Murdock v. Moore

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

STATESVILLE DIVISION

5:24-cv-00119-MR

AJANAKU MURDOCK, )

)

Plaintiff, )

vs. ) ORDER

)

)

FNU MOORE, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

________________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff’s

Complaint [Doc. 1] filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)

and 1915A, and Plaintiff’s letter [Doc. 5]. Plaintiff is proceeding in forma

pauperis in this matter. [Docs. 2, 4].

I. BACKGROUND

Pro se Plaintiff Ajanaku Murdock (“Plaintiff”) is a prisoner of the State

of North Carolina currently incarcerated at Central Prison in Raleigh, North

Carolina. On May 10, 2024, he filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

naming FNU Moore, FNU Curtis, FNU Adkins, and FNU Baers, all identified

as Correctional Officers at Alexander Correctional Institution (“Alexander”),

as Defendants. [Doc. 1]. Plaintiff alleges as follows.

On an unidentified date while Plaintiff was housed at Alexander,

Defendant Moore falsely accused Plaintiff of assaulting him. In “unlawfully”

taking Plaintiff to segregation, Defendants Moore and Curtis squeezed

handcuffs around Plaintiff’s wrists “super tight” and “drug” Plaintiff down the

hallway, “jerking [his] arms different way’s [sic] by snatching them in painful

way’s [sic].” [Id. at 2-3]. An “excessive report was taken out,” but Plaintiff

did not “elaborate on it” out of fear of retaliation. Plaintiff brings this claim

now only because he has been transferred to Central Prison. [Id. at 3].

In an apparently unrelated event on December 12, 2023, Plaintiff was

inside his cell and “was asked to go to D.H.O. and told to take of [his] ‘hat’

which was [his] religion crown as RASTAFARIAN.” [Id. at 4]. Plaintiff refused

because he is allowed to wear the crown “ANYWHERE except when

shipping.” [Id.]. Defendant Adkins became belligerent, and Plaintiff yelled

for Sergeant Emig, who was nearby, to “supervise the situation” and tell

Defendant Adkins that Plaintiff was allowed to wear the crown. Sergeant

Emig never came. Plaintiff told Defendant Adkins that he was not allowed to

“spray” him (for presumably refusing to remove the crown) without

“supervisory consent.” Defendant Adkins responded that “he can do

whatever the fuck he wanted… for [Plaintiff] to take the fucking hat off and

sit it on the fucking bed.” Plaintiff again refused and “held the trap because

[he] didn’t want him and Baers to say [he] refused to go to D.H.O.” [Id.].

Adkins and Baers both “sprayed” him. The spray touched Plaintiff’s arm and

stomach, causing Plaintiff to have an allergic reaction, and Plaintiff “re-

injured” his right hand “when the trapdoor shut.” [Id. at 5].

Plaintiff further alleges that he wants Sergeant Emig to be a Defendant

in this action because, shortly after Plaintiff was sprayed, Emig asked Plaintiff

to submit to handcuffs, took Plaintiff to the showers, took Plaintiff to see the

DHO, and was designated to take pictures of Plaintiff’s arm. When Emig

saw that Plaintiff’s arm had “broken out,” he pretended like the camera had

malfunctioned. He returned to take pictures weeks later when the “swelling

and rashes” had disappeared. Emig served as the investigating officer,

which is against policy. [Id. at 5]. “They made up the FALSE charge that it

was over a NECKLACE instead of a religious crown,” which shows

“deliberate indifference and cruel and unusual punishment.” [Id. at 6]. Unit

Manager Sigmon never got Plaintiff’s witness statements for Plaintiff’s

disciplinary hearing, which is a procedural violation and a violation of

Plaintiff’s “inmate rights.” [Id. at 5].

Plaintiff claims that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated by

Defendants Moore and Curtis by their “jerking and yanking on [Plaintiff’s]

arms while handcuffed from behind extremely hard,” and by Defendants

Adkins and Baers by their pepper spraying him “without just cause.” [Id. at

7]. For injuries, Plaintiff claims he suffered an allergic reaction, injured his

hand, was placed in isolation, and suffered night terrors and emotional

distress. [Id.]. Plaintiff seeks monetary relief only. [Id. at 9].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court must review the

Complaint to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the grounds that

it is “frivolous or malicious [or] fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore, § 1915A requires an initial

review of a “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from

a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” and

the court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any

portion of the complaint, if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, or fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief from

a defendant who is immune from such relief.

