Lyda v. Griffin

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ASHEVILLE DIVISION

1:22-cv-00273-MR

TIMOTHY LYDA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) ORDER

)

)

LIBBY HARVEY, )

)

Defendant. )

___________________________ )

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment [Doc. 14] and Defendant’s Motion to Seal [Doc. 16].

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Pro se Plaintiff Timothy Lyda (“Plaintiff”) filed this action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Lowell Griffin, identified as the Sheriff of

Henderson County, North Carolina; the Henderson County Detention Facility

(the “Jail”); the City of Hendersonville; and Libby Harvey, identified as a Jail

Nurse. [Doc. 1]. In his unverified Complaint, Plaintiff alleged, in pertinent

part, that he did not receive his blood pressure medication while he was

detained at the Jail from April 9, 2021 to April 11, 2021; that Defendant

Harvey refused to give him his blood pressure medication during medication

administration time on April 9, 2021; that he immediately took his medication

when he was released from Jail on April 11, 2021; and that he ultimately

suffered two six-inch blood clots in his right common iliac artery four months

later, requiring a 10-hour surgery to remove. [Doc. 1-1 at 1].

Plaintiff’s Complaint survived initial review on his Fourteenth

Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Harvey. [Doc.

5]. Plaintiff’s remaining claims, including his claims for negligence and

medical malpractice, and all claims against Defendants Griffin, Henderson

County Detention Facility, and City of Hendersonville were dismissed for

Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim for relief. [Id.].

On November 16, 2023, Defendant Harvey moved for summary

judgment. [Doc. 14]. She argues that she is entitled to summary judgment

because she was not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical

needs and, even if she was, she is entitled to qualified immunity. [Doc. 15].

In support of her motion, Defendant Harvey submitted her own Affidavit, the

Jail’s medication verification and initiation of medication policies, the

Plaintiff’s Jail medical records, and unpublished case law. [Docs. 15-2 to 15-

12, 18-19].

Thereafter, the Court entered an order in accordance with Roseboro v.

Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the requirements

for filing a response to the summary judgment motion and of the manner in

which evidence could be submitted to the Court. [Doc. 20]. The Plaintiff was

specifically advised that he “may not rely upon mere allegations or denials of

allegations in his pleadings to defeat a summary judgment motion.” [Id. at

2]. Rather, he must support his assertion that a fact is genuinely disputed

by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions,

documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations,

stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only),

admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” [Id. (citing Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(a))]. The Court further advised that:

An affidavit is a written statement under oath; that is,

a statement prepared in writing and sworn before a

notary public. An unsworn statement, made and

signed under the penalty of perjury, may also be

submitted. Affidavits or statements must be

presented by Plaintiff to this Court no later than

fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order and

must be filed in duplicate.

[Id. at 3-4 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4))].

In response to Defendant’s motion, Plaintiff submitted an unsworn

response, internet printouts from medical websites regarding high blood

pressure, unauthenticated partially redacted medical record excerpts, and a

partial copy of an unidentifiable search warrant dated April 9, 2021. [See

Docs. 21, 22]. Defendant replied to Plaintiff’s response. [Doc. 23]. As noted,

Plaintiff’s Complaint was not verified or otherwise submitted under penalty of

perjury and, therefore, cannot be considered for its evidentiary value here.

See Goodman v. Diggs, 986 F.3d 493, 498-99 (4th Cir. 2021) (holding that

a district court is to consider verified prisoner complaints as affidavits on

summary judgment “when the allegations contained therein are based on

personal knowledge”). Thus, in terms of evidentiary forecast, Defendant’s is

unrefuted.

This matter is now ripe for adjudication.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is

genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). A fact is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under

governing law. Id.

The movant has the “initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)

(internal citations omitted).

Once this initial burden is met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving

party. The nonmoving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 322 n.3. The nonmoving party may not

rely upon mere allegations or denials of allegations in his pleadings to defeat

a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 324. Rather, the nonmoving party

must oppose a proper summary judgment motion with citation to

“depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or

declarations, stipulations …, admissions, interrogatory answers, or other

materials” in the record. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(a). Namely, the

nonmoving party must present sufficient evidence from which “a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

248; accord Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, Md., 48 F.3d 810, 818 (4th

Cir. 1995).

When ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must view the

evidence and construe all reasonable inferences and ambiguities against the

movant and in favor of the nonmoving party. Wai Man Tom v. Hospitality

Ventures LLC, 980 F.3d 1027, 1037 (4th Cir. 2020); see Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 255. Facts, however, “must be viewed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott

v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). That is, “[w]hen the moving party has

carried its burden under Rule 56(c), the opponent must do more than simply

show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts…. Where

the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for

the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec.

Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348,

1356 (1986) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Defendant’s uncontroverted forecast of evidence shows the following.

At the relevant times, Defendant was employed by Comprehensive

Providers, LLC, and worked as a nurse at the Henderson County Jail. [Doc.

15-2 at ¶ 2: Harvey Aff.]. Defendant remains and has been so employed for

approximately five years. [Id.].

Comprehensive Providers provides medical care for the Jail. [Id. at ¶

3]. Comprehensive Providers maintains a medication verification policy

pursuant to which the active prescriptions of an arrestee are confirmed and

verified before they can be administered to an arrestee. [Id. at ¶ 8; Doc. 15-

3]. Before administering a medication to an arrestee, the medication

verification policy requires the Jail provider, at minimum, to identify the

patient and the outside prescriber, identify the name of the medication and

the dosage to be dispensed, obtain directions for the use and stop date of

the medication, and obtain the date on which the prescription was last filled

and the quantity dispensed. [Doc. 15-3 at 2; see Doc. 15-2 at ¶ 10]. The

Jail provider cannot dispense medication to an arrestee without this

verification. [Doc. 15-2 at ¶ 10; Doc. 15-3 at 2 (providing that “[t]he option to

decline should be invoked whenever medication is thought to be

unnecessary or inappropriate based upon diagnosis, usage, drug type, drug

indication, [or] dosage…”)]. The decision not to dispense must be

documented in the health record. [Id.].

Defendant Harvey’s duties at the Jail include performing intake of

arrestees to obtain their medical information, medical history, medications,

and medical conditions. [Id. at ¶ 4]. In performing these duties, Defendant

Harvey is required to follow Comprehensive Providers’ medication

verification policy. [See Doc. 15-2 at ¶¶ 5, 10]. In Defendant Harvey’s

experience, arrestees sometimes attempt to bring illegal substances into the

Jail disguised in prescription bottles. As such, it is particularly important to

follow the medication verification policy to prevent substance abuse and

illegal substances in the Jail and to ensure that arrestees receive only the

medication they are prescribed. [See Doc. 15-2 at ¶ 11].

On April 10, 2021, Defendant Harvey performed the intake on the

Plaintiff. [Doc. 15-2 at ¶ 12]. As part of the intake, she took Plaintiff’s blood

pressure, which was 149/99 mmHg. [Id. at ¶ 13; Doc. 18 at 2]. In Defendant

Harvey’s experience, arrestees typically exhibit elevated blood pressure

during intake “due to their adrenaline and nerves.” [Id. at ¶ 13]. During

intake, Plaintiff reported having high blood pressure and that he took

Klonopin, Clonidine, and Cymbalta. Plaintiff’s brother brought in Plaintiff’s

purported medications, which included the blood pressure medication

Clonidine. [Id. at ¶ 14; see Doc. 18 at 3]. Defendant Harvey counted the

number of pills in the bottle, and based on the date on the prescription, she

concluded that Plaintiff was not compliant with his blood pressure

medication. [Id.].

At intake, Plaintiff identified Walmart as his pharmacy. Defendant

Harvey, therefore, called Walmart to verify Plaintiff’s prescriptions. [Doc. 15-

2 at ¶ 15; see Doc. 18 at 6]. According to the Walmart pharmacy, Plaintiff’s

current prescriptions were for Klonopin, Cymbalta, and Flexeril. [Id.; Doc. 18

at 6]. The pharmacist informed Defendant that Plaintiff had no active

prescription for high blood pressure medication. [Doc. 15-2 at ¶ 15].

