Opinion

BOUIE v. CITY OF PATERSON

Court
District Court, D. New Jersey
Filed
Jul 14, 2020
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 25.2%

“It has long been the law that an officer may not use deadly force against a suspect unless the officer reasonably believes that the suspect poses a threat of serious bodily injury to the officer or others.” (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985

How later courts described this case

  • “It has long been the law that an officer may not use deadly force against a suspect unless the officer reasonably believes that the suspect poses a threat of serious bodily injury to the officer or others.” (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985
  • reversing a district court’s grant of summary judgment on plaintiff’s Monell claim
  • denying motion for summary judgment where “[b]oth avenues to qualified immunity, i.e., no violation or, if a violation, it [wa]s excused because the Arresting Officers made a reasonable mistake of law or fact, hinge[d] on disputed facts”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

LARRY BOUIE, Case No. 17-4109 (SDW) (SCM)

Plaintiff,

OPINION

v.

July 14, 2020

CITY OF PATERSON, OFFICER HAYDEE

SANTANA, in her individual and official

capacity, and OFFICER JANE DOE 1, in their

individual capacity,

Defendants.

WIGENTON, District Judge.

Before this Court is Defendants City of Paterson (the “City”) and Haydee Santana’s

(“Officer Santana”) (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 56. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant

to 28 U.S.C § 1331. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391. This motion is decided without

oral argument pursuant to Rule 78. For the reasons discussed below, Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The undisputed facts in this matter are few. On October 29, 2016, Officer Santana, a

member of the Paterson Police Department, responded to a report regarding an emotionally

disturbed person in the area of 111 Broadway, Paterson, New Jersey. (D.E. 62-2 ¶¶ 1–2, 61.)1

1 Record citations in this opinion are generally to Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (D.E. 62-2),

Plaintiff’s Responsive Statement and Supplemental Statement of Disputed Material Facts (D.E. 66), and Defendants’

When she arrived at the scene, Officer Santana was wearing her gun, ASP baton, and pepper spray.

(D.E. 66 at 10 ¶ 24.) She parked across the street from the sidewalk where Plaintiff Larry Bouie

(“Plaintiff”) was located and broadcast over her police radio that “this is a good one.” (D.E. 62-2

¶¶ 6–7.)2 When Officer Santana exited her vehicle, Plaintiff, unarmed, began approaching her.

(See id. ¶ 12; D.E. 66 at 8 ¶ 9.) In response, Officer Santana took out her gun and shot Plaintiff

once in the stomach. (See D.E. 62-2 ¶ 1.) Approximately 24 seconds elapsed from the moment

that Officer Santana stated “this is a good one” to the moment that she shot Plaintiff. (D.E. 62-2

¶ 16.) Plaintiff survived the shooting but required ten surgeries. (D.E. 66 at 9 ¶ 17.)

Plaintiff commenced this lawsuit on June 7, 2017, and subsequently filed the Amended

Complaint on May 7, 2018. (D.E. 1, 21.) The Amended Complaint asserts three claims under 42

U.S.C. § 1983: excessive force by Officer Santana (Count I), failure to intervene by Officer Jane

Doe 1 (Count II), and municipal liability with respect to the City for failure to train (Count III).

(D.E. 21 at 8–14.) Plaintiff requests compensatory damages of $10 million as well as punitive

damages. (Id. at 9, 11, 14.) Following discovery, Defendants jointly filed the instant motion for

summary judgment and briefing was timely completed. (D.E. 62, 65, 71.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). The “mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an

otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no

Responsive Statement and Supplemental Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (D.E. 71-1), as well as the record

citations contained therein.

2 According to Officer Santana, this message was meant to indicate to her backup that they needed to arrive at the

scene quickly. (D.E. 62-2 ¶ 7.) The phrase was the officers’ “own terminology” and not official police radio code.

(D.E. 66 at 2 ¶ 7.)

genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986). A

fact is only “material” for purposes of a summary judgment motion if a dispute over that fact

“might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id. at 248. A dispute about a

material fact is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for

the nonmoving party.” Id. The dispute is not genuine if it merely involves “some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

586 (1986).

The moving party must show that if the evidentiary material of record were reduced to

admissible evidence in court, it would be insufficient to permit the nonmoving party to carry its

burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). Once the moving party

meets its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant who must set forth specific facts

showing a genuine issue for trial and may not rest upon the mere allegations, speculations,

unsupported assertions or denials of its pleadings. Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 481 (3d Cir.

2001). “In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility

determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence; instead, the non-moving party’s

evidence ‘is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.’” Marino v.

Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).

The nonmoving party “must present more than just ‘bare assertions, conclusory allegations

or suspicions’ to show the existence of a genuine issue.” Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Serv., 409 F.3d

584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325), abrogated on other grounds by

Rotkiske v. Klemm, 890 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2018). Further, the nonmoving party is required to

“point to concrete evidence in the record which supports each essential element of its case.” Black

Car Assistance Corp. v. New Jersey, 351 F. Supp. 2d 284, 286 (D.N.J. 2004). If the nonmoving

party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that

party’s case, and on which . . . [it has] the burden of proof[,]” then the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322–23. Furthermore, in deciding the

merits of a party’s motion for summary judgment, the court’s role is not to evaluate the evidence

and decide the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The nonmoving party cannot defeat summary judgment simply by

asserting that certain evidence submitted by the moving party is not credible. S.E.C. v. Antar, 44

F. App’x 548, 554 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of

Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the

United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action

at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. . . .

Section 1983 does not itself create any rights, it merely provides “private citizens with a means to

redress violations of federal law committed by state [actors].” Woodyard v. Cty. of Essex, 514 F.

App’x 177, 180 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979).

To bring a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must prove “(1) that the conduct complained of was

committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the conduct deprived the

plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States.” Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 319 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted); see also Hilton

v. Whitman, No. 04-6420, 2008 WL 5272190, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2008) (noting that the plaintiff

must “identify the exact contours of the underlying right said to have been violated”).

A. Excessive Force Claim Against Officer Santana (Count I)

1. Constitutional Violation

“The use of excessive force is itself an unlawful ‘seizure’ under the Fourth Amendment.”

Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 496 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395

(1989); Carswell v. Borough of Homestead, 381 F.3d 235, 240 (3d Cir. 2004)). Thus, to determine

whether the challenged conduct amounts to a constitutional violation, courts apply the Fourth

Amendment’s “objective reasonableness test,” which is a “highly individualized and fact specific”

inquiry. Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 417 (3d Cir. 2015).

The Supreme Court has articulated three factors that must be considered in evaluating

whether the use of force was reasonable: (i) “the severity of the crime at issue”; (ii) “whether the

suspect pose[d] an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others”; and (iii) “whether [the

suspect] actively resist[ed] arrest or attempt[ed] to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at

396. The Third Circuit has expanded this inquiry to include “the possibility that the persons subject

to the police action are themselves violent or dangerous, the duration of the action, whether the

action takes place in the context of effecting an arrest, the possibility that the suspect may be

armed, and the number of persons with whom the police officers must contend at one time.”

Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 822 (3d Cir. 1997) (abrogated on other grounds). Additionally,

a court must “evaluate objective reasonableness from the perspective of the officer at the time of

the incident and not with the benefit of hindsight.” Santini, 795 F.3d at 417 (citing Maryland v.

Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 85 (1987)); see also Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 206–07 (3d Cir. 2007).

Here, Defendants argue that it was objectively reasonable for Officer Santana to shoot

Plaintiff because he menacingly charged at her when she exited her vehicle, ignoring her

instructions to stop. (D.E. 62-1 at 10–11.) Plaintiff is about six feet tall and weighed about 280

pounds at the time of the incident, while Officer Santana is five feet three inches tall and weighed

about 160 pounds. (Id.) According to Defendants, Officer Santana was in immediate danger and

did not have sufficient time to use a non-lethal weapon, which is why she used her gun when

Plaintiff was about two feet away from her. (Id.)

The record contains evidence to support Defendants’ version of what happened. Multiple

witnesses described Plaintiff’s behavior immediately before Officer Santana arrived as “crazy,”

saying that he was running, yelling, striking the ground with his hands, and terrifying pedestrians.

(See D.E. 62-2 ¶¶ 19–27.) Witnesses also stated that he quickly approached Officer Santana when

she exited her vehicle, despite her instructions to him to stop. (D.E. 71-1 at 12–14 ¶¶ 2, 4.)

However, the record also contains ample evidence that calls into question Defendants’

account of the shooting. Just a few minutes prior to Officer Santana’s arrival at the scene, Plaintiff

encountered an officer identified as “Detective Boone,” who spoke with him and determined that

Plaintiff could be ill or under the influence of drugs or alcohol. (D.E. 66 at 9 ¶¶ 18–19.) Despite

standing only one foot from Plaintiff during this conversation, Detective Boone did not use any

force during the encounter and instead walked into police headquarters and asked another officer

to notify dispatch that there was possibly an emotionally disturbed person in front of the

headquarters building. (Id.) Detective Boone then returned to his duties, (id.), and his actions

indicate that he did not consider Plaintiff to be an immediate threat to himself or others.

