Ragin v. Lockwood

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ASHEVILLE DIVISION

CIVIL CASE NO. 1:23-cv-00313-MR

ERRIE RAGIN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

SHEKINA LOCKWOOD, ) ORDER

)

Defendant. )

_______________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of the pro se

Complaint [Doc. 1]. The Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. [Doc. 8].

I. BACKGROUND

The pro se incarcerated Plaintiff appears to have filed this action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, addressing an incident that allegedly occurred

at the Marion Correctional Institution.1 The Plaintiff names as the sole

Defendant Shekina Lockwood, a correctional officer at the Marion CI. He

describes the nature of the case as “[w]rongfully accused of exposing myself

to a correction officer.” [Doc. 1 at 2]. He states his cause of action as follows:

1 The Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at the Foothills Correctional Institution.

Count 1: Excessive Force

Sprayed me with mace excessively for which she thought I

expose myself to her which I did not.

[Id. at 4] (errors uncorrected).

For injury, the Plaintiff states:

Yes I know wear glasses and when I came to prison I had perfect

vision now my vision is poor in left and right eye.

[Id.] (errors uncorrected). The Plaintiff seeks damages. [Id. at 5].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because the Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must

review the Complaint to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the

grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious [or] fails to state a claim on which

relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore, under § 1915A

the Court must conduct an initial review and identify and dismiss the

complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune to such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether a complaint

raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly

baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se

complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a

district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his Complaint which

set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

III. DISCUSSION

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was

deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,

and that the alleged deprivation was committed by a “person” acting under

color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan,

526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999); Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty. v. Talevski,

599 U.S. 166 (2023).

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual

punishments,” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, and protects prisoners from the

“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,

319 (1986). To establish an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must

satisfy both an objective component–that the harm inflicted was sufficiently

serious–and a subjective component–that the prison official acted with a

sufficiently culpable state of mind. Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761

(4th Cir. 1996). In adjudicating an excessive force claim, the Court must

consider such factors as the need for the use of force, the relationship

between that need and the amount of force used, the extent of the injury

inflicted, and, ultimately, whether the force was “applied in a good faith effort

to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically for the very

purpose of causing harm.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21.

Here, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant pepper sprayed him

“excessively” on the mistaken belief that he had exposed himself; however,

he has failed to plausibly allege that the Defendant acted with a sufficiently

culpable state of mind. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a “short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”);

Simpson v. Welch, 900 F.2d 33, 35 (4th Cir. 1990) (conclusory allegations,

unsupported by specific allegations of material fact are not sufficient);

Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 201-02 (4th Cir. 2002) (a pleader

must allege facts, directly or indirectly, that support each element of the

claim). The allegations are too vague and conclusory to state a plausible

excessive force claim and, accordingly, the Complaint will be dismissed

without prejudice.

IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim, and the Complaint is

dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).

The Court will allow Plaintiff thirty (30) days to amend his Complaint, if

he so chooses, to properly state a claim upon which relief can be granted, in

accordance with the terms of this Order. Any amended complaint will be

subject to all timeliness and procedural requirements and will supersede the

Complaint. Piecemeal amendment will not be permitted. Should the Plaintiff

fail to timely amend his Complaint in accordance with this Order, the Court

will dismiss this action without further notice.

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:

1. The Complaint [Doc. 1] is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).

2. The Plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days in which to amend his

Complaint in accordance with the terms of this Order. If Plaintiff

fails to so amend his Complaint, the matter will be dismissed

without further notice.

The Clerk is respectfully instructed to mail the Plaintiff a blank § 1983

complaint form and a copy of this Order.

Signed: February 7, 2024

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ie ee

Chief United States District Judge AS