The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
1:23-cv-00296-MR
ANTONIO YULANDER )
PEARSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) ORDER
)
)
ROBERT T. BARKER, )
)
Defendant. )
___________________________ )
THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint [Doc. 9], filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2); 1915A.
I. BACKGROUND
Pro se Plaintiff Antonio Yulander Pearson (“Plaintiff”) is a prisoner of
the State of North Carolina currently incarcerated at Granville Correctional
Institution in Butner, North Carolina. On October 17, 2023, Plaintiff filed this
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Robert T. Barker, a
Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) at Marion Correctional Institution
(“Marion”), as the sole Defendant. [Doc. 1 at 2-3]. Plaintiff alleged that
Defendant was the DHO assigned to Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing and
punished Plaintiff for his offense, which resulted in Plaintiff losing his radio
and recreation time for 60 days. Plaintiff alleged that he was in his cell “with
nothing,” including no access to a television or opportunity to exercise. [Id.
at 3]. Plaintiff claimed that he was subjected to cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment. [Id. at 2-3].
Plaintiff’s Complaint failed initial review for Plaintiff’s failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. [Doc. 8]. The Court allowed Plaintiff
30 days to amend his Complaint to properly state a claim for relief in
accordance with the Court’s Order or the Court would dismiss this action
without prejudice and without further notice to Plaintiff. [Id. at 5-6].
Plaintiff timely filed an Amended Complaint, which is now before the
Court on initial review. [Doc. 9]. In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff again
names Defendant Barker as the sole Defendant, suing him in his official and
individual capacities. [Id. at 2]. Plaintiff alleges that he was in Marion’s
Rehabilitative Diversion Unit (RDU) Program from July 17, 2023 to
September 17, 2023 and “forced to remain locked in [his] room for 60 days
as a prisoner of war! [He] had no privilages [sic] except shower 3 times a
week!” [Id. at 4-5]. Plaintiff also alleges that he “was even found Guilty for
one charge that [he] wasn’t even written up for & that was all for 60 Days!”
[Id. at 12].
For injuries, Plaintiff alleges having suffered “Mental Distress &
physical distress.” [Id. at 5]. Plaintiff seeks monetary relief only. [Id.].
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must
review the Complaint to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the
grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious [or] fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore, under § 1915A
the Court must conduct an initial review and identify and dismiss the
complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune to such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether the Complaint
raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly
baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se
complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a
district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his Complaint which
set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
III. DISCUSSION
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was
deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,
and that the alleged deprivation was committed by a “person” acting under
color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan,
526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999); Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty. v. Talevski,
599 U.S. 166, 143 S.Ct. 1444 (2023).
The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of
punishment and from inhumane conditions of confinement. Williams v.
Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996). Extreme deprivations are
required, and only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure
of life's necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth
Amendment violation. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). The plaintiff
must allege facts sufficient to support a claim that prison officials knew of
and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 847 (1994). A plaintiff must also allege “a serious or significant
physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions.”
Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.3d 1375, 1381 (4th Cir.1993).
A reviewing court “owe[s] ‘substantial deference to the professional
judgment of prison administrators.’” Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528
(2006) (quoting Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003)). “[R]estrictive
prison regulations are permissible if they are ‘reasonably related to legitimate
penological [objectives],’ and are not an ‘exaggerated response’ to such
objectives.” Id. (quotations omitted) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,
87 (1987)). The length of time Plaintiff was subjected to the harsh conditions
is an important factor in analyzing whether his constitutional rights were
violated. See Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 504 (4th Cir.1997).
“[I]n certain circumstances, restricting inmates’ opportunities for
physical exercise constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eight Amendment.” Clay v. Miller, 626 F.2d 345, 347 (4th Cir. 1980)
(citations omitted). “In deciding whether conditions at a jail are so onerously
burdensome as to reach constitutional dimensions, courts must look at the
totality of the circumstances, including the extent to which the restrictions
adversely affect the mental or physical health of the inmate.” Id. (citations
omitted). These circumstances include the overall duration of incarceration,
the length of time for which prisoners are locked in their cells each day, and
the practical opportunities for the institution to provide prisoners with
increased exercise opportunities. Mitchell v. Rice, 954 F.2d 187, 191 (4th
Cir. 1992). “Thus, confinement or punishment conditions imposed under one
set of circumstances may constitute an Eighth Amendment violation; yet the
same conditions, imposed under different circumstances, would not.” Id.
Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true and giving him the benefit of every
reasonable inference, he has nonetheless again failed to state a claim for
relief. Plaintiff alleges only that he was placed in RDU at Marion for a period
of 60 days, presumably as punishment for a disciplinary offense, and that as
a result he lost privileges, such as television and recreation time. While
certainly not ideal, these conditions are not sufficiently extreme to be
constitutionally redressable.
Moreover, Plaintiff fails to allege any personal participation by
Defendant Barker in any event. See Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928
(4th Cir. 1977) (citation omitted) (To establish liability under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, a plaintiff must show that the defendants “acted personally” to cause
the alleged violation.).
Finally, Plaintiff’s official capacity claims also fails initial review. “[A]
suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against
the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.” Will v. Michigan
Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Because a state is not a
“person” under § 1983, state officials acting in their official capacities cannot
be sued for damages thereunder. Allen v. Cooper, No. 1:19-cv-794, 2019
WL 6255220, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 22, 2019). Furthermore, as noted the
Eleventh Amendment bars suits for monetary damages against the State of
North Carolina and its various agencies. See Ballenger v. Owens, 352 F.3d
842, 844-45 (4th Cir. 2003). As such, Plaintiffs official capacity claim fails
as a matter of law.
Because Plaintiff failed to amend his Complaint in accordance with the
Court’s Order and has otherwise properly failed to state a claim for relief, the
Court will dismiss this action with prejudice. See Green v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., 790 Fed. App’x 535, 536 (4th Cir. 2020).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint with prejudice.
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Plaintiffs Amended Complaint
[Doc. 9] is DISMISSED with prejudice in accordance with the terms of this
Order for Plaintiff's failure to state a claim for relief.
The Clerk is respectfully instructed to terminate this action.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: January 16, 2024
Reidinger ee
Chief United States District Judge ES