Pacheco v. Whitley

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

STATESVILLE DIVISION

CIVIL CASE NO. 5:23-cv-00190-MR

ELIJAH E. PACHECO, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

FNU WHITLEY, et al., ) ORDER

)

Defendants. )

_______________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of the Plaintiff’s pro

se Amended Complaint [Doc. 7].1 The Plaintiff is proceeding in forma

pauperis. [Doc. 6].

I. BACKGROUND

The pro se Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

addressing incidents that allegedly occurred at the Wilkes County Jail

(“WCJ”), where he is a pretrial detainee. [Doc. 1]. He purports to raise claims

under “I Amend., XIV Amend. – Denial of a Religious Practice –

Unreasonable Punishment/ Transport (Involuntary – Commitment) … [and] -

‘Retaliation.’” [Doc. 7 at 1]. He appears to claim that he was transported from

1 The Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint before the original Complaint [Doc. 1] had

been reviewed for frivolity.

WCJ to the North Carolina Central Prison in Raleigh without his legal

materials on November 16, 2023, and that this transport was done in order

to deprive him of access to the courts and in retaliation for having complained

about the denial of a kosher diet. [Id. at 1-3]. He names as Defendants in

their individual capacities: FNU Whitley, a WCJ major; FNU Wyatt, a WCJ

captain; FNU Hamby, a WCJ corporal; Jane Doe, a WCJ sergeant;

Christopher Shumate, FNU Brown Jonathan Patrick, Ian Grant, and Cody

White, WCJ officers; Robert Anderson2; and John Doe, a doctor.3 He seeks

“compensatory damages for pain & suffering as well as mental & emotional

damage, in addition to punitive relief for statutory damages.” [Id. at 3].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because the Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must

review the Amended Complaint to determine whether it is subject to

dismissal on the grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious [or] fails to state a

claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore,

under § 1915A the Court must conduct an initial review and identify and

dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if it is frivolous,

2 The Plaintiff does not identify the capacity in which Anderson is employed.

3 The body of the Amended Complaint refers to a doctor who saw the Plaintiff upon his

arrival at the Central Prison, as well as a doctor with whom he was supposed to have an

appointment at WJC. The Court cannot determine, at this time, which doctor the Plaintiff

intends to name as a Defendant. [Doc. 7 at 1-2].

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune to such relief. 28 U.S.C. §

1915A.

In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether a complaint

raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly

baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se

complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a

district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his Complaint which

set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

III. DISCUSSION

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was

deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,

and that the alleged deprivation was committed by a “person” acting under

color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan,

526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999); Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty. v. Talevski,

599 U.S. 166 (2023).

A. Parties

The Plaintiff names as Defendants Robert Anderson and Major

Whitley, against whom he makes no factual allegations, and a John Doe

doctor, who is not clearly identified and against whom the Plaintiff makes no

meaningful factual allegations. [See note 2, supra]. The Amended

Complaint is so vague and conclusory in this regard that it fails to satisfy the

most basic pleading requirements. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a

“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief”); Simpson v. Welch, 900 F.2d 33, 35 (4th Cir. 1990) (conclusory

allegations, unsupported by specific allegations of material fact are not

sufficient); Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 201-02 (4th Cir. 2002)

(a pleader must allege facts, directly or indirectly, that support each element

of the claim). Accordingly, the claims against Defendants Anderson, Whitley,

and the John Doe doctor are dismissed without prejudice.

The Plaintiff also uses vague terms and pronouns rather than

identifying the individual(s) involved in each allegation. [See, e.g., Doc. 7 at

2-3 (referring to a “nurse,” “Jail’s administration,” “Jail,” and “lieutenants”)].

Such claims are too vague and conclusory to proceed insofar as the Court

is unable to determine the Defendant(s) to whom these allegations refer.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Simpson, 900 F.2d at 35; Dickson, 309 F.3d at

201-02. These claims are also nullities insofar as they refer to individuals

not named as defendants in the caption as required by the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) (“The title of the complaint must

name all the parties”); Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d 551, 551 (7th Cir.

