“[I]mmunity will not be lost merely because the judge's action is ‘unfair’ or controversial.”
How later courts described this case
- “[I]mmunity will not be lost merely because the judge's action is ‘unfair’ or controversial.”
- holding absolute immunity inapplicable for administrative acts of demoting and discharging probation officer
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
LAMONT G. CRYMES, No. 20-cv-7239 (NLH) (KMW)
Plaintiff,
v. OPINION
JUDGE PATRICIA M. WILD,
Defendant.
APPEARANCE:
Lamont G. Crymes
01-276813
Atlantic County Justice Facility
Compound B
5060 Atlantic Ave.
Mays Landing, NJ 08314
Plaintiff Pro se
HILLMAN, District Judge
Plaintiff Lamont G. Crymes, presently incarcerated in the
Atlantic County Jail in Mays Landing, New Jersey, seeks to bring
a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against New Jersey
Superior Court Judge Patricia Wild. See ECF No. 1. He also
moves for the appointment of pro bono counsel. ECF No. 2.
At this time, the Court must review the complaint, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to determine whether it should be
dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
For the reasons set forth below, the complaint will be
dismissed with prejudice. The motion for counsel will be
denied.
I. BACKGROUND
According to the complaint, Plaintiff was to be released on
the HEDS1 program on an order noting he “was completing a 90 day
sentence out of Egg Harbor Twp, NJ expiring June 04, 2019.” ECF
No. 1 at 9. Plaintiff states that an officer for the HEDS
programs “brought over to the jail the release order of [Judge]
Wild, plus Camden issue municipal. Plus complainant was
indicted #19-10-2062-B for violating a judicial restraining
order of Judge Wild.” Id.
Plaintiff asked another judge, Judge Neimah, “to stay the
remainder of the 90 days, as part of his release from Judge Wild
was to get medical treatment for prostate issue, to get said
treatment . . . .” Id. The judge “clearly told complainant
that Judge Wild told him I was not released, she did not release
me as I did not qualify for the HEDS program.” Id. Plaintiff
informed Judge Neimah that Judge Wild had issued an order for
1 “‘HEDS’ refers to the county’s ‘Home Electronic Detention
System,’ which has been described to us as a home detention
program, where the defendant wears an electronic device to
monitor his or her location.” State v. Harris, 106 A.3d 1265,
1268 n.2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015).
his release, but Judge Neimah indicated Judge Wild had informed
him that Plaintiff was not eligible for release. Id.
According to Plaintiff, an officer checked the computer records
and confirmed Plaintiff was “released by Judge Wild as of April
21, 2019.” Id. Judge Neimah did not release Plaintiff because
even if Judge Neimah released Plaintiff, “you still can’t go
nowhere as she said your [sic] not released.” Id.
Plaintiff appeared before Judge Wild in January 2020 on a
hearing for the violation of a judicial order. Id. “Judge Wild
said on the record, I remember this we helped him go home. . .
.” Id. Plaintiff alleges Judge Wild denied him due process.
Id. at 4. He seeks unspecified punitive and compensatory
damages. Id. at 6.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Section 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review complaints
prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is proceeding in
forma pauperis. The Court must sua sponte dismiss any claim
that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is
subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis
and is incarcerated.
To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a
claim, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMC
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). “‘A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Fair Wind
Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014)
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “[A]
pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
III. DISCUSSION
“It is a well-settled principle of law that judges are
generally ‘immune from a suit for money damages.’” Figueroa v.
Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Mireles v.
Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991)). “A judge will not be deprived of
immunity because the action [she] took was in error, was done
maliciously, or was in excess of [her] authority.” Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978). See also Gallas v. Supreme
Court of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 769 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[I]mmunity will
not be lost merely because the judge's action is ‘unfair’ or
controversial.”). As a judge of the New Jersey Superior Court,
Judge Wild “is absolutely immune from liability for [her]
judicial acts even if [her] exercise of authority is flawed by
the commission of grave procedural errors.” Stump, 435 U.S. at
359.
“[Judicial] immunity is overcome in only two sets of
circumstances.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11. “First, a judge is
not immune from liability for nonjudicial acts, i.e., actions
not taken in the judge's judicial capacity.” Id. “Second, a
judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature,
taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. at 12.
Plaintiff’s claim against Judge Wild rests on an alleged
misrepresentation of her order to Judge Neimah. In determining
whether an act qualifies as a “judicial act,” courts look to
“the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function
normally performed by a judge, and to the expectation of the
parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in [her]
judicial capacity.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 362. Issuing an order
for a detainee’s release and interpreting that order for another
judge is within the judicial function. Both Judge Neimah and
Plaintiff interacted with Judge Wild in her judicial capacity as
opposed to her administrative capacity. See Karoly v. Lehigh
Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 86-6396, 1988 WL 85743, at *5 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 17, 1988) (holding officers “usurp[ed] the
quintessential function of a true judicial officer” when they
interpreted court order for service to permit search of
premises); cf. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988) (holding
absolute immunity inapplicable for administrative acts of
demoting and discharging probation officer). Additionally,
Judge Wild was acting within her jurisdiction as a Superior
Court Judge, so neither exception to absolute judicial immunity
applies.
Plaintiff also moves for the appointment of counsel. ECF
No. 2. Appointment of counsel is a privilege, not a statutory
or constitutional right, Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 192
(3d Cir. 2011), and is governed by the factors enumerated in
Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1993). “As a threshold
matter, the indigent plaintiff’s case must have some arguable
merit in fact and law.” Cuevas v. United States, 422 F. App’x
142, 144 (3d Cir. 2011).
The Court will dismiss the complaint as Judge Wild is
immune from suit. Therefore, the motion for counsel will be
denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the complaint will be dismissed with
prejudice as Judge Wild is immune from suit. The motion for
counsel will be denied. An appropriate order follows.
Dated: _December 29, 2020 ____s/ Noel L. Hillman ___
At Camden, New Jersey NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.