CAMPS v. SCHOLTZ

NOT FOR PUBLICATION ECF No. 170

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CAMDEN VICINAGE

CALVIN CAMPS,

Plaintiff Civ. No. 17-1895 (RMB-JS)

v.

MILLIE SCHOLTZ, et al., OPINION

Defendants

APPEARANCES:

CALVIN CAMPS

MQ 1920

SCI Phoenix

P.O. Box 244

Collegeville, PA 19426

Plaintiff, pro se

DANIEL GEE, Esq.

Evan H.C. Crook, Esq.

MALAMUT & ASSOCIATES, LLC.

457 Haddonfield Road, Suite 500

Cherry Hill, NJ 08002

On behalf of Defendants Warden Scholtz, Captain

McDonnell, Sgt. Davis and Board of Chosen Freeholders of

Burlington County1

BUMB, United States District Judge

This matter comes before the Court upon the summary judgment

motion of Defendants Warden Scholtz, Captain McDonnell, Sgt. Davis

1 The County Defendants have corrected their names and titles,

which were misidentified in the Amended Complaint. The Court will

refer to the defendants’ corrected names. (ECF No. 170 at 1.)

and Board of Chosen Freeholders (collectively the “County

Defendants”) (County Defs’ Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 170); and

Brief in Supp. of Summ. J. (County Defs’ Brief, ECF No. 170-1.)

Plaintiff did not file a brief in opposition to the County

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment but he filed a series of

letters and motions (ECF Nos. 171-185), which the Court will

consider.

The Court takes judicial notice of dozens of civil cases filed

by Plaintiff in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, available on

the Court’s Public Access to Court Electronic Records,

www.PACER.gov. See In re Congoleum Corp., 426 F.3d 675, 678 n. 2

(3d Cir. 2005) (taking judicial notice of proceedings in other

courts). Particularly, the Court takes judicial notice of Camps v.

Nutter, Civ. Action No. 14-01498 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2014).

Plaintiff’s complaint concerning the conditions of confinement in

this matter are virtually a carbon copy of his allegations of the

conditions in Curran-Fromhold Correctional Facility in

Philadelphia in 2014.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b), the Court

will determine the motion for summary judgment on the briefs

without oral argument.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s original complaint was filed in the New Jersey

Superior Court, Burlington County on February 29, 2016. (Compl.,

ECF No. 1 at 8.) Defendant Mildred Scholtz removed the action to

this Court on March 22, 2017. (Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1 at 1.)

On May 1, 2017, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint

because Plaintiff, who was granted in forma pauperis status in

state court, had “three strikes” under the Prison Litigation Reform

Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which prohibited him from filing a civil

action in federal court unless he showed imminent danger of serious

physical injury. (Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 9.) Although Plaintiff

filed at least three cases in forma pauperis that were dismissed

as frivolous, the Court was constrained to deny the motion to

dismiss based on the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

restricting the rule to cases filed in forma pauperis in federal

court. (Opinion, ECF. No. 20.) To prevent prisoners from filing in

state court to get around the three strikes rule in federal court

requires congressional action. Until such time, “recreational

litigants” such as Plaintiff get around the three strikes rule by

filing in state court.

On December 18, 2018, Plaintiff was granted leave to amend

the complaint to add Defendants CFG Health Systems, LLC; Dr. Grace

Nugent; Christina Owens, LPN; Mary Quinn-Murphy, LPN; Lynn

Johnson, NP and Stacey Chase, RN as defendants. (Order, ECF No.

92; Am. Compl., ECF No. 93.) On January 23, 2020, the County

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. (County Defs’ Mot.

for Summ. J., ECF No. 170.) Plaintiff subsequently filed a series

of letters and documents. (ECF Nos. 171-183.)

