“courts have typically rejected recusal motions based on, and effectively created by, a litigant’s deliberate act of criticizing the judge or judicial system.”
How later courts described this case
- “courts have typically rejected recusal motions based on, and effectively created by, a litigant’s deliberate act of criticizing the judge or judicial system.”
- “a presiding judge is not ... required to recuse himself simply because of ‘unsupported, irrational or highly tenuous speculation’ ”
- in order to satisfy § 2253(c), a petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong
- when relief is denied on procedural grounds, a petitioner must establish both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
3:23-cv-104-MOC
(3:20-cr-415-MOC-WCM-1)
CARISSA EUGENIA BROWN, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. )
) ORDER
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Respondent. )
____________________________________)
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Petitioner’s pro se “Motion to Vacate Set Aside
or Discharge Detainment” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [Doc. 1], and “Motion to Substitute Judge
for Good Cause” [Doc. 2].
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner was charged by Bill of Information with committing a wire fraud scheme to
defraud debtors in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (Count One), and money laundering in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (Count Two). [3:20-cr-415 (“CR”) Doc. 1]. She entered a signed Plea
Agreement [CR Doc. 4] and Factual Basis [CR Doc. 5] on December 7, 2020. On December 11,
2020, a Rule 11 hearing came before a magistrate judge who accepted the plea as knowing and
voluntary. [CR Doc. 8]. Petitioner was released on bond pending sentencing. [CR Doc. 10].
Petitioner went through several attorneys and is now representing herself with standby
counsel. [CR Docs. 29, 37]. Petitioner did not appear for sentencing on August 25, 2022 and the
Court issued a bench warrant. [CR Doc. 53]. On September 12, 2022, a magistrate judge revoked
Petitioner’s pretrial release and ordered her detained pending further proceedings. [CR Doc. 58].
Petitioner appealed the revocation and detention Order to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,
which dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on November 16, 2022. [CR Doc. 71].
Petitioner has filed Motions seeking to withdraw her guilty plea which were denied
following an evidentiary hearing on December 13, 2022. See United States v. Brown, 2022 WL
17652883 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 13, 2022); [CR Docs. 47, 70]. A sentencing hearing scheduled for
December 19, 2022, was continued because Petitioner had filed a § 1983 civil rights lawsuit in
which she named as Defendants various executive branch officials, and various judicial branch
officials including the undersigned, Case No. 3:22-cv-617-KDB-DCK. [CR Doc. 86].
Petitioner filed the instant § 2255 Motion to Vacate on February 19, 2023. It appears that
she is attempting to challenge the Order revoking pretrial release and detaining her pending the
sentencing hearing. As relief, she seeks: discharge on her own recognizance; $50,000 in attorneys’
fees and costs; and any other relief the Court deems just and proper. The Petitioner has also moved
for the undersigned’s removal from the instant case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455.
The undersigned stayed this case sua sponte pending the issuance of a Judgment in Case
No. 3:22-cv-617-KDB. [Doc. 3]. That case was dismissed on May 19, 2023 and the Petitioner
has filed a Notice of intent to proceed with the instant case. [Doc. 4; 3:22-cv-617, Doc. 46]. The
stay will, therefore, be lifted.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings provides that courts are to
promptly examine motions to vacate, along with “any attached exhibits and the record of prior
proceedings” in order to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to any relief on the claims set
forth therein. After examining the record in this matter, the Court finds that the motion to vacate
can be resolved without an evidentiary hearing based on the record and governing case law. See
Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d 526, 529 (4th Cir. 1970).
III. DISCUSSION
As a preliminary matter, the Court will address the Petitioner’s “Motion to Substitute.”
Under 28 U.S.C. § 144, a litigant may seek recusal of a judge if the litigant files a “timely and
sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or
prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party….” 28 U.S.C. § 144. The affidavit
“shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed
not less than ten days before the beginning of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or
good cause shall be shown for failure to file it within such time.” Id. Although the judge must
accept as true the facts alleged in an affidavit filed under § 144, the judge is not required to accept
as true conclusory statements, opinions, or speculations. See generally Marty’s Floor Covering
Co. v. GAF Corp., 604 F.2d 266 (4th Cir. 1979).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 455, a judge must disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his
“impartiality may be questioned,” or “[w]here he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 455. The test for determining partiality is objective. United States v. Cherry, 330 F.3d 658, 665
(4th Cir. 2003). However, “[a] presiding judge is not required to recuse himself simply because of
unsupported or highly tenuous speculation.” Megaro v. McCollum, 66 F.4th 151, 163 (4th Cir.
2023). “[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality
motion.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 551 (1994).
