Crump v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Company

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

CHARLOTTE DIVISION

3:23-cv-00824-MR

RAMAR DION BENJAMIN CRUMP, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) ORDER

)

)

OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE )

COMPANY, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

________________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff’s

Complaint, [Doc. 1], filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)

and 1915A. Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. [Docs. 2, 6].

I. BACKGROUND

Pro se Plaintiff Ramar Dion Benjamin Crump (“Plaintiff”) is a prisoner

of the State of North Carolina currently incarcerated at the Foothills

Correctional Institution Morganton, North Carolina. On March 29, 2022,

Plaintiff filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various

unnamed officers with the Mecklenburg County Sheriff’s Office (“Sheriff’s

Office”) and Mecklenburg County Detention Center (“MCDC”) alleging the

use of excessive force on September 4, 2021.1 [Case No. 3:22-cv-133-MR,

Doc. 1]. The Complaint passed initial review and the Court entered a

scheduling order. [Id., Docs. 8, 23]. The Plaintiff conducted some discovery

in that action and obtained a list of the names of the 15 officers who were

present during the incident. [Id., Doc. 31-4 at 3]. Plaintiff, however, never

moved to substitute named Defendants for unnamed Defendants or sought

an extension of the scheduling order deadlines. The Court granted

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding that Plaintiff had not

diligently prosecuted the action, that Plaintiff was either unwilling or unable

to name the Defendants, and the case could not proceed further against the

John Doe Defendants. [Id., Doc. 48 at 8]. The Court dismissed the action

without prejudice to Plaintiff reasserting the claims therein against named

defendants. [Id., id. at 10, n.3].

Now before the Court on initial review is Plaintiff’s renewed Complaint

regarding the alleged events of September 4, 2021, at the MCDC. [Doc. 1].

Plaintiff names 15 Defendants, including the Ohio Casualty Insurance

1 Plaintiff alleged, in relevant part: “On the night of 9/4/21 in pod 3900 I was hit in the head

from behind with a baton by an unidentified Mecklenburg County Sheriff Officer, then

beaten with fist by multiple officers…. Due to the staff shortage multiple officers from all

parts of the Sheriff Office itself were called to respond led by the D.A.R.T. team…. Meck

Co. Sheriff Office coordinated response with the Detention Center. I was assaulted by

unidentifiable officers of both the D.A.R.T. team and the Sheriff Office and the Detention

Center.” [Case No. 3:22-cv-133, Doc. 1 at 5 (errors uncorrected)].

Company, the MCDC, and Sheriff’s Office “Deputy Officers” Geoffrey

Anderson, Bentrell Blocker, Demaris Clegg, Scott Morin, Charles McPhatter,

J. Grimes, FNU Yates, Christopher Hendy, Willie Martin, James Ingram,

Nicolaus Bennett, Miguel Burgos, and Klut Rahlan. [Id. at 2-3, 12-14].

Plaintiff purports to name all Defendants in their individual and official

capacities. [Id.]. Plaintiff alleges as follows:

I was physically assault & beaten by multiple officers

of Mecklenburg County Detention Center. I was hit

in the head from behind with a baton, punched in

head with fist, tasered multiple times and maced.

The assault was witnessed by multiple officers who

neglected to intervene in and stop the negligent and

reckless misconduct and abuse.

[Id. at 5 (errors uncorrected)]. As to each individual Defendant, Plaintiff

alleges that he/she “assisted fellow officers in assaulting and beating

Plaintiff” and “neglected to intervene when Plaintiff was hit in the head with

a baton.”2 [Id. at 15-16]. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ohio Casualty is

the surety for the officers of the Sheriff’s Office and that Defendant MCDC

“facilitated the misconduct and misbehavior of employees through neglect

and failure to investigate reported misconduct and misbehavior according to

MCSO policy and take appropriate action to deter misconduct.” [Id. at 15-

2 Thus, it appears that Plaintiff remains without knowledge of what role each named

Defendant played in the alleged events.

16].

Plaintiff claims violation of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments. [Id. at 3]. For injuries, Plaintiff claims he suffered various

physical and emotional injuries. [Id. at 5]. Plaintiff seeks monetary relief

only. [Id.].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must

review the Complaint to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the

grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious [or] fails to state a claim on which

relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore, under § 1915A

the Court must conduct an initial review and identify and dismiss the

complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune to such relief.

In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether the Complaint

raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly

baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se

complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a

district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his Complaint which

set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

III. DISCUSSION

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was

deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,

and that the alleged deprivation was committed by a “person” acting under

color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan,

526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999); Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty. v. Talevski,

599 U.S. 166, 143 S.Ct. 1444 (2023)

A. Defendant MCDC

Defendant MCDC is not a proper Defendant in this matter because it

is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. See Brooks v. Pembroke Cty.