II. THE AMENDED COMPLAINT

On December 18, 2018, the Honorable Magistrate Judge Joel

Schneider granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Join Defendants and

directed the Clerk to docket Plaintiff’s Motion to Join Defendants

as the Amended Complaint. (Order, ECF No. 92.) Plaintiff did not

reassert all allegations against the original defendants in his

Motion to Join Defendants. Plaintiff’s many filings in this matter

suggest that he intended to continue his claims as pled in the

original complaint. Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and is

thus entitled to liberal construction of pleadings, the Court will

treat the Amended Complaint as incorporating the allegations filed

in the original Complaint. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94

(2007) (“a document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed[.]”)

(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).

Plaintiff alleges the following facts against the County

Defendants. (Compl., ECF No. 1; Am. Compl., ECF No. 93.) Plaintiff

was a pre-trial detainee in Burlington County Detention Center

(“BCDC”)2 at all relevant times alleged in the Complaint. (Am.

Compl., ¶4.) Warden Mildred Scholtz, Captain McDonnell and

2 Plaintiff refers to the facility as “Burlington County Jail” but

documents submitted by Warden Matthew Leith indicate the facility

is officially called “Burlington County Detention Center.” (ECF

No. 170-2 at 5.) The Court will refer to the facility as “BCDC.”

Sergeant Davis are employed by BCDC and are responsible for its

daily operations and overseeing all of its employees. (Id., ¶¶5-

7.) Plaintiff alleges the Board of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington

County are responsible for all policies carried out by the

officials at BCDC. (Id., ¶8.)

At the time Plaintiff filed the original Complaint, he was

the third man in his assigned cell, which was seven feet by ten

feet in size and designed to hold two inmates; and he was forced

to sleep in a plastic boat next to the toilet, exposed to urine

and feces. (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 11.) Plaintiff spent the majority

of his pre-trial detention in this overcrowded cell. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that the overcrowding combined with

continuous lockdowns subjected him to inadequate medical care and

deprived him of access to the courts. (Id. at 12.) The lockdowns

prevented him from showering on a daily basis. (Id.) The showers

were covered in black mold and were in disrepair. (Id. at 12-13.)

The cells were infested with insects and rodents. (Id. at 13.)

Plaintiff further alleged that due to overcrowding there was

(1) inadequate “day room” and recreational space; (2) poor

ventilation and poor air quality; (3) stained or damaged mattresses

with stained or damaged sheets, towels and blankets; (3) inadequate

laundry practices, which forced inmates to wash clothes in their

sinks and toilets in their cells; (4) failure to train and

supervise staff; (5) inadequate staffing leading to constant

lockdowns; and (6) denial of access to programs and services. (Id.

at 14-17.)

As to individual defendants, Plaintiff alleged Sergeant Davis

denied his requests, over the course of a number of months, for

envelopes with postage, which precluded him from sending legal

mail for his cases in Pennsylvania state and federal courts. (Id.

at 17.) Plaintiff alleged Captain McDonnell refused him use of the

law library, refused his requests regarding his missing property,

including money taken when he was arrested; and refused his

requests about sleeping on the floor in a plastic boat. (Compl.,

ECF No. 1 at 17.) Plaintiff alleged Warden Scholtz “refused to

stop those illegal acts.” (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 18.) Plaintiff

alleged all of the defendants approved the policies and customs

that caused his constitutional injuries. (Id. at 23.)

In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges he was deprived

of his property taken by BCDC employees without due process. (Am.

Compl., ECF No. 93 at 8.) He further alleges that Defendants

refused to send out his legal mail to the Court of Common Pleas,

Civil Division, and he “suffered injury to his filed LEGAL Cases….”

(Id.)

Plaintiff added several medical provider defendants in the

Amended Complaint, alleging they refused to provide him with anti-

viral medications that he had been receiving for Hepatitis C prior

to his incarceration in BCDC. It appears that Plaintiff also seeks

to hold the County Defendants liable for failing to provide him

with requested medical treatment. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff brings his

claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleges violations of the United

States Constitution and the New Jersey Constitution. (Id. at 10.)

The New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 et seq., was

modeled after and has repeatedly been interpreted analogously to

§ 1983. Trafton v. City of Woodbury, 799 F.Supp.2d 417, 443 (D.N.J.

