when a district court dismisses all claims independently qualifying for the exercise of federal jurisdiction, it “ordinarily dismiss[es] … all related state claims.”
How later courts described this case
- when a district court dismisses all claims independently qualifying for the exercise of federal jurisdiction, it “ordinarily dismiss[es] … all related state claims.”
- a pleader must allege facts, directly or indirectly, that support each element of the claim
- “[T]o make someone a party the plaintiff must specify him in the caption and arrange for service of process.”
- prisoner could not bring § 1983 due process claim that prison officials fabricated evidence so that plaintiff would be wrongfully convicted of prison disciplinary infractions, causing him to lose good-time credits, because the disciplinary conviction had not been invalidated
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
STATESVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL CASE NO. 5:23-cv-00154-MR
BRUCE L. GORHAM EL,1 )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) ORDER
)
RONNIE L. HONEYCUTT, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
_______________________________ )
THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff’s pro se
Amended Complaint [Doc. 21]. The Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.
[Doc. 6].
I. BACKGROUND
The pro se incarcerated Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 addressing incidents that allegedly occurred at the Alexander
Correctional Institution during the summer of 2023.2 [Doc. 1]. He named as
Defendants the Department of Adult Correction; the Director of Prisons
1 According to the North Carolina Department of Public Safety’s (NCDAC) website, the
Plaintiff’s name is Bruce L Gorham. See https://webapps.doc.state.nc.us/opi/viewoffende
r.do?method=view&offenderID=0462072&obscure=Y&listpage=1&listurl=pagelistoffend
ersearchresults&searchOffenderId=0462072&searchDOBRange=0 (last accessed May
13, 2024); Fed. R. Evid. 201.
2 The Plaintiff is now incarcerated at the Scotland Correctional Institution.
Brandeshawn Harris; Alexander CI Warden Ronnie L. Honeycutt; and Unit
Managers Joshua Sigmon, Chris Beiker, and Stephanie Hall. [Id.]. The
Plaintiff attempted to amend the Complaint on a piecemeal basis, which was
denied, and the Plaintiff was granted the opportunity to amend. [Doc. 20].
The Plaintiff was instructed to file an Amended Complaint that “clearly
identifies the Defendants against whom he intends to proceed, and sets forth
facts describing how each of the Defendants allegedly violated his rights.”
[Doc. 20 at 3]. He was cautioned that any Amended Complaint “will
supersede the Plaintiff’s prior filings.” [Id.].
The Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint [Doc. 21], wherein the
Plaintiff names as Defendants in their individual and official capacities: FNU
Walsh and FNU Hansley, Alexander CI sergeants; and FNU Mitzel, FNU
Green, and FNU Morrison, Alexander CI correctional officers. He purports
to sue pursuant to “U.S. Const. 8th and 14th Amend; Dept. of Adult Corr.
policy and procedures, Human Rights Art. 5 and 7” under § 1983. [Id. at 4].
He now appears to claim that former Defendants Sigmon and Hall conspired
against him; that Defendants Hansley, Walsh, Green, and Mitzel searched
and confiscated his legal property, which deprived him of access to the
courts; that Defendants Mitzel and Green falsely charged him with
disciplinary infractions and failed to provide him with the evidence he
requested in his defense3; that Defendant Morrison falsely labeled some of
the Plaintiff’s legal documents as sovereign-citizen material, which resulted
in additional disciplinary charges4; and that all of this was done in retaliation
for the Plaintiff’s initiation of the instant lawsuit.5 [Doc. 21 at 5-9]. For injury,
he claims: “continued discrimination, cruel and unusual punishment,
deprived of equal protection, and further subjected to slander, racial and
religious discrimination, and deprived of numerous Human Rights … [and]
acts of retaliation under color of law.” [Id. at 9]. He seeks damages and
injunctive relief. [Id.].
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because the Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must
review the Amended Complaint to determine whether it is subject to
dismissal on the grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious [or] fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore,
3 The NCDAC’s website reflects that the Plaintiff received infractions for “threaten to
harm/injure staff,” “substance possession,” and “disobey order” on October 19, 2023.
https://webapps.doc.state.nc.us/opi/viewoffenderinfractions.do?method=view&offenderI
D=0462072&listpage=1&listurl=pagelistoffendersearchresults&searchOffenderId=04620
72&searchDOBRange=0&obscure=Y (last accessed May 13, 2024); Fed. R. Evid. 201.
4 The NCDAC’s website reflects that the Plaintiff received an infraction for “involvement
w/gang or SRG” on October 27, 2023. See note 3, supra.
5 The Amended Complaint does not include the claims that allegedly occurred during the
summer of 2023 that were raised in the original Complaint.
under § 1915A the Court must conduct an initial review and identify and
dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if it is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune to such relief. 28 U.S.C. §
1915A.
