The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
LAWRENCE L. CRAWFORD and No. 18-cv-13459 (NLH) (KMW)
YAHYA MUQUIT,
Plaintiffs, OPINION
v.
CHIEF JUDGE LINARES,
Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
Lawrence L. Crawford
300839
Lee Correctional Institution
990 Wisacky Highway
P.O. Box 1000
Bishopville, SC 29010
Plaintiff Pro se
Yahya Muquit
318455
Leiber Correctional Institution
P.O. Box 205
Ridgeville, SC 29472
Plaintiff Pro se
HILLMAN, District Judge
Plaintiffs Lawrence L. Crawford and Yahya Muquit, inmates
incarcerated in South Carolina, filed a request asking former
Chief Judge Jose Linares to form a multidistrict panel for
consideration of a plethora of civil and criminal cases. ECF
No. 1. Plaintiff Crawford also alleges Chief Judge Linares
improperly closed a prior habeas corpus proceeding. ECF No. 1-8
at 10.
At this time, the Court must review the Complaint, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to determine whether it should be
dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss the
Complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs have filed approximately 20 “affidavits of
facts” covering hundreds of pages since the inception of this
matter asking this Court to form a multidistrict panel “for the
purpose of disqualifying the SC District Court and transfer
venue to New Jersey.” ECF No. 1-8 at 3. They ask to
consolidate this matter with, at a minimum, Plaintiff Crawford’s
prior habeas corpus proceeding, Crawford v. Warden Williams, No.
18-10129 (D.N.J. administratively terminated July 19, 2018), and
Plaintiff Muquit’s civil rights action from the District of
South Carolina, Muquit v. Hood, et al., No. 8:17-1804 (D.S.C.
dismissed Aug. 28, 2018). ECF No. 1-8 at 12.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Section 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review complaints
prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is proceeding in
forma pauperis. The Court must sua sponte dismiss any claim
that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is
subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis
and is incarcerated.
To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a
claim, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMC
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). “‘A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Fair Wind
Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014)
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “[A]
pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Claims Against Chief Judge Linares
“When a judge or judicial nominee is named as a defendant
and his credibility or personal or financial interests are at
issue, all judges of the same district should recuse, unless the
litigation is patently frivolous or judicial immunity is clearly
applicable.” Judicial Conference of the United States,
Committee on Code of Conduct for United States Judges,
Compendium of Selected Opinions § 3.6–6[1](b) (2017). See also
28 U.S.C. § 455.
Because Plaintiffs named former Chief Judge Linares of this
Court as the defendant in their complaint, this matter was
reallocated from the Newark Vicinage to the Camden Vicinage
pursuant to this Court’s January 13, 1994 Standing Order which
requires that, in all cases where a judge of this Court is named
as a party, the matter shall be assigned to a judge sitting in a
different vicinage of this Court than the one in which the named
judge sits. Pursuant to § 3.6–6 and the standing order, this
Court need not recuse if the assigned judge determines the
matter to be patently frivolous or if judicial immunity is
plainly applicable, but the Court must request designation of a
judge from outside of this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
292(b) in the event the matter is neither frivolous nor subject
to judicial immunity. This is a specific application of the
broader ethical requirement that a judge “shall disqualify
himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).1
The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ claims against Chief Judge
Linares are without merit. In 1996, Congress amended § 1983 to
state that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for
an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity,
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory
decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42
U.S.C. § 1983; see also Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 304 (3d
Cir. 2006). This provision of § 1983 applies to both state and
federal judges. Azubuko, 443 F.3d at 304 (citing Bolin v.
Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000)).
Plaintiffs allege Chief Judge Linares:
“administratively closed [Civil Action No. 18-10129].
The filing in forma pauperis documents were sent in
within the time required. The and the N.J. District
Court spoliated that sent in informa [sic] pauperis
documents and claimed Crawford sought to reinstate the
case without sending those required documents in acts
of mail tampering stripping him of immunity.”
1 The undersigned also acknowledges that recusal would be
mandatory where the judge “has a personal bias or prejudice
concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §
455(b)(1). The undersigned has no such personal knowledge or
bias, is unfamiliar with Plaintiff’s prior cases beyond the
public docket and has not discussed this case with any of the
defendants.
