MASSEY v. HENDRICKS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

KEITH R. MASSEY, Civil Action No. 15-3613 (SRC)

Plaintiff,

v. OPINION

ROY L. HENDRICKS, et al.,

Defendants.

CHESLER, District Judge:

This matter comes before the Court on the motions for summary judgment filed by

Defendants.1 (ECF Nos. 84, 87). After being provided with a number of extensions, Plaintiff filed

a response to the motions. (ECF No. 92). Plaintiff’s response, however, did not include a

statement of material facts in dispute, nor did it address in any substantive way Defendants’

statements of material facts. Defendants filed reply briefs. (ECF Nos. 93-94). The Court having

reviewed the motions and the record of this matter, and for the reasons set forth below, Defendants’

motions shall be granted, and judgment shall be entered in favor of Defendants. As judgment shall

be granted to Defendants, the Correction Officer Defendants’ third party-complaint shall in turn

be dismissed.

1 Throughout this opinion, this Court refers to both the “Medical Defendants” and the “Corrections

Officer Defendants.” The term Medical Defendants refers to Defendants Kelly, Ojelade,

Annicette, Rizvi, and CFG Health Systems, which is named only as a third-party Defendant. The

Corrections Officer Defendants instead refers to Defendants Wohl, Brandt, Condito, Shelly,

Alvarez, and Hendricks.

I. BACKGROUND

This matter arises out of the medical care Plaintiff received while incarcerated in the Essex

County jail between August 15, 2014 and the filing of Plaintiff’s complaint in this matter on May

28, 2015.2 Prior to being arrested and brought to the jail, Plaintiff has had a long history of hip

and back pain problems. (Document 2 attached to ECF No. 84 at 3, 18-20). Following his arrest,

he was taken to the St. Barnabas Medical Center for treatment of his hip and back pain. (Id.). At

the hospital, Plaintiff was provided with an injection of Toradol, an anti-inflammatory pain

medication, and an oral dose of Tramadol, a “narcotic-like pain reliever.” (Id.). Upon his

discharge from the hospital, Plaintiff was provided with non-refillable prescriptions for ibuprofen

and tramadol for his pain. (Id.).

On August 14, 2014, Plaintiff arrived at the jail and was given an initial intake screening

by a jail nurse, at which time the nurse noted both Plaintiff’s complaints of hip and back pain and

his use of a cane. (Id. at 4). The following day, Plaintiff was seen by Kevin Kelly, a nurse

practitioner, who took a detailed medical history of Plaintiff and offered Plaintiff several non-

steroidal anti-inflammatory pain medications, including naproxen and ibuprofen, which Plaintiff

refused, requesting that he instead be provided with narcotic pain medication such as Percocet.3

2 Because Plaintiff did not file a statement of material facts in dispute or otherwise directly respond

to Defendants’ statements of material facts, and because Defendants’ statements accurately

summarize the jail medical records submitted in this matter, this Court draws its summary of

Plaintiff’s jail medical treatment from the Medical Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts not in

dispute, which, as explained below, is considered unopposed for the purposes of this opinion

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)(2) and Local Civil Rule 56.1.

3 This was apparently not the first time Plaintiff had differed with doctors over their refusal to

provide him with opioid pain relievers. In June 2014, while being treated for his hip and pain

issues at Zufall Medical Center, Plaintiff sought pain and insomnia medication and walked out of

the clinic when he was told that they would not provide him with the requested medications.

(Document 2 attached to ECF No. 84 at 7). Like the jail practitioners, the doctors at Zufall

recommended Plaintiff take naproxen for his pain. (Id. at 8).

(Id.). Although the jail declined to provide Plaintiff Percocet, he was placed in a special needs

unit and referred to an orthopedist for an evaluation. (Id.). Kelly also referred Plaintiff for an

evaluation of whether a further prescription of tramadol was required. (Id.). Plaintiff, despite his

initial refusal, was thereafter provided naproxen for his pain throughout August of 2014. (Id.).

