Cannady v. Polk County Sheriff Dep

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ASHEVILLE DIVISION

CIVIL CASE NO. 1:23-cv-00170-MR

LAMAR CANNADY, )

)

Petitioner, )

) MEMORANDUM OF

vs. ) DECISION AND ORDER

)

POLK COUNTY SHERIFF )

DEPARTMENT, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

_______________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Petitioner’s pro se Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [Doc. 1], and

on the Petitioner’s Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying

Fees or Costs [Doc. 2].

I. BACKGROUND

The pro se Petitioner is a pretrial detainee at the Henderson County

Detention Center (“HCDC”) on a Polk County charge of felony second

degree murder by drug distribution, Case No. 22CRS000028.1 The Polk

1 The Court takes judicial notice of the Petitioner’s file in Polk County Case No.

22CRS000028. See Fed. R. Evid. 201.

County Superior Court set secured bond in the amount of $400,000. [See

Note 1, supra].

The Petitioner filed the instant § 2241 Petition on June 30, 2023. [Doc.

1]. He claims: (1) “Excessive Bond of 400,000/local policy 100,000… Policy

of 100,000/prisoners with same charge 80,000;” (2) “14th Amend due process

(multiple areas). Missing unreplacible evidence/ no investigation;” (3) “14th

Amend due process violation. Presenting known, or should have known

false testimony to grand jury. They have one sole witness with multiple

statements.” [Doc. 1 at 6] (errors uncorrected). The Petitioner did not raise

any of these grounds in the state courts.2 [Id. (the § 2241 petition form states

“Did you present [this] Ground … in all appeals that were available to you?”

and Petitioner does not respond]. To explain why he did not pursue all

available appeals, he states:

I was denied my 6th amend self representation to go pro se on

three accounts 10-31-22/ 2-28-23/ 4-24-23/ re: willfully refusing

to discharge duties by counsel even after order by judge on 10-

31-22. I continue to file motions, was given new counsel on 4-24-

23.

2 In an unsigned document attached to the § 2241 Petition, the Petitioner appears to

assert that he exhausted his present claims by filing civil rights lawsuits in this Court, Case

Nos. 1:22-cv-163-MR, 1:23-cv-74-MR, which have been dismissed. [See Doc. 1-2 at 2;

see also Case No. 1:23-cv-168-KDB (§ 1983 lawsuit that is presently pending)]. He also

refers to another “habeas corpus” action that he purports to have filed in this Court, but

the Court has no record of the Petitioner having filed any habeas action other than the

instant case.

[Id. at 7] (errors uncorrected). For relief, he seeks “release on unsecure bond

under G.S. 15-10 of speedy trial – or dismissed charges by due process

violations.” [Id.].

II. APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

The Petitioner’s Application shows that he has had an average monthly

income of $20 during the past 12 months and that he expects to receive no

income next month. [Doc. 2 at 1-2]. Petitioner reports having no assets or

monthly expenses. [Id. at 2-5]. He further explains his inability to pay the

costs of these proceedings as follows: “confined.”3 [Id. at 5]. The Court is

satisfied that the Petitioner does not have sufficient funds to pay the filing fee

and will grant the Petitioner’s Application to proceed in forma pauperis.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings provides that

courts are to promptly examine habeas petitions to determine whether the

petitioner is entitled to any relief on the claims set forth therein. See Rule

1(a), (b), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (a district court may apply the rules for § 2254

proceedings to habeas petitions other than those filed under § 2254). Pro

se pleadings are construed liberally. See generally Haines v. Kerner, 404

3 A prisoner trust account statement that was recently filed in one of Petitioner’s § 1983

cases indicates that his modest account balance is far exceeded by his debt for

outstanding court-ordered fees. [See 1:23-cv-168, Doc. 7]; Fed. R. Ev. 201.

U.S. 519 (1972) (a pro se complaint, however inartfully pled, must be held to

less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers). After

examining the record in this matter, the Court finds that the § 2241 Petition

can be resolved without an evidentiary hearing based on the record and the

governing case law. See Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d 526, 529 (4th

Cir. 1970).

III. DISCUSSION

As a preliminary matter, all of the Petitioner’s claims are vague,

conclusory, and lacking in factual support. On this basis alone, the Petition

is subject to dismissal.

