Opinion

STILE v. HOLLINGSWORTH

Court
District Court, D. New Jersey
Filed
Jun 4, 2020
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 25.2%

triple-celling of pre-trial detainees with only sixteen unencumbered square feet per prisoner in a cell did not violate the Constitution where adequate space existed in common rooms

How later courts described this case

  • triple-celling of pre-trial detainees with only sixteen unencumbered square feet per prisoner in a cell did not violate the Constitution where adequate space existed in common rooms
  • “the subsequent filing and denial of a claim after suit has been commenced does not overcome the failure to exhaust administrative remedies and premature filing of the complaint”
  • holding allegations that prisoner suffered a serious medical need and prison official was deliberately indifferent to the need for treatment states an Eighth Amendment claim
  • “The Amendment, as we have said, requires that inmates be furnished with the basic human needs, one of which is ‘reasonable safety.’”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION ECF 65

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CAMDEN VICINAGE

JAMES STILE, :

: Civ. Action No. 17-2693(RMB)

Plaintiff :

:

v. : OPINION

:

WARDEN JORDAN HOLLINGSWORTH :

et al.,

:

:

Defendants :

APPEARANCES:

Francis X. Manning, Esq.

STRADLEY, RONON, STEVENS & YOUNG, LLP

Liberty View

457 Haddonfield Road

Suite 100

Cherry Hill, NJ 08002

Adam Joseph Petit, Esq.

Joseph William Catuzzi, Esq.

STRADLEY RONON STEVENS & YOUNG LLP

2005 Market Street

Suite 2600

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Samantha Beth Kats, Esq.

STRADLEY RONON STEVENS & YOUNG LLP

Great Valley Corporate Center

30 Valley Stream Parkway

Malvern, PA 19355

On behalf of Plaintiff

Jessica Rose O’Neill, Assistant United States Attorney

Office of the U.S. Attorney, District of New Jersey

401 Market Street

4th FLOOR

P.O. BOX 2098

Camden, NJ 08101

On behalf of Defendants

BUMB, United States District Judge

On April 20, 2017, Plaintiff brought this Bivens and Federal

Tort Claim action, alleging he was subjected to unconstitutional

conditions of confinement while incarcerated for two years at the

Federal Correctional Institution in Fort Dix, New Jersey (“FCI

Fort Dix”). (Compl., ECF No. 1.) This matter comes before the Court

upon Defendants Warden Jordan Hollingsworth and Warden David

Ortiz’s (“Defs.”) Partial Motion to Dismiss Counts I, II and III

of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. (“Defs.’ Partial Mot. to

Dismiss,” ECF No. 65); Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’

Partial Motion to Dismiss (“Pl’s Opp. Brief,” ECF No. 73); Reply

Brief in Further Support of Partial Motion to Dismiss Counts I, II

and III of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (“Defs.’ Reply Brief,”

ECF No. 76); and Plaintiff’s Sur-Reply Brief in Support of His

Opposition to Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss. (“Pl’s Sur-

Reply Brief,” ECF No. 78 at 10.) This Court will decide the motions

on the briefs without an oral hearing, pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 78(b). For the reasons discussed below, the Court

will grant in part and deny in part Defendants’ Partial Motion to

Dismiss.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

As required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b) and § 1915A, this

Court reviewed the pro se complaint on October 23, 2017, and

permitted certain claims related to the environmental conditions

at FCI Fort Dix against Wardens Hollingsworth and Ortiz to proceed,

noting that they were subject to further briefing pursuant to the

United States Supreme Court’s decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S.

Ct. 1843 (2017). (Opinion and Order, ECF Nos. 4, 5.) Defendants

moved for dismissal of Plaintiff’s remaining claims. (First Mot.

to Dismiss, ECF No. 29.) Plaintiff responded with a motion to amend

his complaint to state his constitutional claims as tort claims

under the Federal Tort Claims Act. (Mot. to Amend, ECF No. 32.)

Plaintiff was appointed counsel on March 20, 2019. (Order, ECF No.

42.) After discussions with the Court, counsel filed an amended

complaint on August 13, 2019. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 51.) Upon

service of the amended complaint, Defendants filed the present

partial motion to dismiss Counts I, II and III and a motion for

partial summary judgment on Claim IV.

II. AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff alleges the following in his amended complaint.

Plaintiff was confined at FCI Fort Dix from June 2015 to December

2017. (Am. Compl. ¶1, ECF No. 51.) During that time, the United

States of America was responsible for his care. (Id., ¶4.) Warden

Hollingsworth was the warden of Fort Dix from June 2015 until

approximately October 2016 and Warden Ortiz was the prison's warden

from approximately October of 2016 through, at least, the remainder

of Plaintiff’s confinement. (Id., ¶¶5-6.)