2011) (citations omitted). Thus, the Court will analyze the claims

together, following § 1983 jurisprudence.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Summary of Arguments

1. The County Defendants’ Brief

The County Defendants argue they are entitled to summary

judgment because Plaintiff fails to state a claim supported by

competent evidence in the record. (County Defs’ Brief, ECF No.

170-1 at 9.) First, the County Defendants assert the fact that

Plaintiff was subject to sleeping three to a cell designed for

two, in proximity to the toilet, does not rise to the level of a

constitutional violation. (Id.) Second, the record is devoid of

competent evidence concerning the alleged unsanitary conditions.

(Id. at 10.) In sum, the County Defendants contend the complained

of conditions of confinement do not rise to the level of asserting

a violation of a “clearly established” right. (Id.)

Second, the County Defendants argue they are entitled to

qualified immunity. (Id.) They rely on the Third Circuit’s decision

in Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 236 (3d Cir. 2008), noting

that the degree of prison overcrowding that constitutes punishment

in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment is not clearly

established. (County Defs’ Brief, ECF No. 170-1 at 12.) The Third

Circuit specifically stated, “our own precedents have never

established a right of pretrial detainees to be free from triple-

celling or from sleeping on a mattress placed on the floor.” Id.

(quoting Hubbard, 538 F.3d at 236.)

As to the alleged unsanitary conditions, the County

Defendants contend the record is devoid of any evidence of mold

and/or insects and rodents. (Id. at 13.) Even assuming the

conditions existed, the County Defendants contend the record is

devoid of any facts showing that any defendants ignored the

unsanitary conditions or denied plaintiff medical treatment for

any medical injuries arising from either insect population and/or

mold. (Id. at 13-14.)

Third, the County Defendants maintain that the claims against

each of them must be dismissed as a matter of law because there

are no facts alleged and/or competent evidence in the record as to

any personal involvement of these individuals in any

constitutional violation. (Id. at 14.) The County Defendants also

suggest the Burlington County Board of Chosen Freeholders is not

a separate legal entity from Burlington County and therefore, not

subject to suit. (Id. at 15.)

Even if the proper municipal defendant is Burlington County,

the County Defendants assert Plaintiff has failed to plead facts

and/or support the complaint with competent evidence that county

policymakers are subject to liability. (County Defs’ Brief, ECF

No. 170-1 at 16.) Plaintiff has failed to put forth competent

evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that the

complained of conditions of confinement i.e. overcrowding,

lockdowns and/or unsanitary conditions were caused by the customs

and/or policies of the facility as to be the moving force behind

any alleged constitutional violation. (Id.)

2. Plaintiff’s Filings

Plaintiff did not file a brief in opposition to the County

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 56(c)(3), “[t]he court need consider only the

cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the

record.” Thus, the Court considers the following materials in the

record.

After the County Defendants filed their motion for summary

judgment, Plaintiff’s first filing was a motion to appoint pro

bono counsel (Mot. Appoint Counsel, ECF No. 171), which was denied

on February 27, 2020. (Order, ECF No. 181.) In that motion,

Plaintiff asserted he was not provided with discovery concerning

the conditions of confinement. (Id. at 2.)

On February 3, 2020, Plaintiff submitted his own affidavit,

stating that his property was taken when he was arrested and

brought to Burlington County Jail. (Aff., ECF No. 172 at 2.) He

cites to seven different lawsuits he initiated in 2014 for failure

to treat his liver condition. (Aff. ECF No. 172 at 3.) Plaintiff

states that he exhausted his administrative remedies by appealing

to Warden Scholtz. (Id. at 5.)

Plaintiff also continued to file copies of his late discovery

requests on the Medical Defendants. (Letters, ECF Nos. 175-177.)

He filed a motion to compel discovery, which was denied because

the deadline for discovery, which had been ongoing for

approximately three years, had passed. (Mot. to Compel, ECF No.

178; Order, ECF No. 182.) Plaintiff also filed documents concerning

medical malpractice lawsuits brought in other jurisdictions. (ECF

No. 183.)

