KANSHAW v. DESANTIS

Not for Publication

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

SASHA KANSHAW,

Plaintiff Civil Action No. 18-11758

v OPINION

WILLIAM PATERSON UNIVERSITY, et al.,

Defendants.

John Michael Vazquez, U.S.D.J.

Plaintiff Sasha Kanshaw brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that

Defendants, police officers in the William Paterson University Police Department, violated her

rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. D.E. 7. Currently pending before the Court

is Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. D.E. 10. The Court reviewed the parties’ submissions in

support and in opposition! and decided the motion without oral argument pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

P, 78(b) and L. Civ. R. 78.1(b). For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

' Defendants’ brief in support of its motion will be referred to as “Def. Br.,” D.E. 10-1; Plaintiff's

opposition will be referred to as “Pl. Opp.,” D.E. 13; Defendants’ reply will be referred to as “Def.

Reply,” D.E. 14.

I. BACKGROUND?

Plaintiff is a resident of Hawthome, New Jersey. FAC 75. In the early moming on April

10, 2018, Piaintiff noticed a portion of her finger was swollen. /d. at 713. Plaintiff believed the

swelling was due to an allergic reaction to medication. /d, Plaintiff decided to drive herself to

Saint Joseph’s Hospital in Wayne, New Jersey, located about five miles away from her home. Jd.

at 14. On the way, Plaintiff's vehicle ran out of fuel. /d. at She contacted “BMW Assist,”

a service provided to BMW drivers, and requested roadside assistance. Jd. at 7 17. Shortly

thereafter, multiple police vehicles surrounded Plaintiff's vehicle. Jd. at € 18. Defendant Officer

DeSantis approached Plaintiff's vehicle. /d. at 919. DeSantis was allegedly not wearing any

police clothing and failed to identify herself as a police officer. /d. DeSantis demanded that

Plaintiff roll down her window. Jd. at 20. Unaware that DeSantis was a police officer, Plaintiff

lowered the window only a few inches in order to “protect herself.” Jd. DeSantis allegedly became

aggressive towards Plaintiff, and along with the other police officer Defendants, demanded that

Plaintiff exit her vehicle. /d. at { 21. Plaintiff told Defendants she was suffering an allergic

reaction and was going to the hospital. /d. at § 22.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Officer Hunter proceeded to physically force down

Plaintiff's driver’s side back window; cut Plaintiff's seatbelt; and, with the help of the other

Defendants, remove Plaintiff from the vehicle by pulling her by the hair and grabbing her. Jd. at

{ 24. Plaintiff was not free to leave after being forced out of her vehicle and claims that Officer

> The facts are derived from Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, D.E. 7 (“FAC”). When

reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts in the complaint.

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). Additionally, a district court may

consider “exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record” as well as “an

undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if

the plaintiff's claims are based on the document.” Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol.

Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir, 1993).

Hunter falsely accused Plaintiff of referring to another officer at the scene as the “n-word[.]” Jd.

at § 26. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Sergeant Bardi called for an ambulance so Plaintiff

could be taken for a psychological evaluation. /d. at ]27. Defendants also had Plaintiff's vehicle

towed. /d, at § 28. Defendants allegedly followed Plaintiff to the hospital and forcibly placed

Plaintiffin a room, without permitting her to leave or obtain medical care. /d. at §§] 30, 31. Plaintiff

asserts that the hospital staff allegedly ordered the police officers to cease their conduct, and

Plaintiff was placed in a regular hospital room, where she was administered Benadryl for the

allergic reaction. /d. at § 33.

Moreover, Plaintiff claims that when her towed vehicle was recovered, the bumper was

removed, a wheel rim was broken, the front hood was damaged, exterior paint was damaged, the

driver’s seatbelt was cut, and the suspension was damaged. /d. at § 34. She also claims that

Defendant officers prepared a false police report making untruthful statements regarding Plaintiff

and the incident, including Plaintiff kicking DeSantis, spitting in Hunter’s face, and possessing

Fildena, an illegal substance. /d. at {J 35-37.

Plaintiff filed her Complaint on July 18, 2018, D.E. 1, and Defendants responded with a

motion to dismiss, D.E. 4, On September 17, 2018, Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint.

