The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:23-CV-00351-KDB-DCK
DWM INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v. ORDER
CRISTAUX, INC.,
Defendant.
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Cristaux, Inc.’s (“Cristaux”) Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. No. 12). Cristaux asks the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for lack of personal
jurisdiction, or, in the alternative, to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Doc. Nos. 12, 13. In
response, Plaintiff DWM International, Inc. (“DWM”) urges the Court to exercise personal
jurisdiction over Cristaux and argues that it has plausibly alleged fraud and unfair and deceptive
trade practices under North Carolina law. See Doc. No. 16. The Court has carefully considered this
motion and for the reasons briefly discussed below, the Court will GRANT Cristaux’s Motion to
Dismiss.
I. DISCUSSION
When a “district court decides a pretrial personal jurisdiction motion without conducting
an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of personal
jurisdiction.” Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Centers, Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 396 (4th
Cir. 2003) (citing Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673, 676 (4th Cir. 1989)). The Court, in reviewing
such a motion, “take[s] all disputed facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Id.
(citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 2 F.3d 56, 59-60 (4th Cir. 1993)).
It is well established that there are two ways – general and specific jurisdiction – for a
federal court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant. See, e.g., Universal Leather, LLC
v. Koro AR, S.A., 773 F.3d 553, 559 (4th Cir. 2014). Neither applies here.
A. General Personal Jurisdiction
“A court with general jurisdiction may hear any claim against that defendant, even if all
the incidents underlying the claim occurred in a different State.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.
Superior Ct. of Calif., San Francisco Cnty., 582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017) (emphasis in original) (citing
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)). General
jurisdiction exists where a corporation’s contacts with a state are so “continuous and systematic as
to render [the corporation] essentially at home in the forum State.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571
U.S. 117, 139 (2014) (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 920) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
paradigm basis for the exercise of general jurisdiction for a corporation is its “place of
incorporation and principal place of business.” Id. at 137 (citation omitted).
Here, all parties agree that Cristaux is incorporated in Illinois and has its principal place of
business in that state. See Doc. No. 1 at, 1; Doc. No. 13, at 4. Further, Plaintiff’s argument that the
Court should exercise general personal jurisdiction because Cristaux had three North Carolina
customers in 2023 falls short. See Doc. No. 16, at 6. Having three customers does not arise to the
level of systematic contacts required to establish that Cristaux is at home in the forum state. In
fact, the amount of business generated by those customers is so low that North Carolina does not
require Cristaux to register to collect and remit North Carolina sales and use tax. See Doc. No. 13,
at 2. Further, Cristaux does not have employees in the State nor does it own or lease any real
property in North Carolina. See Doc. No. 13-1, at 1. Accordingly, the Court finds that DWM has
not plausibly alleged that this Court has general personal jurisdiction over Cristaux.
B. Specific Personal Jurisdiction
As for specific personal jurisdiction, Plaintiff’s lack of particular factual allegations
regarding the Defendant’s conduct in North Carolina leads to the same result. The Court can only
exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if doing so comports with the
North Carolina long-arm statute and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. See, e.g.,
Mitrano v. Hawes, 377 F.3d 402, 406 (4th Cir. 2004). In North Carolina, where the long-arm
statute extends personal jurisdiction to the limits of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause, “the statutory inquiry merges with the constitutional inquiry.” Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs.
v. Nolan, 259 F.3d 209, 215 (4th Cir. 2001). Specific jurisdiction depends on “an affiliation
between the forum and the underlying controversy.” Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 918 (citations omitted).
To satisfy the pleading requirements for specific jurisdiction, DWM must plausibly allege that (1)
Cristaux had “continuous and systematic” contacts with North Carolina, (2) DWM’s claims arise
out of those contacts, and (3) exercising personal jurisdiction would be fair. See Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
DWM contends that this Court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction because Cristaux
had statements on its website that allegedly and falsely took credit for DWM’s work. See Doc. No.
16, at 7. Essentially, DWM urges the Court to exercise specific jurisdiction because North Carolina
residents may have seen these alleged statements on Cristaux’s website.1 However, the Fourth
Circuit has held that “specific jurisdiction in the Internet context may be based only on an out-of-
state person's Internet activity directed at [North Carolina] and causing injury that gives rise to a
1 DWM relies on the assertion that Cristaux has three customers in North Carolina only to
support general personal jurisdiction. See Doc. No. 16, at 6. However, even if it had done so to
support its claim for specific personal jurisdiction, it failed to allege that its claims relate to or arise
out of those three contacts and so those contacts could not form the basis for a finding of specific
personal jurisdiction.
potential claim cognizable in [North Carolina].” ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Service Consultants,
Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714 (4th Cir. 2002) (emphasis supplied). Merely placing information on the
internet does not subject a corporation to jurisdiction in each state in which that information might
be viewed. Id. (“Such passive Internet activity does not generally include directing electronic
activity into the State with the manifested intent of engaging business or other interactions in the
State thus creating in a person within the State a potential cause of action cognizable in courts
located in the State.”).
In its Motion to Dismiss, Cristaux provided an affidavit from its Chief Creative Officer,
Andre Janus. Janus testified that “Cristaux has never directed or targeted any of [its] advertising
to customers or potential customers in North Carolina,” nor has it ever “participated in any trade
sho[w]s, sales pitches, or other marketing efforts” in North Carolina. Doc. No. 13-1, at 2. DWM
did not respond to this testimony or otherwise challenge it. Therefore, the Court finds that DWM
has failed to make a prima facie showing that this Court has specific personal jurisdiction over
Cristaux.
Because this Court finds that it lacks personal jurisdiction over Cristaux and will
accordingly dismiss Plaintiff’s claims, it need not reach the issue of whether DWM has plausibly
alleged a claim for fraud or unfair and deceptive trade practices under North Carolina law.
II. ORDER
NOW THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 12) is GRANTED; and
2. The Clerk is directed to close this matter in accordance with this Order.
SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED.
Signed: December 11, 2023
LeS JA hon SD
QO
Kenneth D. Bell
United States District Judge nou