 06234, 2014 WL

4798783, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2014). The TCA’s prosecutorial immunity

provision provides that “[a] public employee is not liable for injury caused by

his instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within

the scope of his employment.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:3-8. However, prosecutorial

immunity in New Jersey is narrower than its federal counterpart: a prosecutor

is not exonerated from liability “if it is established that his conduct was outside

the scope of his employment or constituted a crime, actual fraud, actual

malice, or willful misconduct.” Newsome, 2014 WL 4798783, at *5 (quoting

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:3-14a).

Mr. Saint-Jean argues that Prosecutor Samson is not entitled to state-

law immunity because his conduct “can only be considered actual fraud, actual

malice, and willful misconduct.” (Opp. Br. at 26). Specifically, Saint-Jean

alleges that Samson continued prosecuting Saint-Jean when there was

“irrefutable evidence” of his innocence, and that Samson did so in order to

“cover up” the unconstitutional actions of the Officer Defendants. (See

Complaint ¶¶ 61, 63 & 108). Saint-Jean also alleges that “Defendant(s)

demonstrated their malicious intent by requiring Saint-Jean to either accept an

Adjournment in Contemplation of Dismissal . . . or plead guilty to the charges,

despite having incontrovertible evidence that Plaintiff was innocent of the

charges.” (Id. ¶ 97). Finally, Saint-Jean generally alleges that “the prosecution

of Plaintiff was initiated and continued by Defendants with malice,” and that

“Plaintiff’s race was the motivating factor behind the decision to prosecute

Plaintiff.” (Id. ¶¶ 86–87).

These allegations do not contain facts that plausibly set forth fraud,

malice, or willful misconduct on the part of Prosecutor Samson. Samson’s

decision to continue the prosecution, alone, is insufficient to overcome

immunity under New Jersey law. See Van Engelen v. O'Leary, 732 A.2d 540,

548 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (explaining that conduct “does not render

the statutory immunity inapplicable unless it bespeaks a deliberate action,

taken for [the prosecutor’s] own improper purposes. Carelessness,

unreasonable conduct or even noncompliance with substantive law would not

have that effect.”). And, without more factual allegations, the purported

improper motives provided by Saint-Jean––Plaintiff’s race and a cover-up

operation––are speculative and conclusory. No facts suggesting racial bias are

alleged, and presumably a prosecutor who wished to “cover up” the

unconstitutional conduct of the police would drop, not pursue, the case. See

Small v. State, No. A-4113-13T4, 2015 WL 1057840, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.

Div. Mar. 12, 2015) (“[P]laintiffs’ bare allegations of malice must fail.”); Bovery

v. Monmouth Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, No. A-2940-18T3, 2020 WL 5544108, at

*5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 16, 2020) (allegations were “plainly

insufficient to properly aver that the actions of the individual defendants

constituted actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct such as to

abrogate defendants’ statutorily-granted immunity.”); Castro v. Atl. Cty., No. 15

-02041, 2018 WL 3122065, at *10 (D.N.J. June 25, 2018) (“Plaintiff's collective

and conclusory allegations of the [p]rosecutor [d]efendants’ actions relative to

the investigation and prosecution are insufficient to overcome the protections

of their prosecutorial immunity.”).

On this alternative ground, the motion to dismiss the state law claims,

Counts VII and VIII, against Prosecutor Samson for failure to state a claim is

granted.

C. Officer Defendants

As to the Officer Defendants, the motion to dismiss the federal-law

claims has already been denied on qualified immunity grounds, and the result

as to the state law claims is the same.

The immunity standards governing the state law claims against the

Officer Defendants parallel those of federal law. “In determining whether an

employee has established qualified immunity under N.J.S.A. 59:3–3, the court

applies the same standards of objective reasonableness that are used in federal

civil rights cases.” N.E. for J.V. v. State Dep’t of Children & Families, Div. of

Youth & Family Servs., 158 A.3d 44, 59 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017). That

is, “[a] court must examine whether the actor’s allegedly wrongful conduct was

objectively reasonable in light of the facts known to him or her at the time. . . .

Objective reasonableness will be established if the actor’s conduct did not

violate a clearly established constitutional or statutory right.” Id. (internal

citations omitted).

As in Hof v. Janci, “because the Court finds that Defendant is not

entitled to qualified immunity for the § 1983 claim, the Court likewise finds

Defendant is not entitled to immunity under the NJTCA.” No. 17-295, 2018 WL

6318381, at *7 (D.N.J. Dec. 3, 2018). Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the

state law claims, Counts VII and VIII, as against the Officer Defendants is

denied.

V. LEAVE TO AMEND

Saint-Jean requests an opportunity to amend his complaint to cure any

pleading deficiencies identified by the Court. (Opp. Br. at 30 n. 5). I will grant

Saint-Jean a period of 30 days to file an amended complaint that addresses

and cures the deficiencies identified in this Opinion.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Complaint

is GRANTED as to defendants PIPC, PIPPD, and Prosecutor Samson. The

motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as to the Officer

Defendants. That dismissal is without prejudice to the submission, within 30

days, of a proposed amended complaint. The action was voluntarily dismissed

as against the remaining defendant, the County of Bergen.

For clarity, what currently remains of the case is contained in Counts I,

II, VII, and VIII, to the extent they are asserted against the Officer Defendants.

An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

Dated: December 28, 2020

/s/ Kevin McNulty

___________________________________

Hon. Kevin McNulty

United States District Judge