D.E. 7. Plaintiff asserted three counts pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest (Count 1), false

imprisonment (Count II, and excessive force (Count II). Jd. Plaintiff seeks a declaratory

judgment that Defendants’ actions violated her rights, compensatory damages, reasonable costs

and attorneys’ fees, and punitive damages. /d. at 46, 51, 57. On September 27, 2018,

Defendants filed the current motion to dismiss, D.E. 10, Plaintiff filed opposition, D.E. 13, and

Defendants replied, D.E. 14. The parties agree that the only issue for the Court to decide is whether

Defendants, in their individual capacities, are entitled to qualified immunity. Pl. Opp. at 5; Def.

Reply at 1. Accordingly, the Court limits its review to that issue.

The Court notes that Defendants also moved to dismiss the FAC against them in their

official capacities. Def. Br. at 5. While Plaintiff does not expressly concede the issue, Plaintiff

does admit that “[t]he sole issue to be decided — and the sole argument made as to the claims

against the individual defendants in their individual capacities, is whether defendants are entitled

to qualified immunity.” Pl. Opp. at 5 (emphases added). Moreover, Plaintiff does not provide any

contrary authority indicating that Defendants can be sued in their official capacities. As a result,

the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to their official capacity argument.

Il. LEGAL STANDARD

For a complaint to survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), it must contain sufficient factual

matter to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible

“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” /d. Although the plausibility standard

“does not impose a probability requirement, it does require a pleading to show more than a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780,

786 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Further, a plaintiff must

“allege sufficient facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will uncover proof of her

claims.” Jd. at 789.

In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, a district court must accept all factual

allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.

Phillips v, County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008). A court, however, is “not

compelled to accept unwarranted inferences, unsupported conclusions or legal conclusions

disguised as factual allegations.” Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 211 (3d Cir, 2007). If,

after viewing the allegations in the complaint most favorable to the plaintiff, it appears that no

relief could be granted under any set of facts consistent with the allegations, a court may dismiss

the complaint for failure to state a claim. DeFazio v. Leading Edge Recovery Sols., No. 10-2945,

2010 WL 5146765, at *1 (D.N.J. Dec. 13, 2010).

I. ANALYSIS

As noted, Plaintiff asserts her claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides

in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to

be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within

the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable

to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress[.]

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

To obtain relief under this statute, Plaintiff must establish: (i) that one of his rights secured

by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and (ii) that this violation was caused

or committed by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48

(1988); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (noting that Section 1983 does not

provide substantive rights; rather, it provides a vehicle for vindicating violations of other federal

rights).

“Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages liability unless the

official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the

challenged conduct.” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,

563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)). In determining whether qualified immunity exists, a court must assess

(1) “whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged .. . make out a violation of a constitutional right”

and (2) “whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant’s alleged

misconduct.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.

194, 201 (2001)). Courts are permitted “to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of

the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first[.]” Jd. at 236. “If the

plaintiff fails to satisfy either prong, the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 2012) (finding defendant police officers

were entitled to qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage) (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at

232).

The privilege of qualified immunity is “tan entitlement not to stand trial or face the other

burdens of litigation.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). The Supreme Court has

“made clear that the ‘driving force’ behind creation of the qualified immunity doctrine was a desire

to ensure that “insubstantial claims” against government officials [will] be resolved prior to

discovery.”” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231-32 (alterations in original) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton,

483 U.S. 635, 640, n.2 (1987)). Accordingly, the Supreme Court has “repeatedly . . . stressed the

importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” Hunter v.

Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam). However, “[t]he qualified immunity analysis

involves a fact-intensive inquiry that is generally ill-suited for resolution at the pleadings stage.”

Janowski v. City of North Wildwood, 259 F, Supp. 3d 113, 121 (D.N.J. 2017) (quoting Batiz v.

Brown, No. 12-581, 2013 WL 1137531, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 14, 2013)). Therefore, “qualified

immunity will be upheld on a 12(b)(6) motion only when the immunity is established on the face

of the complaint.” Thomas v. Independence Township, 463 F.3d 285, 291 (3d Cir. 2006). Finally,

the party asserting qualified immunity “bears the burden of proving its applicability.” Janowski,

259 F, Supp. 3d at 122 (citing Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 223 (3d Cir. 2010)).

A. Plaintiff's Constitutional Violation Allegations

The first prong of the qualified immunity analysis is whether a constitutional violation

£

occurred. This “is not a question of immunity, but whether there is any wrong to address.” James,

700 F.3d at 679 (quoting Ray v. Township of Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 174 (3d Cir. 2010)) (internal

quotation marks omitted); see also Jones v, Walsh, No. 15-2629, 2018 WL 1203472, at *4 (D.N_J.