Plaintiff thereafter received his orthopedic consultation on September 5, 2014, with Dr. Paul

O’Connor. (Id. at 5). O’Connor determined that Plaintiff was likely a candidate for a double hip

replacement and prescribed tramadol for Plaintiff. (Id.). Because Tramadol was not available at

the jail at the time, Plaintiff was provided instead Tylenol #3 with codeine, a pain medication

containing both acetaminophen and the opioid pain medication codeine which is used to treat

moderate to severe pain, by Defendant Ojelade. (Id. at 5). Because his current cane was damaged,

the jail also ordered a new cane for Plaintiff on September 10, 2014. (Id.). Plaintiff received his

new cane on October 2. (Id. at 6).

On September 12, 2014, Plaintiff was again seen by an orthopedist, this time Dr. Anthony

Kaiser. (Id. at 5). Dr. Kaiser examined Plaintiff’s history and pain issues, and ordered that Plaintiff

continue to receive Tylenol #3 and prescribed Plaintiff a sleep aid and night-time pain relief

medication. (Id. at 5-6). Plaintiff thereafter received these medications, as well as his naproxen

and other unrelated medications daily save for the instances in which Plaintiff refused his

medication. (Id. at 6). On October 1, 2014, Plaintiff was again seen by Dr. O’Connor for a follow-

up, and the doctor again noted Plaintiff would need bilateral hip replacement to alleviate his hip

issues. (Id.). The doctor also recommended x-rays of both hips for further evaluation of Plaintiff’s

candidacy for hip replacements. (Id.). On October 22, Plaintiff was referred by Ojelade for an

additional orthopedic consult with Dr. Kaiser, who saw Plaintiff on October 24. (Id.). Following

this consultation, Dr. Kaiser recommended Plaintiff receive Tylenol #4, which differs from

Tylenol #3 only in that it contains additional codeine. (Id.). Because Tylenol #4 was not available

at the jail, however, Plaintiff was instead offered an additional dose of Tylenol #3, which would

provide him with the same additional codeine, which he received for the remainder of October and

most of November unless refused by Plaintiff. (Id.).

On November 22, 2014, Plaintiff was seen by Kelly, who reviewed his medications, found

Plaintiff in “no acute distress” and offered Plaintiff tramadol, which was not available, and

naproxen for his pain. (Id. at 8). Plaintiff initially refused, but Kelly still prescribed him the pain

medications twice a day. (Id.). When Plaintiff continued to complain of pain on November 24,

he was also once again provided Tylenol #3 and was returned to the infirmary as he claimed

difficulty walking. (Id.). On November 25, Plaintiff complained to a nurse of pain, but was able

to walk and was not in distress. (Id.). Plaintiff again refused his prescribed pain medications,

insisting on Tylenol #4, which he was not provided. (Id.). The following day, Plaintiff was again

seen by Dr. O’Connor who referred him for further evaluations aimed at an eventual hip

replacement. (Id. at 9). Following the visit, however, Dr. O’Connor noted that nonnarcotic pain

relievers should be sufficient to manage Plaintiff’s pain. (Id.). Following this visit, Plaintiff

accepted tramadol and continued to receive non-steroidal anti-inflammatory pain medications and

stretching and strengthening exercises were recommended to help Plaintiff deal with his pain.

(Id.). Plaintiff, however, continued to complain of pain that he did not believe was adequately

addressed by his medications. (Id.). Plaintiff was thereafter prescribed further medications on

December 2, 2014, including Meloxicam, a pain reliever specifically designed for treating arthritic

pain, Neurontin, an anti-convulsive sometimes used to treat nerve pain, and a corticosteroid in

addition to Tylenol #3, naproxen, tramadol and other unrelated medications. (Id. at 10). Plaintiff

was released from the infirmary on December 3, 2014. (Id.).

On January 5, 2015, Plaintiff returned to the infirmary after he complained of difficulty

walking, and he was offered the use of a wheelchair. (Id.). Plaintiff was seen by Defendant, Dr.

Rizvi, at which point Plaintiff again claimed that “only Percocet helps him.” (Id.). Dr. Rizvi

declined to provide Plaintiff with Percocet, and instead offered him naproxen, Tylenol #3, and a

trial prescription of prednisone, an anti-inflammatory medication that might help his pain. (Id.).