Plaintiff alleges that during his confinement at Fort Dix, he

was subject to deprivations of potable water, overcrowded and

unsanitary conditions, and exposure to asbestos, mold and toxic

fumes. (Id., ¶¶13-103.) As early as 2015, Warden Hollingsworth

(and subsequently Warden Ortiz) became aware of water

contamination at Fort Dix. (Am. Compl. ¶155, ECF No. 51.) However,

Defendants did not address the contamination and, as a result,

Plaintiff was forced to consume and bathe in water that was

contaminated with dangerous chemicals. (Id.) Recognizing the

dangers posed by the contaminated water, FCI Fort Dix prison staff

used their own bottled water and bottled water distributed by the

Government. (Id., ¶25.) On multiple occasions, staff at Fort Dix

would tell Plaintiff "do not drink the water." (Id., ¶28.)

Realizing that something was wrong with the water, Plaintiff

requested bottled water, but his requests were denied by Defendants

and others. (Id., ¶¶30-31.) Thus, Plaintiff contends, he was forced

to consume contaminated water for years. (Id., ¶133.)

For the duration of Plaintiff’s confinement at FCI Fort Dix,

Plaintiff also alleges that he was forced to live in severely

overcrowded conditions, sharing a room with twelve inmates,

amounting to just 43 square feet of living space for each inmate.

(Id., at ¶60.) This was significantly less than the mandated sixty

square feet, as set forth in Program Statement-1060.11, Part

7(3)(b), which states, "any multiple occupancy housing, areas in

a low security institution must provide at least 60 square feet

per inmate." (Id.) The Warden Defendants were aware of the chronic

overcrowding at FCI Fort Dix. (Id., ¶72.) In the amended complaint,

Plaintiff alleges that as a result of overcrowding his residence

had inadequate sanitation, including leaking bathroom pipes and

refuse in the halls. (Id., ¶¶73-83.)

Plaintiff was also exposed to asbestos in the prison's

flooring tiles and pipe coverings throughout the prison. (Id.,

¶¶84-89.) Additionally, he was exposed to breathing airborne

asbestos during a three-day demolition project in the law library,

where he spent time because he was not notified of the asbestos

exposure. (Id., ¶¶89-94.)

Plaintiff was exposed to black mold and toxic fumes. (Id.,

¶¶39-46.) The black mold permeated throughout Plaintiff’s primary

residence and remained unabated despite repeated complaints. (Id.,

¶¶43-45.) Likewise, Plaintiff was exposed to carbon monoxide and

other fumes from jets operating close to his residence daily. (Id.,

¶¶47-59.) Thus, Plaintiff suffered injuries including consumption

of chemicals, damages to his respiratory system, an exacerbation

of pre-existing conditions, numerous bacterial infections,

Escherichia coli (commonly known as E. coli), urinary tract

infections, severe emotional distress and anguish, and other

injuries. (Id., ¶104.)

In Count I, Plaintiff brings a claim under the Federal Tort

Claims Act (“FTCA”) against the United States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346,

2671-2680. He claims that the United States breached a duty to

provide him with clean water, clean air and a sanitary environment.

(Am. Compl., ¶¶132-37.) Count II under the FTCA is for negligence

per se in violation of federal and state environmental statutes,

such as the Safe Drinking Water Act and the Clean Water Act. (Id.,

¶¶138-142.) In Count III, Plaintiff seeks to recover from the

present warden, Warden David Ortiz, and the former warden, Jordan

Hollingsworth, under a Bivens theory of liability. (Id., ¶¶143-

156.) Plaintiff claims that the wardens were aware of the various

environmental issues as well as the overcrowding and that they

maintained policies that allowed the conditions to persist. (Id.)

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Defendants raise a factual challenge to subject matter

jurisdiction over Counts I and II, pursuant Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that Plaintiff has not met the

jurisdictional requirements of the FTCA. Rule 12(b)(1) permits a

party to challenge subject matter jurisdiction in a responsive

pleading. A factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction is

more than a pleading deficiency, but rather the failure to comport

with jurisdictional prerequisites, U.S. ex rel. Atkinson v. PA.

Shipbuilding Co., 473 F.3d 506, 512 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations

omitted)). When deciding a factual challenge to jurisdiction, a

court can look at materials beyond the pleadings. Gould Elecs.

Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176-77 (3d Cir. 2000)).

Additionally, Defendants seek dismissal of Count III of the

amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted. When considering a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss, courts must accept a plaintiff’s allegations as

true “with the important caveat that the presumption of truth

attaches only to those allegations for which there is sufficient

“factual matter” to render them “plausible on [their] face.”

Schuchardt v. President of the United States, 839 F.3d 336, 347

(3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679

(2009)). The plausibility determination is context-specific and

requires a reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and

common sense. Id. (citations omitted).