Mar. 8, 2018) (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201) (“Because the first step of a qualified-immunity

analysis is to examine whether the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the defendant violated a

constitutional or statutory right, that question overlaps with the issue of whether the plaintiff has

stated a claim under § 1983.”), Here, the FAC alleges that Defendants falsely arrested, falsely

imprisoned, and used excessive force against Plaintiff.

1. Plaintiff's False Arrest and False Imprisonment Claims (Counts I and ID)

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable seizures of the person. See U.S.

Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment, in turn, is applicable to the States through the

Fourteenth Amendment. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142 (1979). “To state a claim for false

arrest under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must establish: (1) that there was an arrest; and (2)

that the arrest was made without probable cause.” James, 700 F.3d at 680 (citing Groman v.

Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 1995)). Similarly, “where the police lack

probable cause to make an arrest, the arrestee has a claim under § 1983 for false imprisonment

based on a detention pursuant that arrest.” Groman, 47 F.3d at 636; Adams v. Officer Eric Selhorst,

449 F. App’x 198, 201 (3d Cir. 2011).

With respect to the first element of a false arrest or imprisonment claim, “[a] Fourth

Amendment seizure occurs when the government terminates the freedom of an individual through

means intentionally applied.” Vargas v. City of Philadelphia, 783 F.3d 962, 969 (3d Cir. 2015)

(citing Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S, 593, 596-97 (1989)). In other words, a seizure occurs

“Co]nly when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way

restrained the liberty of a citizen[.]” James, 700 F.3d at 680 (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S.

429, 434 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted), The Fourth Amendment, however, “does not

protect against all seizures; it only protects against those that are unreasonable.” Vargas, 783 F.3d

at 970 (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985)). Determining the reasonableness

of a seizure requires a court to balance “the need of law enforcement officials against the burden

on the affected citizens and consider[ ] the relation of the policeman’s actions to his reason for

stopping the [individual].” Baker v. Monroe Township, 50 F.3d 1186, 1192 (3d Cir. 1995).

Defendants argue they “are entitled to qualified immunity under the first prong of the

qualified immunity analysis” because their actions fall within the “community caretaking doctrine”

and therefore cannot amount to a violation of Plaintiffs constitutional rights. Def. Br. at 24-25.

The community caretaking doctrine “is an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth

Amendment and allows police with a non-law enforcement purpose to seize or search a person or

property ‘in order to ensure the safety of the public and/or the individual, regardless of any

suspected criminal activity.’”” Vargas, 783 F.3d at 971 (quoting United States v. King, 990 F.2d

1552, 1560 (10th Cir. 1993)). The doctrine is not limitless, however, as the Eighth Circuit has

articulated:

Whether the seizure of a person by a police officer acting in his or

her noninvestigatory capacity is reasonable depends on whether it is

based on specific articulable facts and requires a reviewing court to

balance the governmental interest in the police officer’s exercise of

his or her “community caretaking function” and the individual’s

interest in being free from arbitrary government interference.

Winters v. Adams, 254 F.3d 758, 767 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing King, 990 F.2d at 1560).

In Vargas, the plaintiff dialed 911 to seek emergency assistance for her daughter’s asthma

attack. 783 F.3d at 966. While waiting for paramedics to arrive, the plaintiff and two other

individuals placed the plaintiffs daughter in a vehicle and prepared to take the daughter to the

hospital themselves. /d. Police officers, responding to a report of screaming individuals, allegedly

positioned their vehicle so that it blocked the plaintiff's vehicle. Jd. The officers reportedly

ordered everyone out of the vehicle and knowing an ambulance was nearby, instructed the plaintiff

and the others to wait for the paramedics. /d. at 967. The plaintiff claimed that the officers

unreasonably seized her in violation of the Fourth Amendment. /d. at 968. The Third Circuit held

that “the community caretaking doctrine can apply in situations when . . . a person outside of a

home has been seized for a non-investigatory purpose and to protect that individual or the

community at large.” /d. at 972. The Vargas court agreed with the defendants’ argument that

even if there was a seizure, it was reasonable under the community caretaking doctrine. However,

the Third Circuit’s holding was premised on the following:

The undisputed facts show that the actions of [the officers] were

reasonable. They were responding to a volatile situation which they

did not initially know involved a medical emergency, and any brief

seizure that may have occurred was a result of the officers’ concern

for the safety of everyone involved .... Once the officers realized

[the plaintiff's daughter] needed medical attention, it was reasonable

for them to direct [the plaintiff] to wait because an ambulance was

within earshot and its arrival was apparently imminent.