2005) (“to make someone a party the plaintiff must specify him in the caption

and arrange for service of process.”); Perez v. Humphries, No. 3:18-cv-107-

GCM, 2018 WL 4705560, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 1, 2018) (“A plaintiff's failure

to name a defendant in the caption of a Complaint renders any action against

the purported defendant a legal nullity”). The allegations directed at

individuals not named as Defendants, and which refer to non-parties are,

therefore, dismissed without prejudice.

B. Religious Exercise

To state a free exercise claim under the First Amendment, a plaintiff

must allege facts sufficient to show that: (1) he held a sincere religious belief

and (2) that his religious practice has been substantially burdened by a

prison policy or practice. See generally Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680,

699 (1989); Greenhill v. Clarke, 944 F.3d 243, 253 (4th Cir. 2019). A prison

policy that substantially burdens an inmate’s ability to practice his religion

withstands a First Amendment challenge when it is “reasonably related to

legitimate penological interests.” O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342,

349 (1987) (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89). “A substantial burden either

puts pressure on a person to change his religious beliefs or puts that person

to a choice between abandoning his religion or following his beliefs and

losing some government benefit.” Firewalker-Fields v. Lee, 58 F.4th 104, 114

(4th Cir. 2023) (citing Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 187 (4th Cir. 2006)). If

that threshold showing is made, the prisoner must then show that the

practice or regulation is not “reasonably related to legitimate penological

interests.” Id. (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89).

The Plaintiff appears to allege that he repeatedly requested a kosher

diet for his religious practice; that some unidentified captain denied the

Plaintiff’s requests, saying “we no longer do special diets”; that the Plaintiff

informed that captain that he could not eat the meals that were being

provided; and that the Plaintiff experienced mental and physical harm,

including the loss of more than 30 pounds, as a result. [Doc. 7 at 2-3]. Once

again, the Plaintiff does not allege that such actions were done by an

identified defendant. As such, this claim cannot pass initial review.

C. Retaliation

An inmate has a clearly established First Amendment right to be free

from retaliation for filing lawsuits. See Booker v. S.C. Dep’t of Corrs., 855

F.3d 533, 540 (4th Cir. 2017); Thompson v. Commonwealth of Va., 878 F.3d

89, 110 (4th Cir. 2017). Inmates also have a protected First Amendment

right to complain to prison officials about prison conditions and improper

treatment by prison employees that affect them. See Patton v. Kimble, 717

F. App’x 271, 272 (4th Cir. 2018).

To state a colorable First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must

allege that (1) he engaged in protected First Amendment activity, (2) the

defendant took some action that adversely affected his First Amendment

rights, and (3) there was a causal relationship between his protected activity

and the defendant’s conduct. Martin v. Duffy, 977 F.3d 294, 299 (4th Cir.

2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Retaliation claims brought by

prisoners, however, are treated with skepticism because every act of

discipline by a prison official is retaliatory in that it responds directly to

prisoner misconduct. See Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994).

More, bare or conclusory assertions of retaliation are insufficient to establish

a retaliation claim. Id.

Here, the Plaintiff appears to claim that Defendants Shumate, Brown,

Patrick, Grant, White, and Sergeant Jane Doe forced him to transfer to

Central Prison without his legal property in retaliation for having complained

about the conditions at WCJ. The Plaintiff alleges that he informed

Defendant Hamby a few months prior to the transfer that, if he were to be

transferred, he did not consent to his legal materials being left behind. [Doc.

7 at 1-3]. The Defendants who are identified in relation to this claim,

however, are merely the transport officers who participated in transferring

the Plaintiff to Raleigh. The Plaintiff alleges that he was told by these officers

that his materials would be forwarded to him. There are no allegations that

any of these Defendants participated in a decision to have the materials

withheld. Moreover, the Plaintiff alleges no facts giving rise to an inference

that any of these Defendants were even aware of the Plaintiff’s complaints

regarding his diet. Therefore, this claim as to these Defendants will be

dismissed without prejudice.