Here, the Petitioner claims that: a conflict of interest exists because the instant case
“originate[s]” from the underlying criminal case, 3:20-cr-415; the undersigned “can not be
impartial because he is bias and prejudice as a result of being a DEFENDANT in the counterclaim
suit … related case #3:22-CV-617;” Petitioner believes that the undersigned was assigned to the
instant case “to prevent the corruption [in the criminal case] from being exposed” and to deny her
a fair § 2255 proceeding; the Court allowed the criminal case to be initiated in violation of the law;
the undersigned “yelled” at her in open court in the criminal case; the Petitioner has filed a judicial
misconduct complaint; and no hearing has yet been scheduled,1 in violation of due process. [Id.
at 2; Doc. 2-1 at 1] (errors uncorrected).
Petitioner has failed to set forth any cognizable basis for the Court’s removal from this
action. The Plaintiff’s Motion relies on vague and unsubstantiated claims of prejudice and bias.
The Court’s prior judicial rulings in the criminal case, any contentiousness in those proceedings,
and the Plaintiff’s conclusory claims of animus and a desire to deprive her of due process, provide
no basis for relief. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 551; United States v. Cherry, 330 F.3d 658, 665 (4th
Cir. 2003) (“a presiding judge is not ... required to recuse himself simply because of ‘unsupported,
irrational or highly tenuous speculation’ ”) (quoting United States v. DeTemple, 162 F.3d 279, 287
(4th Cir. 1998)). Nor will the Plaintiff be allowed to force the Court’s removal from the instant
action by filing a judicial conduct complaint, or by naming the undersigned as a defendant in a
civil case. See United States v. Owens, 902 F.2d 1154, 1156 (4th Cir. 1990) (“courts have typically
rejected recusal motions based on, and effectively created by, a litigant’s deliberate act of
criticizing the judge or judicial system.”); see, e.g., Woltz v. United States, 2010 WL 330218
(W.D.N.C. Jan. 20, 2010) (a litigant’s filing of a complaint of judicial misconduct against a
presiding judge does not infer bias or impartiality; such would result in judge-shopping). In short,
1 This appears to refer to both the instant § 2255 proceeding and the criminal sentencing hearing.
the Plaintiff’s displeasure with the Courts assignment to this case fails to provide any basis for
relief under §§ 144 or 455, and the Plaintiff’s Motion is denied.
Insofar as the Petitioner seeks § 2255 relief, the petition is premature. The language of §
2255 clearly states that the motion is available for a “prisoner” who is “in custody” and “under
sentence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); see, e.g., Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 149 (2012) (discussing
the finality of a judgment for purposes of § 2255); Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 532 (2003)
(same). “Thus, where a federal prisoner has not yet been sentenced, a district court lacks
jurisdiction over a motion brought under § 2255.” Austin v. United States, No. 3:05-CR-213, 2008
WL 922344, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 2008) (citing Stantini v. United States, 140 F.3d 424, 427
(2d Cir. 1998)). Petitioner has not yet been sentenced and, accordingly, there is no judgment that
the Petitioner may challenge pursuant to § 2255. Accordingly, the instant § 2255 Motion to Vacate
is dismissed without prejudice as premature.2
Moreover, to the extent that the Petitioner seeks to challenge her pretrial detention,3 or to
be awarded money damages,4 she may not do so in a § 2255 action. See generally 28 U.S.C. §
2255(b).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the stay is lifted, the “Motion to Substitute” is denied, and the
instant § 2255 Motion to Vacate is dismissed without prejudice as premature.
2 Should the Petitioner choose to file a § 2255 petition after her judgment becomes final, she must comply with all
applicable timeliness and procedural requirements. She is strongly urged to use a § 2255 form (which will be provided)
and to describe her claims in a short and plain manner. The Court makes no determinations about the potential merit
or procedural viability of a future § 2255 action.
3 See generally Shine v. U.S. Marshell, 2023 WL 2959882 (W.D.N.C. March 27, 2023) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 3145
and 28 U.S.C. § 2241).
4 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971).
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1. The Order staying this case [Doc. 3] is LIFTED.
2. Petitioner’s § 2255 Motion to Vacate [Doc. 1] is DISMISSED without prejudice
as premature.
3. Petitioner’s “Motion to Substitute Judge for Good Cause” [Doc. 2] is DENIED.
4. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing
Section 2254 and Section 2255 Cases, this Court declines to issue a certificate of
appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338
(2003) (in order to satisfy § 2253(c), a petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable
jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims
debatable or wrong); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (when relief is
denied on procedural grounds, a petitioner must establish both that the dispositive
procedural ruling is debatable and that the petition states a debatable claim of the
denial of a constitutional right).
5. The Clerk is respectfully instructed to mail the Petitioner a blank § 2255 form and
a copy of this Order, and close this case.
Signed: July 31, 2023
i )
pr-ervrnca
Max O. Cogburn i yg
United States District Judge Toa gt