A plaintiff has the burden of pleading sufficient “factual

matter” but need not plead “specific facts.” Id. (quoting Boykin

v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 215 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569 (2007) and Erickson v. Pardus,

551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007)). “Implicit in the notion that a plaintiff

need not plead ‘specific facts’ to survive a motion to dismiss is

that courts cannot inject evidentiary issues into the plausibility

determination.” Id., (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A court

may not dismiss a complaint based on the court’s “assessment that

the plaintiff will fail to find evidentiary support for his

allegations or prove his claim to the satisfaction of the

factfinder.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 573.)

In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, a court must

first identify the legal elements required to state a cognizable

claim. Argueta v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 643

F.3d 60, 74 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950,

Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F.3d 121, 129-30 (3d Cir. 2010)).

Second, the court should identify allegations that are no more

than conclusions that are not entitled to an assumption of truth.

Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016).

“[T]he clearest indication that an allegation is conclusory and

unworthy of weight in analyzing the sufficiency of a complaint is

that it embodies a legal point.” Connelly, 809 F.3d at 790 (citing

Peñalbert–Rosa v. Fortuño–Burset, 631 F.3d 592, 595 (1st Cir. 2011)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Third, a court must determine whether the “well-pleaded

factual allegations plausibly give rise to an entitlement to

relief.” Argueta, 643 F.3d at 74 (citing Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950,

Santiago, 629 F.3d at 129-30.) The plausibility requirement “‘is

not akin to a ‘probability requirement.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 129

S. Ct. at 1949). The plausibility requirement requires a pleading

to show “‘more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully.’” Connelly, 809 F.3d at 786 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678)). Allegations that are “merely consistent with a

defendant's liability” … are not enough. Santiago, 629 F.3d at 133

(quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949–50 (internal quotation marks

omitted)). Where there is an allegation consistent with a

defendant’s liability but there is an “obvious alternative

explanation,” the inference of the defendant’s liability is not

plausible. Id.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction Over FTCA Claims

1. Applicable Law

“Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the United States

‘is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued….’” Cooper v.

Comm'r, 718 F.3d 216, 220 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v.

Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted)). “Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the

Federal Government and its agencies from suit”. FDIC v. Meyer, 510

U.S. 471, 475 (1994)).

The FTCA is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity over claims

against the federal government and its agencies. Dolan v. U.S.

Postal Service, 546 U.S. 481, 484-85 (2006). For jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), a claim must be made

[1] against the United States, [2] for money

damages, ... [3] for injury or loss of

property, or personal injury or death [4]

caused by the negligent or wrongful act or

omission of any employee of the Government [5]

while acting within the scope of his office or

employment, [6] under circumstances where the

United States, if a private person, would be

liable to the claimant in accordance with the

law of the place where the act or omission

occurred.’

CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 141 (3d Cir. 2008), as amended

(Sept. 29, 2008) (quoting FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477 (1994)

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1)) (alterations in original)).

Furthermore, 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) mandates that a tort action

“shall not be instituted” against the United States unless two

prerequisites have been satisfied: (1) “the claimant shall have

first presented the claim” to the agency and (2) the claim “shall

have been finally denied by the agency in writing.” 28 U.S.C. §

2675(a). Stated another way, no FTCA action may be commenced on a

claim against the United States until the claimant has first

presented, and exhausted, the available administrative remedies

prior to bringing suit in any court. McNeil v. United States, 508

U.S. 106, 111-13 (1993). If a plaintiff files a suit without

having submitted a timely claim to the appropriate agency, the

suit must be dismissed. Id. at 112-13 (1993); Perez-Barron v.

United States, 480 F. App’x 688, 691 (3d Cir. 2012). A complaint

must also be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction if a plaintiff

submits an administrative claim to the agency and then files a

complaint before either: (1) the agency has finally denied the

claim in writing, or (2) the six-month period for agency action

has expired, the complaint must be dismissed for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. Id. at 112-13.

2. The Parties’ Arguments

Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not complied with the

administrative exhaustion requirement that is a jurisdictional

prerequisite to bringing an FTCA claim in a federal district court.

(Defs.’ Brief, ECF No. 65-1 at 28.) Plaintiff filed the original

complaint on April 20, 2017. (Defs.’ Brief, ECF No. 65-1 at 30.)

Plaintiff never filed an administrative claim before filing the

complaint. (Id., citing Declaration of Tara Moran (“Moran Decl.”),

ECF No. ECF No. 65-2.) Plaintiff first submitted an administrative

claim on June 5, 2017. (Id., ¶3, Ex. 1.) A few days later, the

Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) responded by notifying Plaintiff that

because his claim involved multiple unrelated allegations, he must

refile separate claims. (Id., ¶4, Ex. 2.) Plaintiff failed to

respond to the BOP’s letter and did not take any further actions

to exhaust his administrative remedies. (Id., ¶5.)

