Rosado v. Langdon

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ASHEVILLE DIVISION

1:24-cv-00108-GCM

LUIS ANTONIO ROSADO, JR., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) ORDER

)

FNU LANGDON, et al. )

)

Defendants. )

__________________________________________)

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint,

[Doc. 7], see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A. Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. [Docs.

2, 5].

I. BACKGROUND

Pro se Plaintiff Luis Antonio Rosado, Jr., (“Plaintiff”) is a prisoner of the State of North

Carolina currently incarcerated at Marion Correctional Institution (“Marion”) in Marion, North

Carolina. He filed this action on April 11, 2024, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendants

FNU Langdon, identified as a psychologist at Marion; Cindy Hayes, identified as an employee of

Marion; Kevin Freemen, identified as a Unit Manager at Marion; FNU Haynks, identified as an

Americans with Disabilities Act (A.D.A.) Coordinator at Marion; and Christine M. Khandelwal,

identified as the President of the North Carolina Medical Board, in their individual and official

capacities. [Doc. 1 at 1-4].

Plaintiff alleged as follows. When he arrived to Marion’s Rehabilitative Diversion Unit

(RDU)1, he found out from a male psychologist that he was classified as Mental Health Level 1

(“M1”), when he had requested to be Mental Health Level 2 (“M2”). [Id. at 8]. Plaintiff was

told that if he “needed [his] meds again” he “could ask to see the psych doctor.” Plaintiff “filled

out a referral form” and was seen by Defendant Langdon, who told Plaintiff that “it would take

up to 6 months to get on case load.” [Id.]. After having Plaintiff take a test that he had taken in

2017, which had given him Mental Health Level 3 (“M3”) status, Defendant Langdon “state[d] a

false claim of malingering symptoms” and “denie[d] to see [him].” [Id.]. Plaintiff filed a

grievance about the “A.D.A. Denial” and “the lack of following policy & procedure.” Defendant

Freeman “stated no error,” failed to provide a reason for the refusal of accommodation or address

the issue of denial of mental health services,” and “proceeded to state false claims.” [Id. at 6, 8].

In addition to being denied reasonable accommodations, Plaintiff is “being forced in a cell” for

23 to 24 hours a day and “only allowed Rec when staff allows.” [Id. at 8]. Defendant

Khandelwal “denied to assist [Plaintiff] with medical/mental health services.” [Id. at 6].

Defendants Freeman, Haynks, and Langdon “failed to comply” with “part of the [grievance]

process” in violation of the Fifth Amendment. [Id.].

Plaintiff claimed violation of his rights under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments and the

A.D.A., 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and asserted a state law negligence claim. [Id. at 3].

Plaintiff sought monetary relief and termination of Defendants’ employment. [Id. at 7, 9].

The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint without prejudice on initial review for

Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim for relief. [Doc. 6]. As for Plaintiff’s ADA claim, the Court

noted that Plaintiff did not allege that he has a disability; that he was denied participation in or

1 The North Carolina RDU program is designed to transition inmates out of a segregated housing

environment and provide intensive treatment and programming. Moore v. Corpening, No. 1:18-cv-

00146-FDW, 2018 WL 4110547, at *2 n.1 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 29, 2018).

the benefits of any prison services, programs, or activities that he would otherwise be qualified

for absent his disability; that any such exclusion or denial was because of his disability; or what

accommodation Defendants allegedly refused. [Id. at 4]. The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s official

capacity claims as barred by sovereign immunity. [Id. at 5]. The Court found that Plaintiff

failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim because the conditions he alleged were too vague and

did not rise to the level of an extreme deprivation necessary to state an Eighth Amendment

claim. The Court also noted that Plaintiff failed to allege personal participation by any

Defendant relative to Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement. The Court concluded that Plaintiff’s

allegations failed to support that any Defendant was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s mental

or medical health needs. [Id. at 7]. As to Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim, the Court

noted there is no constitutional entitlement to grievance procedure and Plaintiff, therefore, had

failed to state a due process claim. [Id. at 8]. The Court allowed Plaintiff 30 days to amend his

Complaint to properly state a claim for relief. [Id. at 8-9].

Now before the Court on initial review is Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. [Doc. 7]. In

addition to the five Defendants named in Plaintiff’s original Complaint, Plaintiff also names

Loris Sutton, identified as the Deputy Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Adult

Corrections (NCDAC), and Charles Bumgarner, identified as the Marion Program Director, as

Defendants. [Id. at 2-4]. Plaintiff again names all Defendants in their individual and official

capacities. [Id.]. Plaintiff alleges as follows.

In 2017, Plaintiff was screened by the North Carolina Department of Public Safety and

deemed an M3 inmate. “During this time,” Plaintiff was diagnosed with attention deficit

hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), attention deficit disorder (ADD), anxiety, and depression with

psychotic episodes. Sometime later, Plaintiff was diagnosed with bi-polar disorder and post-

traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). After transfer from Maury Correctional Institution to Foothills

Correctional Institution, Plaintiff requested the Therapeutic Development Unit (TDU) for M3

inmates at least six (6) times and has been denied due to “race & age.” [Id. at 6, 11]. When

Plaintiff arrived at Marion, a psychiatrist told him he was M1 status. Plaintiff requested

numerous “mental health referrals” since arriving at Marion. Defendant Langdon told Plaintiff it

would take six (6) months to be added to the mental health case load as an M2 or M3 offender,

which was a “lie.” [Id.].

Plaintiff filed with Defendant Haynks “for A.D.A. due to [his] diagnoises [sic] above and

asked for reasonable accommodation that an inpatient receives,” including reinstatement of M3

status, reinstatement of his medication after a doctor’s appointment, two therapy appointments a

month, “gain time to put at minimum release,” and TDU placement. [Id. at 6, 8]. This ADA

request was denied “with no reason stated.” [Id. at 6]. Plaintiff grieved this denial and, during

that process, “wrote the medical board about the clear biasness of the psych. dept.,” which was

dismissed. [Id.]. Regarding the grievance process, Defendant Freeman “laid a false narrative”

relative to Steps One and Two and failed to comply with grievance deadlines. [Id. at 7].

Plaintiff wrote the Medical Board regarding Marion’s failure to “tak[e] psychiatric health

seriously.” The Medical Board is “biased and did not interfere.” [Id.].

Plaintiff talked to Defendant Langdon two or three times about the mental health

services. “She lied” and then told Defendant Freeman that she had seen Plaintiff eighth times

since he arrived at Marion, which is untrue. [Id. at 7]. Defendant Langdon has spoken “on

[presumably Plaintiff’s] mental health issues in front of other offenders & staff which violates

patient confidentiality.” [Id. at 8-9].

Plaintiff alleges that under NCDAC policy the RDU is only for inmates found guilty of

an A3 offense for assaulting staff resulting in physical injury. [Id. at 9, 11]. Plaintiff alleges that

he never assaulted staff and that he was improperly placed in the RDU at Marion in 2022. For

six months before his placement in the RDU he was housed in Restrictive Housing for Control

Purposes (RHCP) for a “fabricated,” unidentified A26 offense and was thereafter placed in the

RDU “with no notice.” [Doc. 7 at 10]. Plaintiff has been “held behind a cell door” “from Sept.

2022 til now 5/19/2024” “for 23-24 hours a day with no psychiatric help” and has not been

allowed to progress through the steps of the RDU according to policy. [Id. at 8, 10]. That is,

Plaintiff should have proceeded to Phase Three of the RDU two and a half months ago after

completing 10 weeks at Phase 2 Part 2. [Id. at 9-10]. Plaintiff, however, remains at Phase 2 Part

2. [Id. at 10]. The NCDAC “is allowing facilities to breach policey [sic] and keep offenders

behind a door for extended time.” Plaintiff has been “behind a door” from September 2022 until

the date of his Amended Complaint. [Id. at 10]. Plaintiff’s placement in the RDU is hindering

his taking college courses and earning gain time from employment and has amounted to

lockdown “for close to 18 months.” [Id. at 10-11].

