Watkins v. Goodwin

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

CHARLOTTE DIVISION

CIVIL CASE NO. 3:21-cv-00341-MR

ADRIAN DOMINIC WATKINS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) MEMORANDUM OF

vs. ) DECISION AND ORDER

)

KATRINA GOODWIN, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

_______________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Defendant Katrina

Goodwin’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 30].

I. BACKGROUND

The incarcerated Plaintiff Adrian Dominic Watkins proceeding pro se,

is serving a sentence of 32 years, 11 months, for second-degree murder

(principal) in the North Carolina Department of Adult Corrections.1 On July

1https://webapps.doc.state.nc.us/opi/viewoffender.do?method=view&offenderID=05793

27&searchOffenderId=0579327&searchDOBRange=0&listurl=pagelistoffendersearchres

ults&listpage=1 (last accessed July 24, 2023<update>); see Fed. R. Evid. 201. The

Plaintiff’s address of record is at the Scotland Correctional Institution, but the North

Carolina Department of Adult Corrections’ website (NCDAC) indicates that he resides at

the Caswell Correctional Center. The Plaintiff is reminded that it is “Plaintiff’s responsibility

to keep the Court advised of his/her address at all times” and that “[i]f the Plaintiff’s

address changes and no Notice is promptly filed with the Clerk of Court, this case may

be dismissed for lack of prosecution.” [Doc. 5: Order of Instructions at 2].

7, 2021,2 the Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

addressing incidents that allegedly occurred while he was incarcerated at the

Lanesboro Institution.3 [See Doc. 1: Complaint]. The Plaintiff’s Complaint4

passed initial review against Defendant Katrina Goodwin (“Officer

Goodwin”)5 for the use of excessive force and retaliation. [Doc. 10: Order on

Initial Review]. The Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief,

compensatory and punitive damages, a jury trial, costs, and any additional

2 The date of prison staff’s signature on the mailing envelope is used here [Doc. 1-1 at 2]

because the Complaint was signed by the Plaintiff and acknowledged by a notary on

different dates, and the Plaintiff does not indicate when he placed the Complaint in the

prison’s mail system. [See Doc. 1: Complaint at 17-18 (the Plaintiff purports to have

signed the Complaint on June 8, 2021, but the Notary Acknowledgement is dated June

11, 2021)]; Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 275 (1988) (Under the “Prison-Mailbox Rule,”

a prisoner’s pleading is filed with the court as of the date that the prisoner placed the

pleading in the prison system’s outgoing mail to the court).

3 The Plaintiff also made allegations about incidents at the Bertie Correctional Institution,

but they failed initial review. [See Doc. 10: Order on Initial Review].

4 Only the Attachment to the Complaint is signed under penalty of perjury. [Doc. 1: Compl.

Attachment at 19-27]. The Complaint itself has a “Notary Acknowledgement,” but it is not

sworn or verified. [Doc. 1: Complaint at 18-19]. The Complaint thus does not serve as an

affidavit. See generally N.C. Gen. Stat. § 10B-3(1) (defining an “Acknowledgement”);

N.C. Gen. Sat. § 10B-41 (describing notarial certificate of acknowledgement); Pratt v.

Allbritton, No. 4:16-cv-00198-BR, 2018 WL 4610151, at *7 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 8, 2018), report

and recommendation adopted, No. 4:16-cv-198-BR, 2018 WL 4604522 (E.D.N.C. Sept.

21, 2018), aff’d sub nom. Pratt v. Albriton, 764 F. App’x 343 (4th Cir. 2019). Accordingly,

only the verified Attachment to the Complaint will be considered in the summary judgment

analysis. See generally Goodman v. Diggs, 986 F.3d 493, 498 (4th Cir. 2021) (“it is well

established that a verified complaint is the equivalent of an opposing affidavit for summary

judgment purposes, when the allegations contained therein are based on personal

knowledge”) (internal quotations omitted).

5 The Complaint also passed initial review against Defendant Cohandan Francis Christian

Smith, who was dismissed from this action for lack of service pursuant to Rule 4(m) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. [See Doc. 28: Order].

relief the Court deems just, proper, and equitable. [Doc. 1: Complaint at 5,

17].

Defendant Goodwin filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment.

