Hampton-Bey v. Blowing Rock Police Department

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

STATESVILLE DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:23-CV-00028-KDB-SCR

JON'TA HAMPTON-BEY,

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER

JONATHAN HAYES, ET AL.,

Defendants.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

No. 11). The Court has carefully considered this motion and the parties’ briefs and exhibits. For

the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes that Defendants are entitled to judgment as a

matter of law and will accordingly GRANT the motion.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” United States v.

8.929 Acres of Land in Arlington Cnty., Virginia, 36 F.4th 240, 252 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a)); see United States, f/u/b Modern Mosaic, LTD v. Turner Construction Co., et al.,

946 F.3d 201, 206 (4th Cir. 2019). A factual dispute is considered genuine “if the evidence is such

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); 8.929 Acres of Land, 36 F.4th at 252. “A fact is material if it might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id. (quoting Libertarian Party of Va. v.

Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 313 (4th Cir. 2013)).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence

of a genuine issue of material fact through citations to the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits in the record. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

323 (1986) (when the nonmoving party “has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential

element of [his] claim with respect to which [he] has the burden of proof,” summary judgment is

warranted); United States ex rel. Gugenheim v. Meridian Senior Living, LLC, 36 F.4th 173, 178

(4th Cir. 2022). If the movant satisfies his initial burden to demonstrate “an absence of evidence

to support the nonmoving party's case,” the burden shifts to the nonmovant to “present specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 8.929 Acres of Land, 36 F.4th at 252 (quoting

Humphreys & Partners Architects, L.P. v. Lessard Design, Inc., 790 F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir.

2015)). “The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an

otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment. Hixson v. Moran, 1 F.4th 297, 302

(4th Cir. 2021). Rather, the nonmoving party must establish that a material fact is genuinely

disputed by, inter alia, “citing to particular parts of the materials of record” and cannot rely only

on “conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the building of one inference upon another, or the

mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A); 8.929 Acres of Land, 36

F.4th at 252 (quoting Dash v. Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013)).

Still, summary judgment is not intended to be a substitute for a trial of the facts. Anderson,

477 U.S. at 249. In determining if summary judgment is appropriate, “courts must view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and refrain from weigh[ing] the

evidence or mak[ing] credibility determinations.” Variety Stores, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,

888 F.3d 651, 659 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lee v. Town of

Seaboard, 863 F.3d 323, 327 (4th Cir. 2017)). “Summary judgment cannot be granted merely

because the court believes that the movant will prevail if the action is tried on the merits.” Jacobs

v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 780 F.3d 562, 568-69 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting 10A Charles

Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 2728 (3d ed.1998)).

In the end, the relevant inquiry on summary judgment is “whether the evidence presents a

sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party

must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52.

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This is a pro se civil rights action alleging that the plaintiff’s civil rights were violated by

issuance of a traffic citation in February 2023 for driving an unregistered vehicle and driving with

no driver’s license in possession. Both charges were dismissed after the plaintiff registered the

vehicle and provided proof thereof to the District Attorney. The plaintiff had a valid driver’s

license, but was simply not carrying it at the time of the traffic stop. See Doc. Nos. 1-1; 11-1.

Although the contested traffic stop occurred in Watauga County, North Carolina, Plaintiff

filed this action in Iredell County Small Claims Court asserting that Defendants Jonathan Hayes

and the Blowing Rock Police Department violated plaintiff’s rights under color of law, entitling

him to $10,000 in damages.1 Defendants timely removed the case to this Court, Doc. No. 1, and

have now filed a motion for summary judgment, which Plaintiff opposes. Doc. Nos. 11, 15.

1 Plaintiff’s subsequently filed “Declaration of Moorish American National and Civil Rights

Supplemental Complaint” asserts the traffic citation was “made in false pretenses” to “convert”

his rights as a “Moorish American National” into “a crime.” Doc. No. 8 at 2. Plaintiff has no such

special “rights.” See, e.g., El-Bey v. City of Greensboro, 2011 WL 4499168 at *2 (M.D.N.C. 2011)

(“Despite his contention to the contrary, Plaintiff is not immune to the laws of the States and the

United States. Plaintiff is not special. Just like any other person who is driving a car in North

Carolina, he must have a valid driver’s license and current registration. Plaintiff’s ridiculous claim

that he is a member of some fanciful, ancient tribe of Moors does not change that.”).

III. DISCUSSION

The Court readily finds that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. Under North

Carolina law a police officer “may stop and issue a citation to any motorist who ‘he has probable

cause to believe has committed a misdemeanor or infraction.’” State v. Hamilton, 125

N.C.App. 396, 481 S.E.2d 98, 100 (1997) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 15A– 302(b)). Here, Officer

Hayes stopped Plaintiff’s vehicle after observing him driving it while displaying a fictitious

Moorish Nation placard instead of the DMV issued rear license plate required by N.C.G.S.

§ 20-163(d). See Doc. No. 11-1. Upon confirming the vehicle was unregistered, Hayes cited

Plaintiff for violating N.C.G.S. § 20-111(1), which makes it a Class 3 misdemeanor to operate

an unregistered vehicle on the street. Likewise, Hayes included on the same citation a violation

of N.C.G.S. § 20-7(a) for Plaintiff’s failure to “carry [his driver’s] license while driving the

vehicle.” Id. Because “[t]he Fourth Amendment is not violated by an arrest [or citation] based

on probable cause,” Plaintiff’s claim that his civil rights were violated fails. See Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989).2 Further, beyond the lack

of any claim with substantive merit, Plaintiff cannot sue the Blowing Rock Police Department as

a separate entity. See Coleman v. Cooper, 89 N.C. App. 188, 192, 366 S.E.2d 2, 5 (1988) (holding

that a police department may not be sued because “there is no statute authorizing suit against a

police department”). Therefore, both defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of

law.

2 Moreover, Officer Hayes would be entitled to qualified immunity because his conduct was not

“clearly proscribed” by preexisting law. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 (1985).

Indeed, Officer Hayes’ traffic stop based on probable cause was entirely lawful.

IV. ORDER

NOW THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 11) is GRANTED; and

2. The Clerk is directed to close this matter in accordance with this Order.

SO ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED.

Signed: November 6, 2023

Kenneth D. Bell ey,

United States District Judge il of