Goodman v. Moose

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ASHEVILLE DIVISION

CIVIL CASE NO. 1:23-cv-00023-MR

SHAWN LOUIS GOODMAN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

TIMOTHY DARRYL MOOSE, et al., ) ORDER

)

Defendants. )

_______________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of the pro se

Amended Complaint [Doc. 10]. The Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.

[Doc. 6].

I. BACKGROUND

The pro se incarcerated Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 addressing his transfer from the Harnett Correctional Institution to the

Mountain View Correctional Institution (MVCI), and incidents that allegedly

occurred at the MVCI where he still resides. The Complaint was dismissed

on initial review, and the Plaintiff was provided the opportunity to amend.1

1 The claims against the Defendants in their official capacities for damages were

dismissed with prejudice, and the remaining claims were dismissed without prejudice.

[Doc. 9]. The Amended Complaint is now before the Court for initial review

[Doc. 10].

The Plaintiff again names as Defendants in their official and individual

capacities: Larry Williamson, the western regional director of NCDAC; Mike

Slagle, the warden of MVCI; Kella Jones Phillips, a correctional captain at

MVCI; and John Garland and David Hoilman, correctional officers at MVCI.

He appears to assert claims for the use of excessive force and failure to

intervene, denial of access to the courts, supervisory liability, and North

Carolina assault and battery. He seeks a declaratory judgment, injunctive

relief,2 compensatory and punitive damages, a jury trial, costs, any additional

relief that the Court deems suitable. [Id. at 21].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because the Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must

review the Amended Complaint to determine whether it is subject to

dismissal on the grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious [or] fails to state a

claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore,

under § 1915A the Court must conduct an initial review and identify and

dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if it is frivolous,

2 Insofar as the Plaintiff again requests preliminary injunctive relief, this is denied for the

reasons discussed on the Order on initial review of the Complaint. [See Doc. 9 at 16].

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune to such relief. 28 U.S.C. §

1915A.

In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether a complaint

raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly

baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se

complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a

district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his Complaint which

set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Excessive Force and Failure to Intervene

The Plaintiff claims that Defendant Garland stomped his torso and that

Defendants Hoilman and Phillips failed to intervene. [Doc. 10 at 15-16, 19-

20; see Doc. 9 at 7 (setting forth the excessive force standard)]; see also

Randall v. Prince George's Cnty., 302 F.3d 188, 202 (4th Cir. 2002) (the

Fourth Circuit addresses a failure to intervene claim as a theory of “bystander

liability” wherein there is “an omission to act...coupled with a duty to act.”).

Taking the Plaintiff’s allegations as true for the purposes of this initial review

and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, the Plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment claims against Defendants Garland, Hoilman, and Phillips are

not clearly frivolous.

Because the excessive force claims have passed initial review, the

Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Plaintiff’s North

Carolina assault and battery claims at this time. [Doc. 10 at 20]; see generally

28 U.S.C. § 1367.

B. Denial of Access to the Courts

The Plaintiff again claims that Defendant Phillips forced him to destroy

excess legal materials, “causing a potentially meritorious claim to fail.” [Doc.

10 at 18-19]. These vague and conclusory allegations are insufficient to

state a plausible actual injury. [See Doc. 9 at 10-11]; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)

(requiring a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief”); Simpson v. Welch, 900 F.2d 33, 35 (4th Cir. 1990)

(conclusory allegations, unsupported by specific allegations of material fact

are not sufficient); Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 201-02 (4th Cir.

2002) (a pleader must allege facts, directly or indirectly, that support each

element of the claim). Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s claim for denial of access

to the courts is again dismissed.

C. Supervisory Liability

The Plaintiff claims that he and his spouse complained to Defendants

Slagle and Williamson about the incidents addressed in the Amended

Complaint, but that Defendants Slagle and Williamson failed to take

“disciplinary or other action to curb the known pattern of physical abuse of

inmates and the abuse suffered by Plaintiff by Defendants Garland and

Holman….” [Doc. 10 at 19-20]. He alleges that this constituted deliberate

indifference to the Plaintiff’s safety and contributed to and proximately

caused the violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. [Id. at

20].

To establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that

the defendants “acted personally” to cause the alleged violation. See

Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977) (citation omitted). As

such, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in actions brought

under § 1983. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).

A supervisor can only be liable where (1) he knew that his subordinate “was

engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of

constitutional injury;” (2) his response showed “deliberate indifference to or

tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices;” and (3) there was an

“affirmative causal link” between her inaction and the constitutional

injury.” Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

The Plaintiff’s vague and conclusory claims about “known abuses” and

communications that he and his wife had with Defendants Slagle and

Williamson after the incidents at issue fail to state a plausible claim for

supervisory liability. See King v. Riley, No. 22-6410, 2023 WL 4982353, at

*7 (4th Cir. Aug. 4, 2023) (“a supervisor’s ‘mere knowledge’ that his

subordinates are engaging in unconstitutional conduct is not enough;” “a

complaint must contain specific allegations of each individual’s conduct and

state of mind”) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677). Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s

claims against Defendants Slagle and Williamson are dismissed.

D. Miscellaneous Claims

The Plaintiff again alleges that he was forced to throw away property

[Doc. 10 at 18]; that the Defendants violated prison policy [id. at 15]; and that

his grievances were destroyed [id. at 19]. These claims fail for the reasons

discussed on initial review of the Complaint and they are again dismissed for

the same reasons. [See Doc. 9 at 4-5, 11-12].

IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, the Plaintiff’s excessive force/failure to intervene claims pass

initial review against Defendants Garland, Hoilman, and Phillips, and the

Court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over the Plaintiff’s North Carolina

assault and battery claims against them. The remaining claims are

dismissed.

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:

1. The Amended Complaint [Doc. 10] passes initial review against

Defendants Garland, Hoilman, and Phillips for the use of

excessive force and failure to intervene, and the Court exercises

supplemental jurisdiction over the Plaintiff’s North Carolina

assault and battery claims against them.

2. The remaining claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall commence

the procedure for waiver of service as set forth in Local Civil Rule 4.3 for

Defendants David Hoilman, John Garland, and Kella Jones Phillips, who

are alleged to be a current or former employees of the North Carolina

Department of Public Safety.

The Clerk is respectfully instructed to mail the Plaintiff an Opt-In/ Opt-

Out form pursuant to the Standing Order in Misc. Case. No. 3:19-mc-00060-

FDW and a copy of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: August 28, 2023

Seal ities ae

Chief United States District Judge AU,