Plaintiff purports to state claims based on the “5th Amendment, 8th Amendment,

Indifference, [and] negligence.” [Id. at 3]. Plaintiff appears to claim the “psych doctor,”

presumably Defendant Langdon, was negligent for denying Plaintiff services and failing to help

Plaintiff despite Plaintiff having shown an error was made. [Id. at 7].

Plaintiff seeks monetary and injunctive relief, including Plaintiff’s removal from the

RDU, placement on M3, reinstatement of his medication, and transfer to a different close

custody facility; termination of Defendants’ employment; and revision of RDU policy to prevent

M3 inmates “to be placed in such harsh conditions. [Id. at 12-13]. For injuries, Plaintiff claims

“mental & emotional damages” and “breach of client confidentiality.” [Id. at 12].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review the Complaint

to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious

[or] fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore,

under § 1915A the Court must conduct an initial review and identify and dismiss the complaint,

or any portion of the complaint, if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune to such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether the Complaint raises an

indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such

as fantastic or delusional scenarios. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989).

Furthermore, a pro se complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,

520 (1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a district court to

ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his Complaint which set forth a claim that is cognizable

under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

III. DISCUSSION

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was deprived of a right

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was

committed by a “person” acting under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Am. Mfrs. Mut.

Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999); Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty. v.

Talevski, 599 U.S. __, 143 S.Ct. 1444 (2023). The Court will address all claims fairly raised by

the Plaintiff’s Complaint regardless of the label assigned by Plaintiff.2

2 Any claim propounded by Plaintiff not specifically addressed herein has been considered and is

A. Eighth Amendment

1. Conditions of Confinement

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments,” U.S.

Const. amend. VIII, and protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and from

inhumane conditions of confinement, Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996).

“The Eighth Amendment ‘does not prohibit cruel and unusual prison conditions.’” Thorpe v.

Clarke, 37 F.4th 926, 940 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1381 (4th

Cir. 1993)). “It asks instead whether the conditions of confinement inflict harm that is,

objectively, sufficiently serious to deprive of minimal civilized necessities.” Id. (citation

omitted). “Prison conditions may be harsh and uncomfortable without violating the Eighth

Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.” Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F.3d

640, 642 (7th Cir. 1997). Extreme deprivations are required. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1,

9 (1992).

To establish an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must satisfy both an objective

component–that the harm inflicted was sufficiently serious–and a subjective component–that the

prison official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Williams, 77 F.3d at 761. The

Supreme Court has stated that “a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth

Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows

of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

837 (1994). “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. A

dismissed for Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim for relief.

plaintiff must also allege “a serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the

challenged conditions.” Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1381 (4th Cir. 1993).

Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true and giving him the benefit of every reasonable

inference, Plaintiff has nonetheless failed to state an Eighth Amendment conditions of

confinement claim against any Defendant. Plaintiff again fails to allege personal participation by

any Defendant relative to Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement. That is, Plaintiff alleges that he

has been improperly placed in the RDU where he is being subjected to harsh conditions,

resulting in near lockdown for approximately 18 months without necessary mental healthcare.

Plaintiff also alleges that he has remained on RDU Phase 2 Part 2 status for two and a half

months longer than policy proscribes and that he has been denied TDU at least six times.

Plaintiff, however, fails to allege which Defendant, if any, are responsible for his allegedly

improper placement in RDU, the denial of TDU (or any facts describing the TDU or supporting

his eligibility therefore), or the failure to properly advance through the RDU phases. As such,

the Court will dismiss this claim.

