The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
TOMS RIVER REGIONAL SCHOOLS
DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 19-15629 (MAS) (LHG)
v. MEMORANDUM ORDER
A.E. & A.P., on behalf of D.M.,
Defendants.
This matter comes before the Court upon the Court’s review of the docket. On July 19,
2019, Plaintiff Toms River Regional Schools District (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint and
Application for Preliminary Injunctive Relief. (See Compl., ECF No. 1.) On July 23, 2019,
Plaintiff filed correspondence indicating that the injunctive relief Plaintiff seeks has been granted
in an underlying administrative hearing.1 (Correspondence, ECF No. 8.) On July 24, 2019,
Defendants A.E. and A.P., on behalf of D.M. (“Defendants”) filed correspondence requesting,
inter alia, injunctive relief and a teleconference with the Court. (Correspondence, ECF No. 9.)
On July 24, 2019, the Court held a telephone conference with the parties.2 (See ECF No. 10.)
This matter arises out of a dispute between Plaintiff and Defendants pursuant to the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1450. (Compl. ¶ 1.) On
August 17, 2018, pursuant to the IDEA and New Jersey law, Plaintiff filed a Petition for Due
Process and the petition was subsequently transmitted to the New Jersey Office of Administrative
1 As a result of Plaintiff receiving the injunctive relief it seeks, Plaintiff’s Application for
Preliminary Injunctive relief is moot.
2 Due to the spontaneous nature of the teleconference, the telephone conference was not placed on
Law (the “Underlying Proceeding”). (Id. ¶¶ 29-30.) The matter was assigned to the Honorable
Jeffrey N. Rabin, A.L.J. (Compl. ¶ 30.) On June 25, 2019, Judge Rabin issued an order (the “June
25 Order”) (Compl., Ex. A (“June 25 Order”), ECF No. 1), and he issued a second order on July
1, 2019 (the “July 1 Order”) (Compl., Ex. B (“July 1 Order”), ECF No.1). Plaintiff appeals the
June 25 Order and the July 1 Order on an interlocutory basis.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co., Inc. v.
Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 418 (3d Cir. 2010). A federal court, therefore, is required to determine
whether it has jurisdiction even if the parties to an action have not made a jurisdictional challenge.
Packard v. Provident Nat’l Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1049 (3d Cir. 1993).
“The IDEA grants subject matter jurisdiction to the federal district courts[,]” by allowing
an “aggrieved party to bring a civil action in . . . federal court.” D.E. v. Cent. Dauphin Sch. Dist.,
765 F.3d 260, 274 (3d Cir. 2014). Specifically, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) “permits an appeal to
the federal courts only where a party is ‘aggrieved by the findings and decision’ made under
subsections (f), (k), or (g) of the statute.” Hopewell Valley Reg’l Bd. of Educ. v. J.R., No. 15-8477,
2016 WL 1761991, at *3 (D.N.J. May 3, 2016) (internal citation omitted). “In the normal case,
exhausting the IDEA’s administrative process is required in order for the statute to ‘grant subject
matter jurisdiction to the district court.’” S.D. by A.D. v. Haddon Heights Bd. of Educ., 722 F.
App’x 119, 125 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Batchelor v. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist., 759 F.3d 266,
272 (3d Cir. 2014)).
Plaintiff asserts that the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i). (Compl.
¶ 1.) Plaintiff, however, has not exhausted its administrative remedies in the Underlying
Proceeding, and, as a result, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) cannot provide the Court subject matter
jurisdiction. Id. (“Section 1415(l) of the IDEA requires exhaustion of the administrative hearing
process . . . in actions brought directly under the IDEA . . . .”).
Plaintiff asserts that the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction is based on satisfying three out
of four of the exceptions to the IDEA’s administrative exhaustion requirements. (Id. ¶¶ 48-52.)
The Third Circuit has recognized four situations where exhaustion of administrative remedies is
not required, where: “(1) exhaustion would be futile or inadequate; (2) the issue presented is purely
a legal question; (3) the administrative agency cannot grant relief; and (4) exhaustion would cause
severe or irreparable harm.” D.E., 765 F.3d at 275. The Court finds that none of these exceptions
are satisfied.
