Fuller v. Sheppard

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ASHEVILLE DIVISION

CIVIL CASE NO. 1:21-cv-00257-MR

JOHNATHAN A. FULLER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) MEMORANDUM OF

) DECISION AND ORDER

)

NATHANIEL SHEPPARD, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

___________________________ )

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment. [Doc. 33].

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 27, 2021, Plaintiff Johnathan A. Fuller (“Plaintiff”),

proceeding pro se, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against four

prison official Defendants for the violation of his civil rights while incarcerated

at Avery/Mitchell Correctional Institution (“AMCI”) in Spruce Pine, North

Carolina. [Doc. 1]. Plaintiff’s unverified Complaint, in which he named, in

their individual and official capacities, Correctional Officer Nathaniel

Sheppard, Warden Ronnie Honeycutt, Disciplinary Hearing Officer Randy S.

Mull, and North Carolina Department of Public Safety (NCDPS)1

Commissioner Todd Ishee, survived initial review on Plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment deliberate indifference and Fourteenth Amendment equal

protection claims against Defendants Nathaniel Sheppard and Ronnie

Honeycutt. Plaintiff’s other claims, including claims under the First, Fourth,

Fifth, Sixth Amendments; his official capacity claims; and Defendants Mull

and Ishee were dismissed. [Doc. 9 at 13-14]. Plaintiff alleges as follows.

On December 4, 2020, while Plaintiff, an African American, was

housed in segregation at AMCI, Defendant Sheppard tried to force Plaintiff

to sign a DC-160 form, which would have given permission to destroy all of

Plaintiff’s valuables, including Plaintiff’s family photos and prescription

eyewear. Plaintiff was denied many of his photographs, which depicted

Plaintiff’s Caucasian fiancé and friends, and left with only a picture of his

biracial child. Plaintiff was denied his state-prescribed eyeglasses, which

contain special UV lenses that protect Plaintiff’s eyes, and has suffered

significant eye damage as a result. [Id. at 3-4]. AMCI, a white-controlled

institution, is renowned for the suffering of its African American inmates and

Defendant Sheppard’s actions were racially motivated. [Id. at 4]. Defendant

1 The NCDPS is now called the North Carolina Department of Adult Corrections (NCDAC).

The Court, however, will refer to it as the NCDPS in conformity with the forecast of

evidence before the Court.

Honeycutt condoned Defendant Sheppard’s actions, failed to intervene, and

participated in “the prosecution of [Plaintiff and his] personal property.” [Id.].

Plaintiff claims he suffered injury to his eyes and vision, lost property, and

injury to his emotional and mental health. [Id. at 6]. For relief, Plaintiff seeks

monetary and injunctive relief and punitive damages.2 [Id. at 6].

On January 27, 2023, Defendants moved for summary judgment.

[Doc. 33]. Defendants argue that summary judgment should be granted

because Defendants did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and

because qualified immunity bars Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants. [Id.].

In support of their summary judgment motion, Defendants submitted a brief,

their own affidavits, various prison policies, Plaintiff’s infraction history,

inventories of Plaintiff’s property, an incident report, disciplinary records,

Plaintiff’s Offender Population Unified System (“OPUS”) summary, and

Plaintiff’s relevant medical records. [Docs. 34, 35, 35-1 to 35-16].

Thereafter, the Court entered an order in accordance with Roseboro v.

Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the requirements

for filing a response to the summary judgment motion and of the manner in

which evidence could be submitted to the Court. [Doc. 36]. The Plaintiff was

2 Because Plaintiff has been transferred from AMCI to Johnston Correctional Facility, his

claim for injunctive relief is moot and will be dismissed. Incumaa v. Ozmint, 507 F.3d

281, 286-87 (4th Cir. 2007).

specifically advised that he “may not rely upon mere allegations or denials of

allegations in his pleadings to defeat a summary judgment motion.” [Id. at

2]. Rather, he must support his assertion that a fact is genuinely disputed

by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions,

documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations,

stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only),

admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” [Id. (citing Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(a))]. The Court further advised that:

An affidavit is a written statement under oath; that is,

a statement prepared in writing and sworn before a

notary public. An unsworn statement, made and

signed under the penalty of perjury, may also be

submitted. Affidavits or statements must be

presented by Plaintiff to this Court no later than

fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order and

must be filed in duplicate.