Plaintiff was also given a referral to a pain management clinic. (Id.). On several days between

January 5 and January 13, 2015, Plaintiff refused his medication and other medical evaluations.

(Id. at 11). Plaintiff’s mother called jail medical staff, and he was ultimately prescribed ultram to

aid him in managing his pain. (Id.). On January 25, 2015, Plaintiff was seen by mental health

workers, and was referred to a psychiatrist on January 28 who prescribed further treatment with

Neurontin and the antidepressant Remeron to aid Plaintiff with sleeping. (Id.). Plaintiff continued

to receive naproxen, Tylenol #3, meloxicam, prednisone, and Tylenol with tramadol throughout

January when he did not refuse medication. (Id.). On February 6, 2015, Plaintiff was again seen

by Dr. O’Connor, and he added a complaint of a neck injury to his hip issues. (Id.). Dr. O’Connor

prescribed him a muscle relaxant to aid with his discomfort. (Id. at 12). On February 21, Plaintiff

again complained of pain, but he was given no new medications as the jail continued him on the

path of referrals that would ultimately lead to hip replacements. (Id.). Throughout February,

Plaintiff continued to receive his pain and other medications in February and March, although he

was out of the jail between March 12 and March 17, 2015. (Id.).

On April 2, 2015, Plaintiff was scheduled for an orthopedic clinic at University Hospital.

(Id. at 12). On April 11, following injuries Plaintiff apparently suffered in a transport van, Plaintiff

was again referred to Dr. Kaiser, who treated him for neck and shoulder pain on April 15. (Id. at

13). Plaintiff continued to receive pain and other medications throughout March and April 2015.

(Id.). On June 29, 2015, Plaintiff was taken to the clinic at University Hospital for an evaluation

for hip replacement. (Id.). Doctors at the clinic again concluded that pain management with non-

steroidal pain medication was sufficient to deal with Plaintiff’s pain, and Plaintiff continued to be

moved toward hip replacement surgery. (Id.). Plaintiff remained in the Essex County jail until

July 16, 2015, but despite being provided with pain and other medications, he refused nearly all of

them. (Id. at 13-14). During his deposition, Plaintiff clarified that his complaints against the

Medical Defendants arise out of his belief that he was not provided sufficient pain medication as

Defendants refused to give him oxycodone, Percocet, or Percodan and instead treated him with

other medications which he did not believe were aimed at alleviating his pain. (Id. at 15-18).

Following his release from prison, Plaintiff received a left hip replacement in July 2016, and a

right hip replacement in April 2018, which largely alleviated his pain issues. (Id. at 19).

In addition to his medical claims, Plaintiff also seeks relief from various Corrections

Officer Defendants related to an incident that occurred on January 14, 2015. On that date, at

approximately 10 p.m., Plaintiff was released from the medical department to be placed in a regular

cell. (Document 1 attached to ECF No. 94 at 5-8, ECF No. 92 at 4-5). After walking to the

appropriate unit, Plaintiff was told he needed to climb the stairs and lock into his cell for the night.

(Id.). Plaintiff told the officers he was unable to climb the stairs. (ECF No. 92 at 4). The officers

had no other cell available, but offered to carry Plaintiff to his cell, an offer Plaintiff refused. (Id.).

Defendants Brandt and Wohl told Plaintiff that if he did not go to his cell, he would be charged

with a disciplinary infraction, but Plaintiff continued to state he couldn’t climb the stairs. (Id.).

Plaintiff was thereafter charged for a disciplinary infraction for refusing to go to his cell, with or

without help, as ordered, and he was moved to administrative segregation pending the outcome of

jail disciplinary proceedings. (Id.; Document 1 attached to ECF No. 94 at 5-8). Upon his arrival

at the administrative segregation unit, he was again told to climb stairs to lock into a cell, and again

stated that he could not do so. (Id.). Defendants Brandt and Alvarez therefore took Plaintiff’s

cane, picked him up, and carried him to his cell for the night. (Id.). The following day, Plaintiff

was interviewed by a hearing officer, Defendant Condito, who said he would look into Plaintiff’s

medical issues and have Plaintiff released if it was clear that his refusal to go to his cell was based

on his inability to climb the stairs. (ECF No. 92 at 5). Plaintiff was moved to a lower tier cell in

the disciplinary unit and remained there for three days. (Id.). Plaintiff was thereafter released

from the administrative segregation unit, allegedly without being told the result of his charges.