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s filing cannot satisfy the

presentment requirement because Plaintiff filed his original

complaint before the agency had “finally denied” the claim “in

writing.” 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). (Defs.’ Brief, ECF No. 65-1 at 31.)

The subsequent filing of an amended complaint cannot undo the fact

that the suit was initiated before administrative exhaustion was

achieved. (Id., citing e.g., McNeil, 508 U.S. at 112; Perez-Barron,

480 F. App’x at 691; Wadhwa v. Nicholson, 367 F. App’x 322, 325

(3d Cir. 2010)). Therefore, Defendants assert that the Court lacks

jurisdiction over Counts I and II, and they should be dismissed.

In opposition, Plaintiff contends that he met the

jurisdictional requirements for his FTCA claims. (Pl’s Brief, ECF

No. 73 at 11.) Upon screening Plaintiff’s original complaint, the

Court was unsure whether Plaintiff intended to bring an FTCA claim,

thus stated that if Plaintiff "intended to bring an FTCA claim, he

must file an amended complaint, establishing that he met the

jurisdictional prerequisites." (Pl’s Brief, ECF No. 73 at 10,

citing ECF. No. 4 at 5.) Following the Court's Order, Plaintiff

amended his complaint and presented a claim under the FTCA against

the United States of America. (Id. at 11.)

Plaintiff claims that he satisfied the two statutory

prerequisites, prior to asserting his FTCA claim, by presenting

his claim to the BOP on May 30, 2017, and responding to the BOP’s

letter requiring him to submit separate “SF95” forms on June 17,

2017. (Id., citing Declaration of James Stile, (“Stile Decl.”)

¶¶2-3, ECF No. 73 at 22.) The BOP still has not issued a written

decision on Plaintiff’s administrative claims. (Id., citing Stile

Decl., ¶5.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), the FTCA claims may

be considered denied "any time" after six months. (Id.) If the

Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction, Plaintiff will seek to

file the FTCA claim in a separate complaint. (Id. at 13.)

In reply, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s individual SF-

95 forms were not presented to the agency. (Defs.’ Reply Brief,

ECF No. 73 at 6.) Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 14.2, “a claim shall be

deemed to have been presented when a Federal agency receives from

a claimant, his duly authorized agent or legal representative, an

executed Standard Form 95 or other written notification of an

incident…” (Defs.’ Reply Brief, ECF No. 73 at 6.)) Defendants

contend Plaintiff failed to meet his burden to demonstrate that

the federal agency was in actual receipt of his claim. (Id.,

quoting Lightfoot v. U.S., 564 F.3d 625, 628 (3d Cir. 2009) (“We

now join these sister Courts in rejecting the mailbox rule and

holding that a plaintiff must demonstrate that the Federal agency

was in actual receipt of the claim, whether on initial presentment

or on a request for reconsideration.”)) According to the

Declaration of Tara Moran, Plaintiff never refiled his claims on

individual SF-95 forms. (Id., citing Moran Decl. ¶5.) In response,

Plaintiff asserts that there is a fact question requiring discovery

of whether Defendants received Plaintiff’s SF-95s. (Pl’s Sur-

reply, ECF No. 78 at 10-11.)

3. Analysis

Upon review of the original complaint, the Court concludes

that Plaintiff, acting pro se in April 2017, raised an FTCA claim.

In Plaintiff’s jurisdictional statement, he asserted jurisdiction

under Bivens and 28 U.S.C. § 1346. (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2-3.)

Consistent with an FTCA claim, Plaintiff named the United States

of America as a defendant, based on alleged negligence of

government employees. (See generally, Compl., ECF No. 1.) The

complaint was filed on April 20, 2017, and the BOP received

Plaintiff’s first submission regarding his claims on June 5, 2017.

(Moran Decl., ¶3, ECF No. 65-2.) This was well in advance of the

Court’s October 23, 2017 Opinion and Order, directing Plaintiff to

file an amended complaint establishing exhaustion of

administrative remedies if he was asserting an FTCA claim. (Opinion

and Order, ECF Nos. 4, 5.)

As such, Plaintiff prematurely filed an FTCA complaint on

April 20, 2017, without meeting the FTCA jurisdictional

requirements. Plaintiff’s FTCA claims were not saved by filing an

amended complaint on August 13, 2019. See Priovolos v. Fed. Bureau

of Investigation, 686 F. App'x 150, 152 (3d Cir. 2017) (“the

subsequent filing and denial of a claim after suit has been

commenced does not overcome the failure to exhaust administrative

remedies and premature filing of the complaint”) (quoting McNeil,

508 U.S. at 111-12.)) Therefore, the Court lacks jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s FTCA claims, and Counts I and II are dismissed without

prejudice.1

1 Plaintiff seeks leave of court to file a new FTCA action. Leave

of court is not required to file a new action and Defendants may

raise any defenses deemed proper if such action is filed.