Id.

Here, Defendants assert that Plaintiff “told them she was suffering from a medical

emergency but refused to allow them to help.” Def. Reply at 5. Defendants assert that they faced

the following decision:

[Defendants] could either physically remove [Plaintiff] from her

vehicle, place her in an ambulance and get her to the hospital where

she can receive the medical attention she needs, or they could

disregard her medical emergency and allow her to remain in her

vehicle on University Drive on a Tuesday moming when classes

were in session.

Id. Defendants argue they chose the first option and that the community caretaking doctrine

permits this course of action.’ Id.

Vargas is readily distinguishable from the present matter. First, in Vargas the Third Circuit

reviewed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds against

the plaintiff following discovery. 783 F.3d at 969. The present action remains at the motion to

dismiss stage and discovery has not yet commenced. Asa result, the Court accepts all of Plaintiff's

well-pleaded facts as true in deciding the motion. Second, the FAC does not indicate why the

officers arrived at Plaintiff's vehicle in the first place. Nothing in the FAC indicates that

Defendants, like the officers in Vargas, were responding to a 911 call or other comparable situation

that would support the community caretaking doctrine.

Finally, Defendants suggest that Plaintiff informed them that “she was suffering from a

medical emergency” and her refusal to allow them to help necessitated the physical removal of

Plaintiff from her vehicle. Def. Reply. at 5. Yet the FAC merely alleges that “Plaintiff informed

the officers that she was suffering an allergic reaction and on her way to the hospital.” FAC at □

22. The allergic reaction was limited to sweiling on a portion of one of Plaintiff's fingers. /d. at

Such circumstances do not appear to constitute a “medical emergency” for which a non-

investigatory, warrantless seizure of Plaintiff was necessary in order to ensure public safety and/or

the safety of Plaintiff. In other words, the factual allegations, viewed in the light most favorable

to the Plaintiff at this stage, do not “show that the actions of [the officers] were reasonable.”

3 Defendants further assert that “New Jersey law enforcement officers have a duty to take a person

into custody when faced with circumstances like those in this case.” Def. Reply. at 5 (citing

N.J.S.A, 30:4-27.6). However, N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.6 is inapposite. The statute provides, in relevant

part, that a “law enforcement officer shall take custody ofa person and take the person immediately

and directly to a screening service if] ] . . . [o]n the basis of personal observation, the law

enforcement officer has reasonable cause to believe that the person is in need of involuntary

commitment to treatment[.]” N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.6(a), Nothing in the FAC suggests that Defendants

had reasonable cause to believe that Plaintiff was in need of involuntary commitment.

Vargas, 783 F.3d at 972. Therefore, although further development of this case may support the

reasonableness of Defendants’ conduct, the Court rejects Defendants’ argument that the

community caretaking doctrine entitles them to qualified immunity based on the current record.

Plaintiff alleges that she was seized by physical force. FAC at 924. As noted, the limited

factual record before the Court does not suggest the seizure was reasonable under the community

caretaking doctrine. Accordingly, Plaintiff satisfies the first element of her false arrest and false

imprisonment claims.

As to the second element of Plaintiffs false arrest and false imprisonment claims,

“probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer’s

knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense

has been committed or is being committed by the person to be arrested.” Reedy, 615 F.3d at 211

(quoting Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995)). Here, the FAC does not

suggest that Defendants’ reasonably believed that Plaintiff had committed or was committing a

criminal offense. Defendants make no argument regarding their knowledge of any facts or

circumstances that would reasonably lead them to this belief. In fact, Defendants’ invocation of

the community caretaking doctrine necessarily prevents the Court from finding that Defendants

acted with the reasonable belief that Plaintiff had committed or was committing an offense.

Accordingly, Plaintiff satisfies the second element of her false arrest and false imprisonment

claims.

Because Plaintiff has satisfied both elements of her false arrest and false imprisonment

claims, she has sufficiently alleged that “there is [a] wrong to address.” James, 700 F.3d at 679.

Therefore, Plaintiff satisfies the first prong in the qualified immunity analysis at the pleading stage

with respect to these claims.