[Id. at 3-4 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4))]. Despite these instructions, Plaintiff

did not file a response. Also, as noted, Plaintiff’s Complaint was not verified

or otherwise submitted under penalty of perjury and, therefore, cannot be

considered for its evidentiary value here. See Goodman v. Diggs, 986 F.3d

493, 498-99 (4th Cir. 2021) (holding that a district court is to consider verified

prisoner complaints as affidavits on summary judgment “when the

allegations contained therein are based on personal knowledge”). Thus, in

terms of evidentiary forecast, the Defendants’ is unrefuted.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is

genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). A fact is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under

governing law. Id.

The movant has the “initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)

(internal citations omitted).

Once this initial burden is met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving

party. The nonmoving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 322 n. 3. The nonmoving party may not

rely upon mere allegations or denials of allegations in his pleadings to defeat

a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 324. Rather, the nonmoving party

must oppose a proper summary judgment motion with citation to

“depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or

declarations, stipulations …, admissions, interrogatory answers, or other

materials” in the record. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(a). Courts “need

not accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or

arguments.” Eastern Shore Mkt. Inc. v. J.D. Assoc.’s, LLP, 213 F.3d 174,

180 (4th Cir. 2000). The nonmoving party must present sufficient evidence

from which “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; accord Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, Md.,

48 F.3d 810, 818 (4th Cir. 1995).

When ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must view the

evidence and any inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Facts, however, “must be

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a

‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380

(2007). As the Supreme Court has emphasized,

“[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under

Rule 56(c), the opponent must do more than simply

show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the

material facts …. Where the record taken as a whole

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’”

Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986)

(footnote omitted). “[T]he mere existence of some

alleged factual dispute between the parties will not

defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for

summary judgment; the requirement is that there be

no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-28, 106 S. Ct.

2505 (1986). When opposing parties tell two

different stories, one of which is blatantly

contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury

could believe it, a court should not adopt that version

of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for

summary judgment.

Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Defendants’ uncontroverted forecast of evidence shows the following.

At the relevant times, Defendants Sheppard and Honeycutt were

employed by AMCI as a Correctional Officer and the Warden, respectively.

[Doc. 35-3 at ¶ 2: Sheppard Dec.; Doc. 35-12 at ¶ 2: Honeycutt Dec.].

Plaintiff was a convicted state prisoner housed at AMCI. [Doc. 35-1 at 1]. At

AMCI, custody status determines what property offenders are allowed to

possess in their cells. [See Doc. 35-5: Offender Personal Property Policy;

Doc. 35-3 at ¶ 4]. Offenders in medium or close custody may possess up to

25 unframed photographs and eyeglasses, among many other items. [Doc.

35-3 at 1-5]. Offenders maintaining property more than established limits

are deemed to be violating a direct order and are subject to disciplinary

action. Excess property is considered contraband and subject to

confiscation and disposal. The Special Affairs Captain and Unit Manager

determine proper disposition of contraband. [Doc. 35-5 at 6]. Offenders in

Restrictive Housing are limited to only 10 photographs. [Doc. 35-5 at 7].

When regular population offenders are moved to Restrictive Housing, their

personal property is inventoried and recorded on a DC-160 form. [Doc. 35-

3 at ¶ 5]. Any property possessed by an offender that exceeds allowable

Restrictive Housing limits is stored for the offender in a secure location.

When the offender returns to the regular population, the property is returned.

[Doc. 35-3 at ¶ 5].

On December 1, 2020, Plaintiff was transferred from AMCI’s Watauga

Unit to Restrictive Housing for threatening to assault staff. [Doc. 35-3 at ¶ 3;

Doc. 35-11 at 3]. Before Plaintiff was moved to Restrictive Housing, Officers

Larry Moore and Nathaniel Welch inventoried Plaintiff’s personal property

and recorded all items on a DC-160 form, including 25 photographs. [Doc.

