Lyda v. Griffin

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ASHEVILLE DIVISION

1:22-cv-00273-MR

TIMOTHY LYDA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) ORDER

)

LOWELL GRIFFIN, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

________________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff’s

Complaint, [Doc. 1], filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)

and 1915A, and Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, [Doc. 4].

I. BACKGROUND

Pro se Plaintiff Timothy Lyda (“Plaintiff”) filed this action on December

21, 2022, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendants Lowell Griffin,

identified as the Henderson County Sheriff; the Henderson County Detention

Facility (the “Jail”); the City of Hendersonville; and Libby Harvey, identified

as a Jail Nurse, based on events allegedly occurring while he was detained

at the Jail.1 [Doc. 1]. Plaintiff alleges as follows.

1 Plaintiff does not specify the capacity in which he purports to sue the individual

Defendants in this matter.

On April 9, 2021, Plaintiff was taken to the Jail by the Henderson

County Sheriff’s Department and put in a classification cell. [Doc. 1-1 at 1].

Sometime on the same day, Plaintiff’s brother brought Plaintiff’s medication

to the Jail. [Doc. 1 at 4]. During medication administration time that same

day, Plaintiff asked Defendant Harvey about his blood pressure medication.

Defendant Harvey responded, “well I counted them and you weren’t taking

them right out there so I’m not going to give them to you at all.” [Doc. 1-1 at

1]. On April 10, 2021, Plaintiff pressed the medical call button for someone

to take his blood pressure. Plaintiff knew that he was in “hypertensive

emergency state.” [Id. at 1]. Officer Rummage, identified as a PERT team

member, responded to Plaintiff’s call and took Plaintiff’s blood pressure.2

Plaintiff explained the situation with his medication. Officer Rummage

explained that “the order had came from above and there was absolutely

nothing he could do and … to lay on the cold concrete.” [Id.]. Plaintiff took

his medication immediately upon his release from Jail on April 11, 2021. For

four months, Plaintiff sought medical advice regarding his right leg and

“suffered the most excruciating pain any man, could EVER, feel that’s even

close to giving childbirth.” Plaintiff “ended up with two 6-in blood clots” in his

2 Plaintiff alleges that “Deputy Rummage” is employed by the Sheriff’s Department and

acted under color of law. [Doc. 1 at 4]. Plaintiff, however, does not name Rummage as

a Defendant in this matter. [See id. at 1-3].

right common iliac artery. [Id. at 1]. Plaintiff underwent a 10-hour surgery to

remove the blood clots from his leg. Plaintiff alleges that the order “from

above” to deprive Plaintiff of his medication was retaliation by the Sheriff’s

Department because Plaintiff has a video of “them” performing an illegal

search and seizure on Plaintiff. [Id.]. Plaintiff claims violation of his

Fourteenth Amendment rights, medical malpractice, and negligence. [Doc.

1 at 3].

For injuries, Plaintiff claims he has suffered nerve damage and loss of

feeling between his knee and ankle, diminished “capacity of life” and

“cardiovascular capabilities,” and a severely diminished libido. [Id. at 5]. For

relief, Plaintiff seeks $5 million in damages. [Id.].

II. IN FORMA PAUPERIS MOTION

The Court first addresses Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma

pauperis. [Doc. 4]. Plaintiff’s affidavit shows that he had an average monthly

income of $1,186.00 for the past twelve months and that he expects to

receive the same income next month. [Id. at 1-2]. Plaintiff reports having no

cash, a negative balance of $110.00 in his checking account, a motor vehicle

valued at $1,210.00, and no other assets. [Id. at 2-3]. Plaintiff reports that

his monthly expenses total $990.00 and that no one relies on him for support.