B. Whether Special Factors Counsel Hesitation in Implying

a Bivens Remedy for an Eighth Amendment Conditions of

Confinement Claim

Defendants ask the Court to dismiss the claims in Count III,

arguing the Court should not extend the Bivens damages remedy into

this new context because (1) there are alternative processes

available to protect the interests at issue here and (2) special

factors counsel against extending Bivens to this context. (Defs.’

Brief, ECF No. 65-1 at 11.) “Whether a cause of action exists is

not a question of jurisdiction, and may be assumed without being

decided” See Bistrian, 912 F.3d at 89 n.15 (quoting Air Courier

Conference of Am. v. Am. Postal Workers Union AFL-CIO, 498 U.S.

517, 523 n.3 (1991)). Thus, the Court assumes a damages remedy is

available for allegations of failure to protect Plaintiff from

environmental conditions that pose a serious risk to his health

and for conditions that caused Plaintiff to suffer a serious

medical need to be removed from exposure to those conditions, and

that Defendants were aware of the risks but refused to protect

Plaintiff. See Helling v. McKinney 509 U.S. 25 (1993) (holding

Eighth Amendment claim exists where conditions posed a serious

risk to prisoner’s future health); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97

(1976) (holding allegations that prisoner suffered a serious

medical need and prison official was deliberately indifferent to

the need for treatment states an Eighth Amendment claim).

Therefore, the Court turns to the qualified immunity defense.

C. Qualified Immunity on Bivens Claims

Defendants assert the affirmative defense of qualified

immunity to the Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claims.

1. Standard of Review

The defense of qualified immunity to a Bivens claim may

properly be addressed at the motion to dismiss stage. See e.g.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 672. “The doctrine of qualified immunity shields

government officials from Bivens claims and money damages, unless

a plaintiff can establish that the official violated a statutory

or constitutional right, and that the right was ‘clearly

established at the time of the challenged conduct.’” Bryan v.

United States, 913 F.3d 356, 362 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)).

There are two inquiries in determining qualified immunity

and courts may address the inquiries in either order. Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. at 232. The two inquiries are (1) “whether

the facts that [the plaintiff] has alleged . . . make out a

violation of a constitutional right” and (2) if so “whether the

right at issue was ‘clearly established.’” Id. (citations

omitted).

A constitutional right is “clearly established” if, at the

time of the challenged conduct, “‘[t]he contours of [a] right [are]

sufficiently clear’” that every “‘reasonable official would have

understood that what he is doing violates that right.’” Ashcroft

v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (emphasis added) (quoting

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). To meet this

standard, existing precedent must have placed the constitutional

question beyond debate. Id. (citation omitted). The inquiry must

involve a high degree of specificity of the challenged conduct in

relation to the existing precedent. D.C. v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577,

590 (2018) (citation omitted). If “a reasonable officer might not

have known for certain” that the particular conduct ascribed to

him “was unlawful,” then he “is immune from liability.” Abbasi,

137 S. Ct. at 1867.

Thus, to apply the doctrine of qualified immunity, courts

must look to the constitutional right at issue. Government

officials are liable only for their own conduct; accordingly, they

must have had some sort of personal involvement in the alleged

constitutional violation. Argueta v. U.S. Immigration & Customs

Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 71 (3d Cir. 2011). Liability under Bivens

cannot be predicated on the doctrine of respondeat superior. See

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual

punishment applies to deprivations that constitute an “unnecessary

and wanton infliction of pain,” including “those that are ‘totally

without penological justification.’” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.

337, 346 (1981) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183

(1976)). “[A] prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only

when two requirements are met.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

834 (1994).

First, “the deprivation alleged must be, objectively,

‘sufficiently serious,’” resulting in “the denial of ‘the minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” Id. at 834 (quoting,

respectively, Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) and Rhodes

v. Chapman, 452 U.S. at 347)). The Eighth Amendment “‘does not

mandate comfortable prisons.’” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298 (quoting,

Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349). However, it is “cruel and unusual

punishment to hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions.”

Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315–316 (1982); see also Helling,

509 U.S. at 33 (“The Amendment, as we have said, requires that

inmates be furnished with the basic human needs, one of which is

‘reasonable safety.’”) (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t

of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989)).

In challenges to conditions that pose an “unreasonable risk

of serious damage to [a prisoner’s] future health,” a prisoner

must allege that the exposure is of an unreasonably high level.

Helling, 509 U.S. at 35. The objective factor of the claim “also

requires a court to assess whether society considers the risk that

the prisoner complains of to be so grave that it violates

contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to

such a risk.” Id. at 36.