(Id.). Prison records indicate that Plaintiff’s charges were dismissed without any disciplinary

action being taken. (Document 1 attached to ECF No. 94 at 43).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Pursuant to Rule 56, a court should grant a motion for summary judgment where the record

“shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of

“identifying those portions of the pleadings depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A factual dispute is

material “if it bears on an essential element of the plaintiff’s claim,” and is genuine if “a reasonable

jury could find in favor of the non-moving party.” Blunt v. Lower Merion School Dist., 767 F.3d

247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014). In deciding a motion for summary judgment a district court must “view

the underlying facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party

opposing the motion,” Id., but must not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing

of the evidence. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). “Where the

record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,

[however,] there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsuhita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

Once the moving party has met this initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving

party who must provide evidence sufficient to establish that a reasonable jury could find in the

non-moving party’s favor to warrant the denial of a summary judgment motion. Lawrence v. Nat’l

Westminster Bank New Jersey, 98 F.3d 61, 65 (3d Cir. 1996); Serodio v. Rutgers, 27 F. Supp. 3d

546, 550 (D.N.J. 2014). “A nonmoving party has created a genuine issue of material fact if it has

provided sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find in its favor at trial. However, the party opposing

the motion for summary judgment cannot rest on mere allegations, instead it must present actual

evidence that creates a genuine issue as to a material fact for trial.” Serodio, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 550.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)(2) and Local Civil Rule 56.1, where, as

here, the moving party files a proper statement of material facts and the non-moving party fails to

file a responsive statement of disputed material facts, this Court is free to consider the moving

party’s statement of material facts undisputed and therefore admitted for the purposes of resolving

the motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Ruth v. Sel. Ins. Co., No. 15-2616, 2017 WL 592146,

at *2-3 (D.N.J. Feb. 14, 2017). Even where the defendants’ statement of material facts is deemed

admitted and unopposed, a district court is still required to “satisfy itself that summary judgment

is proper because there are no genuine disputes of material fact and that [defendants are] entitled

to judgment as a matter of law” in order to grant summary judgment. Id. at 2 (citing Anchorage

Assocs. v. Virgin Islands Bd. Of Tax Review, 922 F.2d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 1990)).

B. Analysis

1. Plaintiff’s Medical Claims

Both the Medical Defendants and Corrections Officer Defendants argue that they are

entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s claims asserting that they were deliberately

indifferent to his medical needs. As a pre-trial detainee during the relevant timeframe, Plaintiff’s

claim arises out of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 231 (3d Cir.

2008). To state a claim for relief under the Fourteenth Amendment based on his medical treatment,

a plaintiff must show both that he has a sufficiently serious medical need, and that the defendants

were deliberately indifferent to that need. See, e.g., Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318

F.3d 575, 581-82 (3d Cir. 2003); Parkell v. Morgan, 682 F. App’x 155, 159-60 (3d Cir. 2017);

King v. Cnty. of Gloucester, 302 F. App’x 92, 96 (3d Cir. 2008). A defendant acts with deliberate

indifference when he “kn[e]w of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”

Natale, 318 F.3d at 582 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). This requires

that the defendant was “both [] aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a

substantial risk of serious harm exists and . . . dr[e]w th[at] inference.” Id. Where the defendants

provided some level of treatment to address the plaintiff’s medical needs and the parties dispute

the adequacy of the provided treatment, courts “are generally reluctant to second guess medical

judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.’” Everett v. Nort, 547 F.

App’x 117, 121 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting United States ex rel. Walker v. Fayette Cnty., 599 F.2d

573, 575 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1979)). Neither a detainee’s subjective dissatisfaction nor disagreement

with the professional judgment of medical staff as to how best to deal with a medical issue are

normally sufficient to establish deliberate indifference. Hairston v. Director Bureau of Prisons,

563 F. App’x 893, 895 (3d Cir. 2014); White v. Napolean, 897 F.2d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1990);

Andrews v. Camden Cnty., 95 F. Supp. 2d 217, 228 (D.N.J. 2000).

