Ashford v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

CHARLOTTE DIVISION

CASE NO. 3:23-CV-00344-FDW-SCR

SHANNON ASHFORD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER

)

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., )

)

Defendant. )

)

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and

Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Stay Pending Completion of Arbitration Proceedings, (Doc. No. 9);

Magistrate Judge Susan Rodriguez’s Memorandum and Recommendation (“M&R”), (Doc. No.

16); and Pro Se Plaintiff’s Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Memorandum and

Recommendation, (Doc. No. 17). For the reasons set forth below, the M&R is AFFIRMED.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 9, 2023, Pro Se Plaintiff Shannon Ashford filed this lawsuit against Defendant

Wells Fargo Bank alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (Doc. No. 1.)

From December 2018 to October 2022, Plaintiff was employed by Defendant but was ultimately

terminated as part of a reduction in force plan. (Doc. No. 1, p. 8.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant

engaged in discriminatory acts against her based on her race and color. (Id.) Prior to filing this

lawsuit, Plaintiff filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and received

her “Notice of Right to Sue” on March 13, 2023. (Id.)

On September 21, 2023, Defendant filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration and Dismiss, or

in the Alternative, Stay Pending Completion of Arbitration Proceedings (“Motion”). (Doc. No. 9.)

On March 14, 2024, the Magistrate Judge entered a M&R staying the case and ordering arbitration.

(Doc. No. 16.) The Magistrate Judge also recommended the motion to dismiss be denied. (Id.) On

April 2, 2024, Plaintiff objected to the M&R. (Doc. No. 17.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may designate a magistrate judge to “submit to a judge of the court

proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition” of dispositive pretrial matters.

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Federal Magistrate Act provides a district court shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the report or specific proposed findings or recommendations to

which an objection is made. Id.; Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 200 (4th Cir. 1983). By contrast,

in the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but

instead must “only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to

accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315

(4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note). “‘Any written objections

must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are

made and the basis for such objections.’” Morgan v. N.C. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 421

F. Supp. 2d 890, 893 (W.D.N.C. 2006) (emphasis in original) (quoting Thomas v. Westinghouse

Savannah River Co., 21 F. Supp. 2d 551, 560 (D.S.C. 1997)); see also Battle v. U.S. Parole

Comm'n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987) (“[P]arties filing objections must specifically identify

those findings objected to.”) (quotation omitted). “Frivolous, conclusive or general objections need

not be considered by the district court.” Battle, 834 F.2d at 421 (quotation omitted).

A district court need not review issues that are beyond the subject of an objection. Thomas

v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); Camby, 718 F.2d at 200. Thus, “[a]n ‘objection’ that does

nothing more than state a disagreement with a magistrate’s suggested resolution, or simply

summarizes what has been presented before, is not an ‘objection’ as that term is used in this

context.” Aldrich v. Bock, 327 F. Supp. 2d 743, 747 (E.D. Mich. 2004). General or conclusory

objections result not only in the loss of de novo review by the district court but also in waiver of

appellate review. Tyler v. Beinor, 81 F. App'x 445, 446 (4th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); United States

v. Woods, 64 F. App’x 398, 399 (4th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). Upon careful review of the record,

a district court may accept, reject, or modify the findings or recommendations made by the

magistrate judge. Battle, 834 F.2d at 421.

III. ANALYSIS

At the outset, the Court notes Plaintiff’s Objections to the M&R appear to largely be the

same as in her initial opposition to Defendant’s Motion. Compare (Doc. No. 13) with (Doc. No.

17). In objecting to the Magistrate Judge’s M&R, Plaintiff argues the Arbitration Agreement is

unenforceable for two reasons: (1) Defendant has already admitted to wrongdoing making

arbitration unnecessary and (2) the claims at issue are not arbitrable.

Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant has “violated its own alleged Arbitration Agreement

through is own actions, conduct, and by its admission” does not constitute a specific objection to

the M&R. Rather, it merely summarizes Plaintiff’s previously presented argument in opposition

to Defendant’s initial Motion. Therefore, the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion finding against

unconscionability as a valid defense to the Arbitration Agreement is reviewed for clear error. (Doc.

No. 16, p. 8.) After conducting a careful review of the M&R, the Court finds no error in, summarily

agrees with, and adopts those portions of the M&R to which no objection was raised and to this

general objection. The Court now turns to Plaintiff’s specific objection.

Plaintiff’s argument that this case involves claims outside the scope of the Arbitration

Agreement suggests the Magistrate Judge was incorrect in concluding Plaintiff failed to plead

claims related to Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) and fraud in her

Complaint. Specifically, the Magistrate Judge reviewed the Complaint and found “Plaintiff alleges

unlawful discrimination, retaliation, and harassment based on her race and color.” (Doc. No. 16,

p. 9.) Even after liberally construing the Complaint in light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the

Magistrate determined no claims related to ERISA or fraud were pled meaning “Plaintiff has failed

to properly bring those claims before the Court.” (Doc. No. 16, p. 10.)

A plaintiff's “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[O]nce a claim

has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the

allegations in the complaint.” Id. at 563. “When considering a motion to dismiss involving pro se

parties, the court construes the pleadings liberally to ensure that valid claims do not fail merely for

lack of legal specificity.” Brown v. Charlotte Rentals LLC, No. 3:15-cv-0043-FDW-DCK, 2015

WL 4557368, at *2 (W.D.N.C. July 28, 2015) (citing Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th

Cir. 1978)).

Here, Plaintiff asserts she informed the Court “Defendant was engaged in ‘ongoing’ as well

as ‘other action’” in her Complaint. (Doc. No. 17, p. 3.) While the Complaint states Plaintiff

received a “coaching notice for ‘poor performance’” after “Plaintiff discovered [a vendor contract]

had been subjected to fraud”, there are no other facts detailing the alleged fraud. (Doc. No. 1, p.

9.) Now, Plaintiff contends it was the Court’s responsibility to “instruct[] Plaintiff[] the degree to

which to elaborate on ‘ongoing’” as mentioned in her Complaint and the “alleged ERISA

violations in which the Defendant was engaging against the Plaintiff were done as part of ongoing

‘other actions’.” (Id.) However, despite Plaintiff being pro se, it is well established the Court

should not “assume the role of advocate for the pro se plaintiff.” Gordon, 574 F.2d at 1151

(quotation omitted). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), at this stage of the proceeding

a plaintiff must seek leave of court to amend her Complaint and cannot merely include additional

factual allegations in a responsive pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). See Materson v. Stokes, 166

F.R.D. 368, 370 (E.D.Va.1996); Beck v. City of Durham, 129 F.Supp.2d 844, 855 (M.D.N.C.

2000) (“Additional factual allegations contained in a response brief are not considered on a motion

to dismiss.”) Therefore, despite liberally construing the Complaint, Plaintiff has failed to properly

plead claims related to ERISA or fraud and only the claims related to race discrimination,

retaliation, and harassment are properly before this Court.

Accordingly, upon de novo review, this Court finds this case involves claims entirely

within the scope of the Arbitration Agreement. Thus, Plaintiff’s objection to the M&R on this point

is OVERRULED.

IV. CONCLUSION

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge’s Memorandum and

Recommendation, (Doc. No. 16), is AFFIRMED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Objections to the Memorandum and

Recommendation, (Doc. No. 17), are OVERRULED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and

Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Stay Pending Completion of Arbitration Proceedings, (Doc. No. 9),

is GRANTED IN PART as to compelling arbitration and staying the case and DENIED IN

PART as to the Motion to Dismiss. The parties shall submit their dispute to arbitration according

to the terms of the Contract and shall file a status report within 90 days of this Order and each 90

days thereafter.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: April 23, 2024

Frank D. Whitney ‘?_¥¢

United States District Judge er