RUFFIN v. CASTANO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CHAMBERS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING COURTHOUSE

SUSAN D. WIGENTON 50 WALNUT ST.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

NEW 97A 3R -6K 45, -N 5J 9 00 37 101

October 21, 2020

Tamica Ruffin

410 10th Avenue

Paterson, NJ 07514

Pro Se Plaintiff

Jessica Lynn Mariconda, Esq.

Linda Jean Niedweske, Esq.

Niedweske Barber LLC

98 Washington Street

Morristown, NJ 07960

Counsel for Defendants

LETTER OPINION FILED WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT

Re: Ruffin v. Castano, et al.

Civil Action No. 19-18841 (SDW) (LDW)

Litigants:

Before this Court is Defendants Christian Castano (“Castano”) and Turning Point, Inc.’s

(“Turning Point”) (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss pro se Plaintiff Tamica Ruffin’s

(“Ruffin” or “Plaintiff”) Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). This

Court having considered Defendants’ submissions, noting that Plaintiff has not opposed the

motion, and having reached its decision without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 78, for the reasons discussed below, GRANTS Defendants’ motion.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint

must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). This Rule “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007) (internal citations omitted); see also Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d

Cir. 2008) (stating that Rule 8 “requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of an

entitlement to relief”). In considering a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must

“accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may

be entitled to relief.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231 (external citation omitted). However, “the tenet

that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to

legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009) (discussing the Iqbal standard).

B. Plaintiff’s Complaint Fails To State A Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted

On or about November 18, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and the New Jersey Division on Civil Rights

(“DCR”), alleging that Turning Point1 was “subjecting me and a class of employees to

discrimination in connection to our age (43) and race (African American/Black) in violation of the

Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended (ADEA) and Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, as amended (Title VII).” (D.E. 17-2 Ex. A.) On July 11, 2019, the EEOC

sent Plaintiff a Notice of Dismissal and Right to Sue letter. (D.E. 17-2 Ex. C.) On October 9,

2019, Plaintiff filed suit in this Court generally alleging that Defendants engaged in

“[d]iscriminatory acts in [sic] which created a hostile work environment” in violation of federal

law. (D.E. 1.) Although Plaintiff’s Complaint does not identify the specific legal basis for her

claims, this Court treats her Complaint as alleging discrimination under the ADEA and Title VII.2

Under the ADEA, employers are prohibited from “discharg[ing] any individual or

otherwise discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age[.]” 29 U.S.C. §

623(a)(1). To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, a plaintiff must show: “(1) the

plaintiff is at least forty years old; (2) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment decision; (3)

1 It appears that Turning Point is a substance abuse treatment facility, operating in the state of New Jersey and that

Plaintiff was employed there in 2017 and 2018. See https://www.turningpointnj.org/, last visited Oct. 19, 2020.

Plaintiff’s position, responsibilities, and precise dates of her employment are not clearly articulated in the Complaint.

2 Plaintiff did not raise a hostile work environment/retaliation claim in her initial EEOC filing, therefore, such a claim

is not available to her here. See Rowan v. City of Bayonne, 474 F. App’x 875, 878 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that “[a]fter

a plaintiff files an EEOC complaint, any subsequent Title VII claims are limited to those contained in [that] EEOC

complaint”).

Plaintiff’s discrimination claims under the ADEA and Title VII are subject to the burden-shifting framework the

Supreme Court articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).

First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. If the plaintiff succeeds in

establishing a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant “to articulate some legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.” Finally, should the defendant carry this

burden, the plaintiff then must have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that

the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for

discrimination.

Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 410 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted).

the plaintiff was qualified for the position in question; and (4) the plaintiff was ultimately replaced

by another employee who was sufficiently younger so as to support an inference of a

discriminatory motive.” Willis v. UPMC Children's Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 808 F.3d 638, 644 (3d

Cir. 2015). Although Plaintiff states in her EEOC filing that she is 43 years old, her Complaint

contains no other allegations supporting an ADEA claim. It does not allege that Plaintiff suffered

an adverse employment decision, that she was qualified for the position, or that she was replaced

by someone younger. Therefore, Plaintiff’s ADEA claim will be dismissed.

To establish a prima facie case of race discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must show

that she: (1) was a member of a protected class; (2) was qualified for the position; (3) suffered an

adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances of the adverse employment action imply

discrimination. Jones v. School Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 410–11 (3d Cir. 1999). The factual

basis for Plaintiff’s claims is set out in a nine-page list of “Documented Incidents” which does not

clearly articulate any specific discriminatory conduct, but rather appears to set out a series of events

with which Plaintiff takes issue. (D.E. 1.) This disjointed narrative does not identify Plaintiff’s

qualifications, nor specify what adverse employment action she suffered. Although Plaintiff

alleges that three non-black employees were allowed to become Medicaid certified, but “no other

counselor was offered the opportunity to do so,” she does not plead that she or any other employee

was qualified to obtain that certification or that there were any other racially motivated

discriminatory events.3 As a result, Plaintiff’s Title VII claim will be dismissed.

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint will be GRANTED. Plaintiff shall have

thirty (30) days within which to file an amended complaint. An appropriate order follows.

__/s/ Susan D. Wigenton________

SUSAN D. WIGENTON, U.S.D.J

Orig: Clerk

cc: Parties

Leda D. Wettre, U.S.M.J.

3 Plaintiff does allege that a fellow employee named Christina - who accused Plaintiff of “stumping” into her office,

calling her a “little girl,” and frightening her - “was trying to imply [that Plaintiff was an] ‘angry black woman’ . . . .”

(D.E. 1.) However, it does not appear that Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action as a result of that incident.