Even if Plaintiff had so alleged, the conditions alleged by Plaintiff do not rise to the level

of an extreme deprivation necessary to state an Eighth Amendment claim based on conditions of

confinement. Namely, Plaintiff alleges that he has been “behind a door… for 23-24 hours a

day” for approximately 18 months, the first six months of which consisted of RHCP for “a

serious (A) charge.” [Doc. 7 at 8, 10]. Plaintiff, however, also alleges that, although he has

stalled at Phase 2 Part 2, he is progressing through the phases of the RDU program whereby he

gains additional out-of-cell time and privileges as he completes them. [See Doc. 1 at 9-10].

Moreover, Plaintiff has not alleged “a serious or significant physical or emotional injury

resulting from the challenged conditions,” Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1381, or, for that matter, that

any Defendant was subjectively aware of the substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff. See Thorpe v.

Clarke, 37 F.4th 926, 933 (4th Cir. 2022) (“Eighth Amendment liability comes into play only

where a corrections officer appreciates the harm confinement conditions impose yet chooses to

disregard it[.]”). Rather, Plaintiff alleges only “mental & emotional damages.” [Doc. 1 at 12].

2. Denial of Mental Healthcare

Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on an alleged lack of or inappropriate medical

treatment fall within the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To state such a claim under the Eighth Amendment,

a plaintiff must show a “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs” of the inmate. Id.

Deliberate indifference “entails something more than mere negligence,” but does not require

actual purposeful intent. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994); Rish v. Johnson, 131

F.3d 1092, 1096 (4th Cir. 1997). As with a conditions of confinement claim, “[i]t requires that a

prison official actually know of and disregard an objectively serious condition, medical need, or

risk of harm.” Rish, 131 F.3d at 1096 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).

To be found liable under the Eighth Amendment, a prison official must know of and

consciously or intentionally disregard “an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer,

511 U.S. at 837; Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 167 (4th Cir. 1998). “[E]ven if a prison

doctor is mistaken or negligent in his diagnosis or treatment, no constitutional issue is raised

absent evidence of abuse, intentional mistreatment, or denial of medical attention.” Stokes v.

Hurdle, 393 F. Supp. 757, 762 (D. Md. 1975), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1250 (4th Cir. 1976).

A “serious medical need” is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating

treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity

for a doctor’s attention.” Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation

marks omitted). An official acts with deliberate indifference if he had actual knowledge of the

prisoner's serious medical needs and the related risks but nevertheless disregards them. DePaola

v. Clarke, 884 F.3d 481, 486 (4th Cir. 2018). The prison official “must both be aware of facts

from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he

must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true and giving him the benefit of every reasonable

inference, Plaintiff also fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim based on the alleged denial of

mental healthcare since arriving at Marion. While the denial of mental or medical health care

may give rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to support that

any Defendant was deliberately indifferent to his mental or medical health needs. See Farmer,

511 U.S. at 837. Plaintiff alleges only that he was diagnosed with various mental health

conditions in 2017; that he was errantly classified as an M1 inmate at Marion despite his request

for M3 status; that he requested numerous “mental health referrals” since arriving at Marion; that

Defendant Langdon told him it would take six months to be added to the mental health case load

as an M2 or M3 offender; that Defendant Langdon lied to Defendant Freeman about having seen

Plaintiff eight times since he arrived at Marion; and that Defendant Langdon “breached

confidentiality” by talking about mental health issues in front of other inmates. Plaintiff has not

alleged that he currently suffers from a serious mental health condition or that any Defendant

actually knew of and disregarded an objectively serious condition or risk of harm. Rather,

Plaintiff’s allegations suggest, at best, an error was made relative to Plaintiff’s assigned mental

health status on his arrival at Marion and that there is a delay in availability of mental healthcare

at Marion.3 As such, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims based on the

conditions of his confinement and deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

B. Fourteenth Amendment

1. Due Process

To prevail on a procedural due process claim, an inmate must first demonstrate that he

was deprived of “life, liberty, or property” by governmental action. Bevrati v. Smith, 120 F.3d