In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether the Complaint

raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly

baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se

complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a

district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his Complaint which

set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

III. DISCUSSION

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was

deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,

and that the alleged deprivation was committed by a “person” acting under

color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan,

526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999); Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty. v. Talevski,

599 U.S. 166, 143 S.Ct. 1444 (2023).

Here, Plaintiff claims Defendants, in two unrelated incidents, violated

his right under the Eighth Amendment to be free from cruel and unusual

punishment.1 [Doc. 1 at 7]. A plaintiff may not assert unrelated claims

against unrelated defendants in a single action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a),

20(a)(2); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that

“[u]nrelated claims against different defendants belong in different suits,” to

prevent prisoners from dodging the fee payment or three-strikes provisions

in the Prison Litigation Reform Act). “For example, Plaintiff may not pursue

1 The Court notes that Plaintiff’s allegations also implicate his due process rights. These

allegations, however, will be dismissed as discussed below.

claims of retaliation involving one set of defendants while simultaneously

pursuing claims for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against

another set of defendants.” Thomas v. Davey, No. 1:16cv925, 2017 WL

2691824, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 22, 2017). A plaintiff may only bring a claim

against multiple defendants when (1) the claim arises out of the same

transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions and occurrences; and (2)

there are common questions of law or fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). While

both incidents involve alleged violations of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

rights, they do not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence or series

of transactions or occurrences. As such, they may not be litigated in the

same action. The Court will not blindly select which related set of facts and

Defendants Plaintiff might want to pursue in this action. The Court, therefore,

will allow Plaintiff to amend his Complaint to make these decisions.

Moreover, the body of the Complaint contains allegations against

individuals who are not named as defendants in the caption as required by

Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a)

(“The title of the complaint must name all the parties[.]”); Myles v. United

States, 416 F.3d 551 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]o make someone a party the plaintiff

must specify him in the caption and arrange for service of process.”); Perez

v. Humphries, No. 3:18-cv-107-GCM, 2018 WL 4705560, at *1 (W.D.N.C.

Oct. 1, 2018) (“A plaintiff’s failure to name a defendant in the caption of a

Complaint renders any action against the purported defendant a legal

nullity.”). That is, Plaintiff alleges he “wants” Sergeant Emig to be a

Defendant in this matter and also directs allegations at Unit Manager

Sigmon, but Plaintiff fails to properly name either Emig or Sigmon as a

Defendant. The Court, therefore, dismisses these allegations without

prejudice. The Court, however, will allow Plaintiff to amend his Complaint to

state a claim for relief.

Also pending is Plaintiff’s letter regarding the Court’s Standing Order

of Instructions in which Plaintiff states he was unaware he would have to

send a copy of the Complaint to Defendants and asks the Clerk to return his

Complaint so that he may make copies to serve Defendants and to receive

a file-stamped copy from the Clerk. [Doc. 5]. Plaintiff is advised that, should

his Amended Complaint survive initial review, the Court will facilitate service

on Defendants. The Court, however, will direct the Clerk to send Plaintiff a

copy of his Complaint. The Plaintiff, however, is admonished that should he

seek copies of any materials in this case in the future he must properly

request such copies from the Clerk and include payment with such request.2

2 A litigant is ordinarily required to pay his own litigation expenses, even if he is indigent.

See United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 321 (1976) (“The established rule is that

the expenditure of public funds is proper only when authorized by Congress….”). The

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s

Complaint fails initial review and will be dismissed without prejudice. The

Court will allow Plaintiff thirty (30) days to amend his Complaint, if he so

chooses, to properly state a claim upon which relief can be granted in

accordance with the terms of this Order. Any amended complaint will be

subject to all timeliness and procedural requirements and will supersede the

Complaint. Piecemeal amendment will not be permitted. Should Plaintiff fail

to timely amend his Complaint in accordance with this Order, the Court will

dismiss this action without prejudice.

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails initial

review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B) for Plaintiff’s

failure to state a claim for relief and shall be DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE in accordance with the terms of this Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days in

which to amend his Complaint in accordance with the terms of this Order. If

standard rate for copies of documents in this matter is $.50 per page. See

https://www.ncwd.uscourts.gov/court-fees.

Plaintiff fails to so amend his Complaint, the matter will be dismissed without

prejudice.

The Clerk is respectfully instructed to mail Plaintiff a blank prisoner §

1983 form and a copy of his Complaint [Doc. 1] in this matter.

IT |S SO ORDERED.

Signed: June 10, 2024

Martifi Reidinger ee

Chief United States District Judge “AES