In litigating this matter, Plaintiff has repeatedly asserted that the Medical Defendants were

deliberately indifferent to his needs insomuch as the medication they provided did not alleviate his

pain to his satisfaction and that Defendants should have provided him with stronger medication –

specifically narcotics such as Percocet or Percodan. Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s subjective

feelings of pain arising from his hip issues, Plaintiff has provided no expert testimony nor any

proposed medical expert in support of his contention that stronger medications would have

alleviated his pain and that the numerous pain medications he was provided were insufficient to

manage his pain. The Medical Defendants, however, have provided both Plaintiff’s medical

records, which include the opinions of Plaintiff’s jail orthopedist that the “non-narcotic medicine

[provided to Plaintiff was] sufficient” to manage Plaintiff’s pain and show that Defendants on

multiple occasions adjusted Plaintiff’s pain medication to better aid him, and an expert report

prepared by Dr. Ricardo Ruiz, a licensed internist and hospitalist who has practiced in the field of

correctional healthcare for eighteen years. (Document 5 attached to ECF No. 84 at 46-49). In his

report, Dr. Ruiz opines that Plaintiff “was treated appropriately by the defendants and all health

care providers for both his acute and chronic . . . pain” and that, given Plaintiff’s history of admitted

substance abuse “the providers were appropriately cautious in their treatment” of Plaintiff,

including their decision not to provide him with the narcotic pain medications he desired. (Id. at

49). In total, Plaintiff’s medical records and the report of Dr. Ruiz, in the absence of any

conflicting expert testimony regarding the propriety of the level of treatment received, indicate

that Plaintiff received ample medical care, that medical staff treated his hip issues as best they

were able, and that Plaintiff received medically appropriate pain medication. As such, and in light

of the record before this Court, Plaintiff’s claims against the Medical Defendants related to

Plaintiff’s treatment and pain medication present no more than Plaintiff’s base disagreement with

the treatment he received, which is patently insufficient to amount to deliberate indifference.

Plaintiff’s unsupported personal opinion that he should have been provided stronger pain

medication is insufficient to change this fact. White, 897 F.2d at 110. The Medical Defendants

are therefore entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s claims against them.4

The Corrections Officer Defendants also argue that, to the extent Plaintiff is raising a claim

against them based on deliberate indifference to his medical needs, they are entitled to summary

judgment as they are entitled to rely on the treatment they knew him to be receiving from medical

staff and Plaintiff has otherwise failed to show that they were deliberately indifferent to his needs.

To the extent that Plaintiff has raised a medical claim against the Corrections Officer Defendants

premised on a failure to intervene in his medical care, Defendants are correct that they are entitled

to rely on the care provided by the Medical Defendants, and no such claim will lay. See, e.g.,

Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993).

4 In his complaint, Plaintiff also sought to raise a claim against Dr. Anicette, the head of the jail’s

medical department, for failing to correct his medical care following several complaints made by

Plaintiff and his family. Even putting aside questions regarding whether this is a proper basis for

supervisory liability, see, e.g., Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207-08 (3d Cir. 1988), as

Plaintiff has failed to present facts sufficient to show he was receiving medically inadequate care,

the doctor cannot be found to have been deliberately indifferent where the care he was asked to

request was not itself inadequate. Likewise, to the extent Plaintiff sought to base his claim against

Dr. Anicette on the failure to answer grievances, that claim fails for the reasons discussed below

in relation to Defendant Hendricks. As with the remaining medical Defendants, Dr. Annicette is

thus entitled to summary judgment. Similarly, any claim by Plaintiff based on his disagreement

with Dr. Rizvi regarding whether or not Plaintiff technically has Rheumatoid arthritis cannot form

the basis of a valid claim as Plaintiff has failed to show he did not receive adequate treatment, and

in any event Plaintiff’s medical records indicate that he “does not have significant active

rheumatoid arthritis,” and that he therefore did not require significant treatment for the condition.

(Document 5 attached to ECF No. 84 at 46). Plaintiff’s disagreement with Dr. Rizvi’s diagnosis

thus appears to be little more than a semantic dispute over the difference between not having a

clinically significant, treatable case of rheumatoid arthritis and not having the disease at all.