With respect to what occurred after Officer Santana arrived on the scene, Defendants admit

that Officer Santana testified that she “did not know and did not recall whether she said anything

to Plaintiff before she discharged her weapon.” (D.E. 71-1 at 13 ¶ 4.) Defendants also admit that

witnesses had varying testimonies when asked how far Plaintiff was from Officer Santana when

she shot him, with answers ranging from two feet to ten feet. (Id. at 12–13 ¶ 3.) The record before

this Court therefore contains genuine disputes of material facts as to whether Plaintiff posed “an

immediate threat to the safety” of Officer Santana. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. These disputes

must be resolved by a jury in order to determine whether Officer Santana’s use of lethal force was

objectively reasonable. Summary judgment for Defendants is therefore not appropriate.

2. Qualified Immunity

The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability so long

as “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.” Santini, 795 F.3d at 417 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457

U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted)). To determine whether a defendant is

entitled to qualified immunity, a court must “decide whether the facts that a plaintiff has . . . shown

. . . make out a violation of a constitutional right.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).

In addition, the court must “decide whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time

of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Id.3 If the answer to either question is “no,” the analysis may

end, and immunity applies. Gardner v. N.J. State Police, No. 15-08982, 2018 WL 5342715, at *7

(D.N.J. Oct. 29, 2018) (citing Pitman v. Ottehberg, No. 10-2538, 2015 WL 6445872, at *6 (D.N.J.

Oct. 23, 2015)).

“Generally, the applicability of qualified immunity is a question of law.” Hill v. Algor, 85

F. Supp. 2d 391, 401 (D.N.J. 2000) (citing Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 401 n.4 (3d Cir.

1997)). “However, where factual issues relevant to the determination of qualified immunity are

in dispute, the Court cannot resolve the matter as a question of law.” Id. (citing Karnes v. Skrutski,

62 F.3d 485, 491 (3d Cir. 1995)); see also Santini, 795 F.3d at 420; Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271,

3 Judges may “exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis

should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236; see

also Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 325 (3d Cir. 2009).

278 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Just as the granting of summary judgment is inappropriate when a genuine

issue exists as to any material fact, a decision on qualified immunity will be premature when there

are unresolved disputes of historical fact relevant to the immunity analysis.”); Norman v. Haddon

Twp., No. 14-6034, 2017 WL 2812876, at *6 (D.N.J. June 29, 2017).

As discussed above, there remain issues of fact as to whether Officer Santana violated

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. These disputed facts are intertwined with this Court’s

determination as to whether Plaintiff’s rights were clearly established. See, e.g., Norman, 2017

WL 2812876, at *6; Klein v. Madison, 374 F. Supp. 3d 389, 409 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (denying motion

for summary judgment where “[b]oth avenues to qualified immunity, i.e., no violation or, if a

violation, it [wa]s excused because the Arresting Officers made a reasonable mistake of law or

fact, hinge[d] on disputed facts”). For example, if a jury were to find that Plaintiff was in fact 30

feet away from Officer Santana when she shot him, as he claims, or was in fact only walking

towards her, then she would not be protected by qualified immunity. See Lamont v. New Jersey,

637 F.3d 177, 185 (3d Cir. 2011) (“It has long been the law that an officer may not use deadly

force against a suspect unless the officer reasonably believes that the suspect poses a threat of

serious bodily injury to the officer or others.” (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985)

(other citation omitted)). Summary judgment based on qualified immunity is therefore denied.

B. Monell Claim Against the City (Count III)

Generally, a public entity is not liable under § 1983 for the actions of its employees unless

the injury results from the “execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its

lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy[.]”

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). A policy or custom can be

established where:

(1) the entity or supervisor promulgates an applicable policy

statement and the act the plaintiff complains of is the

implementation of that policy; (2) the policymaker, without a

formally announced policy, violates federal law itself; or (3) . . . “the

policymaker has failed to act affirmatively at all, [though] the need

to take some action to control the agents of the government is so

obvious, and the inadequacy of [the] existing practice so likely to

result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymaker

can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the

need.”

Defreitas v. Montgomery Cty. Corr. Facility, 525 F. App’x 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Natale

v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 584 (3d Cir. 2003)). Where the alleged wrongdoing

is inadequate training, a municipality may be liable under § 1983 only where the failure to train

“amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into

contact.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). To show deliberate indifference, a

plaintiff must show that a training program is inadequate and that the inadequate training can

justifiably be said to represent municipal policy. Id. at 390. The focus in failure to train cases is

on the “adequacy of the training program in relation to the tasks the particular officers must

perform.” Id. at 390–91. Where the need for “more or different training is so obvious, and the

inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights,” then the policymakers of

the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need. Id. at 390.