[Doc. 30: MSJ]. Thereafter, the Court entered an Order in accordance with

Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising the Plaintiff of

the requirements for filing a response to the summary judgment motion and

of the manner in which evidence could be submitted to the Court. [Doc. 34:

Roseboro Order]. The Plaintiff has not responded, and the time to do so has

expired. This matter is ripe for disposition.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is

genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). A fact is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under

governing law. Id.

The movant has the “initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)

(internal citations omitted).

Once this initial burden is met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving

party. The nonmoving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 322 n.3. The nonmoving party may not

rely upon mere allegations or denials of allegations in his pleadings to defeat

a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 324. Rather, the nonmoving party

must oppose a proper summary judgment motion with citation to

“depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or

declarations, stipulations …, admissions, interrogatory answers, or other

materials” in the record. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(a). Namely, the

nonmoving party must present sufficient evidence from which “a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

248. To that end, only evidence admissible at trial may be considered by the

Court on summary judgment. Kennedy v. Joy Technologies, Inc., 269 F.

App’x 302, 308 (4th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

When ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must view the

evidence and any inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Facts, however, “must be

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a

‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127

S.Ct. 1769, 1776 (2007). As the Supreme Court has emphasized,

“[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under

Rule 56(c), the opponent must do more than simply

show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the

material facts …. Where the record taken as a whole

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’”

Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986)

(footnote omitted). “[T]he mere existence of some

alleged factual dispute between the parties will not

defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for

summary judgment; the requirement is that there be

no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-28, 106 S. Ct.

2505 (1986). When opposing parties tell two

different stories, one of which is blatantly

contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury

could believe it, a court should not adopt that version

of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for

summary judgment.

Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Viewing the forecast of evidence in the light most favorable to the

Plaintiff, the following is a recitation of the relevant facts.

Officer Goodwin was a correctional officer at Lanesboro on June 16,

2018 when she was conducting rounds. [Doc. 32-6: Goodwin Decl. at ¶ 3].

Officer Goodwin noticed that the Plaintiff had covered his cell window with

sheets, which is prohibited by Department policy due to safety concerns.

[Doc. 32-6: Goodwin Decl. at ¶¶ 5-7; Doc. 32-7: Glover Decl. at ¶ 7]. The

Plaintiff had 82 disciplinary violations at that time. [See Doc. 32-3: MSJ Ex

at 1-3]. Officer Goodwin knocked on the Plaintiff’s door and asked him to

remove the blind from his window so that she could see him. [Doc. 32-6:

Goodwin Decl. at ¶ 8, 10].

The Plaintiff was in bed, wearing only boxer shorts. Doc. 1: Compl.

Attachment at 21]. The Plaintiff told Officer Goodwin to give him a chance

to get up, but Officer Goodwin immediately started to “belligerently berate”

him. The Plaintiff told Officer Goodwin that “she could stand there until she

calmed down.” [Id.].

The Plaintiff did not uncover his window. [Doc. 32-6: Goodwin Decl. at

¶ 9, 11]. Officer Goodwin knocked on the door again and asked him to

remove the blind. [Id. at ¶ 11]. The Plaintiff said “Get away from his door”

and that “[Goodwin] must want some problems.” [Id. at ¶ 12]. Officer

Goodwin radioed Sergeant Glover for assistance.6 [Id. at ¶ 13; Doc. 32-7:

Glover Decl. at ¶ 5]. When Sergeant Glover arrived, Officer Goodwin opened

6 According to Officer Goodwin, she asked Sergeant Glover to assist with a cell search.

[Doc. 32-6: Goodwin Decl. at ¶ 5]. According to the Plaintiff, Officer Goodwin told

Sergeant Glover that the Plaintiff was “unresponsive,” as though the Plaintiff were

unconscious. [Doc. 1: Compl. Attachment at 21].

the Plaintiff’s cell door and removed the sheet from his window. [Doc. 32-6:

Goodwin Decl. at ¶ 14; Doc. 32-7: Glover Decl. at ¶ 8].