In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether a complaint
raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly
baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se
complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a
district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his Complaint which
set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
III. DISCUSSION
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was
deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,
and that the alleged deprivation was committed by a “person” acting under
color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan,
526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999); Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty. v. Talevski,
599 U.S. 166 (2023).
A. Parties
The body of the Complaint contains allegations against individuals who
are not named as defendants in the caption as required by Rule 10(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) (“The title of the
complaint must name all the parties[.]”); Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d
551 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]o make someone a party the plaintiff must specify
him in the caption and arrange for service of process.”); Perez v. Humphries,
No. 3:18-cv-107-GCM, 2018 WL 4705560, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 1, 2018) (“A
plaintiff’s failure to name a defendant in the caption of a Complaint renders
any action against the purported defendant a legal nullity.”); [see, e.g., Doc.
21 at 5-6, 9 (referring to Sgt. Emig, Stephanie Hall, Joshua Sigmon, Ronnie
L. Honeycutt, and Chris Beiker)]. The allegations directed at individuals not
named as Defendants, including the conspiracy claims against former
Defendants Hall and Sigmon, are therefore dismissed without prejudice.
B. Vague and Conclusory Claims
The Plaintiff vaguely alludes to claims of abuse of authority; policy and
procedure violations6; human rights violations, including “Human Rights Art.
5 and 7”; violation of equal protection; racial and religious discrimination; and
cruel and unusual punishment. [Doc. 21 at 4, 6, 9]. These allegations,
however, are so vague and conclusory that they fail to satisfy the most basic
pleading requirements. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a “short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”);
Simpson v. Welch, 900 F.2d 33, 35 (4th Cir. 1990) (conclusory allegations,
unsupported by specific allegations of material fact are not sufficient);
Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 201-02 (4th Cir. 2002) (a pleader
must allege facts, directly or indirectly, that support each element of the
claim). Accordingly, these claims are dismissed without prejudice.
C. Retaliation
An inmate has a clearly established First Amendment right to be free
from retaliation for filing lawsuits. See Booker v. S.C. Dep’t of Corrs., 855
F.3d 533, 540 (4th Cir. 2017); Thompson v. Commonwealth of Va., 878 F.3d
89, 110 (4th Cir. 2017). Inmates also have a protected First Amendment
6 Further, the alleged violation of prison policy does not rise to the level of a § 1983 claim
absent a plausible allegation of an underlying constitutional violation. See generally
Jackson v. Sampson, 536 F. App’x 356, 357 (4th Cir. 2013).
right to complain to prison officials about prison conditions and improper
treatment by prison employees that affect them. See Patton v. Kimble, 717
F. App’x 271, 272 (4th Cir. 2018).
To state a colorable First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must
allege that (1) he engaged in protected First Amendment activity, (2) the
defendant took some action that adversely affected his First Amendment
rights, and (3) there was a causal relationship between his protected activity
and the defendant’s conduct. Martin v. Duffy, 977 F.3d 294, 299 (4th Cir.
2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Retaliation claims brought by
prisoners, however, are treated with skepticism because every act of
discipline by a prison official is retaliatory in that it responds directly to
prisoner misconduct. See Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994).
More, bare or conclusory assertions of retaliation are insufficient to establish
a retaliation claim. Id., 40 F.3d at 74.
Here, the Plaintiff alleges no facts that would give rise to any inference
of a connection between his filing of a civil action against other persons, and
the actions of the Defendants named regarding the alleged retaliation. As
such, the Plaintiff makes no plausible allegations regarding the third element
of this claim. As a result, the Plaintiff’s retaliation claim will be dismissed
without prejudice.
D. Access to the Courts
The Supreme Court stated in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977),
that prisoners must have meaningful access to the courts. The “meaningful
access” referred to in Bounds does not, however, entitle a plaintiff to total or
unlimited access. See Moore v. Gray, No. 5:04-CT-918-FL, 2005 WL
3448047, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 26, 2005), aff’d, 133 F. App’x 913 (4th Cir.
2005) (unpublished) (citation omitted). The right of access to the courts only
requires that prisoners have the capability of bringing challenges to
sentences or conditions of confinement. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343,
356-57 (1996). Moreover, as a jurisdictional requirement flowing from the
standing doctrine, the prisoner must allege an actual injury. See id. at 349.
“Actual injury” is prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation,
such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or present a non-frivolous claim
challenging their conviction or conditions of confinement. See id. A plaintiff’s
“[f]ailure to show that a ‘nonfrivolous legal claim has been frustrated’ is fatal
to his Bounds claim.” Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1155 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Casey, 518 U.S. at 353).
The Plaintiff claims that the Defendants confiscated his legal materials
in the instant case as well as in an active criminal case; that this was meant
to “sabotage” his civil suit; and that this “hinder[ed] [his] ability to pursue legal
obligations.” [Doc. 21 at 6]. The Plaintiff’s vague and conclusory allegations
are insufficient to plausibly demonstrate that any of the Defendants caused
him an actual injury. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s access to courts claim is
dismissed without prejudice.