ECF No. 1-8 at 9-10. For their relief, “[Plaintiffs] motion to
vacate all orders in Case 2:18-cv-10129-JLL and we motion it be
consolidated with case 8:17-cv-0104-RBH-JDA.” Id. at 10.
These allegations relate solely to actions taken in Chief
Judge Linares’ capacity as a judicial officer. Plaintiffs have
not shown that those actions violated a declaratory decree or
that declaratory relief is unavailable; therefore, their claim
for injunctive relief against Chief Judge Linares is barred.2
Because Plaintiffs’ claims against Chief Judge Linares are
barred, Compendium § 3.6–6 and the Standing Order of January 13,
1994 do not require recusal.
B. Request for a Multidistrict Panel
Plaintiffs’ primary request is for “a panel review for the
purpose of seeking to transfer these cases to New Jersey
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1407, 1612-1612 [sic] et seq. in
the interest of justice.” ECF No. 1-8 at 17. From what the
Court can discern, Plaintiffs were convicted in New Jersey and
South Carolina of murder and allege a vast, multi-district
conspiracy of judges “to thwart fair and proper review by
listing the defendants in the case incorrectly.” Id. at 18.
Moreover, Plaintiffs further allege:
2 The Court notes that the docket of Civil Action No. 18-10129
does not indicate that any in forma pauperis application was
received by the Clerk. Any motion for relief from an order in
that matter must be filed in Civil Action No. 18-10129.
“[The alleged conspiring judges’] additional intent
was to prevent evidence of collateral estoppel from
being established in the court record emerging from
the Crawford state case 2013-cp-400-0084 to which the
United States and United Nations are party to the
default establishing Crawford as Heir, King, Khalifah
to the 4 Global Thrones of Religious Prophecy.”
Id. at 18-19.
This Court lacks the authority to empanel a multidistrict
panel for review of civil cases. The United States Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“the MDL Panel”) has the
statutory authority to “(1) determine whether civil actions
pending in different federal districts involve one or more
common questions of fact such that the actions should be
transferred to one federal district for coordinated or
consolidated pretrial proceedings; and (2) select the judge or
judges and court assigned to conduct such proceedings.”
Overview of Panel, available at https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/
overview-panel-0 (last visited Apr. 16, 2020) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407). Only the MDL panel can decide whether to create a
multidistrict litigation.
Even if the Court could form such a panel, it would not.
Plaintiffs’ voluminous “affidavits of facts” indicate they have
filed motions to intervene in several pending high-profile
cases, including but not limited to State of Texas, et al., v.
United States of America, et al., No. 19-10011 (5th Cir. Nov.
10, 2019) (challenge to the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act), ECF No. 42; and Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v.
Harvard University, No. 14-cv-14176 (D. Ma. Sept. 29, 2018)
(challenge to Harvard’s admission policies), ECF No. 8 at 58.
Plaintiffs are known vexatious litigants in the District of
South Carolina. See Duren v. Hood, No. 2:17-CV-1127-JMC-MGB,
2018 WL 3687977, at *1 n.1 (D.S.C. July 2, 2018), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 2:17-CV-01127-JMC, 2018 WL 3660094
(D.S.C. Aug. 2, 2018) (noting that “[v]arious prisoners
(including Anthony Cook, Lawrence Crawford, Yahya Muquit, David
Duren, Vincent Beaton, Travis Bellamy, and Robert Mitchell) have
repeatedly and improperly attempted to litigate on each other’s
behalf, often filing the same complaints and attachments” and
citing cases). It is clear from the record that this complaint
follows their modus operandi and has “no coherent issues or
plausible claims” and “consists largely of nonsensical ranting
and erroneous procedural arguments that build upon faulty
premise after faulty premise.” Id. at *6.
As the Court cannot grant Plaintiffs the relief they seek,
the complaint will be dismissed with prejudice. Generally,
“plaintiffs who file complaints subject to dismissal under [§
1915] should receive leave to amend unless amendment would be
inequitable or futile.” Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293
F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). Because the complaint is
frivolous as well, leave to amend is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is dismissed
with prejudice for failure to state a claim.3 An appropriate
order follows.
Dated: _April 29, 2020_______ ___s/ Noel L. Hillman_______
At Camden, New Jersey NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
3 This dismissal counts as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).