The Plaintiff got up off of the bed and told Officer Goodwin that “she

was going to stop running in [his] cell and harassing [him] like she was

crazy.”7 [Doc. 1: Compl. Attachment at 21]. Officer Goodwin told the Plaintiff

to “cuff up”; when the Plaintiff asked Officer Goodwin why she wanted him to

cuff up, she responded “to search [his] cell.” [Id.]. The Plaintiff told Officer

Goodwin that she did not come to his cell to search it, and she sprayed him

with pepper spray. [Id..

The Plaintiff was placed in hand restraints and he was escorted to

restrictive housing to be decontaminated in a shower. [Id.; Doc. 32-6:

Goodwin Decl. at ¶ 17; Doc. 32-7: Glover Decl. at ¶ 13].

The Plaintiff asserts that Officer Goodwin “was just searching for a way

to create a situation that would lead to a reason to spray [Plaintiff], confront

him while [he] was almost naked or do [him] harm because [he] wouldn’t

respond to her raunchiness.”8 [Id. at 22].

7 According to the Plaintiff, Officer Goodwin had entered his cell the previous day while

the Plaintiff was only wearing boxer shorts, and stomped on his pinky toe while “speaking

raunchily” to him. [Doc. 1: Compl. Attachment at 20].

8 Officer Goodwin denies that she ever interacted with the Plaintiff prior to June 16, that

she ever made sexual advances towards him, or that she used excessive force or

retaliated against him. [Doc. 32-6: Goodwin Decl. at ¶¶ 18-20]. However, at this stage

of the proceedings, the Court must accept the forecast of evidence presented by the

Officer Goodwin has filed video exhibits containing footage from the

prison that show the following events:9

10:32:39 Officer Goodwin is standing in the second-tier hallway

outside the Plaintiff’s cell [Id., Union B Dayroom10]

10:32:45 Sergeant Glover walks up the stairs to the second tier

towards the Plaintiff’s cell [Id., Union B Dayroom]

10:33:22 A male correctional officer runs into the dayroom and up

the stairs to the second tier [Id., Union B Dayroom]

10:34:03 The Plaintiff, wearing boxer shorts, is escorted into the

hallway and down the stairs from the second tier by Officer

Goodwin and a male correctional officer [Id., Union B

Dayroom]

10:34:38 The Plaintiff exits the dayroom, escorted by Officer

Goodwin and the male correctional officer [Id., Union B

Dayroom]

10:34:43 The escort continues [Id., Union Hallway ABC]

10:35:05 The escort continues [Id., Union Sallyport at elevator]

10:35:24 The escort continues; the Plaintiff, Goodwin, and male

officer appear to be calm and uninjured [Doc. 33: Manually

Filed Ex, Central to Union Hallway]

Plaintiff as true.

9 Only the incidents relevant to the excessive force and retaliation claims against Officer

Goodwin are summarized here. The thumb drive contains eight video files which are

partially overlapping. They have been consolidated and arranged by time stamp for ease

of reference.

10 The view of the Plaintiff’s upper-tier cell door and the hallway outside his cell are

partially obstructed by railings.

10:36:57 The escort continues [Id., Hallway to Richmond]

10:37:21 The escort continues [Id., Lower Richmond Sallyport]

10:37:35 The escort continues [Id., Richmond Lower Hall to Seg]

10:38:09 The escort continues [Id., Richmond A Dayroom]

10:38:26 The Plaintiff is placed in a new cell [Id., Richmond A

Dayroom]

10:38:35 Officer Goodwin exits the dayroom and returns to the

Plaintiff’s old cell [Id., Richmond A Dayroom]

10:45:13 Officer Goodwin and other officers remove bags and a

mattress from the Plaintiff’s old cell and place them on carts

[Id., Union B Dayroom]

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Statute of Limitations

The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is borrowed from the

applicable state’s statute of limitations. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384,

387 (2007); Tommy Davis Const., Inc. v. Cape Fear Pub. Util. Auth., 807

F.3d 62, 66-67 (4th Cir. 2015). Section 1983 claims arising in North Carolina

are limited by the three-year period for personal injury actions. See N.C.G.S.

§ 1–52; Nat’l Advertising Co. v. City of Raleigh, 947 F.2d 1158, 1162 n. 2 (4th

Cir. 1991). The limitations period for a § 1983 claim begins to run when the

plaintiff has “a complete and present cause of action”—in other words, when

it could have “file[d] suit and obtain[ed] relief.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388

(quoting Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Tr. Fund v. Ferbar Corp.

of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201 (1997)).