Jail, 722 F. Supp. 1294, 1301 (E.D.N.C. 1989). As such, Plaintiff has failed

to state a claim against this Defendant and the Court will dismiss it.

B. Official Capacity Claims

Suits against an officer in his official capacity “generally represent only

another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an

agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099 (1985)

(1985) (quoting Monell v Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436

U.S. 658, 690 n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035 (1978)). The Office of Sheriff is

not liable under § 1983 for an employee’s acts “unless action pursuant to

official municipal policy of some nature caused [the] constitutional tort.”

Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120-21, 112 S.Ct. 1061,

1066 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2036). That is, “[f]or a

governmental entity to be liable under section 1983, the official policy must

be the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Moore v. City of

Creedmoor, 345 N.C. 356, 366, 481 S.E.2d 14, 21 (1997) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). “Thus, the entity’s ‘policy or custom’ must have

played a part in the violation of federal law.” Id. (quoting Monell, 436 U.S.

658, 694, 98 S.Ct. at 2037-38).

Plaintiff purports to sue the individual Defendants, who are employees

of the Mecklenburg County Sheriff’s Office, in their official and individual

capacities. Plaintiff, however, fails to allege that any official policy was the

moving force behind or otherwise played a part in any constitutional

violation. Plaintiff alleges only that Defendant MCDC “facilitated the

misconduct” by failing to investigate pursuant to Sheriff’s Office policy the

misconduct “of employees involved” and “take appropriate action to deter

misconduct.” The Court, therefore, will dismiss Plaintiff’s official capacity

claims.

C. Excessive Force and Failure to Protect

The Fourteenth Amendment “protects a pretrial detainee from the use

of excessive force that amounts to punishment.” Graham v. Connor, 490

U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989). To state an excessive force claim, a pretrial

detainee must show only that the force “purposely or knowingly used against

him was objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389

(2015). The standard for assessing a pretrial detainee’s excessive force

claim is “solely an objective one.” Id. In determining whether the force was

objectively unreasonable, a court considers the evidence “from the

perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer

knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. (citing Graham,

490 U.S. at 396).

Similarly, “[a] failure-to-protect claim brought by a pretrial detainee

constitutes a due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution.” McFadden v. Butler, No. TDC-16-0437, 2018

WL 1394021, at *4 (D. Md. Mar. 19, 2018) (citing Smith v. Sangamon Cty.

Sheriff’s Dep’t, 715 F.3d 188, 191 (7th Cir. 2013). “[T]he standards for a

Fourteenth Amendment failure-to-protect claim are the same as those for a

comparable claim brought by a convicted prisoner under the Eighth

Amendment.” Id. (citations omitted). To show deliberate indifference under

the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege that the prison official had

actual knowledge of an excessive risk to the plaintiff’s safety. Danser v.

Stansberry, No. 13-1828, 2014 WL 2978541, at *5 (4th Cir. Sept. 12, 2014).

In other words, the prison official “must both be aware of facts from which

the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,

and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

837 (1994). Further, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently

serious.” Id. at 235-36 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see

Brown v. N.C. Dep’t of Corr., 612 F.3d 720, 723 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[A] prisoner

must allege a serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from

the challenged conditions.”) (quoting Odom v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 349 F.3d

765, 770 (4th Cir. 2003))).

Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true for the purposes of this initial

review and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, Plaintiff’s claims

based on the use of excessive force and the failure to protect him from harm

survive initial review as not clearly frivolous.

Plaintiff, however, is admonished that, once the Pretrial Order and

Case Management Plan is entered in this case, he must conduct discovery

in such a manner as to specifically identify which Defendant(s) committed

the particular acts of which he complains. That is, Plaintiff must adduce facts

showing which Defendant(s) personally participated in the alleged assault(s)

and which Defendant(s) failed to protect Plaintiff from harm. Moreover,

should Plaintiff learn through discovery that an individual he has named as

a Defendant merely arrived on the scene and had no role in any alleged

constitutional violation, Plaintiff should voluntarily dismiss such Defendant(s)

from the case.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims

based on the use of excessive force and the failure to protect him from harm

survive initial review. Plaintiff, however, has failed to state a claim against

Defendant MCDC and it will be dismissed.

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims based on the

use of excessive force and the failure to protect Plaintiff from harm survive

initial review in accordance with this Order. Plaintiff’s official capacity claims

are DISMISSED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Mecklenburg County

Detention Center is DISMISSED as Defendant in this matter.

The Clerk is instructed to mail fourteen (14) blank summonses to

Plaintiff to fill out and identify the Defendants, and then return the

summonses to the Court. Plaintiff is required to provide the necessary

information for the U.S. Marshal to effectuate service on the Defendants.

When the Court receives the summonses from Plaintiff, the Clerk shall direct

the U.S. Marshal to effectuate service upon the Defendants.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: January 11, 2024

Martiff Reidinger ee

Chief United States District Judge “AES

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