B. Summary Judgment Standard of Review

Summary Judgment is proper where the moving party “shows that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);

Daubert v. NRA Group, LLC, 861 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2017). “A

dispute is “genuine” if ‘a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party[.]’” Baloga v. Pittston Area Sch. Dist.,

927 F.3d 742, 752 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Santini v. Fuentes, 795

F.3d 410, 416 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “[A] fact is ‘material’ where

‘its existence or nonexistence might impact the outcome of the

suit under the applicable substantive law.’” Baloga, 927 F.3d at

752 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).

The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to show, beyond the

pleadings, “‘that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Daubert,

861 F.3d at 391 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 447 U.S. 317,

324 (1986) (emphasis in Daubert)). “With respect to an issue on

which the non-moving party bears the burden of proof, the burden

on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’—that is,

pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of

evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Conoshenti v.

Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 145–46 (3d Cir. 2004)

(quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325).

A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is

genuinely disputed must support the assertion

by:

(A) citing to particular parts of

materials in the record, including

depositions, documents, electronically

stored information, affidavits or

declarations, stipulations (including

those made for purposes of the motion

only), admissions, interrogatory

answers, or other materials; or

(B) showing that the materials cited do

not establish the absence or presence of

a genuine dispute, or that an adverse

party cannot produce admissible evidence

to support the fact.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

“At the summary judgment stage, facts must be viewed in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a

‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.

372, 380 (2007) (citing Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(c)). The court’s

role is “‘not ... to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of

the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for

trial.’” Baloga, 927 F.3d at 752 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at

249)).

Plaintiff alleged that he has not received all discovery

(Letter, ECF No. 185); therefore, summary judgment for the

defendants is improper. The Court disagrees. The Court denied

Plaintiff’s most recent discovery motion, noting “Plaintiff has

had more than a sufficient opportunity to conduct discovery and

the discovery at issue was served late.” (Order, ECF No. 182.)

Discovery was permitted for a period of nearly three years. (Id.

at 2.) No further discovery is permitted.

C. Conditions of Confinement

1. Standard of Law

Conditions of confinement claims brought by pretrial

detainees are analyzed under the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. Hubbard, 538 F.3d at 230. The inquiry in

such cases is whether the conditions amount “to punishment of the

detainee.” Id. at 231 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535

(1979)). The first part of the inquiry is “whether the disability

is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an

incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose.” Hubbard,

538 F.3d at 232 (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 538-39)). If there is

a legitimate governmental purpose, the question is whether the

condition is excessive in relation to that purpose. Id. Governments

have an interest in maintaining security and order in operating

correctional facilities in manageable fashion, and courts should

ordinarily defer to the professional expertise of corrections

officials in the administration of detention facilities. Id.

(quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 540 n. 23) (citations omitted)).

2. Analysis

Triple-celling, even if it occurred for the majority of

Plaintiff’s seven-month confinement in BCDC, does not amount to

punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hubbard, 538

F.3d at 233 (without evidence that sleeping on the floor resulted

in disease, sleeping on a floor mattress for three to seven months

did not violate Due Process rights). Prison officials have a

legitimate interest in managing an overcrowded prison. Id. (citing

Union County Jail Inmates v. DiBuono, 713 F.2d 984, 993 (3d Cir.

1983). Plaintiff’s nonspecific allegations of unsanitary

conditions such as mold in the showers, insects and rodents, poor

ventilation, inadequate laundry practices and lockdowns due to

staff shortages, especially where unsupported by evidence in the

record3 after the close of discovery, fail to establish that

Plaintiff was subjected to a genuine privation and hardship over

an extended period of time. Hubbard, 538 F.3d at 235; see Lindsey

v. Shaffer, 411 F. App’x 466, 468 (3d Cir. 2011) (sleeping on

mattress on the floor and sharing a toilet did not amount to cruel

and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment).