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2. Plaintiff's Excessive Force Claim (Count ITD)

As with false arrest and false imprisonment claims, a claim that a law enforcement officer

used excessive force “in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free

citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard{.]”

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). “To state a claim for excessive force as an

unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must show that a ‘seizure’ has

occurred and that it was unreasonable.” Estate of Smith vy. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 515 (3d Cir.

2003) (quoting Abraham vy. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 288 (3d Cir. 1999)). Determining the

reasonableness of the force used requires a court to balance “‘the nature and quality of the intrusion

on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests’ against the countervailing governmental interests

at stake.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). The use of force must be “objectively unreasonable” and

factors to consider in this analysis include the following:

_[T]he severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat

to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he actively is resisting arrest or

attempting to evade arrest by flight, see Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, as well as the

possibility that the persons subject to the police action are themselves violent or

dangerous, the duration of the action, whether the action takes place in the context

of effecting an arrest, the possibility that the suspect may be armed, and the number

of person with whom the police officers must contend at one time, see Sharrar v.

Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 822 (3d Cir. 1997).

Estate of Smith, 318 F.3d at 515.

Here, Plaintiff sufficiently states a claim for excessive force. Plaintiff had not committed

and was not in the process of committing a crime, nor is there any indication Plaintiff herself is

violent or dangerous. Plaintiff was not armed, and the officers did not have to contend with other

individuals other than Plaintiff. Although further development of the factual record may prove

otherwise, the swelling on Plaintiff's finger and her indication that she was going to the hospital

because of an allergic reaction do not suggest Plaintiff was a threat to the officers or others.

Additionally, while Plaintiff may not have cooperated with Defendants, she allegedly did not know

that Defendants were police officers. FAC at 20. Further, as Defendants themselves argue,

Defendants sought to seize Plaintiff for non-investigatory purposes pursuant to the community

caretaking doctrine. Def. Br. at 24-25. This lends further support to the conclusion that the “nature

and quality of the intrusion” against Plaintiff-forcing down Plaintiff's window, cutting her

seatbelt, and pulling Plaintiff out of her vehicle by her hair, FAC at § 24, outweigh the

“countervailing governmental interests at stake’-the purported need to seize an individual

suffering from an allergic reaction and transporting them to the hospital. Graham, 490 U.S. at

396. Accordingly, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that Defendants’ use of force was “objectively

unreasonable” under the circumstances. Estate of Smith, 318 F.3d at 515.

It bears repeating that discovery may uncover proof that Defendants used a reasonable

amount of force under the circumstances (or that Defendants did not use the force alleged). Based

on the limited allegations currently before the Court and the Court’s obligation to accept Plaintiff's

factual allegations as true, however, the Court finds Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that “there is

[a] wrong to address.” James, 700 F.3d at 679, Therefore, Plaintiff satisfies the first prong in the

qualified immunity analysis at the pleading stage with respect to her excessive force claim.

B. Whether the Rights at Issue were “Clearly Established”

A clearly established right is one that is “sufficiently clear ‘that every reasonable official

would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’"” Reichle, 566 U.S. at 664

(quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741). The second prong of the qualified immunity analysis “shields

an officer from suit when she makes a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably

misapprehends the law governing the circumstances she confronted.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543

U.S, 194, 198 (2004) (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 206). An officer will not be subjected to the

burdens of litigation “{i]f the law at [the time of the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct] did

not clearly establish that the officer’s conduct would violate the Constitution[.]” /d. While a case

directly on point is not required to clearly establish a right, “existing precedent must have placed

the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741; see also Kedra

v. Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424, 450 (3d Cir. 2017) (“We typically look to Supreme Court precedent or

a consensus in the Courts of Appeals to give an officer fair warning that his conduct would be

unconstitutional.”). In other words, qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent

or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S, 335, 341 (1986).

Furthermore, courts should not “define clearly established law at a high level of

generality[,]” but rather determine “whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly

established.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742 (“The general proposition, for example, that an

unreasonable search or seizure violates the Fourth Amendment is of little help in determining

whether the violative nature of particular conduct is established.”). This inquiry “must be

undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.”

Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 198 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In Brosseau, which involved an excessive force claim based upon a police shooting of a

suspect fleeing by car, the Ninth Circuit denied qualified immunity because the officer had violated

the clearly established rule that “deadly force is only permissible where the officer has probable

cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to

others.” Haugen v. Brosseau, 339 F.3d 857, 873 (9th Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court reversed,

holding that the Ninth Circuit applied a “general” test for excessive force. Brosseau, 543 U.S. at

199. Instead, according to the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit should have asked whether it was

clearly established that the Fourth Amendment prohibited the officer’s conduct in the “‘situation

LA

[she] confronted’: whether to shoot a disturbed felon, set on avoiding capture through vehicular

flight, when persons in the immediate area are at risk from that flight.” Jd. at 199-200. The

Supreme Court concluded that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity because none of the

court of appeals cases cited by the parties “squarely governs the case here.” /d, at 201.

Further guidance on the required degree of specificity is found in Anderson. There, the

lower court denied qualified immunity because the plaintiff had the clearly established “right to

be free from warrantless searches of one’s home unless the searching officers have probable cause

and there are exigent circumstances.” Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. The Supreme Court held that

the lower court should have asked whether “the circumstances with which [the officer] was

confronted . . . constitue[d] probable cause and exigent circumstances.” /d. at 640-41. Without

first addressing that question, the Supreme Court observed, the principle that warrantless searches

without probable cause and exigent circumstances violate the Fourth Amendment did not clearly

establish that the officer’s search was unlawful. /d. at 641,

Thus, the question this Court must address is whether a reasonable officer in Defendants’

position would have understood that the Fourth Amendment prohibited their conduct in the

situation they confronted: whether to forcibly seize an individual in a parked vehicle who was

suffering from an allergic reaction, intending to travel to the hospital, and refusing‘ the officers’

directions (with at least one of the officers not in police uniform and failing to identify herself as

a police officer).

Defendants argument on this prong is not entirely clear. Defendants argue, in conclusory

fashion, that there is no clear precedent from the United States Supreme Court nor a robust

“Or at least refusing in part. Plaintiff indicates that she did roll down a few inches in response to

DeSantis’ command to roll down the window.

consensus from the circuits, that “clearly establishes that the Officer Defendants actions here

violated the Fourth Amendment.” Def. Br. at 18. As □ result, the Court reviews the second prong

as to the community caretaking doctrine and then turns to the Fourth Amendment in general.

As noted, the community caretaking doctrine permits the physical seizure of an individual

for non-investigatory purposes in order to ensure public safety and/or the safety of the Plaintiff.

See, e.g., King, 990 F.2d at 1560; United States v. Rideau, 969 F.2d 1572, 1574 (Sth Cir. 1992);

Winters, 254 F.3d at 764; Vargas, 783 F.3d at 972. However, an individual’s Fourth Amendment

rights “‘are not eviscerated simply because a police officer may be acting in a noninvestigatory

[sic] capacity for ‘it is surely anomalous to say that the individual . . . is fully protected by the

Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior.’” King, 990 F.2d

at 1560 (quoting Camara v. Mun, Court of City & Cty. of S.P., 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967)). Asa

result, the Court must address whether Defendants, “even if [their conduct was] constitutionally

deficient, reasonably misapprehend[ed]” that the community caretaking doctrine applied here.

Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 198.

Based on the allegations in the FAC, the Court cannot find that Defendants reasonably

misapprehended the community caretaking doctrine. Plaintiff was in a parked car, was

complaining of an allergic reaction, was indicating that she was traveling to the hospital, and was

(at least initially) responding to DeSantis, who did not identify herself as a police officer and who

was not in uniform. The FAC does not indicate that Plaintiff was in distress or was acting in a

manner that was threatening to herself or others. The FAC also does not reference any other

emergent situation or circumstances,

As to the Fourth Amendment in general, the FAC does not contain factual allegations from

which the Court can conclude that Defendants reasonably misapprehended probable cause to arrest

or reasonably misapprehended their right to use the alleged force. This conclusion does not mean

that Defendants acted unreasonably so as to prevent Defendants from asserting qualified immunity

at a later stage of the litigation. See Janowski, 259 F. Supp. 3d at 126. However, because “qualified

immunity will be upheld on a 12(b)(6) motion only when the immunity is established on the face

of the complaint[,]” Thomas, 463 F.3d at 291, the Court finds that Plaintiff satisfies the second

prong in the qualified immunity analysis such that her claims survive a motion to dismiss.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff's FAC pursuant to Fed,

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The motion is granted as to the

Defendants in their official capacities. The motion is denied as to qualified immunity. An

appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

Dated: September 5, 2019