The Petitioner’s claims are also unexhausted on the face of the

Petition. A federal habeas petitioner who is “in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court,” may seek relief pursuant to Title 28, Section

2254(a). A pretrial detainee, however, is not “in custody” pursuant to a state

court judgment a relief under § 2254 is not available. See Dickerson v.

Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1987). A pretrial detainee’s exclusive

federal remedy for alleged unconstitutional confinement is to file a petition

for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), but only after fully

exhausting the available state remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3);

Thomas v. Crosby, 371 F.3d 782, 786 (11th Cir. 2004). Although § 2241

contains no express reference to exhaustion of state remedies, as does §

2254, exhaustion is required prior to filing a § 2241 petition. See, e.g.,

Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir., 410 U.S. 484, 490-91 (1973); Moore v. DeYoung,

515 F.2d 437, 442-43 (3d Cir. 1975). To satisfy the exhaustion requirement,

a habeas petitioner must present his claims to the state courts such that the

courts have the fair “opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the

facts bearing upon [his] constitutional claim.” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S.

270, 275-77 (1971); see O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) (in

order to properly exhaust state remedies, “state prisoners must give the state

courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking

one complete round of the State’s established appellate review process”).

Here, the Petitioner admits that he did not exhaust his claims in the

North Carolina courts, and that his exhaustion efforts are underway. [See

Doc. 1 at 7 (stating that he continues to file motions)]. He appears to rely on

his prior federal court filings to satisfy the exhaustion requirement; however,

he is required to exhaust his remedies in the North Carolina courts, not the

federal courts. Picard, 404 U.S. at 275-77. As the Petitioner has failed to

exhaust his state remedies before filing this action, the Petition is dismissed

without prejudice.

Even if the Petitioner had exhausted his claims, § 2241 relief appears

to be precluded by abstention principles. While federal courts have the

jurisdiction to grant federal habeas relief in advance of trial, Younger v.

Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) “serves as an exception to the traditional rule that

federal courts should exercise jurisdiction conferred on them by statute.”

Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm’n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392,

1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). In Younger, the Supreme Court held

that a federal court should not interfere with state criminal proceedings

except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances. 401 U.S. at

43-44. Under the abstention doctrine, abstention is proper in federal court

when (1) there is an ongoing state court proceeding; (2) the proceeding

implicates important state interests; and (3) the petitioner has an adequate

opportunity to present the federal claims in the state proceeding. Emp’rs

Res. Mgmt. Co. v. Shannon, 65 F.3d 1126, 1134 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing

Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm’n v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423,

432 (1982)); see also Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72–73

(2013) (explaining the circumstances when Younger abstention is

appropriate).

The first Younger prong is satisfied in the instant case because the

Petitioner has ongoing criminal proceedings in state court. The second

prong is satisfied because “the States’ interest in administering their criminal

justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of

the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types

of relief.” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986) (citation omitted). The

third prong is satisfied because “ordinarily a pending state prosecution

provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of

federal constitutional rights.” Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 904 (4th Cir.

1996) (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)). The Petitioner

has an adequate remedy at law with regard to his criminal prosecution, and

he has failed to demonstrate the existence of narrow and extraordinary

circumstances that warrant immediate consideration of his claims.

Accordingly, the Petitioner’s § 2241 claims are barred by Younger

abstention.4

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Petitioner’s § 2241 Petition is

dismissed without prejudice.

4 Moreover, to the extent that the Petitioner seeks the dismissal of his pending criminal

charges, such relief is not available by way of § 2241. See Dickerson v. State of Louisiana,

816 F.2d 220, 226 (5th Cir. 1987) (“[A]n attempt to dismiss an indictment or otherwise

prevent a prosecution” is not attainable through federal habeas corpus) (quoting Brown

v. Estelle, 530 F.2d 1280, 1283 (5th Cir. 1976)).

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Petitioner’s Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [Doc. 1] is DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules

Governing Section 2254 Cases, this Court declines to issue a certificate of

appealability.

The Clerk is respectfully instructed to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: August 29, 2023

Martifi Reidinger ey

Chief United States District Judge AS