Plaintiff also appears, however, to raise in his complaint a medical claim based on the

failure of the Corrections Officer Defendants to take his conditions into account in relation to his

refusal to go into the upper tier cell to which he was assigned after leaving the jail infirmary. To

the extent Plaintiff does raise such a claim, however, it is clear based on Plaintiff’s own

submissions that that claim must fail. By Plaintiffs own admission, the Corrections Officer

Defendants, other than the unserved John Doe Officer who assigned Plaintiff to an upper tier cell

saw him walk to his unit, directed him to an upper cell, and when he refused to climb the stairs to

his cell the “officers on duty told me they would carry me up the stairs,” an offer Plaintiff refused.

(ECF No. 92 at 4). It was only after Plaintiff refused this offer that the issue was raised to

Defendants Brandt and Wohl and Plaintiff again refused to go to or be carried to his assigned cell

that Plaintiff was charged with disobeying an order and placed in administrative segregation. (Id.

at 4-5). Thus, based on Plaintiff’s own version of the facts of this issue presented in his reply brief,

the named Corrections Officer Defendants, when told Plaintiff could not climb the stairs – an

inability they had no reason to be aware of previously – offered to accommodate him as best they

could under the circumstances and in the absence of an available lower tier cell (see Document 3

attached to ECF No. 87 at 55), and only when Plaintiff refused this accommodation did the

situation escalate and result in Plaintiff’s placement in a segregation cell. Indeed, by Plaintiff’s

own admission, even in segregation after the first night when he was carried to, and the following

morning from, his cell, he was moved to a lower tier cell. Under these facts as admitted by

Plaintiff, the Corrections Officer Defendants were not deliberately indifferent to his needs once

informed of them. The named Corrections Officer Defendants are thus entitled to summary

judgment as, by Plaintiff’s own admission, they attempted to accommodate his needs by carrying

him to a cell until a lower tier cell was available.

Finally, Plaintiff pled a claim for deliberate indifference in his complaint against a John

Doe Officer who was responsible for initially assigning Plaintiff to the upper tier cell to which he

refused to go, allegedly knowing of Plaintiff’s medical conditions. Plaintiff never amended his

complaint to name or identify this officer, and the time for doing so has long passed. As Plaintiff

has failed to identify this Defendant, and has offered the Court no basis for concluding that he

could not have done so through reasonable diligence, Plaintiff’s claim against the John Doe Officer

who assigned him to an upper tier cell is dismissed without prejudice. See, e.g., Parker v. United

States, 197 F. App’x 171, 173 n. 1 (3d Cir. 2006); Mutschler v. Corby, No. 16-327, 2017 WL

3894681, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 2017).

2. Plaintiff’s Disciplinary Claims

The Corrections Officer Defendants also argue that they are entitled to summary judgment

as to Plaintiff’s Disciplinary related claims including Plaintiff’s claims against Wohl, Brandt, and

Shelly for instituting charges against him for failing to follow orders by refusing to go into his

upper tier cell with or without assistance, a claim against Shelly for allegedly “falsely” reporting

that Plaintiff refused the order to go to his cell, and a Due Process claim alleging that the hearing

officer, Defendant Condito, failed to timely deliver him a copy of the result of Condito’s

investigation into Plaintiff’s charges.

Turning first to Defendants Wohl, Brandt, and Shelly, the filing of even false reports

charging a detainee with a disciplinary infraction is, in and of itself, not a constitutional violation.

See, e.g., Poole v. Mercer Cnty. Corr. Ctr., No. 11-3730, 2012 WL 694689, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 29,

2012); see also Mimms v. U.N.I.C.O.R., 386 F. App’x 32, 36 (3d Cir. 2010) (the “filing of false

disciplinary charges does not constitute a claim under § 1983 so long as the inmate was granted a

hearing and an opportunity to rebut the charges”); Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 653-54 (3d

Cir. 2002). In this matter, the charging Defendants charged Plaintiff with failing to lock into his

assigned cell after being instructed to do so. Although Plaintiff claims that Defendants Wohl,