The futility exception does not apply. As a threshold matter, the factual record does not
appear to be fully developed, as recognized in the July 1 Order, in which Judge Rabin stated that
there are genuine issues and questions of fact. (See July 1 Order.) Additionally, nothing on the
face of the Complaint establishes that this is an emergency situation involving the mental or
physical health of D.M. Plaintiff also has not alleged that the remedy it seeks in the Underlying
Proceeding is unavailable pursuant to the IDEA. At bottom, Plaintiff’s objection to the July 1
Order is a mere disagreement with Judge Rabin’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion for summary
decision. Similarly, Plaintiff’s disagreement with the June 25 Order does not satisfy the futility
exception because the June 25 Order is procedural in nature and any purported error in the June
25 Order or harm resulting from the same can be addressed on appeal after the due process hearing.
The purely legal exception to exhaustion is derived from the futility exception. See Lester
H. by Octavia P. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 869 (3d Cir. 1990) (“The basis for the district court’s
futility finding is that the issues involved here were purely legal, not factual.”). This is because
exhaustion is required “where the peculiar expertise of an administrative hearing officer is
necessary to develop a factual record.” Id. If no factual record needs to be developed and no
evidentiary disputes remain, i.e., the matter is purely legal, “the court can and should decide legal
issues.” Id.
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegation that “all that remains are the ‘purely legal
questions’ of whether the [Defendants’] unreasonable and fraudulent conduct bars them from
attaining the relief they now seek[,]” fails. As discussed, ALJ Rabin found that there were issues
of fact which precluded the grant of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Decision on the issue of
Defendants’ registration of D.M. Despite ALJ Rabin’s conclusions, Plaintiff alleges the Court has
subject matter jurisdiction because there are no issues of fact. Plaintiff’s position is significantly
undermined by the fact that the July 1 Order contains a limited number of findings of fact—four—
and the standard of review the Court must apply to the July 1 Order—modified de novo. See L.E.
v. Ramsey Bd. of Educ., 435 F.3d 384, 389 (3d Cir. 2006) (“When deciding an IDEA case, the
District Court applies a modified de novo review and is required to give due weight to the factual
findings of the ALJ.”)
In effect, Plaintiff invites the Court to base its subject matter jurisdiction on a limited
factual record that ALJ Rabin has already determined requires a full evidentiary hearing to
complete. The Court declines Plaintiff’s invitation, especially in light of the Third Circuit’s
caution that “[d]isruption and interference with the state proceedings can have serious adverse
effects[,]” while “the duplication of effort in evaluating the same areas of controversy is a
substantial detriment to consistency and procedural efficiency.” Komninos by Komninos v. Upper
Saddle River Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d 775, 779 (3d Cir. 1994).
The Third Circuit has advised that the “severe or irreparable harm” exception “is to be
sparingly invoked[,]” and to establish irreparable harm, a party “must provide a sufficient
preliminary showing that the child will suffer serious and irreversible mental or physical damage
(e.g., irremediable intellectual regression) before the administrative process may be
circumvented.” Id. at 778-79. Here, Plaintiff cannot satisfy this threshold requirement because
Plaintiff does not allege that harm will come to D.M. (Compl. ¶ 51.) Additionally, the speculative
harms Plaintiff alleges it may suffer can be rectified if and when Plaintiff is in a position to appeal
a final decision following the due process hearing. The Court, accordingly, concludes the severe
or irreparable harm exception does not apply.
In sum, none of the exceptions to the IDEA’s exhaustion of administrative remedies
requirement are satisfied.3 The Court, accordingly, finds it does not have subject matter
jurisdiction over this matter.
For the reasons set forth above, and other good cause shown,
IT IS on this 25th day of July, 2019 ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff’s Application for Preliminary Injunctive Relief (ECF No. 1) is DENIED as
moot.
2. Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED.
3. The Clerk of Court shall close this matter
s/ Michael A. Shipp
MICHAEL A. SHIPP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
3 Plaintiff does not allege that the fourth exception applies, and the Court does not consider whether
it applies because Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the same. Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United