Additionally, “to sustain a claim based on a failure to train theory, the identified deficiency in the

training program must be closely related to the ultimate constitutional injury. The failure to train

must have a causal nexus with the plaintiff’s injury.” Thomas v. Cumberland Cty., 749 F.3d 217,

226 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Officer Santana testified that she received training to quickly remove her gun from

its holster and use it in an emergency situation. (D.E. 68-3 (Santana Tr.) at 110:20–116:1.)

However, she also testified that she was not similarly trained to quickly deploy her ASP baton or

pepper spray. (See id.; D.E. 71-1 at 10 ¶ 27.)4, 5 Although the record does show that Officer

Santana received regular training on the use of force, (see D.E. 62-2 ¶ 61), there remains a fact

issue as to whether the City provided Officer Santana with sufficient training regarding the use of

non-lethal weapons.

Similarly, there remains a fact issue as to whether the City provided Officer Santana with

sufficient training to de-escalate and avoid the use of lethal force. This is underscored by Officer

Santana’s testimony that she did not wait or call for backup before exiting her vehicle because

“I’ve never waited for backup. It’s not who I am. . . . 22 ½ years that’s what I’ve done.” (D.E.

68-3 at 46:11–14.) A reasonable jury could find such testimony to be indicative of a lack of

training, particularly where several uniformed officers were working at a police station just a few

feet away. (See D.E. 66 at 11 ¶ 29.) Such a determination would be in line with the expert opinion

provided by Plaintiff’s use-of-force expert, a former chief of police. (See id. at 11 ¶¶ 29–31.)

As with Defendants’ qualified immunity defense, Plaintiff’s Monell claim is intertwined

with the disputed facts as to whether Officer Santana violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. If,

for example, the jury finds that Plaintiff was in fact only walking towards Officer Santana when

she shot him, the jury could also reasonably find that the need for more or different training was

so obvious as to amount to deliberate indifference on the part of the City’s policymakers. City of

Canton, 489 U.S. at 390. Even if the jury finds that Plaintiff ran towards Officer Santana, it could

still find that a reasonably trained officer could and would have retrieved her pepper spray or ASP

baton in the same amount of time that it took Officer Santana to retrieve her gun, as opined by

4 Officer Santana testified that she did receive training on how to use her ASP baton, but not on how to retrieve it.

(D.E. 68-3 at 113:3–16.) She received no training on how to retrieve or use her pepper spray. (Id. at 111:19–112:11.)

5 Plaintiff states that Officer Santana was never issued a Taser nor trained on how to use one. (See D.E. 65 at 13.)

However, the Third Circuit “ha[s] never recognized municipal liability for a constitutional violation because of failure

to equip police officers with non-lethal weapons.” Carswell, 381 F.3d at 245.

Plaintiff’s expert. (See D.E. 68-12 at 35–36.) “Presented with this evidence and using their

judgment and common sense, a reasonable jury could [] conclude[] that the lack of training in

conflict de-escalation” and the quick use of non-lethal force caused Plaintiff’s injuries. Thomas,

749 F.3d at 227.

Thus, viewing the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, this Court

concludes that “there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the C[i]ty exhibited

deliberate indifference to the need for [] training in conflict de-escalation . . . and whether the lack

of such training bears a causal relationship to [Plaintiff’s] injuries.” Id. (reversing a district court’s

grant of summary judgment on plaintiff’s Monell claim). Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment is therefore denied as to Count III.6

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED

IN PART and DENIED IN PART.7, 8 An appropriate order follows.

s/ Susan D. Wigenton_______

SUSAN D. WIGENTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Orig: Clerk

cc: Hon. Steven C. Mannion, U.S.M.J.

Parties

6 This Court notes, however, that Plaintiff’s burden at trial will be “high,” and that proving deliberate indifference in

the absence of “proof of a pattern of underlying constitutional violations” will be a “difficult task.” See Carswell, 381

F.3d at 244–45.

7 The parties agree that Count II against unidentified officer “Jane Doe 1” must be dismissed for lack of identification

following discovery. (D.E. 62-1 at 18–19; D.E. 65 at 16.) This Court will therefore dismiss Count II. See Blakeslee

v. Clinton Cnty., 336 F. App’x 248, 250 (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming district court’s sua sponte dismissal of fictitious

parties that were not identified after discovery).

8 Because public entities are not liable for punitive damage awards, see City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453

U.S. 247 (1981), any such claim against the City is dismissed.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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