Doe v. The University of North Carolina System

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ASHEVILLE DIVISION

CIVIL CASE NO. 1:23-cv-00041-MR

JACOB DOE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) ORDER

)

THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH )

CAROLINA SYSTEM, et al. )

)

Defendants. )

)

________________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Defendants’ Motion to Stay

Pending Appeal [Doc. 70].

I. BACKGROUND

The Plaintiff Jacob Doe, a former student of the University of North

Carolina at Chapel Hill (“UNC-CH”), brings this action asserting federal

claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of

1972 (“Title IX”), as well as various state law claims, challenging the handling

of the disciplinary proceedings brought against him based on allegations of

sexual misconduct. [See Doc. 1]. In his Verified Complaint, Plaintiff names

as Defendants the UNC System, UNC-CH, the UNC Board of Trustees, the

UNC Board of Governors, the UNC-CH Chancellor, the Interim Head of

UNC-CH’s Equal Opportunity and Compliance Office, UNC-CH Title IX

investigators, the Director of Report and Response in UNC-CH’s Equal

Opportunity and Compliance Office, a UNC-CH hearing officer, and the

UNC-CH Dean of Students. [Id.].

The Defendants moved to dismiss the Plaintiff’s claims. [Docs. 32-35].

In so moving, the Defendants asserted the defenses of Eleventh Amendment

immunity, sovereign immunity, and qualified immunity with respect to the

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims and state law claims. [See Docs. 32, 34]. UNC-CH

challenged the Plaintiff’s Title IX claim only on the grounds that the Plaintiff

had failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. [Doc. 34].

On March 4, 2024, the Court granted in part and denied in part the

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss. [Doc. 65]. Specifically, the Court granted

the Motions with respect to the Plaintiff’s claims for negligent hiring,

supervision, and retention and for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

[Id. at 46-47]. In all other respects, the Motions were denied. Specifically,

the Court denied UNC-CH’s motion to dismiss the Plaintiff’s Title IX claim

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), and it declined to dismiss the Plaintiff’s other

claims on the basis of sovereign immunity, Eleventh Amendment immunity,

and qualified immunity, concluding that the Defendants had not established

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that they are entitled to such immunities at this stage of the proceedings. [Id.

at 25-26, 32-33, 35].

On April 2, 2024, the Defendants filed a timely Notice of Appeal of

those parts1 of the Court’s Order denying the Defendants’ Motions to

Dismiss. [Doc. 68]. The following day, the Defendants filed the present

motion, seeking a stay of these proceedings pending resolution of their

appeal in the Court of Appeals. [Doc. 70].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in

every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with

economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v.

N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). “The party seeking a stay must justify

it by clear and convincing circumstances outweighing potential harm to the

party against whom it is operative.” Williford v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc.,

715 F.2d 124, 127 (4th Cir. 1983). When considering a motion to stay, a

court must balance “various factors relevant to the expeditious and

comprehensive disposition of the causes of action on the court’s docket.”

1 In the Order, the Court also denied a motion for change of venue filed by the Defendants.

3

Maryland v. Universal Elections, Inc., 729 F.3d 370, 375 (4th Cir. 2013)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

To the extent that this Court’s Order denied the Defendants’ Motions

to Dismiss on the grounds of qualified immunity, sovereign immunity, and

Eleventh Amendment immunity, such Order is immediately appealable under

the collateral order doctrine. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530

(1985) (holding that denial of qualified immunity is appealable final decision

to the extent that the availability of the defense turns on a question of law);

see also Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 766

(noting that sovereign immunity “provides an immunity from suit”); P.R.

Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993)

(noting that Eleventh Amendment immunity “confers an immunity from suit”).

While an interlocutory appeal is pending, a district court generally is

“divest[ed] . . . of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the

appeal.” Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski, 599 U.S. 736, 740 (2023) (quoting Griggs

v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982).

While the Court may lack jurisdiction as to any issue related to the

Defendants’ immunity defenses while the interlocutory appeal is pending,

such appeal does not divest the Court over issues unrelated to those

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immunity defenses. Regardless of the outcome of the appeal as to the

Defendants’ immunity defenses, a significant portion of this litigation—

namely, the Plaintiff’s Title IX claim—will go forward. Thus, even if the

Defendants could show that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their

appeal regarding the denial of the various immunities that they have

asserted, such showing does not weigh in favor of granting a stay of the

entire action pending resolution of the appeal.2

The Defendants argue that they intend to ask the Fourth Circuit to

exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction and review the denial of UNC-CH’s

Motion to Dismiss the Title IX claim. Even assuming that pendent appellate

jurisdiction exists over such claim, the Fourth Circuit’s decision to exercise

such jurisdiction is “purely discretionary.” Clem v. Corbeau, 284 F.3d 543,

549 n.2 (4th Cir. 2002). The Court declines to stay this entire action based

on the mere possibility that the Fourth Circuit might exercise its discretion

2 In addition, the Defendants appeal from an Order at the Rule 12(b) stage where the

Court must take the Plaintiff’s allegations as true. Thus, the question of whether any

Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity turns on what may be very different facts from

what may be before the Court at summary judgment. It is for that reason that a dismissal

based on qualified immunity is rarely granted (and why the Court sees the Defendant’s

actions in this regard as likely imposed merely for the purposes of delay). Moreover, such

procedural posture demonstrates that proceeding with discovery would be efficient during

the pendency of the Defendants’ appeal.

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and review the Court’s Order denying the dismissal of this claim under Rule

12(b)(6).3

The Defendants contend that, regardless of whether the Fourth Circuit

grants review of the Title IX claim, a stay of this action is nevertheless

warranted because “[i]t would be impractical to proceed with that one claim

while Plaintiff’s other five claims are on appeal.” [Doc. 71 at 9]. The Court,

however, sees no significant impediments in proceeding with the litigation

with respect to the Title IX claim while the interlocutory appeal is pending.

The parties may conduct discovery regarding the underlying factual issues

as they pertain to the Plaintiff’s Title IX claim. Such discovery will also likely

be applicable to any § 1983 claims or state law claims that remain after the

resolution of the appeal. The Defendants fail to explain how proceeding with

discovery on these underlying factual issues would be “difficult to administer

and potentially duplicative.” [Id.].

Finally, the Defendants contend that failing to stay the entire action

would result in “the possibility of inconsistent rulings at summary judgment,

3 Even if the Court of Appeals reverses and remands this matter on qualified immunity

and Title IX for an order of dismissal, such dismissal may be without prejudice so as to

allow the Plaintiff to amend his allegations, since this is at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. See

Adbul-Mumit v. Alexandria Hyundai, LLC, 896 F.3d 278, 292 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting that

decision to dismiss with or without prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6) is a matter within the

court’s discretion) (citing Carter v. Norfolk Cmty. Hosp. Ass’n, Inc., 761 F.2d 970, 974 (4th

Cir. 1985)).

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and then further risk of conducting two separate trials.” [Doc. 71 at 9]. The

denial of the Defendant’s motion to stay, however, shall be without prejudice.

The Defendants are free to renew their request for a stay should their

interlocutory appeal not be resolved by the time that this matter is ripe for the

filing of dispositive motions.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Defendants’ Motion to Stay

Pending Appeal [Doc. 70] is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: April 10, 2024