The Plaintiff filed the Complaint on July 7, 2021. [See Doc. 1-1 at 2;

Note 2, supra]. The excessive force and retaliation incidents at issue

allegedly occurred more than three years earlier on June 18, 2018.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are time-barred and Officer

Goodwin’s Motion for Summary Judgment on this ground is granted.

Even if this action were not time-barred, however, Officer Goodwin’s

Motion for Summary Judgment would be granted because, for the reasons

discussed infra, the Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the existence of a

genuine dispute of material fact for trial.

B. Official Capacity Claims

The Plaintiff purports to sue Officer Goodwin, who is a state official, in

her individual and official capacities. [Doc. 1: Complaint at 3]. However, “a

suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against

the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.” Will v. Dep’t of

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Because a state is not a “person” under

§ 1983, state officials acting in their official capacities cannot be sued for

damages thereunder. Allen v. Cooper, No. 1:19-cv-794, 2019 WL 6255220,

at *2 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 22, 2019). Furthermore, the Eleventh Amendment bars

suits for monetary damages against the State of North Carolina and its

various agencies. See Ballenger v. Owens, 352 F.3d 842, 844-45 (4th Cir.

2003). As such, Officer Goodwin is granted summary judgment on the

Plaintiff’s claims against her in her official capacity.

C. Excessive Force

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual

punishments,” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, and protects prisoners from the

“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,

319 (1986). To establish an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must

satisfy both an objective component–that the harm inflicted was sufficiently

serious–and a subjective component–that the prison official acted with a

sufficiently culpable state of mind. Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761

(4th Cir. 1996). In adjudicating an excessive force claim, the Court must

consider such factors as the need for the use of force, the relationship

between that need and the amount of force used, the extent of the injury

inflicted, and, ultimately, whether the force was “applied in a good faith effort

to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically for the very

purpose of causing harm.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21.

Moreover, “[c]orrectional officers do not have to be under physical

attack to justify the use of force; they can also use appropriate force ‘to

preserve internal order by compelling compliance with prison rules and

procedures.’” Shiheed v. Harding, 802 Fed. App’x 765, 767 (4th Cir. 2020)

(quoting Brooks v. Johnson, 924 F.3d 104, 112 (4th Cir. 2019)). “‘And we owe

officers wide-ranging deference in their determinations that force is required

to induce compliance with policies important to institutional security.’” Id.

(quoting Brooks, 924 F.3d at 112).

Here, the forecast of evidence construed in the light most favorable to

the Plaintiff demonstrates that the Plaintiff’s cell window was covered so that

correctional officers could not see inside, which presented a safety concern.

[Doc. 32-6: Goodwin Decl. at ¶ 7]. When Officer Goodwin directed the

Plaintiff to uncover his window he did not comply. [Id. at ¶¶ 8-11]. Officer

Goodwin entered the cell to uncover the window, at which time the Plaintiff

argued with her and refused to cuff up. [Doc. 1: Compl. Attachment at 21].

Officer Goodwin then applied two one-half second bursts of pepper spray to

the Plaintiff’s face. [Doc. 32-6: Goodwin Decl. at ¶ 16]. The Plaintiff was

immediately secured in handcuffs and escorted to a shower. [Id. at ¶ 17]. It

was objectively reasonable for Officer Goodwin to apply this minimal use of

force in light of the Plaintiff’s repeated refusal to comply with her orders. The

Plaintiff has not forecast any evidence that this use of force was

unreasonable, or that Officer Goodwin used pepper spray maliciously and

sadistically rather than for a legitimate penological objective.

The Plaintiff’s subjective beliefs that Sergeant Glover should have

attempted to resolve the situation before Goodwin entered the cell, that

Officer Goodwin should have used additional efforts to “control through

communication” before resorting to force, and that Officer Goodwin should

have used hands-on physical force rather than pepper spray, are of no legal

significance.11 [Doc. 1 at 21-22]; see, e.g., Kitchen v. Ickes, 116 F.Supp.613,

628-29 (D. Md. July 14, 2014). Accordingly, Officer Goodwin is entitled to

summary judgment on the Plaintiff’s excessive force claim.