Brandt, and Shelly “falsely” asserted that he refused to lock into his cell, the facts that he admits

in his own reply show that he was instructed to do so, said he was unable, and refused an offer to

be carried to his cell. Although he and the officers may certainly differ whether this is a true

“refusal” to lock into his cell, that Plaintiff considers this something less than an outright refusal

doesn’t make the charges made against him by Wohl, Brandt, and Shelly “false,” let alone show

that they somehow denied him Due Process by charging him with this infraction. As Plaintiff has

not even attempted to show that these Defendants denied him Due Process in charging him and

filing the “false” reports, he has failed to present a viable claim against them, and Defendants

Wohl, Brandt, and Shelly are entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s disciplinary claims.

Turning to Defendant Condito, Plaintiff appears to claim that he was Denied Due Process

because Conditio told him he’d investigate his claim that he should not be punished as he was

medically unable to go to his cell, and then did not provide Plaintiff with the result of that

investigation before Plaintiff was released from segregation seventy-two hours later after it was

determined that he should not have been placed in segregation. By Plaintiff’s own admission, after

seventy-two hours, he was released from segregation. (See Document 3 attached to ECF No. 87

at 62). Prison records indicate that he was so released because the charges against Plaintiff were

dismissed, presumably by Condito. (Document 1 attached to ECF No. 94 at 43). Plaintiff’s claim

against Condito thus appears to be entirely based on Plaintiff’s belief that Condito should have

resolved his charges and released him within forty-eight hours rather than the seventy-two he spent

in segregation. Based on the facts presented, Plaintiff’s claim thus boils down to his allegation

that he was entitled to a decision within two days rather than three. While the Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment does entitle a pretrial detainee to notice, an opportunity to be heard

including a limited right to present evidence and witnesses, and a written explanation of any

disciplinary action taken5 as a result of the hearing on a Plaintiff’s disciplinary charge, it does not

require that disciplinary investigations be completed within forty-eight hours. See, e.g., Kanu v.

Lindsey, No. 13-6451, 2016 WL 1086565, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2016). Plaintiff was thus not

entitled by the Constitution to a disciplinary decision within the forty-eight hours about which he

complains, and Defendant Condito is therefore entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s Due

Process claim related to his disciplinary proceedings.

3. Plaintiff’s Grievance Related Claims

Defendants Hendricks is named as a Defendant in this matter solely based on his alleged

failure to respond to various grievances Plaintiff filed related to his medical claims. Hendricks

argues that, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to hold him liable based on the lack of responses to

Plaintiff’s grievances as a stand-alone claim separate and apart from his medical treatment claim,

Plaintiff’s grievance related claim is based on an untenable theory of relief. The United States

Constitution does not provide a state detainee or inmate with a right to an inmate grievance system,

nor does it provide a right for such prisoners to have their grievances addressed to the extent the

state has proactively created such a system. See, e.g., Roberts v. Aviles, No. 10-5916, 2012 WL

5 Plaintiff neither alleged nor testified at his deposition that any specific disciplinary action was

taken following the investigation of Condito, instead stating that he does not know what, if

anything came of his charges other than his release after three days. Prison records show that the

charges against him were dismissed. Because Plaintiff did not receive any disciplinary punishment

following Condito’s investigation, that he did not receive a written decision stating the reasons for

disciplinary action does not give rise to a Due Process violation.

603790, at *1 n. 4 (D.N.J. Feb. 16, 2012); Wilson v. Horn, 971 F. Supp. 943, 947 (E.D. Pa.), aff’d,

142 F.3d 430 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994) (“the

Constitution creates no entitlement to grievance procedures or access to any such procedure

voluntarily established by a state”). Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff’s claim against Hendricks is

based solely on the failure to respond to grievances, rather than using the grievances as a method

to connect Hendricks to his failed medical claims discussed above, that claim fails to state a valid

basis for relief. Hendricks is entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s grievance related claim.

