PEARSON v. SWEENEY

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CAMDEN VICINAGE

____________________________________

COREY PEARSON, :

: Civ. No. 20-2065 (RMB-JS)

Plaintiff :

v. :

: OPINION

DONNA SWEENEY, et al., :

:

Defendants :

______________________________:

BUMB, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court upon the filing of a civil

rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Plaintiff Corey Pearson,

an inmate presently incarcerated in Bayside State Prison in

Leesburg, New Jersey. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff filed an

application to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee (“in

forma pauperis” or “IFP”) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), which

establishes his financial eligibility to proceed IFP and will be

granted.

Federal law requires this Court to screen Plaintiff’s

Complaint for sua sponte dismissal prior to service, and to dismiss

any claim that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and/or to dismiss any

defendant who is immune from suit. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B),

1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).

I. Sua Sponte Dismissal

When a prisoner is permitted to proceed without prepayment of

the filing fee or when the prisoner pays the filing fee for a civil

action and seeks redress from a governmental entity, officer or

employee of a governmental entity, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and

1915A(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) require courts to review the

complaint and sua sponte dismiss any claims that are (1) frivolous

or malicious; (2) fail to state a claim on which relief may be

granted; or (3) seek monetary relief against a defendant who is

immune from such relief.1

Courts must liberally construe pleadings that are filed pro

se. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Thus, “a pro se complaint,

however inartfully pleaded, must be held to ‘less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). A pleading must contain a

“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “To survive a

motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

1 Conclusive screening is reserved until the filing fee is paid or

IFP status is granted. See Izquierdo v. New Jersey, 532 F. App’x

71, 73 (3d Cir. 2013) (district court should address IFP

application prior to conclusive screening of complaint under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)).

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.) Legal conclusions, together

with threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, do

not suffice to state a claim. Id.

Thus, “a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to

begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than

conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at

679. “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a

complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. If

a complaint can be remedied by an amendment, a district court may

not dismiss the complaint with prejudice but must permit the

amendment. Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 108

(3d Cir. 2002).

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Complaint

Plaintiff brings his claims against defendants under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for violating the Eighth Amendment by failing to

protect him from assault by another inmate. (Compl., ¶4, Dkt. No.

1.) The Court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as

true for purposes of screening the complaint. Plaintiff does not

clearly present the chronological events that led to his assault

by another inmate nor does he describe the assault or when it

occurred. Plaintiff alleges he was incarcerated in a prison in New

Hampshire, where he was misclassified as a sex offender and was

assaulted by another inmate at some time before he was transferred

to C.R.A.F.2 in New Jersey, where he remained from May 13, 2019 to

June 3, 2019. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1 at 7.) The named defendants are

Donna Sweeney, Interstate Transfer Analyst for the New Jersey

Department of Corrections (“NJDOC”); Marcus O’Hicks, NJDOC

Commissioner; Detective Tabolski, Special Investigative Officer

for South Woods State Prison; and S. Bailey, Senior Classifications

Officer at South Woods State Prison. (Compl. ¶4, Dkt. No. 1.)

Plaintiff asserts these defendants had the opportunity to correct

his misclassification as a sex offender but negligently failed to

do so before he was assaulted by another prisoner. (See generally

Compl., Dkt. No. 1.)

B. Section 1983 Claims

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in relevant part,

2According to its website, “CRAF”, Central Reception and Assignment

Facility, “serves as a central processing unit for all adult males

sentenced to the New Jersey Department of Corrections.”

Available at

https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=19oCJlVou1rAvf3KLu7Se3U

fAJF0&ll=40.24716930000003%2C-74.8046279&z=8 (last visited July

27, 2020).

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of

any State … subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States …

to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and

laws, shall be liable to the party injured in

an action at law….

“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the

violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the

United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was

committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v.

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

1. Elements of a failure to protect claim

Under the Eighth Amendment prison officials have a duty “to

take reasonable measures to protect prisoners from violence at the

hands of other prisoners.” Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 746

(3d Cir.1997) (citations and internal quotations omitted). The

elements of an Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim are (1)

the plaintiff was “incarcerated under conditions posing a

substantial risk of serious harm”; and (2) the defendant prison

officials acted with “deliberate indifference” to the plaintiff’s

safety. Bracey v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 571 F. App'x 75, 78

(3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834

(1994)). “Deliberate indifference may be proven by showing that

‘the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate

health or safety.’” Reed v. Harpster, 506 F. App'x 109, 112 (3d

Cir. 2012) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837)). “Not only must a

prison official be ‘aware of facts from which the inference could

be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but the

official ‘must also draw the inference.’” Id. Deliberate

indifference does not require an inmate to show he “was especially

likely to be assaulted by the specific prisoner who eventually

committed the assault.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 843 (1994).

It is enough if prisons officials were aware that risk of assault

was “so common and uncontrolled that some potential victims dared

not sleep” for fear of assault. Id.

2. Analysis

While the Eighth Amendment imposes a duty upon prison

officials to protect the safety of inmates under their custody,

the Court is not aware of any precedent holding a prison official

who was not the prisoner’s immediate custodian liable for failure

to protect from assault by another inmate. See Garcia v. Lemaster,

439 F.3d 1215, 1216 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding a New Mexico prisoner

incarcerated in California pursuant to Interstate Corrections

Compact (“ICC”) failed to state a claim when he brought a 42

U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging unconstitutional classification and

denial of recreation in New Mexico district court against New

Mexico Corrections Department defendants.)

Even assuming such a claim is possible, a plaintiff must

allege facts indicating that a defendant’s deliberate indifference

to a substantial risk to his safety caused his injury. Plaintiff

has not alleged facts suggesting it was obvious to the defendants

that if they did not act quickly to correct the misinformation

causing Plaintiff to be classified as a sex offender, he was under

a substantial risk of serious harm from assault by another inmate.

For example, Plaintiff did not allege facts indicating how other

prisoners were aware of his sex offender classification. For these

reasons, the Court will dismiss the complaint without prejudice

for failure to state an Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim.

III. CONCLUSION

The Court will grant Plaintiff’s IFP application but dismiss

the complaint without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).

An appropriate Order follows.

DATE: July 27, 2020

s/Renée Marie Bumb

RENÉE MARIE BUMB

United States District Judge