Defendant Harvey documented this in her intake note. [Id.; Doc. 18 at 6

(“Pharmacist states there are no hypertension medications that are active.”)].

Because Plaintiff’s pharmacy did not verify his blood pressure medication,

Defendant Harvey was unable to dispense it to him.1 [Id. at ¶ 16]. A follow

up appointment with medical was scheduled for the Plaintiff to determine

whether he needed blood pressure medication. [Doc. 15-2 at ¶ 20].

However, Plaintiff was released from the Jail on April 12, 2021, before

this scheduled appointment. [Doc. 15-2 at ¶¶ 17, 20]. During his two-day

stay at the Jail, Plaintiff did not complain to Defendant Harvey regarding

symptoms consistent with high blood pressure. [Doc. 15-2 at ¶ 17].

Defendant Harvey was also not made aware that Plaintiff was suffering with

such symptoms or any medical condition during this time. [Id. at ¶ 18]. On

April 12, 2021, Plaintiff’s blood pressure was taken again. It was 132/86

mmHg, which was significantly lower than his blood pressure at intake. [Id.

at ¶ 19].

Defendant Harvey was not aware that Plaintiff was suffering from a

serious medical condition during his detention at the Jail and did not believe

1 With his summary judgment materials, Plaintiff submitted what appears to be a

photograph of a portion of a page of an unidentified medical record reflecting a

prescription record for Clonidine HCl. [See Doc. 22 at 9]. To the extent this is Plaintiff’s

medical record, it reflects prescriptions for Clonidine HCl active on April 6, 2020 – a year

before Plaintiff’s detention at the Jail at issue – and on April 15, 2021 – three days after

Plaintiff was released from the Jail. Neither prescription reflects for how long it was valid

and, even if this record had been presented in a form acceptable at summary judgment,

it would not support Plaintiff’s contention that he had a valid prescription at the time of his

detention or that Defendant Harvey was aware or should have been aware of one.

a single high blood pressure at intake constituted a serious medical

condition. [Doc. 15-2 at ¶¶ 21-22]. Based on the prescription presented, the

number of pills, and her conversation with Plaintiff’s pharmacist, Defendant

Harvey had no basis to believe that Plaintiff had a valid prescription for blood

pressure medication. [Doc. 15-2 at ¶ 23]. Moreover, Defendant Harvey did

not believe that Plaintiff would suffer any injury from not receiving blood

pressure medication for two days. [Doc. 15-2 at ¶ 24].

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Deliberate Indifference2

A pretrial detainee’s claim based on deliberate indifference to a serious

medical need is properly brought pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.

Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th 593, 611 (4th Cir. 2023). To make out such a

claim, a plaintiff must show that:

(1) they had a medical condition or injury that posed

a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendant

intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly acted or failed

to act to appropriately address the risk that the

condition posed; (3) the defendant knew or should

have known (a) that the detainee had the condition

and (b) that the defendant's action or inaction posed

2 Plaintiff withdrew this claim in his response to Defendant’s summary judgment motion

[Doc. 21 at 2, 4 (out of order)] but recently filed an improper letter directed to the

Undersigned in which he purports to reinstate the claim [Doc. 25]. Despite that the Court

would typically strike such a letter from the docket, the Court will nonetheless address

Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim here because Plaintiff errantly believes his claims

of negligence and medical malpractice survived the Court’s initial review of his Complaint.

[See Doc. 21 at 2].

an unjustifiably high risk of harm; and (4) as a result,

the detainee was harmed.

See id. at 611. Under this standard, a plaintiff need not show that the

defendant actually knew of the detainee’s serious medical condition but must

show that the defendant acted or failed to act “in the face of an unjustifiably

high risk of harm is either known or so obvious that it should be known.” Id.

Negligence or the accidental failure “to do right by the detainee,” however,

are not enough. Id. at 611-12.