E. False Disciplinary Charges
The Plaintiff claims that Defendants Green, Mitzel, and Morrison falsely
charged him with disciplinary infractions which resulted in four disciplinary
convictions. [Doc. 21 at 5, 7]; see Notes 3, 4, supra. This claim appears to
be barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the United
States Supreme Court held as follows:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by
actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or
sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction and sentence has been reversed on direct
appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by
a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or
called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages
bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that
has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.
Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983
suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity
of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must
be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the
conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if
the district court determines that the plaintiff's action, even
if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any
outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the
action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of
some other bar to the suit.
Id. at 485-87 (footnotes omitted). In Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641
(1997), the Supreme Court extended the Heck rule to claims alleging
constitutional deficiencies in prison disciplinary proceedings that have
resulted in the loss of good time credits.
Here, if the Plaintiff were to prevail on his claim that the disciplinary
charges were unfounded, that would necessarily imply the invalidity of the
disciplinary convictions. See, e.g., Edwards, 520 U.S. at 646-47 (plaintiff’s
claims that he was denied the opportunity to put on a defense and that there
was deceit and bias by the hearing officer would necessarily imply the
invalidity of the disciplinary proceedings); Moskos v. Hardee, 24 F.4th 289
(4th Cir. 2022) (prisoner could not bring § 1983 due process claim that prison
officials fabricated evidence so that plaintiff would be wrongfully convicted of
prison disciplinary infractions, causing him to lose good-time credits,
because the disciplinary conviction had not been invalidated). The Plaintiff,
however, has not alleged that the disciplinary convictions have been
reversed or otherwise invalidated. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims about the
false disciplinary charges appear to be barred by Heck.
F. Disciplinary Due Process
Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution,
and the full array of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not
apply. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (citing Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488 (1972)). Where a prison disciplinary hearing
may result in loss of good time credits or solitary confinement, however, an
inmate is entitled to certain due process protections. These include: (1)
advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when
consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses
and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written
statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the
disciplinary action. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-71.
The Plaintiff claims that he asked Defendants Mitzel and Green to
gather evidence and videos to demonstrate his innocence of the disciplinary
charges, that he was “denied all evidence requested to support his
innocence,” and that he was thus found guilty of the infractions.7 [Doc. 21 at
7]. The Plaintiff, however, makes no allegations as to what evidence was
denied, or whether such evidence even existed. As such, the Plaintiff’s
7 The Plaintiff also claims that he requested evidence from Sgt. Emig, who is not a
defendant in this case. [Doc. 21 at 6]; see Section A, supra.
allegations are insufficient to present a plausible claim for any due process
violation, and such claim will be dismissed without prejudice.
G. Supplemental Jurisdiction
The Plaintiff appears to assert a claim under North Carolina law in that
the Defendants “subject[ed] Plaintiff to injuries such as slander … by abusing
their authority to establish false allegations against Plaintiff in order to
retaliate against Plaintiff for filing his civil suit.” [Doc. 21 at 7]. The Plaintiff’s
§ 1983 claim pertaining to false disciplinary charges did not pass initial
review and, accordingly the Court declines to assert supplemental
jurisdiction over the Plaintiff’s North Carolina slander claim.8 See Artis v.
Dist. Of Columbia, 583 U.S. 71, 74 (2018) (when a district court dismisses
all claims independently qualifying for the exercise of federal jurisdiction, it
“ordinarily dismiss[es] … all related state claims.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s slander claim is dismissed without prejudice.
8 The allegations are also too vague and conclusory to state a plausible slander claim
under North Carolina law. See generally Donovan v. Fiumara, 114 N.C.App. 524, 526-
28, 442 S.E.2d 572, 574 (1994) (a statement is defamatory if a statement is false, and it
tends “to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, business, or means of
livelihood”).
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, and the Complaint is therefore dismissed without prejudice pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).
Although the Plaintiff has already been afforded an opportunity to file
an amended complaint, the Court in its discretion will allow the Plaintiff one
final opportunity to amend his Complaint, if he so chooses, to properly state
a claim upon which relief can be granted, in accordance with the terms of
this Order. The amended complaint must be filed within thirty (30) days of
the entry of this Order. Any amended complaint will be subject to all
timeliness and procedural requirements and will supersede the Complaint.
Piecemeal amendment will not be permitted. Should the Plaintiff fail to timely
amend his Complaint in accordance with this Order, the Court will dismiss
this action without further notice. Should the Plaintiff wish to assert new
claims that are unrelated to the claims asserted in his present Complaint, he
should file a new civil action raising such unrelated claims.
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1. This action [Doc. 21 Am. Complaint] is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).
2. The Plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days in which to amend his
Complaint in accordance with the terms of this Order. If the
Plaintiff fails to so amend his Complaint, the matter will be
dismissed without further notice.
The Clerk is respectfully instructed to mail the Plaintiff a blank § 1983
complaint form and a copy of this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed: May 15, 2024
Martifi Reidinger ee
Chief United States District Judge “AES
14