Caldwell v. Carroll

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

STATESVILLE DIVISION

5:24-cv-00096-MR

CEDRIC CALDWELL, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) ORDER

)

FNU CARROLL, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

________________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff’s

Complaint, [Doc. 1], see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A, and Plaintiff’s

unsigned addendum, [Doc. 6]. Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.

[Docs. 4, 7].

I. BACKGROUND

Pro se Plaintiff Cedric Caldwell (“Plaintiff”) is a prisoner of the State of

North Carolina currently incarcerated at Alexander Correctional Institution

(“Alexander”) in Taylorsville, North Carolina. Plaintiff filed this action on April

4, 2024, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 against FNU Carroll,

identified as a Sergeant at Alexander, and FNU Adkins and FNU Lay, both

identified as “Lower Rank Officials” at Alexander. [Doc. 1]. Plaintiff does not

allege whether he is suing these Defendants in their individual or official

capacities.1 [See id.].

Plaintiff alleges as follows. On February 18, 2024, at 8:50 to 8:58 a.m.,

after a random search by Defendant Carroll on Blue Unit during which he

was “caught in the act of planting a homade [sic] weapon in [Plaintiff’s] cell,”

Plaintiff was strip searched in a staff bathroom by “Official Mr. Cook.” [Doc.

1 at 2]. Plaintiff was then escorted to Lower Red Unit Segregation.

Defendant Carroll “used accessive [sic] and agressive [sic] profanity towards

[Plaintiff] saying watch what happen to your little A _ _ cheeks and A _ _

hole.” [Id.]. Defendant Carroll told Defendants Lay and Adkins “to mess with

[Plaintiff] in a sexual[ ] way.” [Id.]. Defendants Lay and Adkins then escorted

Plaintiff to the inmate shower in Segregation Apod, made Plaintiff strip naked

again, and “told [Plaintiff] to shake [his] penis up and down” repeatedly.

Defendants Lay and Adkins then made Plaintiff “turn around and spread [his]

as_ cheeks … over-and-over.” Plaintiff stopped and told them he would

“report them and write [a] complaint.” [Id. at 3]. They responded that “they

did not care” and that they would use OC pepper spray on him and put him

in chains if he did not obey orders. Plaintiff was scared and “[did] what they

directed [him] to do.” Defendant Carroll arrived and Plaintiff told him he was

going to write a PREA grievance “and follow suit” because “they were in

1 The Court, therefore, will address both.

violation of [his] constitutional rights.” [Id.]. Defendant Carroll responded, “I

don’t give a fuck you stupid sum-bitch, make sure you spell my name correct.

You dumb piece of shit.” [Id.]. On February 21, 2024, Plaintiff filed a PREA

grievance against the Defendants. [Id. at 4]. Plaintiff never received a Step

1 or Step 2 Response, and he was immediately transferred to Marion

Correctional Institution.2 [Id.]. Defendants acted out of retaliation because

Plaintiff exposed Defendant Carroll for planting the weapon in Plaintiff’s cell.

[Id. at 8].

Plaintiff purports to state claims for retaliation, sexual harassment,

sexual abuse, and “[f]ailure to obey and follow the SAH 101 Refresher

Training Skills.”3,4 [Id. at 1, 8]. For injuries, Plaintiff alleges emotional

distress and injury to his “personal man-hood.” [Id. at 8]. Plaintiff seeks

monetary relief and early release from prison.5 [Id. at 5, 7].

2 Plaintiff has since been transferred back to Alexander. [Doc. 3].

3 The Court will address those claims fairly raised by Plaintiff’s allegations.

4 Plaintiff also recently filed an unsigned Addendum to his Complaint in which he purports

to assert claims of “negligence” against each Defendant. [Doc. 6]. The Court will strike

this unsigned, piecemeal pleading. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a). Plaintiff is admonished

that he must sign all documents he files in this action. See id. To the extent Plaintiff wants

to amend his Complaint to properly assert these claims, he may file an amended

complaint asserting all the claims he wishes to bring against all Defendants to this action.