Even if Plaintiff had garnered some evidence in support of

his allegations, the individual defendants would be entitled to

3 Local Civil Rule 56.1 provides, in pertinent part:

The opponent of summary judgment shall

furnish, with its opposition papers, a

responsive statement of material facts,

addressing each paragraph of the movant’s

statement, indicating agreement or

disagreement, and if not agreed, stating each

material fact in dispute and citing to the

affidavits and other documents submitted in

connection with the motion; any material fact

not disputed shall be deemed undisputed for

purposes of the summary judgment motion. In

addition, the opponent may also furnish a

supplemental statement of disputed material

facts, in separately numbered paragraphs

citing to the affidavits and other documents

submitted in connection with the motion, if

necessary to substantiate the factual basis

for opposition….

Plaintiff did not comply with this rule. If there is competent

evidence supporting Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement, loss of

property or access to courts claims in this voluminous record that

the Court missed, Plaintiff may file a motion for reconsideration.

qualified immunity. “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects

government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as

their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “A clearly

established right is one that is ‘sufficiently clear that every

reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing

violates that right.’” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015)

(quoting Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012) (internal

quotation marks and alteration omitted)). “[E]xisting precedent

must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond

debate.” Id. (citing Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741,

(2011)).

Plaintiff has not cited, nor can the Court find, clearly

established law that “triple celling,” with nonspecific

allegations of inadequate community space, mold in the showers,

the presence of insects and rodents, torn or stained bedding, poor

ventilation and a nonspecific number and duration of lockdowns

constitutes punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

See Hubbard, 538 F.3d at 236 (noting scant guidance from the

Supreme Court on what constitutes “punishment” under the

Fourteenth Amendment); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 305 (1991)

(“Nothing so amorphous as ‘overall conditions’ can rise to the

level of cruel and unusual punishment when no specific deprivation

of a single human need exists.”)

D. Claims Against Individual Defendants

The County Defendants maintain that there are no facts alleged

nor competent evidence in the record as to any personal involvement

of Warden Scholtz, Captain McDonnell or Sergeant Davis in a

constitutional violation. (County Defs’ Brief, ECF No. 170-1 at

14-15.) As to Sergeant Davis, Plaintiff alleged she denied his

requests for envelopes and postage, over the course of several

months, which precluded him from sending legal mail for his cases

in Pennsylvania state and federal courts. In order to state a First

Amendment claim for violation of the right of access to courts, a

plaintiff must establish an actual injury. Lewis v. Casey, 518

U.S. 343, 352-53 (1996). Thus, a plaintiff must demonstrate “that

a nonfrivolous legal claim had been frustrated or was being

impeded.” Id. Plaintiff’s allegations do not rise to this level

because he does not allege any actual injury from delay in sending

a specific piece of legal mail relevant to a nonfrivolous legal

claim.

Next, Plaintiff seeks to hold Captain McDonnell liable for

refusing use of the law library, refusing requests regarding

missing property, and refusing requests about sleeping on the floor

in a plastic boat. Plaintiff has not established that sleeping on

the floor in a plastic boat violated his constitutional rights;

therefore, Captain McDonnell is not liable for not addressing

Plaintiff’s requests in this regard. Like his claim that Sergeant

Davis denied him postage and envelopes for legal mail, Plaintiff

has not demonstrated or even alleged that McDonnell’s denial of

his requests to use the law library denied Plaintiff access to the

courts. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351 (because there is not a freestanding

right to a law library, a plaintiff must show actual injury, for

example, that inadequacies of the law library prevented him even

from filing a complaint.)

Plaintiff also attempts to state a claim for deprivation of

property. “A prisoner's due process claim based on a state actor's

unauthorized deprivation of property is not actionable under §

1983 unless no adequate post-deprivation remedy is available.”

Mattis v. Dohman, 260 F. App'x 458, 461 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984)). Prison grievance

systems that allow prisoners to complain about lost property are

adequate post-deprivations remedies. Id. (citing Tillman v.

Lebanon County Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 422 (3d Cir. 2000)).

State tort suits for conversion of property are also adequate post-

deprivation remedies. Id. (citing Hudson, 468 U.S. at 535).