500, 502 (4th Cir. 1997). Although prisoners are afforded some due process rights while

incarcerated, those liberty interests are limited to “the freedom from restraint which, while not

exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due

Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the

inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484

(1995). Moreover, changes “in a prisoner’s location, variations of daily routine, changes in

conditions of confinement (including administrative segregation), and the denial of privileges

[are] matters which every prisoner can anticipate [and which] are contemplated by his original

sentence to prison.” Gaston v. Taylor, 946 F.2d 340, 343 (4th Cir. 1991); Slezak v. Evatt, 21

F.3d 590, 594 (4th Cir. 1994) (“The federal constitution itself vests no liberty interest in inmates

in retaining or receiving any particular security or custody status ‘[a]s long as the [challenged]

conditions or degree of confinement ... is within the sentence imposed ... and is not otherwise

violative of the Constitution.’”) (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983)).

There is no constitutional “entitlement to grievance procedures or access to any such

procedure voluntarily established by a state.” Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994). “An

inmate thus cannot bring a § 1983 claim alleging denial of a specific grievance procedure.”

3 To be sure, in Plaintiff’s original Complaint, he alleged that Defendant Langdon administered a mental

health screening and determined that Plaintiff was “malingering.” [Doc. 1 at 8].

Booker v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 541 (4th Cir. 2017).

Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true and giving him the benefit of every reasonable

inference, he has nonetheless failed to state a due process claim. As before, his claim is based on

vaguely alleged deficiencies in grievance procedure and now also on Defendant Freeman’s

alleged “false narrative” and delays in processing Plaintiff’s grievance. Plaintiff therefore has

failed to state a due process claim and it will be dismissed.

2. Equal Protection

To state an equal protection claim, Plaintiff must allege that he has been treated

differently from others with whom he is similarly situated, and that the unequal treatment was

the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination. See Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648,

654 (4th Cir. 2001). In doing so, the plaintiff must set forth “specific, non-conclusory factual

allegations that establish an improper [discriminatory] motive.” Williams v. Hansen, 326 F.3d

569, 584 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 405 (4th Cir. 2001)).

Plaintiff here alleges only that he has been denied placement in the TDU due to race and age,

“which is discrimination.” [Doc. 7 at 8]. He fails to allege that he has been treated differently

from others with whom he is similarly situated or anything more than this conclusory allegation

of discrimination. Plaintiff, therefore, has failed to state an equal protection claim and it will be

dismissed.

C. Official Capacity Claims

Plaintiff again purports to sue Defendants in their official capacities. “[A] suit against a

state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit

against the official’s office.” Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

Because a state is not a “person” under § 1983, state officials acting in their official capacities

cannot be sued for damages thereunder. Allen v. Cooper, No. 1:19-cv-794, 2019 WL 6255220,

at *2 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 22, 2019). Furthermore, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for monetary

damages against the State of North Carolina and its various agencies. See Ballenger v. Owens,

352 F.3d 842, 844-45 (4th Cir. 2003). Moreover, while Ex parte Young “permits a federal court

to issue prospective, injunctive relief against a state officer to prevent ongoing violations of

federal law, on the rationale that such a suit is not a suit against the state for purposes of the

Eleventh Amendment[,]” Plaintiff has not stated a claim for which such relief may be ordered in

the first place. McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 399 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing id., 209 U.S.

123, 159-60, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908)). Plaintiff’s official capacity claims, therefore,

do not survive initial review and will be dismissed.

D. Defendants Hayes, Khandelwal, Sutton, or Bumgarner

To establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the defendants

“acted personally” to cause the alleged violation. See Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th

Cir. 1977) (citation omitted). Plaintiff, however, makes no allegations of personal participation

by Defendants Hayes, Khandelwal, Sutton, or Bumgarner. While Plaintiff alleges that he

complained to the North Carolina Medical Board about various issues, he does not allege that

Defendant Khandelwal received Plaintiff’s letters or that she had any obligation to act relative to

Plaintiff’s complaints. Moreover, while Plaintiff alleges that the NCDAC allows facilities to

“breach” RDU policy, Plaintiff makes no allegations regarding any personal participation by

Defendant Sutton. The Court, therefore, will also dismiss these Defendants for Plaintiff’s failure

to state a claim for relief against them.