The Court will instruct the Clerk to mail Plaintiff a blank prisoner § 1983 form.

5 Plaintiff also references a clemency petition he filed with the Juvenile Review Board.

[Doc. 1 at 5, 7]. To the extent Plaintiff seeks relief relative to that petition here, this Court

has no authority to review or grant such clemency. Also, Plaintiff attached a list of items

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must

review the Complaint to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the

grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious [or] fails to state a claim on which

relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore, under § 1915A

the Court must conduct an initial review and identify and dismiss the

complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune to such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether the Complaint

raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly

baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se

complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a

district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his Complaint which

set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

it appears he is requesting the Court to gather. [See Doc. 1 at 10]. The Court does not

conduct discovery for the parties. Once the Court enters a Pretrial Order and Case

Management Plan in this matter, the Plaintiff may conduct his own discovery.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Section 1983

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was

deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,

and that the alleged deprivation was committed by a “person” acting under

color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan,

526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999); Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty. v. Talevski,

599 U.S. 166, 143 S.Ct. 1444 (2023).

1. Official Capacity Claims

“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit

against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.” Will v.

Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Because a state is

not a “person” under § 1983, state officials acting in their official capacities

cannot be sued for damages thereunder. Allen v. Cooper, No. 1:19-cv-794,

2019 WL 6255220, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 22, 2019). Furthermore, as noted

the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for monetary damages against the State

of North Carolina and its various agencies. See Ballenger v. Owens, 352

F.3d 842, 844-45 (4th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff’s official capacity claims, therefore,

do not survive initial review and will be dismissed.

2. Retaliation

Plaintiff claims that Defendants retaliated against him for exposing

Defendant Carroll’s planting a homemade weapon in Plaintiff’s cell during a

random cell search. An inmate has a clearly established First Amendment

right to be free from retaliation for filing grievances. See Booker v. S.C. Dep’t

of Corrs., 855 F.3d 533, 540 (4th Cir. 2017); Thompson v. Commonwealth

of Va., 878 F.3d 89, 110 (4th Cir. 2017). Inmates also have a protected First

Amendment right to complain to prison officials about prison conditions and

improper treatment by prison employees that affect them. See Patton v.

Kimble, 717 Fed. App’x 271, 272 (4th Cir. 2018).

To state a colorable First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must

allege that (1) he engaged in protected First Amendment activity, (2) the

defendant took some action that adversely affected his First Amendment

rights, and (3) there was a causal relationship between his protected activity

and the defendant’s conduct. Martin v. Duffy, 977 F.3d 294, 299 (4th Cir.

2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Retaliation claims brought by

prisoners, however, are treated with skepticism because every act of

discipline by a prison official is retaliatory in that it responds directly to

prisoner misconduct. See Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994).

Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true and giving him the benefit of every

reasonable inference, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s First Amendment

retaliation claim against Defendant Carroll in his individual capacity is not

clearly frivolous and survives initial review. Plaintiff, however, has failed to

state a retaliation claim against Defendants Lay or Adkins because he

alleges only that Defendant Carroll ordered them to “mess with” the Plaintiff,

not that there was a causal relationship between Plaintiff’s protected activity

and their conduct. The Court, therefore, will dismiss this claim against

Defendants Lay and Adkins.

3. Eighth Amendment

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual

punishments,” U.S. Const. amend. VIII, and protects prisoners from the

“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,

319, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986). “There can be little doubt that

sexual abuse is repugnant to contemporary standards of decency, and that

allegations of sexual abuse can amount to an Eighth Amendment violation.”

Jackson v. Holley, 666 F. App'x 242, 244 (4th Cir. 2016); see Woodford v.

Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 118, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (Stevens,

J., dissenting) (“Accordingly, those inmates who are sexually assaulted by

guards, or whose sexual assaults by other inmates are facilitated by guards,

have suffered grave deprivations of their Eighth Amendment rights.”);

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811

(1994) (“Being violently assaulted in prison is simply not part of the penalty

that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” (internal

quotation marks omitted)).

Nonetheless, the law is well-established that taunting comments, slurs,

threats, and other verbal harassment by correctional facility staff, without

more, are not actionable under § 1983. Wilson v. United States, 332 F.R.D.

505, 520 (S.D. W.Va. Aug. 19, 2019) (collecting cases).

Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true and giving him the benefit of every

reasonable inference, Plaintiff’s claim of sexual abuse survives initial review

as not clearly frivolous against all Defendants. Any claim based on verbal

harassment alone, however, fails to state a claim for relief and will be

dismissed.

3. Policy Violation

Plaintiff purports to state a claim against Defendants for their alleged

violation of “SAH 101 Refresher Training Skills.” [Doc. 1 at 8]. A policy

violation does not rise to the level of a § 1983 claim absent a plausible

allegation of an underlying constitutional violation. See generally Jackson v.

Sampson, 536 F. App’x 356, 357 (4th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (holding that

“prison officials’ failure to follow internal prison policies are not actionable

under § 1983 unless the alleged breach of policy rises to the level of

constitutional violation”). Plaintiff here has failed to allege what this policy

regards, how the Defendants violated it, or any other facts that might support

a claim of a constitutional violation independent of the Eighth Amendment

claim that survived initial review. The Court, therefore, will dismiss this claim.

B. Section 1985

To state a claim under § 1985, a plaintiff must allege “concrete facts”

showing that defendants entered a conspiracy which deprived the plaintiff of

his civil rights. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 196-97 (4th Cir. 2009).

Courts reject “section 1985 claims whenever the purported conspiracy is

alleged in a merely conclusory manner, in the absence of concrete

supporting facts.” Williams, at *5 (quoting Simmons v. Poe, 47 F.3d 1370,

1377 (4th Cir. 1995)). The Fourth Circuit has “rarely, if ever, found that a

plaintiff has set forth sufficient facts to establish a section 1985 conspiracy.”

Simmons, 47 F.3d at 1377. To allege a conspiracy, a party must show that

two or more persons acted in concert to commit an unlawful act or to commit

a lawful act by unlawful means. See id. at 1376. Further, “a party must show

an agreement or meeting of the minds between parties to inflict a wrong or

injury upon another that results in damage.” Williams, at *5 (citations

omitted). A plaintiff must also show harm resulting from the alleged

conspiracy. Id. (citations omitted).

Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true and drawing reasonable

inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, Plaintiff has nonetheless failed to allege a

conspiracy to deprive his civil rights under § 1985. At best, Plaintiff alleges

that Defendant Carroll ordered “Lower Rank Official” Defendants Lay and

Adkins to “mess with [Plaintiff] in a sexual[ ] way.” The Court, therefore, will

dismiss this claim on initial review.

V. CONCLUSION

In sum, the Complaint survives initial review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A

as to Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Carroll

and Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against all Defendants in accordance

with the terms of this Order. All remaining claims, including Plaintiff’s official

capacity claims, fail initial review and will be dismissed.

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that all claims asserted in this matter

as to all Defendants are hereby DISMISSED for failure to state a claim,

except for Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant

Carroll and Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against all Defendants, which

are allowed to pass initial review.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs Addendum [Doc. 6] is

hereby STRICKEN from the record in this matter.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall commence

the procedure for waiver of service as set forth in Local Civil Rule 4.3 for

Defendants Carroll, Lay, and Adkins, who are alleged to be current or former

employees of NCDPS.

The Clerk is also instructed to mail Plaintiff a blank prisoner § 1983

form and an Opt-In/Opt-Out form pursuant to Standing Order 3:19-mc-

00060-FDW.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: May 1, 2024

Se ee

Chief United States District Judge AS

11