Second, for an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement

claim, “a prison official must have a ‘sufficiently culpable state

of mind.’” Mammana v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 934 F.3d 368, 372–

73 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Wilson,

501 U.S. at 297.). “In prison-conditions cases that state of mind

is one of ‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety

....” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834) (quoting Wilson, 501

U.S. at 302-03.) “[D]eliberate indifference requires that the

‘prison official must both know of and disregard an excessive risk

to inmate health or safety.’” Id. (quoting Woloszyn v. County of

Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 321 (3d Cir. 2005) (omissions in original)

(quoting Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 133 (3d Cir.

2001)).

2. The Parties’ Arguments

Defendants contend, under the first step of the qualified

immunity test, that neither Warden Hollingsworth nor Warden Ortiz

personally participated in the deprivation of a constitutional

right. (Defs.’ Brief, ECF No. 65-1 at 24.) The sole allegations of

personal involvement against the wardens are that they were “aware”

of the asbestos, water contamination, mold, inadequate

ventilation, lack of sanitation, and overcrowding, and that they

“maintained policies that allowed these conditions” to persist; in

other words, mere conclusory statements. (Id. at 25.)

Defendants state that Plaintiff does not allege how the

wardens had control over things such as the water supply, asbestos

tiling on the floor, flight paths of jets, or the designation of

federal inmates to this particular facility. (Id. at 25-26.)

Defendants argue that the law requires far more to proceed on a

Bivens claim. (Id. at 26.) Because Plaintiff has not alleged the

personal involvement required to hold an individual responsible

for damages under Bivens, the claims against the individual

defendants should be dismissed at the first step of the qualified

immunity analysis. (Id. at 27.)

At the second step of the qualified immunity analysis,

Defendants assert that it would not be clear to a reasonable

officer that his conduct was a violation of a specific right, where

the conduct was awareness of asbestos, mold, jet fumes, poor

bathroom sanitation and overcrowding. (Defs.’ Brief, ECF No. 65-1

at 28.) Defendants argue that “awareness” of these conditions, in

the absence of further allegations that the Wardens had any

information regarding Plaintiff’s health conditions or health

concerns, is not something that a reasonable officer would believe

violated a clearly established constitutional right. (Id.)

Defendants submit they are entitled to qualified immunity. (Id.)

Plaintiff disagrees, noting that prison officials have an

obligation to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical

care, and must "take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety

of the inmates." (Pl’s Opp. Brief, ECF No. 73 at 19, quoting Stile

v. United States, Civ. No. 17-2693 (RMB), 2017 WL 4779617, at *3

(D.N.J. Oct. 23, 2017). Plaintiff contends that he alleged a

sufficient factual basis to show that the Warden Defendants were

aware of the serious constitutional violations occurring at Fort

Dix, were deliberately indifferent to those violations and

acquiesced to them. (Id. at 19-20.)

Plaintiff refers to allegations in the amended complaint that

Defendants were aware of the water contamination at levels

thousands of times higher than the federal government's health

advisory level for drinking water, yet they refused to provide

Plaintiff with an alternative water supply, compelling him to

continue to consume contaminated water. (Id. at 20.) Similarly, he

alleges Defendants were aware of the dangerous level of asbestos,

mold and polluted air from jet fumes, exacerbated by inadequate

ventilation in the prison, and that he complained to Defendants

that these conditions were exacerbating his medical conditions and

increasing his risk of cancer and other future harm to his health.

(See generally, Am. Compl., ECF No. 51.)

Likewise, Plaintiff alleges the Warden Defendants were aware

of the widespread overcrowding at Fort Dix, leading to unsanitary

conditions. (Pl’s Opp. Brief, ECF No. 73 at 21.) Plaintiff contends

that the persistence, duration, and scope of the overcrowding

showed that the Warden Defendants "maintained a policy of

overcrowding" that resulted in sanitation problems. (Id.)

3. Analysis

a. Overcrowding Claim

Plaintiff’s overcrowding claim is not supported by clearly

established precedent. Brown v. Plata is relevant Supreme Court

precedent governing Eighth Amendment claims concerning overcrowded

prisons. 563 U.S. 493 (2011). In Plata, the Court affirmed an

injunction requiring a 137.5% design capacity prison population

limit, necessary to provide constitutionally adequate medical and

mental health care to prisoners. Id. at 541. The lower court found

the extent of overcrowding, 190% of systemwide design capacity,

was “extraordinary” and “almost unheard of.” Coleman v.

Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882, 920 (E.D. Cal. 2009).

Overcrowding in the reception centers was at or above 200% design

capacity, making “it impossible to provide adequate medical and

mental health services to inmates entering the California prison

system.” Id. at 924. Space was insufficient to screen and treat

prisoners. Id. Exam rooms were so small that actual physical exams

were virtually impossible. Id.