35-3 at ¶ 6; Doc. 35-7]. Officers Moore and Welch also separately identified

Plaintiff’s property that was not allowed or in excess of that allowed in the

general population and, therefore, considered contraband. [Doc. 35-3 at ¶ 6;

see Doc. 35-5 at 6]. Officers Moore and Welch errantly included 15 of

Plaintiff’s photographs on this list. That is, as a general population offender,

Plaintiff was allowed to have all 25 photographs. [See Doc. 35-5 at 2]. The

15 photographs disallowed during Plaintiff’s stay in Restrictive Housing

should have been stored until his return to the general population, not

designated as contraband. [See Doc. 35-5 at 7, Doc. 35-7, Doc. 35-10].

Nonetheless, Plaintiff’s disallowed property, including the 15 photographs,

was removed. [Doc. 35-3 at ¶ 6; see Docs. 35-7 at 2, 35-10]. None of the

“contraband” photographs were described on the DC-160. They were simply

listed as “15 Photos.” [See Docs. 35-7 at 2, 35-10].

On arrival to Restrictive Housing, Officer Chris Wilcox inventoried

Plaintiff’s remaining personal property. [Doc. 35-3 at ¶ 7; Doc. 35-9]. The

property Plaintiff was allowed to keep in Restrictive Housing was inventoried

on one DC-160 form. [Doc. 35-8]. This property included a pair of shower

shoes, a radio with ear buds, a comb, and a pair of eyeglasses with a case.3

[Id.]. The disallowed property was listed on a separate DC-160 form and

designated for storage. [Doc. 35-9]. This property included, among other

things, an unidentified number of “assorted photo’s,” various books,

magazines, and a wallet. [Id.].

At approximately 7:45 p.m. that day, after Plaintiff was in Restrictive

Housing, Correctional Officer Joseph Buchanan tried to give Plaintiff the

personal property he was allowed to have there, which included his

3 It is unclear why Plaintiff was not allowed to have the remaining 10 photographs in

Restrictive Housing. [See Doc. 35-5 at 7].

eyeglasses. [Doc. 35-4 at 1; Doc. 35-8]. At that time, Plaintiff told Officer

Buchanan that he wanted to harm himself and needed to be on suicide

watch, which is known as Self-Injurious Behavior (SIB) precautions. [Doc.

35-4 at 1, 3; Doc. 35-3 at ¶ 3]. Plaintiff was moved to an observation cell,

where he remained for approximately two and a half days. [Doc. 35-4 at 1;

Doc. 35-4 at 15-]. During that time, Plaintiff was monitored continuously by

prison staff. [Doc. 35-4 at 10-11; Doc. 35-4 at 15-26]. Offenders on SIB

precautions are not allowed to have any clothing or other possessions,

including prescription eyeglasses. [Doc. 35-4 at 10]. For their safety, they

are provided only a smock, a safety blanket, and a vinyl-coated mattress.

[Doc. 35-4 at 10].

At approximately 10:45 a.m. on December 4, 2020, Plaintiff was

removed from SIB precautions and placed on Close Observation pursuant

to mental health staff recommendation. [Doc. 35-4 at 9; Doc. 35-4 at 13].

Under Close Observation, offenders have no property restrictions unrelated

to their custody status. [Doc. 35-4 at 13]. The same day, after Plaintiff’s

return to Restrictive Housing from SIB precautions, Defendant Sheppard

took Plaintiff a previously prepared DC-160 for his signature. [Doc. 35-3 at ¶

8]. This DC-160 inventoried Plaintiff’s property that had been categorized as

contraband on December 1, 2020, including the 15 photographs, and was,

therefore, designated for disposal. [Doc. 35-10]. As noted, the inventory had

been conducted by Officers Moore and Welch. [Doc. 35-3 at ¶ 8]. Plaintiff

refused to sign the form and was charged with an infraction for his refusal.

