The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
____________________________________
ERIC SIJOHN BROWN, :
: Civ. No. 18-8132(RMB)
Petitioner :
v. :
: OPINION
WARDEN DAVID ORTIZ, :
:
Respondent :
___________________________________:
BUMB, United States District Judge
Petitioner Eric SiJohn Brown, an inmate incarcerated in the
Federal Correctional Institution in Fort Dix, New Jersey, filed a
habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking credit against his
federal sentence for a 21-month period he spent in home confinement
prior to his incarceration at FCI Fort Dix. (Pet., ECF No. 1.)
Respondent filed an answer, opposing habeas relief. (Answer, ECF
No. 6.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies the
habeas petition.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner was arrested by the FBI on April 18, 2013, for
charges of conspiracy to commit loan and wire fraud and other
related charges in an Indictment filed in the U.S. District Court,
Eastern District of Pennsylvania on April 11, 2013. (Declaration
of J.R. Johnson,1 (“Johnson Decl.”) ¶4, Attach. 1, ECF No. 6-1 at
12.) On April 26, 2013, Petitioner was released on bond to reside
at his home. (Id., ¶5, Attach. 2, ECF No. 6-1 at 15-16.) While on
home confinement, Petitioner pled guilty in the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania to many of the charges, and he was sentenced on
October 28, 2014 to a 180-month term of imprisonment. (Id., ¶6,
Attach. 3, ECF No. 6-1 at 18-21.) Petitioner voluntarily
surrendered at FCI Fort Dix on January 7, 2015 and began to serve
his 180-month sentence. (Id., ¶¶7, 8, Attach. 4, 5, ECF No. 6-1 at
28-31.)
Petitioner was awarded prior custody credit for the period of
September 15, 2009 through September 25, 2009 for time in custody
on unrelated drug charges that were later dropped. (Id., ¶9,
Attach. 6, 7, ECF No. 6-1 at 33-39.) Petitioner’s projected release
date is January 12, 2028. (Id., Attach. 6, ECF No. 6-1 at 34.)
Petitioner submitted a “Request for Administrative Remedy” to
the warden of FCI Fort Dix on December 8, 2016, seeking jail credit
for April 18, 2013 until January 7, 2015. (Declaration of Tara
Moran,2 (“Moran Decl.”), ¶4, Ex. 2, ECF No. 6-2 at 12.) The warden
1 J.R. Johnson is a Correctional Programs Specialist for the
Federal Bureau of Prisons, Designation and computation Center.
(Johnson Decl., ¶1, ECF No. 6-1 at 2.
2 Tara Moran is a Legal Assistant with the Federal Bureau of
Prisons, FCI Fort Dix, with access to the Bureau of Prisons files
maintained in the ordinary course of business. (Moran Decl., ¶1,
ECF No. 6-2 at 2.)
denied his request on December 23, 2016. (Moran Decl., ¶4, ECF No.
6-2 at 13.) Petitioner exhausted his administrative remedies and
was denied relief. (Id. at 12-19.)
II. THE PETITION AND RESPONSE
A. The Petition
Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that he should receive sentencing credit
for time spent in home confinement. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) Petitioner
contends that his time spent in home detention amounted to
“official detention” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b),
and he was, therefore, entitled to prior custody credit.
Petitioner recognizes that the Supreme Court, in Reno v.
Koray, 515 U.S. 50 (1995) held that home confinement or electronic
monitoring as a condition of release from custody is not “official
detention” under § 3585(b). (Id. at 5.) However, he distinguishes
Koray because the defendant was not subject to “24 hour lockdown
electronic monitoring.” (Id.) Petitioner further distinguishes his
situation from Koray because
[t]his defendant was confined to a small
space, on a nearly constant basis, with round
the clock surveillance. His every move was
restricted, and his trips to the outside world
were only made with express approval of court
officials. His situation cannot be compared
with a person on conditional release whose
only conditions are a weekly meeting with
court personnel and a ban to travel out of the
jurisdiction.
(Pet., ECF No. 1 at 5.) For authority, Petitioner relies on United
States v. Londono-Cardona, 759 F.Supp. 60 (D.P.R. 1991).3
B. The Answer
Respondent argues that Koray is well-settled law and the Third
Circuit has consistently applied it, holding that home confinement
is not “official detention” under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). (Answer,
ECF No. 6 at 6-7.) Respondent contends the Supreme Court in Koray
has rejected the idea that courts should consider the level of
restrictions on conditional release when considering requests for
custody credit. (Id. at 8.)
III. DISCUSSION
The Attorney General of the United States delegated
computation of federal sentences to the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”).
United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 335 (1992). There are two
steps to the computation: (1) when does the federal sentence
commence; and (2) whether the prisoner can receive prior custody
credit for time spent in custody prior to commencement of the
federal sentence. Blood v. Bledsoe, 648 F.3d 203, 207 (3d Cir.
2011); 18 U.S.C. § 3585.
In Koray, the defendant was released on bail but confined to
a community treatment center before commencement of his federal
3 In dicta, the First Circuit Court of Appeals stated that Londono-
Cardona was wrongly decided. U.S. v. Zackular, 945 F.2d 423, 425
n. 2 (1st Cir. 1991).
sentence. 515 U.S. at 52. Koray sought credit toward his sentence
for the 150 days he spent in a community treatment center. Id. at
53. The issue before the Supreme Court was the meaning of the term
“official detention” in 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). Id. at 55.
18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) provides:
(b) Credit for prior custody.--A defendant
shall be given credit toward the service of a
term of imprisonment for any time he has spent
in official detention prior to the date the
sentence commences—
(1) as a result of the offense for which
the sentence was imposed; or
(2) as a result of any other charge for
which the defendant was arrested after
the commission of the offense for which
the sentence was imposed;
that has not been credited against another
sentence.
The Court considered the two options for pretrial defendants
under the Bail Reform Act of 1984; they could be “released” on
bail under restrictive conditions or placed under “detention” by
commitment to the custody of the Attorney General for confinement
in a corrections facility. (Id. at 57.) Based on the language of
§ 3585(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a), and the context and history of
§ 3585(b), the Court held that “official detention” under § 3585(b)
applies only to those defendants who were detained in a “penal or
correctional facility” under § 3621(b) “and who were subject to
BOP’s control.” Koray, 515 U.S. at 58-59 (emphasis added); accord
West v. Warden Fort Dix FCI, 740 F. App’x 237, 238 (3d Cir. 2018)
(per curiam).
In Koray, the Respondent argued that it was improper to focus
on the release/detention dichotomy because those released on bail
may be subjected to conditions just as onerous as defendants who
were detained. Id. at 62. The Court, however, found that the
controlling distinction was not the degree of restraint imposed on
the person’s liberty but the identity of the custodian. Id. at 63.
Official detention under the statute applies to those “completely
subject to BOP’s control.” Id. at 64.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Koray leaves no room for
Petitioner’s invitation to consider the level of restrictions
imposed on his home confinement when determining whether he is
entitled to prior custody credit under § 3585(b). The BOP did not
err in denying Petitioner prior custody credit for his home
confinement from April 18, 2013 through January 6, 2015.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the habeas petition is
denied.
An appropriate Order follows.
Dated: July 26, 2019
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE