The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL CASE NO. 1:22-cv-00120-MR
RICARDO EDWIN LANIER, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) MEMORANDUM OF
vs. ) DECISION AND ORDER
)
CALEB WYCOFF, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
_______________________________ )
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Defendants Caleb Wycoff
and Antonio Soriano’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 44]. Also
pending is the Defendants’ Motion to Strike the Plaintiff’s Surreply [Doc. 50].
I. BACKGROUND
The Plaintiff Ricardo Edwin Lanier, proceeding pro se, filed this action
while he was a pretrial detainee at the Henderson County Detention Center
(“HCDC”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 The verified Complaint passed
initial review on a retaliation claim against FNU Stone, a detention officer; an
1 The Plaintiff filed this action while he was being held at HCDC. He was transferred to
the North Carolina Department of Adult Corrections (“NCDAC”) on November 18, 2022,
and he was released to supervision on January 20, 2023. See
https://webapps.doc.state.nc.us/opi/viewoffender.do?method=view&offenderID=058517
6&searchLastName=lanier&searchFirstName=ricardo&searchDOBRange=0&listurl=pag
elistoffendersearchresults&listpage=1 (last accessed Aug. 23, 2023); Fed. R. Evid. 201.
excessive force claim against Caleb Wycoff, a deputy sheriff; and a failure to
intervene claim against Antonio Soriano, a detention officer. [Doc. 1:
Complaint; Doc. 1-1: Complaint Attach.; Doc. 21: Order on Initial Review].
Defendant Stone was dismissed without prejudice for lack of service. [Doc.
42: Order]. The Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. [Doc.
1-1 at 1, 8-9].
Defendants Wycoff and Soriano have asserted counterclaims against
the Plaintiff for battery. [Doc. 38: Answer and Counterclaim]. They seek
general and punitive damages, costs, a jury trial, and other relief that the
Court deems just and proper. [Id.].
Defendants Wycoff and Soriano filed the instant Motion for Summary
Judgment. [Doc. 44: MSJ]. They stipulate to the dismissal of all
counterclaims, if summary judgment is granted. [Doc. 45: MSJ Memo. at 2].
Thereafter, the Court entered an Order in accordance with Roseboro v.
Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the requirements
for filing a response to the summary judgment motion and of the manner in
which evidence could be submitted to the Court. [Doc. 47: Roseboro Order].
The Plaintiff filed an unverified Response.2 [Doc. 47: MSJ Response]. The
2 Titled “Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.”
Defendants filed a Reply [Doc. 48: MSJ] and the Plaintiff’ filed a Surreply3
[Doc. 49: Surreply], which the Defendants have moved to strike4 [Doc. 50:
Motion to Strike]. This matter is ripe for disposition.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is
genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). A fact is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under
governing law. Id.
The movant has the “initial responsibility of informing the district court
of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)
(internal citations omitted).
3 Titled “Opposition to Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Response to Motion for Summary
Judgment.”
4 The Motion to Strike will be granted because the unauthorized Surreply violates the
Court’s Local Rules. See LCvR 7.1(e). Even if the Court were to consider the unverified
Surreply, such would have no effect on the outcome of this case.
Once this initial burden is met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving
party. The nonmoving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 322 n.3. The nonmoving party may not
rely upon mere allegations or denials of allegations in his pleadings to defeat
a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 324. Rather, the nonmoving party
must oppose a proper summary judgment motion with citation to
“depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or
declarations, stipulations …, admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials” in the record. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(a). Namely, the
nonmoving party must present sufficient evidence from which “a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at
248. To that end, only evidence admissible at trial may be considered by the
Court on summary judgment. Kennedy v. Joy Technologies, Inc., 269 F.
App’x 302, 308 (4th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
When ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must view the
evidence and any inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Facts, however, “must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a
‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127
S.Ct. 1769, 1776 (2007). As the Supreme Court has emphasized,
“[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under
Rule 56(c), the opponent must do more than simply
show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts …. Where the record taken as a whole
could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’”
Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986)
(footnote omitted). “[T]he mere existence of some
alleged factual dispute between the parties will not
defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for
summary judgment; the requirement is that there be
no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-28, 106 S. Ct.
2505 (1986). When opposing parties tell two
different stories, one of which is blatantly
contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury
could believe it, a court should not adopt that version
of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for
summary judgment.
Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The parties’ forecasts of evidence construed in the light most favorable
to the Plaintiff show the following, which is undisputed except as otherwise
noted.
On January 11, 2022 and approximately 12:00 p.m., Officer Soriano
popped open the Plaintiff’s cell door for meal tray collection. [Doc. 45-3:
Soriano Decl. at ¶ 4; Doc. 45-2: Wycoff Decl. at ¶ 3]. Rather than simply
placing his empty tray outside the cell door for collection, the Plaintiff exited
his cell, walked across the pod, and sat on top of the table near the pod
entrance. [Doc. 1-1: Compl. Attach. at 4; Doc. 45-3: Soriano Decl. at ¶ 4;
Doc. 45-2: Wycoff Decl. at ¶ 3]. The Plaintiff did this to gain the attention of
a senior officer to discuss the return of some legal documents. [Doc. 1-1:
Compl. Attach. at 4].
Officer Wycoff decided to go see if he could talk the Plaintiff into
returning to his cell; Officers Soriano and Edwards accompanied him as
backup because the Plaintiff “is known to assault officers.” [Doc. 45-2:
Wycoff Decl. at ¶ 5]. Officers Wycoff, Soriano, and Edwards entered the pod
to ask the Plaintiff what was going on. [Doc. 1-1: Compl. Attach. at 4]. The
Plaintiff refused to return to his cell and asked to speak to a supervisor. [Doc.
1-1: Compl. Attach. at 4; Doc. 45-2: Wycoff Decl. at ¶ 7].
Wycoff “stated in a threating ‘volatile’ aggressive demeanor, that if
Plaintiff didn’t go to his cell that he’d punch the Plaintiff and make Plaintiff
go.”5 [Doc. 1-1: Compl. Attach. at 4]. The Plaintiff “respectfully asked again”
to speak to a higher officer because the Plaintiff knew that no force could be
used against him while he was sitting still, and that the Officers would be
5 Officer Wycoff claims that he repeatedly told Plaintiff to return to his cell, and Plaintiff
responded “I am not going back to my cell and if you lay your hand on me then I have a
right to defend myself.” [Doc. 45-2: Wycoff Decl. at ¶ 8; see Doc. 45-3: Soriano Decl. at
¶ 7].
required to summon a higher official.6 [Doc. 1-1: Compl. Attach. at 4]. Officer
Wycoff showed the Plaintiff a closed fist and attempted to hit him.7 [Doc. 1-
1: Compl. Attach. at 4]. The Plaintiff stood up to block Officer Wycoff’s
attempt to hit him, and Wycoff missed.8 [Doc. 1-1: Compl. Attach. at 5].
Officer Soriano then attempted to grab the Plaintiff so that Wycoff could hit
him, and Wycoff again attempted to hit Plaintiff with a closed fist.9 [Doc. 1-1:
Compl. Attach. at 5]. Officer Wycoff “made it seem as if the Plaintiff was
resisting so if he was able to actually hit or strike the Plaintiff it would be
justified.” Doc. 1-1: Compl. Attach. at 5-6].
The Plaintiff took a “fighting stance.” [Doc. 45-4: Edwards Decl. at ¶ 6].
Officer Wycoff then used his taser on the Plaintiff, causing Plaintiff to fall to
the ground. [Doc. 1-1: Compl. Attach. at 6; Doc. 45-2: Wycoff Decl. at ¶ 12;
Doc. 54-3: Soriano Decl. at ¶¶ 8-9]. Wycoff tased the Plaintiff for a second
time while the Plaintiff was on the ground, not resisting, and immobilized from
6 According to the Defendants, the Plaintiff became increasingly loud and aggressive.
[Doc. 45-3: Soriano Decl. at ¶ 7].
7 Officer Wycoff states that he told the Plaintiff that the officers “would lay [their] hands on
him and put him back in his cell” if he failed to comply. [Doc. 45-2: Wycoff Decl. at ¶ 8].
8 Officer Wycoff states that he tried to place his hand on the Plaintiff’s shoulder to guide
him off of the table, and back to his cell. [Doc. 45-2: Wycoff Decl. at ¶ 8; see Doc. 45-3:
Soriano Decl. at ¶ 8 (Wycoff grabbed the Plaintiff’s arm; the Plaintiff stood up off the table
and jerked away)].
9 Officer Soriano states that he attempted to grab the Plaintiff’s wrist, but that the Plaintiff
broke free while swinging his arms and backing away. [Doc. 45-3: Soriano Decl. at ¶ 8].
the initial taser discharge.10 [Doc. 1-1: Compl. Attach. at 6]. He was
handcuffed and escorted away. [Doc. 45-2: Wycoff Decl. at ¶ 15].
Officer Wycoff’s finger was broken, and Officer Soriano’s face and arm
were cut in the incident. [Doc. 45-2: Wycoff Decl. at ¶ 16; Doc. 45-3: Soriano
Decl. at ¶ 12; see Doc. 11-1 at DSC 426-40 (DVD photographs of Officer
Soriano’s injuries); see also id. at DSC 441-60 (DVD photographs of the
Plaintiff, revealing no apparent injuries except for two small gouges on the
knuckles of his left hand)].
The Plaintiff was charged in Henderson County Superior Court with
two counts of assault inflicting serious injury on the employee of a detention
facility, Case Nos. 22CRS050531, -532. [See Doc. 1-2 at 3-4 (Arrest
Warrants); Doc. 45-6: MSJ Ex at 2-3 (Indictments); see also Doc. 45-7: MSJ
Ex at 23 (Plaintiff’s discovery response)]. The Plaintiff entered an Alford11
plea in both cases and he was sentenced to between 10 and 21 months’
imprisonment. [Doc. 45-6: MSJ Ex at 4-5 (Judgment)].
10 According to the Officers, the Plaintiff’s continued resistance required a second cycle
of the taser deployed to the Plaintiff’s thigh; he then stopped resisting. [Doc. 45-2: Wycoff
Decl. at ¶¶ 12-13; Doc. 45-3: Soriano Decl. at ¶ 9; Doc. 45-4: Edwards Decl. at ¶ 7].
11 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
A video exhibit [Doc. 11-1: Manually Filed Video Exhibit] containing
footage from the housing pod that shows the following events:
12:08:42 During meal tray collection, the Plaintiff walks across the
dayroom and sits on top of a table.
12:09:20 The Plaintiff gestures and appears to converse with
someone off-camera, and remains seated on the table.
12:09:29 Officers Wycoff, Soriano, and Edwards enter the pod,
approach the Plaintiff, and converse with him while the
Plaintiff remains seated on the table.
12:09:56 Officer Wycoff steps towards the Plaintiff and reaches his
open right hand toward Plaintiff’s shoulder. The Plaintiff
suddenly begins swinging his arms at Wycoff, jumps off the
table, and swings and lunges as officers attempt to restrain
him.
12:10:01 The Plaintiff breaks away from the officers and assumes
an aggressive stance.
12:10:02 Officer Wycoff deploys his taser and Plaintiff falls to the
floor.
12:10:06 The officers attempt to restrain the Plaintiff as he continues
to struggle on the floor.
12:10:15 Officer Wycoff appears to apply the taser to Plaintiff’s leg
while Officers Soriano and Edwards attempt to control
Plaintiff’s arms.
12:10:16 Officers Soriano and Edwards bring the Plaintiff’s arms
behind his back.
12:10:46 Officer Wycoff exits the pod with an obviously-injured hand.
12:12:00 The Plaintiff, in restraints, is escorted off the pod.
IV. DISCUSSION
The Fourteenth Amendment “protects a pretrial detainee from the use
of excessive force that amounts to punishment.” Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989). To state an excessive force claim, a pretrial
detainee must show only that the force “purposely or knowingly used against
him was objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389
(2015). The standard for assessing a pretrial detainee’s excessive force
claim is “solely an objective one.” Id. In determining whether the force was
objectively unreasonable, a court considers the evidence “from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer
knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. (citing Graham,
490 U.S. at 396).
The Fourth Circuit recognizes a cause of action for bystander liability
“premised on a law officer’s duty to uphold the law and protect the public
from illegal acts, regardless of who commits them.” Stevenson v. City of Seat
Pleasant, Md., 743 F.3d 411, 416-17 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Randall v.
Prince George’s Cnty., 302 F.3d 188, 203 (4th Cir. 2002)). A “bystander
officer” can be liable for his or her nonfeasance if he or she: “(1) knows that
a fellow officer is violating an individual’s constitutional rights; (2) has a
reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (3) chooses not to act.”
Randall, 302 F.3d at 204.
Here, the Plaintiff has failed to present a forecast of evidence from
which a reasonable jury could conclude that any Defendant used excessive
force or failed to intervene in order to prevent the use of excessive force. The
Plaintiff’s forecast of evidence consists only of the allegations in his verified
Complaint that Defendant Wycoff used excessive force and that Defendant
Soriano failed to intervene. This forecast of evidence, however, is “so utterly
discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could ... believe[ ] him.”
Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.
The video footage demonstrates that: the Defendants approached the
Plaintiff and conversed with him; Wycoff reached towards Plaintiff with an
open hand, not a fist; the Plaintiff reacted violently by swinging his arms at
Wycoff, jumping off the table, and continuing to swing and lunge at the
officers; the Plaintiff remained standing and resisting until the taser was
deployed; the Plaintiff then fell to the ground and continued to resist until the
taser was deployed for a second time. The video conclusively refutes the
Plaintiff’s claims that Wycoff threatened him with a closed fist, or that any
officer used gratuitous force or failed to intervene in the same. Instead, it
demonstrates that the Defendants’ physical contact with the Plaintiff was
objectively reasonable and necessary in light of the Plaintiff’s escalating
resistance. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Defendants are entitled
to judgment as a matter of law on the Plaintiff’s excessive force and failure
to intervene claims.12
“Qualified immunity protects officers who commit constitutional
violations but who, in light of clearly established law, could reasonably
believe that their actions were lawful.” Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531
(4th Cir. 2011) (en banc). “To determine whether an officer is entitled to
qualified immunity, the court must examine (1) whether the plaintiff has
demonstrated that the officer violated a constitutional right and (2) whether
that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” E.W.
ex rel. T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 178 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The doctrine of qualified immunity “gives government
officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments and
protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the
law.” Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 100 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Here, because Plaintiff has not forecast evidence that the
12 The Court declines to address the Defendants’ alternate argument that the Plaintiff’s
excessive force claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
Defendants violated a constitutional right, the Defendants are also entitled
qualified immunity, and summary judgment is granted on this ground as well.
Because the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is being
granted, the Defendants’ counterclaims will be dismissed pursuant to their
stipulation. [See 45: MSJ Memo. at 2].
The Court further concludes, after carefully reviewing the Plaintiff’s
allegations and the parties’ forecasts of evidence, that the Plaintiff’s claims
are frivolous and malicious. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), 1915A(b)(1).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion to
Strike the Plaintiff’s Surreply, and grants the Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment. The Defendants’ counterclaims are dismissed pursuant
to their stipulation, and this action is dismissed with prejudice.
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1. Defendants’ Motion to Strike [Doc. 50] is GRANTED, and the
Plaintiff’s Surreply [Doc. 49] is STRICKEN.
2. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 44] is
GRANTED, and this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE
as frivolous and malicious.
3. The Defendants’ counterclaims are DISMISSED.
The Clerk is respectfully directed to terminate this action.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed: November 7, 2023
Martifi Reidinger ey
Chief United States District Judge “lly
14