[Doc. 35-3 at ¶ 9]. Defendant Sheppard never inventoried Plaintiff’s property

between December 1, 2020, and December 4, 2020, and never removed

Plaintiff’s eyeglasses from his possession. [Doc. 35-3 at ¶ 10]. His only role

in the relevant events was bringing Plaintiff a form to sign that documented

Plaintiff’s property that had been deemed by Officers Moore and Welch as

contraband. [Doc. 35-3 at ¶¶ 8, 10]. Defendant Honeycutt was not involved

in any matter relevant here and only ever had incidental dealings with the

Plaintiff. [Doc. 35-12 at ¶¶ 3, 5]. Defendants Honeycutt and Sheppard did

not discriminate against Plaintiff on the basis of race or otherwise. [Doc. 35-

3 at ¶ 11; Doc. 35-12 at ¶ 5].

On January 27, 2021, approximately one month after Plaintiff was on

SIB precautions, he was seen at the medical clinic for chest pain. He

complained that his anxiety and depression had been very high the past two

months and that he did not need to be seen for any medical reason at that

time. Plaintiff also stated that he understood nothing could be currently done

for his eyesight. Medical staff noted that Plaintiff had been diagnosed as

legally blind in 2006. [Doc. 35-14]. On March 29, 2001, Plaintiff was seen

at the medical clinic by Lindwood Robinson, M.D., with complaints of

worsening visual acuity and that his current prescription lenses were not

adequate. [Doc. 35-15 at 1]. Dr. Robinson noted Plaintiff’s diagnosis of

chronic blindness in both eyes and requested a consultation for Plaintiff with

the NCDPS Optometry Clinic. [Id. at 2]. In August 2001, Plaintiff was seen

at the Optometry Clinic by Marvin Walker, D.O. [Doc. 35-16 at 1]. Dr. Walker

noted Plaintiff’s complaint that his left eye was “weak for over a year.” [Id.].

Dr. Walker performed a vision examination and noted Plaintiff’s prescription.

[Id. at 2].

IV. DISCUSSION

“Qualified immunity protects officers who commit constitutional

violations but who, in light of clearly established law, could reasonably

believe that their actions were lawful.” Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531

(4th Cir. 2011) (en banc). “To determine whether an officer is entitled to

qualified immunity, the court must examine (1) whether the plaintiff has

demonstrated that the officer violated a constitutional right and (2) whether

that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” E.W.

ex rel. T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 178 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation

marks omitted). The doctrine of qualified immunity “gives government

officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments and

protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the

law.” Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 100 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Here, the uncontroverted forecast of evidence shows that no

constitutional violation occurred. There is no forecast of evidence that

Defendant Sheppard had any involvement in the designation of Plaintiff’s

property as contraband or that he had any knowledge of the images depicted

on any of Plaintiff’s photographs. Moreover, the forecast of evidence shows

that Plaintiff was properly denied his eyeglasses while on SIB precautions

for his own safety and that Plaintiff’s eyeglasses were returned once he

returned to Restrictive Housing. Even if Plaintiff had been improperly denied

his eyeglasses, there is no forecast of evidence that Defendant Sheppard

was involved in this decision. There is no forecast that Defendant Honeycutt

participated in any of the alleged events or that any actions taken with

respect to Plaintiff’s property were racially motivated.

Finally, the forecast of evidence does not show that Plaintiff suffered

any injury from the denial of his eyeglasses. He has been chronically, legally

blind since 2006. The medical records show that Plaintiff’s complaints related

to the weakening of his left eye preceded the events at issue by several

months. As such, Plaintiff has failed to forecast evidence that he suffered

any injury from the alleged, but unproven, deliberate indifference to his

serious medical needs under the Eighth Amendment.

Because Plaintiff has not presented a forecast of evidence that

Defendants violated a constitutional right, Defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity on Plaintiffs remaining Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment

individual capacity claims. As such, the Court will grant summary judgment

for Defendants.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion

for summary judgment.

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment [Doc. 33] is GRANTED and this action is hereby

DISMISSED with prejudice.

The Clerk is instructed to terminate this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed: May 25, 2023

Martifi Reidinger ee

Chief United States District Judge AS

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