E. ADA

Although Plaintiff does not specifically claim violation of his rights under the ADA, he

names ADA Coordinator Haynks as a Defendant and references the denial of an ADA request

“for reasonable accommodation” for his mental health diagnoses, including his unidentified

medication. [See Doc. 7 at 6, 8, 12]. The Court, therefore, will address a possible ADA claim.

Under Title II of the ADA, “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reasons of

such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,

programs, or activities of a public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The ADA defines “public entity”

to include “any State or local government” and “any department, agency, … or other

instrumentality of a State.” United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 126 S.Ct. 877 (2006) (citing

42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)). “[T]his term includes state prisons.” Id. (citing Pennsylvania Dept. of

Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210, 118 S.Ct. 1952 (1998)).

To establish a prima facie case under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show that: (1)

he has a disability; (2) he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of

some public entity’s services, programs, or activities for which he was otherwise qualified; and

(3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability. Miller v.

Hinton, 288 Fed. App’x 901, 902 (4th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). States are obligated to

make “reasonable modifications” to enable the disabled person to receive the services or

participate in programs or activities. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). The duty of reasonable

accommodation, however, must also consider whether the institution’s actions are related to

legitimate penological interests. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254 (1987);

Tanney v. Boles, 400 F.Supp.2d 1027, 1050 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (noting that courts have applied

Turner to ADA and Rehab Act claims). A plaintiff must also establish an actual injury from any

alleged ADA violation. See Rosen v. Montgomery Cty. Md., 121 F.3d 154, 158 (4th Cir. 1997).

Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true and giving him the benefit of every reasonable

inference, Plaintiff has again failed to state a claim under the ADA. While the Court will assume

Plaintiff has alleged a disability, Plaintiff has not alleged that he was denied participation in or

the benefits of any prison services, programs, or activities that he would otherwise be qualified

for absent his disability, or that any such exclusion or denial was because of his disability.

Rather, Plaintiff complains that he is being denied mental health services that he seeks, including

unidentified medication, and that his requests for “reasonable accommodation” have been denied

without reason. The denial of proper mental or medical healthcare does not, by itself, support a

claim under the ADA. Miller v. Hinton, 288 Fed. App’x 901, 903 (4th Cir. 2008) (unpublished

decision) (citing Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that the ADA is

not “violated by a prison’s simply failing to attend to the medical needs of its disabled

prisoners”); Spencer v. Easter, 109 Fed. App’x 571, 573 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding the failure of

prison official to timely obtain prisoner’s medication does not support ADA claim absent a

discriminatory intent “due to any alleged disability”). The Court, therefore, will dismiss this

claim with prejudice.

To the extent that the Plaintiff seeks relief under North Carolina law, the Court declines

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, as no federal claim has passed initial review. See Artis v.

Dist. Of Columbia, 138 S.Ct. 594, 595 (2018) (when a district court dismisses all claims

independently qualifying for the exercise of federal jurisdiction, it “ordinarily dismiss[es] all

related state claims.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Accordingly, those claims are dismissed without

prejudice.

Because the Court afforded Plaintiff the opportunity to amend his Complaint and he has

again failed to state a claim for relief, the Court will dismiss this action with prejudice. See

Green v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 790 Fed. App’x 535, 536 (4th Cir. 2020).

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint with

prejudice.

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint [Doc. 7] is

DISMISSED with prejudice in accordance with the terms of this Order for Plaintiff's failure to

state a claim for relief.

The Clerk is respectfully instructed to terminate this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: June 12, 2024

Libel □□□

Graham C. Mullen ee

United States District Judge mt

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