D. Retaliation

The First Amendment right to free speech “includes not only the

affirmative right to speak, but also the right to be free from retaliation by a

public official for exercising that right.” Suarez Corp. v. McGraw, 202 F.3d

676 (4th Cir. 2000). Prison officials may not retaliate against an inmate for

exercising a constitutional right. See Hudspeth v. Figgins, 584 F.2d 1345,

1347 (4th Cir. 1978). In order to state a colorable retaliation claim under §

1983, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) he engaged in protected First Amendment

11 The Plaintiff’s claims that Officer Goodwin violated prison policy were dismissed on

initial review of the Complaint. [See Doc. 10: Order on Initial Review at 13-14].

activity, (2) the defendant took some action that adversely affected his First

Amendment rights, and (3) there was a causal relationship between his

protected activity and the defendant’s conduct.” Martin v. Duffy, 977 F.3d

294, 299 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.3d 239, 249 (4th Cir.

2017); quoting Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411

F.3d 474, 499 (4th Cir. 2005)). The same-decision test applies to determining

the causation element of a prisoner’s retaliation claim. Id. Once the

prisoner-plaintiff shows that his “protected conduct was a substantial

motivating factor in a prison guard’s decision to take adverse action,” the

burden then shifts to the defendant to prove a permissible basis for taking

that action. Id. at 300. Bare or conclusory assertions of retaliation are

insufficient to establish a retaliation claim. Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74

(4th Cir. 1994). In the prison context, retaliation claims are treated with

skepticism because “[e]very act of discipline by prison officials is by definition

‘retaliatory’ in the sense that it responds directly to prisoner misconduct.” Id.

The forecast of evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff

demonstrates that Officer Goodwin had entered his cell the day before the

excessive force incident while the Plaintiff was only wearing boxer shorts,

and spoke “raunchily” to him. [Doc. 1: Compl. Attachment at 20]. On June

16, the Plaintiff was only wearing boxer shorts when Officer Goodwin came

to his cell. [Id. at 22]. Officer Goodwin encountered the Plaintiff’s covered

cell window during rounds, which presented a safety concern [Doc. 32-6:

Goodwin Decl. at ¶¶ 7-8]. The Plaintiff failed to uncover the window at

Goodwin’s request. [Id. at ¶¶ 8-10]. When Officer Goodwin entered the cell

to uncover the window, the Plaintiff argued with her instead of complying with

an order to cuff up. [Doc. 1: Compl. Attachment at 21]. Consequently, Officer

Goodwin pepper sprayed him. [id.; Doc. 32-6: Goodwin Decl. at ¶¶ 16, 20-

21].

The Plaintiff’s bare and conclusory assertions that Defendant Goodwin

wanted to see him undressed and/or wanted to pepper spray him because

of an interaction that ostensibly happened the day before [Doc. 1: Compl.

Attachment at 22] fails to raise a genuine issue as to whether any protected

conduct was a substantial motivating factor in Officer Goodwin’s decision to

engage with him, enter his cell, and pepper spray him. Accordingly, Officer

Goodwin is entitled to summary judgment on the Plaintiff’s retaliation claim.

E. Qualified Immunity

“Qualified immunity protects officers who commit constitutional

violations but who, in light of clearly established law, could reasonably

believe that their actions were lawful.” Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531

(4th Cir. 2011) (en banc). “To determine whether an officer is entitled to

qualified immunity, the court must examine (1) whether the plaintiff has

demonstrated that the officer violated a constitutional right and (2) whether

that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” E.W.

ex rel. T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 178 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation

marks omitted). The doctrine of qualified immunity “gives government

officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments and

protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the

law.” Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 100 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

Here, because the Plaintiff has not forecasted evidence that the

Defendant violated a constitutional right, Officer Goodwin is also entitled

qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims. Defendant

Goodwin is, therefore, entitled to summary judgment on this ground as well.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment and this action is dismissed with prejudice.

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary

Judgment [Doc. 30] is GRANTED and this action is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

The Clerk is respectfully directed to mail a copy of this Order to the

Plaintiff's address of record as well as to him at the Caswell Correctional

Center and to terminate this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: August 31, 2023

Martifi Reidinger ey

Chief United States District Judge AS

17