D. Access to the Courts

The Supreme Court stated in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977),

that prisoners must have meaningful access to the courts. The “meaningful

access” referred to in Bounds does not, however, entitle a plaintiff to total or

unlimited access. See Moore v. Gray, No. 5:04-CT-918-FL, 2005 WL

3448047, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 26, 2005), aff’d, 133 F. App’x 913 (4th Cir.

2005) (unpublished) (citation omitted). The right of access to the courts only

requires that prisoners have the capability of bringing challenges to

sentences or conditions of confinement. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343,

356-57 (1996). Moreover, as a jurisdictional requirement flowing from the

standing doctrine, the prisoner must allege an actual injury. See id. at 349.

“Actual injury” is prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation,

such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or present a non-frivolous claim

challenging their conviction or conditions of confinement. See id. A plaintiff’s

“[f]ailure to show that a ‘nonfrivolous legal claim has been frustrated’ is fatal

to his Bounds claim.” Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1155 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008)

(quoting Casey, 518 U.S. at 353).

The Plaintiff claims that he was transferred to Central Prison without

his legal materials in order to deny him access to the courts. [Doc. 7 at 2].

Assuming that the Plaintiff is attempting to assert this as a separate claim, it

fails initial review. The Plaintiff’s vague and conclusory allegations are

insufficient to plausibly demonstrate that any Defendant caused him an

actual injury in presenting a non-frivolous claim about his conviction or

conditions of confinement. Accordingly, to the extent that the Plaintiff is

attempting to state a claim for denial of access to the courts this claim is

dismissed without prejudice.

E. Cruel and Unusual Punishment

“[A] pretrial detainee has a right under the Due Process Clause to be

free from punishment before his guilt is adjudicated.” Tate v. Parks, 791 F.

App’x 387, 390 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535

(1979)). An individual pretrial detainee may raise a substantive due process

challenge to his conditions of confinement “where they are so

disproportionate or arbitrary that they are not related to legitimate

penological objectives and amount to punishment.” Id. (citing Williamson v.

Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 174-76 (4th Cir. 2018)). “To prevail on such a claim,

a detainee must show that the challenged treatment or conditions were either

(1) imposed with an express intent to punish, or (2) not reasonably related to

a legitimate nonpunitive objective, in which case an intent to punish may be

inferred.” Id. (citing Williamson, 912 F.3d at 178).

Here, the Plaintiff asserts a claim for “Unreasonable Punishment/

Transport (Involuntary – Commitment).” [Doc. 7 at 1]. He appears to claim

that the transfer to Central Prison was objectively unreasonable because he

was transferred on a “commitment order” despite having “no serious mental

health issue,” and he was not allowed to bring his legal materials or

identification with him. [Id. at 1-3]. The Plaintiff’s claims about the validity of

the commitment order are too vague and conclusory to state a plausible

claim against any Defendant; he does not allege any facts to suggest that

any identified Defendant was responsible for, or had the authority to make,

the commitment decision. Further, the Plaintiff’s claim that he was

transferred without his legal materials and identification is not adequately

serious to rise to the level of punishment under an objective standard. See

generally Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015) (describing the

objective reasonableness standard applies to pretrial detainees’ claims

under the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amendment

standard that applies to convicted prisoners). Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s

claims of “Unreasonable Punishment/ Transport (Involuntary –

Commitment)” are dismissed.

IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted, and this action is therefore dismissed without prejudice pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).

The Court will allow the Plaintiff thirty (30) days to amend his

Complaint, if he so chooses, to properly state a claim upon which relief can

be granted, in accordance with the terms of this Order. Any amended

complaint will be subject to all timeliness and procedural requirements and

will supersede the Complaint. Piecemeal amendment will not be permitted.

Should the Plaintiff fail to timely amend his Complaint in accordance with this

Order, the Court will dismiss this action without further notice.

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:

1. This action [Am. Complaint Doc. 7] is DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).

2. The Plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days in which to amend his

Complaint in accordance with the terms of this Order. If the

Plaintiff fails to so amend his Complaint, the matter will be

dismissed without further notice.

The Clerk is respectfully instructed to mail the Plaintiff a blank § 1983

complaint form and a copy of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

May 15, 2024

Martifi Reidinger ee

Chief United States District Judge AS

12