4. Plaintiff’s Excessive Force Claims

In his final series of claims, Plaintiff argues that Defendants Alvarez6 and Brandt used

excessive force against him in taking his cane and carrying him to his cell following his placement

in administrative segregation and assignment to an upper tier cell. Defendants in turn argue that

they are entitled to qualified immunity as to this claim because, to the extent Plaintiff presents a

valid excessive force claim, the right Plaintiff seeks to vindicate, when addressed at the appropriate

level of specificity, was not clearly established when this incident occurred in 2015. “The doctrine

of qualified immunity shields government officials who perform discretionary functions ‘from

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Santini v. Fuentes, 795

F.3d 410, 417 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “When

properly applied, [qualified immunity] protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who

6 It appears Defendant Alvarez was not properly served in this matter, as service upon him was

refused on the basis that multiple individuals at the jail share that last name (see ECF No. 10).

However, because Defendants’ arguments regarding Defendant Brandt’s entitlement to qualified

immunity are equally applicable to Defendant Alvarez, the issue of whether Defendant Alvarez is

entitled to qualified immunity is discussed alongside the analysis pertaining to Brandt.

knowingly violate the law.” Spady v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 800 F.3d 633, 637 (3d Cir. 2015)

(quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, (2011)).

Entitlement to qualified immunity is evaluated using a two-pronged analysis. “First a court

must decide ‘whether the facts that a plaintiff has . . . shown make out a violation of a constitutional

right’[, a]nd second, the Court must determine ‘whether the right at issue was clearly established

at the time of [the] defendants alleged misconduct.’” Id. (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.

223, 232 (2009)). Where a plaintiff’s claim fails to clear either hurdle, the officer is entitled to

qualified immunity, and a reviewing court may therefore address only the clearly established prong

where it is dispositive of the immunity issue. James v. New Jersey State Pol., 957 F.3d 165, 168-

69 (3d Cir. 2020). A right is clearly established where “existing precedent [has] placed the

statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Spady, 800 F.3d at 638 (quoting al-Kidd, 131

S. Ct. at 2083). With the exception of cases involving “obvious violations” of the rules put in

place by prior Supreme Court precedent, a plaintiff’s claim will only be “clearly established”

where “the violative nature of the particular conduct [was] clearly established.” James, 957 F.3d

at 169 (quoting Ziglar v. Abbassi, --- U.S. ---, ---, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1866 (2017)). The conduct in

question must therefore be defined at an “appropriate level of specificity,” Spady, 800 F.3d at 638,

and, when so defined, the plaintiff must identify “a case where an officer acting under similar

circumstances . . . was held to have violated” the constitutional provision in question. James, 957

F.3d at 169-70. For the purposes of this analysis, “clearly established rights are derived either

from binding Supreme Court and Third Circuit precedent or from a robust consensus of cases of

persuasive authority in the Courts of Appeals” in effect at the time of the conduct in question. Id.

at 170.

In this case, the conduct about which Plaintiff complains is an alleged incident of excessive

force in which Defendants Brandt and Alvarez “unannounced and suddenly” took his cane, picked

him up, and carried him to an upper tier cell before placing him down and returning his cane after

he told the officers that he could not climb the stairs to his cell himself. (See ECF No. 92 at 5;

ECF No. 1 at 12). Although this Court readily accepts that Plaintiff may have suffered some pain

during this incident in light of his medical issues, Plaintiff has failed to identify any cases finding

that the officers’ conduct defined at the appropriate level of specificity – without permission lifting

and carrying an inmate unable to climb the stairs to his cell before returning his walking aid upon

placing him in said cell – amounts to excessive force sufficient to violate the constitution. This

Court is likewise unaware of any Third Circuit or Supreme Court case addressing similar conduct

under similar circumstances, nor does there appear to be a robust consensus of federal appellate

cases on point. Thus, to the extent Plaintiff’s excessive force claim would state a claim for relief

under the Fourteenth Amendment, any such claim is not based on clearly established law, and

Defendants Brandt and Alvarez are therefore entitled to qualified immunity, and in turn summary

judgment, as to that claim.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, this Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions for summary

judgment (ECF Nos. 84, 87). Because judgment will be entered in favor of all moving Defendants

on the relevant claims, the Corrections Officer Defendants’ third-party complaint against the

Medical Defendants is in turn DISMISSED. An appropriate order follows.

s/ Stanley R. Chesler

STANLEY R. CHESLER

United States District Judge

Dated: September 25, 2020