Other issues impacted by the overcrowding in Plata included

forcing prisons to house 25% of prisoners outside of their

classification levels; severe bed shortages at every level of

mental health care, resulting in inmates “decompensating and …

ending up in mental health conditions far more acute than

necessary;” triple bunking in gymnasiums and dayrooms never meant

for housing, with documented disease outbreaks and riots;

inadequate staffing in addition to inadequate space to provide for

additional staffing; and an increase of foreseeable and

preventable suicides. See generally 922 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Cal.

2009).

Plaintiff’s allegations of overcrowding, that he was housed

in a twelve-man room with only 43 square feet per inmate and that

the overcrowding caused spread of disease and unsanitary

conditions such as overflowing trash cans, excessive humidity from

the showers, leaking pipes, and unsanitary shared telephones, fall

far short of the clearly established precedent of an Eighth

Amendment violation in Plata. See also Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d

229, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2008) (triple-celling of pre-trial detainees

with only sixteen unencumbered square feet per prisoner in a cell

did not violate the Constitution where adequate space existed in

common rooms). The Court will grant qualified immunity to

Defendants on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment overcrowding claim.

b. Remaining claims of dangerous environmental

conditions

Apart from his overcrowding claims, Petitioner alleges

exposure to mold, asbestos, jet fumes and contaminated water,

conditions which allegedly violate the Clean Water Act, Safe

Drinking Water Act and Clean Air Act. (See Am. Compl., ¶¶13-59,

84-118.) The Supreme Court, in Helling, held that a plaintiff could

state a cause of action under the Eighth Amendment by alleging

that the defendants, with deliberate indifference, exposed him to

levels of environmental tobacco smoke (“ETS”) that posed an

unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health. 509 U.S.

at 35. The plaintiff in Helling was housed in a cell with a five-

pack a day smoker. Id. The Supreme Court explained that

The Eighth Amendment requires more than a

scientific and statistical inquiry into the

seriousness of the potential harm and the

likelihood that such injury to health will

actually be caused by exposure to ETS. It also

requires a court to assess whether society

considers the risk that the prisoner complains

of to be so grave that it violates

contemporary standards of decency to expose

anyone unwillingly to such a risk. . . . the

subjective factor, deliberate indifference,

should be determined in light of the prison

authorities' current attitudes and conduct.

Helling, 509 U.S. at 36.

The Supreme Court decision in Estelle is also relevant to

Plaintiff’s claims here. In Estelle, the Supreme Court clearly

established that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs

of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of

pain, which violates the Eighth Amendment. 429 U.S. at 104. The

Third Circuit, in Taylor v. Atkinson, 316 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2003),

held that an illness arising from an inmate’s exposure to an

environmental toxin, ETS in that case, could constitute a serious

medical need if the condition endangered the inmate’s existing

health and appropriate medical treatment required removal from the

exposure. Id. at 266-67 (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. 97).

Solely for purposes of this motion to dismiss, the Court

accepts as true the allegations in the amended complaint

concerning: (1) Plaintiff’s level of exposure to toxins in the air

and water at FCI Fort Dix; (2) his allegations that Defendants

were aware of the serious to risk to his health posed by those

conditions and their refusal to address those conditions; and that

the conditions caused or exacerbated his illnesses and/ or caused

a serious risk of future damage to his health. For the purposes of

this motion, the Court will assume Plaintiff has stated an Eighth

Amendment conditions of confinement claim, as described in Helling

and Estelle. See Taylor, 316 F.3d at 263-66 (affirming district

court’s denial of qualified immunity where the plaintiff alleged

facts which, if proven, would establish that “he was unwillingly

exposed to levels of ETS [environmental tobacco smoke] that pose

an unreasonable risk of future harm;” that “society has become

unwilling to tolerate the imposition on anyone of continuous

unwanted risks of second-hand smoke[;]” and that Defendants knew

the ETS was dangerous and that Plaintiff was exposed to it. )

For the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis,

however, the Court cannot accept disputed factual allegations as

true. The Court must determine whether the environmental

conditions were such that a reasonable officer would believe he

violated a clearly established constitutional right by not taking

action to protect Plaintiff from the dangers posed to his health,

and that dangers to his future health were of the type that society

was unwilling to tolerate imposition of those risks on anyone

unwilling. See Atkinson, 316 F.3d at 264 (affirming denial of

qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage without weighing

the underlying evidence). For certain of the alleged dangerous

conditions, discovery is needed. The Court will discuss each

condition in turn.

Plaintiff alleges daily jet activity of takeoffs and landings

in close proximity to the building where he was housed caused him

to breathe carbon monoxide fumes at a level sufficient to cause

him to suffer a serious medical need or that the condition posed

a serious risk to Plaintiff’s future health, and that the

Defendants were aware of these facts and did nothing to protect

Plaintiff. (Am. Compl. ¶¶47-59.) Plaintiff has not pled sufficient

facts to establish that defendants were deliberately indifferent

to his serious medical need caused by air pollution from jet

activity. He has not alleged that he complained to any medical

provider about symptoms he suffered after breathing jet fumes or

that any medical provider recommended that he be removed from the

area where jet fumes polluted the air. Further, the Court cannot

conclude, based on the facts alleged in the complaint, “that

society considers the risk that the prisoner complains of to be so

grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose

anyone unwillingly to such a risk.” Helling, 509 U.S. at 36.