Plaintiff has not alleged facts that would permit a reasonable

fact finder to conclude that adequate post-deprivation remedies

were unavailable to him. Thus, this claim fails against Captain

McDonnell.

Finally, Plaintiff alleged Warden Scholtz is liable for

failing to stop illegal acts. A supervisor is not liable for the

unconstitutional acts of his or her subordinates under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 based on respondeat superior. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S

662, 676 (2009). Here, Plaintiff has not established Warden

Scholtz’s knowledge of any unconstitutional acts, nor has he

alleged in a nonconclusory manner that Warden Scholtz maintained

a policy or custom that violated his constitutional rights. See

Barkes v. First Correctional Medical Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 320 (3d

Cir. 2014) (noting supervisory liability may be found when a

supervisor is deliberately indifferent to a known deficiency in

government policy or procedure that creates an unreasonable risk

of constitutional injury) rev’d on other grounds by Taylor v.

Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015). Therefore, the individual

defendants, Davis, McDonnell and Scholtz, are entitled to summary

judgment on Plaintiff’s § 1983 and NJCRA claims.

E. Claims Against Burlington County

The County Defendants contend that the Board of Chosen

Freeholders of Burlington County is not an entity that is

independently subject to legal suit. (County Defs’ Brief, ECF No.

170-1 at 15.) The Court finds that even if the complaint is

construed as against Burlington County, Plaintiff has not pled

sufficient facts to establish the County was the moving force

behind an alleged constitutional violation based on its policies

or customs.

A plaintiff may bring a claim for municipal liability under

§ 1983 by alleging that an official municipal policy, including

practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the

force of law, caused his or her constitutional injuries. Connick

v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60-61 (2011). Vague assertions of a

custom or policy, with virtually no evidentiary support, fail to

state a § 1983 claim against a municipality. Groman v. Township of

Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 637 (3d Cir. 1995). Plaintiff’s claims of

customs or policies causing constitutional injury are nothing more

than conclusory assertions. Therefore, Burlington County is

entitled to summary judgment.

F. Medical Claims Against Non-Medical Officials

It appears the Plaintiff seeks to hold all defendants liable

for the alleged failure to treatment his Hepatitis C with anti-

viral medications. In a separate Opinion, the Court has found that

the claims against the Medical Defendants are barred by the statute

of limitations. The County Defendants are non-medical prison

officials.

“If a prisoner is under the care of medical experts …, a non-

medical prison official will generally be justified in believing

that the prisoner is in capable hands.” Spruill v. Gillis, 372

F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004). Thus, writing complaints about

medical treatment to a non-medical prison official when the

prisoner is being treated by a prison doctor will not subject the

non-medical prison official to liability under § 1983. Spruill,

372 F.3d at 236 (citing Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d

Cir. 1993). “[A]bsent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge)

that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not

treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison official … will not be

chargeable with … deliberate indifference.’” Id.; see Natale v.

Camden County Correctional Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581-82 (3d Cir.

2003) (analyzing Fourteenth Amendment claim for inadequate medical

care under the standard used to evaluate similar Eighth Amendment

claims). Instead, a plaintiff must show that a prison authority

“den[ied] reasonable requests for medical

treatment ... and such denial exposes the

inmate ‘to undue suffering or the threat of

tangible residual injury,’ [Monmouth County

Correctional Institutional Inmates v.

Lanzaro], 834 F.2d [326], 346 (quoting

Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 (6th Cir.

1976)), and (2) where ‘knowledge of the need

for medical care [is accompanied by the] ...

intentional refusal to provide that care,’”

id. (quoting Ancata v. Prison Health Servs.,

769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1985))

(alterations in original).

Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).

Plaintiff makes only conclusory allegations, based on

submitting grievances, to hold the County Defendants liable for

alleged inadequate medical care. Plaintiff falls far short of

meeting the pleading standard, let alone providing competent

evidence supporting his claims in opposition to summary judgment.

The County Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on all

claims.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court will grant the

County Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

An appropriate Order follows.

Date: March 23, 2020

s/Renée Marie Bumb

RENÉE MARIE BUMB

United States District Judge