The forecast of evidence here fails to show that Defendant Harvey was

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical need under the

Fourteenth Amendment. First of all, Plaintiff has not presented a forecast of

evidence that he actually suffered from high blood pressure on the dates in

questions. Moreover, there is no forecast of evidence from which a

reasonable juror could conclude that Defendant Harvey intentionally,

knowingly, or recklessly failed to address any such risk. There is also no

forecast before the Court that Defendant’s failure to give Plaintiff blood

pressure medication for two days posed an unjustifiably high risk of harm.

Rather, the forecast of evidence shows that Defendant Harvey learned from

Plaintiff’s pharmacist when verifying his medications through the pharmacy

that Plaintiff reported, that he did not have an active prescription for any

blood pressure medication. The forecast of evidence also shows that

Defendant Harvey followed the medication verification policy set forth by the

Jail medical provider and that she understood that such policy was important

to preventing substance abuse in the Jail and to ensure arrestees receive

only the medications they are prescribed. There is no evidence that the

Defendant had any authority to prescribe any new medications for the

Plaintiff, even if she thought they were needed. The forecast of evidence also

shows that, while Plaintiff’s blood pressure was somewhat elevated at intake,

in Defendant Harvey’s experience, arrestees often have elevated blood

pressures at intake due to “adrenaline and nerves” and that Plaintiff’s blood

pressure was significantly reduced on the day of his release two days later.

Moreover, there is no forecast of evidence that Plaintiff was harmed as a

result of his not receiving blood pressure medication for a period of two days.

While Plaintiff alleged in his Complaint having undergone surgery to remove

two giant blood clots in his leg four months after his detention, he forecasts

no evidence whatsoever of a causal connection between the denial of the

medication and this injury or surgery.

As such, there is no genuine issue of material fact on this claim and

the Court will grant Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

B. Qualified Immunity

“Qualified immunity protects officers who commit constitutional

violations but who, in light of clearly established law, could reasonably

believe that their actions were lawful.” Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531

(4th Cir. 2011) (en banc). “To determine whether an officer is entitled to

qualified immunity, the court must examine (1) whether the plaintiff has

demonstrated that the officer violated a constitutional right and (2) whether

that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” E.W.

ex rel. T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 178 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation

marks omitted). The doctrine of qualified immunity “gives government

officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments and

protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the

law.” Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 100 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Here, because Plaintiff has not presented a forecast of evidence that

Defendant violated a constitutional right, Defendant is entitled to qualified

immunity. As such, summary judgment for Defendant would also be proper

on this ground.

V. Defendant’s Motion to Seal

Defendant Harvey, through counsel, moves the Court to seal the

Plaintiff’s medical records she submitted in support of her summary

judgment motion because they “contain confidential information of the

Plaintiff in this case.” [Doc. 17 at 3]. Defendant Harvey filed these

documents under seal. [See Docs. 18, 19].

Before sealing a court document, the Court must “(1) provide public

notice of the request to seal and allow interested parties a reasonable

opportunity to object, (2) consider less drastic alternatives to sealing the

documents, and (3) provide specific reasons and factual findings supporting

its decision to seal the documents and for rejecting the alternatives.”

Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 288, 302 (4th Cir. 2000). In the present

case, the public has been provided with adequate notice and an opportunity

to object to Defendant Harvey’s motion. Defendant filed her motion in

November 2023, and it has been accessible through the Court’s electronic

case filing system since that time. Moreover, the public’s right of access to

Plaintiff’s medical record is substantially outweighed by the Plaintiff’s

competing interest in protecting the details of such information. Having

considered less drastic alternatives to sealing these particular documents,

the Court concludes that sealing these records is necessary to protect the

Plaintiff's privacy interests. As such, the Court will grant Defendant Harvey’s

motion to seal and order that Plaintiff's medical record remain under seal.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Court will grant Defendant’s Motion

for Summary Judgment and Defendant’s Motion to Seal.

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary

Judgment [Doc. 14] is GRANTED; and this action is dismissed with

prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Seal [Doc. 16]

is GRANTED and the documents filed at Docket Numbers 18 and 19 shall

remain sealed.

The Clerk is respectfully instructed to terminate this action.

ITIS SO ORDERED. Signed: March 18, 2024

Martiff Reidinger ee

Chief United States District Judge AS

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