Therefore, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim regarding air pollution from

jet activity.

Plaintiff also alleges he was exposed to black mold for two

years, that it permeated his entire residence, particularly the

showers, and that the ceiling fans caused the mold spores to become

airborne, exacerbating his COPD and emphysema. (Am. Compl. ¶¶39-

46.) He alleges inadequate ventilation exacerbated the risks to

his health. (Id. ¶¶56, 58, 62.) “The mere presence of mold does

not indicate an objectively serious deprivation of life's

necessities.” Forde v. Fischer, No. CIV.A 08-5026(JAG), 2009 WL

5174650, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2009) (listing cases). Plaintiff

has not alleged the basis for his belief that exposure to the mold

was dangerous to his health or that Defendants were aware it was

dangerous and they did nothing to alleviate it.2 The Court

concludes Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because

2 If Plaintiff can allege facts supporting his knowledge that the

black mold he was exposed to was dangerous, or that a medical

provider recommended that he should not be exposed to the mold

because it exacerbated his medical conditions and defendants were

deliberately indifferent to the medical provider’s recommendation,

he can seek reconsideration of Defendants’ qualified immunity on

this claim.

the risk caused by mold, if it is not known to pose a danger to a

person’s health, is not “so grave that it violates contemporary

standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk.”

Plaintiff also alleges that he complained to Defendants that

exposure to the mold exacerbated his COPD and emphysema.

Defendants, however, are the warden and former warden of the

facility, not medical providers. “[A]bsent a reason to believe (or

actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are

mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison

official . . . will not be chargeable with the Eighth Amendment

scienter requirement of deliberate indifference.” Spruill v.

Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004). Plaintiff does not allege

that he complained to a medical provider about exacerbation of his

symptoms and they refused to treat him or that the non-medical

defendants ignored a medical provider’s recommendation for removal

of the mold or moving Plaintiff to a different environment. Based

on these allegations, Defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity because Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth Amendment

claim.

Plaintiff alleges he was forced to drink and bathe in water

contaminated by lead, PFOA, TCE, PCE, vinyl chloride, benzene,

halogenated hydrocarbons and other dangerous chemicals, far in

excess of the safe level for drinking by government standards.

(Am. Compl., ECF No. 51 ¶¶13-38.) Discovery is required to show

the level of these contaminates in the water, the duration of time

that Plaintiff consumed water that was contaminated at this level,

and that Defendants were aware the contamination created a serious

medical need or that the contamination posed a serious risk to

Plaintiff’s future health.

The presence of asbestos is another condition that Plaintiff

alleges was harmful to his health. Plaintiff alleges he was exposed

daily to asbestos in the flooring tiles and mastic glue, which

were worn down and created airborne dust when swept and stripped;

he was exposed to airborne asbestos during a three-day law library

demolition; and he was exposed daily to asbestos laden pipe

coverings throughout the buildings, all of which infiltrated his

lungs over two years. (Am. Compl. ¶¶84-103.) Although Plaintiff’s

claims appear overstated, as they are generalized, discovery is

required to determine whether Defendants knew that the wear and

tear on the floor tiles or the asbestos on pipe coverings caused

asbestos to become airborne; whether Defendants knew that if

Plaintiff was in the law library during the three-day demolition

he would be exposed to a dangerous level of asbestos, and whether

they knew these conditions harmed Plaintiff’s health or posed a

serious risk to Plaintiff’s future health.

In sum, the Court cannot determine whether Defendants are

entitled to qualified immunity without discovery on these

questions of fact concerning contaminated water and asbestos

exposure. See Oliver v. Roquet, 858 F.3d 180, 189 (3d Cir. 2017)

(postponement of qualified immunity defense pending discovery is

appropriate where, without discovery, a plaintiff “would be

foreclosed from being able to show that there is a question of

fact as to whether [the defendant] knowingly violated his

[constitutional right].”

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Defendants’ partial motion

to dismiss Counts I, II and III of the amended complaint is granted

in part, and denied in part. Plaintiff’s FTCA claims are dismissed

for lack of jurisdiction. Defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment overcrowding claim, jet

fume exposure claim and mold exposure claim. The Court postpones

ruling on Defendants’ qualified immunity to Plaintiff’s remaining

Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claims, pending

discovery.

An appropriate Order follows.

Date: June 3, 2020 s/Renée Marie Bumb

RENÉE MARIE BUMB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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