[Id. at 3, 4-5]. Plaintiff explains that he cannot pay the cost of these

proceedings because he receives disability benefits and has no other

income. [Id. at 5]. The Court is satisfied that Plaintiff does not have sufficient

funds to pay the filing fee. The Court will, therefore, allow the motion and

permit Plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis in this action.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must

review the Complaint to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the

grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious [or] fails to state a claim on which

relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore, under § 1915A

the Court must conduct an initial review and identify and dismiss the

complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune to such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether the Complaint

raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly

baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se

complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a

district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his Complaint which

set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

IV. DISCUSSION

“To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the

violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States

and must show that the deprivation of that right was committed by a person

acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

Plaintiff purports to raise claims for violation of his Fourteenth Amendment

rights, medical malpractice, and negligence. The Court will address those

claims fairly raised by Plaintiff’s Complaint.

A. Defendant Jail

A jail is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. See Brooks v.

Pembroke Jail, 722 F.Supp. 1294, 1301 (E.D.N.C. 1989). The Court,

therefore, will dismiss the Jail as a Defendant in this matter.

B. Defendant City of Hendersonville

Local governing bodies “can be sued directly under § 1983 for

monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where ... the action that is alleged

to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance,

regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's

officers.” Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); see Mt.

Healthy City Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977) (Eleventh

Amendment immunity “does not extend to counties or similar municipal

corporations.”). Municipal liability under § 1983 cannot be predicated upon

a respondeat superior theory. Burgess v. Goldstein, 997 F.3d 541, 562 (4th

Cir. 2021). Liability arises only when the offensive acts are taken in

furtherance of municipal policy or custom. Id.; see City of Canton, Ohio v.

Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (a municipality can be liable under § 1983

only where its policies are the “moving force” behind the constitutional

violation) (quoting Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981)).

There are three necessary elements for Monell liability. First, the

plaintiff must plausibly allege a constitutional harm that stems from the acts

of a municipal employee “taken in furtherance of some municipal ‘policy or

custom.’ ” Milligan v. City of Newport News, 743 F.2d 227, 229 (4th Cir. 1984)

(quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018); see also Spell v. McDaniel,

824 F.2d 1380, 1389 (4th Cir. 1987). Second, the plaintiff must allege facts

showing that the policy's creation is fairly attributable to the

municipality. Spell, 824 F.2d at 1389; see also Owens v. Balt.

City State's Attorney's Office, 767 F.3d 379, 402 (4th Cir. 2014) (“Only if a

municipality subscribes to a custom, policy, or practice can it be said to have

committed an independent act, the sine qua non of Monell liability.”). Third,

the plaintiff must allege an affirmative causal link between the “policy or

custom,” and the particular injury suffered by the plaintiff. Spell, 824 F.2d at

1389.

Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts supporting Monell liability

against Defendant City of Hendersonville. This Defendant, therefore, will

also be dismissed.

C. Official Capacity Claims

Suits against an officer in his official capacity “generally represent only

another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an

agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099 (1985)

(1985) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n. 55, 98 S.Ct. at 2035). As with

the City of Hendersonville, the Office of Sheriff is not liable under § 1983 for

an employee’s acts “unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of

some nature caused [the] constitutional tort.” Collins v. City of Harker

Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120-21, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 1066 (quoting Monell, 436

U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2036). As such, to the extent Plaintiff intends to sue

Defendants Griffin and Harvey in their official capacities, Plaintiff does not

allege that any official policy was the moving force behind or otherwise

played a part in any constitutional violation. The Court, therefore, will

dismiss Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against Defendants Griffin and

Harvey.

D. Deliberate Indifference

Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on an alleged lack of or

inappropriate medical treatment fall within the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.3 Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, a

plaintiff must show a “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs” of the

detainee. Id. “Deliberate indifference requires a showing that the defendants

actually knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious injury to the

detainee or that they actually knew of and ignored a detainee’s serious need

for medical care.” Young v. City of Mt. Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 575-76 (4th

Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). “To establish that a health care provider’s

actions constitute deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, the

3 Because the Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee at the relevant times, his deliberate

indifference claims are properly brought under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process

Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment. See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463

U.S. 239 (1983). However, the Fourth Circuit has long applied the Eighth Amendment

deliberate indifference standard to pretrial detainees' deliberate indifference claims. See

Moss v. Harwood, 19 F.4th 614, 624 n.4 (4th Cir. 2021) (noting that, “under Kingsley v.

Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015), pretrial detainees

bringing excessive force claims under the Fourteenth Amendment are no longer required

to satisfy the analogous subjective component that governs the Eighth Amendment

excessive force claims of convicted prisoners ... [however] the Supreme Court has not

extended Kingsley beyond the excessive force context to deliberate indifference claims,

... and neither has our court....”); Mays v. Sprinkle, 992 F.3d 295, 300-02 (4th Cir. 2021)

(declining to decide whether a pretrial detainee must satisfy the subjective component of

the Eight Amendment deliberate indifference standard).

treatment must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to

shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Miltier v.

Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 1990).

Moreover, to establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must

show that the defendants “acted personally” to cause the alleged violation.

See Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977) (citation omitted).

As such, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in actions

brought under § 1983. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. A supervisor can only

be liable where (1) he knew that his subordinate “was engaged in conduct

that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury;” (2) his

response showed “deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the

alleged offensive practices;” and (3) there was an “affirmative causal link”

between her inaction and the constitutional injury.” Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d

791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true and giving him the benefit of every

reasonable inference, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Defendant Harvey is

not clearly frivolous. Plaintiff, however, has failed to state an individual

capacity deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Griffin. Plaintiff

vaguely alleges only that Defendant Harvey followed orders “that came from

above her” to deprive Plaintiff of his medication. Plaintiff, however, makes

no allegations of personal participation by Defendant Griffin relative to the

matter at issue. Defendant Griffin, therefore, will be dismissed.

E. Retaliation

An inmate has a clearly established First Amendment right to be free

from retaliation for filing lawsuits. See Booker v. S.C. Dep’t of Corrs., 855

F.3d 533, 540 (4th Cir. 2017); Thompson v. Commonwealth of Va., 878 F.3d

89, 110 (4th Cir. 2017). Inmates also have a protected First Amendment

right to complain to prison officials about prison conditions and improper

treatment by prison employees that affect them. See Patton v. Kimble, 717

Fed. App’x 271, 272 (4th Cir. 2018).

To state a colorable First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must

allege that (1) he engaged in protected First Amendment activity, (2) the

defendant took some action that adversely affected his First Amendment

rights, and (3) there was a causal relationship between his protected activity

and the defendant’s conduct. Martin v. Duffy, 977 F.3d 294, 299 (4th Cir.

2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Retaliation claims brought by

prisoners, however, are treated with skepticism because every act of

discipline by a prison official is retaliatory in that it responds directly to

prisoner misconduct. See Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994).

More, bare or conclusory assertions of retaliation are insufficient to establish

a retaliation claim. Id., 40 F.3d at 74.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that the decision to deprive him of his medication

was made in retaliation for Plaintiff’s possession of a video of the Sheriff’s

Department performing an allegedly illegal search and seizure. While

peaceful video recording of police activity may be a protected activity, see

Garcia v. Montgomery Cty, Md., 145 F.Supp.3d 492, 508 (D. Md. Nov. 5,

2015), Plaintiff does not allege that he took the video or the circumstances

under which it was taken, and fails to identify and name a defendant whose

conduct constituted retaliation.

F. Negligence and Medical Malpractice

Plaintiff also references claims for negligence and medical malpractice.

He fails, however, to allege who he contends was negligent or committed

medical malpractice against him or what acts he contends constituted

negligence or medical malpractice. Plaintiff’s allegations relative to these

claims fail to meet the most basic pleading requirements. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief”); Simpson v. Welch, 900 F.2d 33, 35 (4th Cir.

1990) (conclusory allegations, unsupported by specific allegations of

material fact are not sufficient); Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193,

201-02 (4th Cir. 2002) (a pleader must allege facts, directly or indirectly, that

support each element of the claim). These claims, therefore, will be

dismissed.

Finally, the body of the Complaint contains allegations against

individuals who are not named as defendants in the caption as required by

Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a)

(“The title of the complaint must name all the parties”); Myles v. United

States, 416 F.3d 551 (7th Cir. 2005) (“to make someone a party the plaintiff

must specify him in the caption and arrange for service of process.”); Perez

v. Humphries, No. 3:18-cv-107-GCM, 2018 WL 4705560, at *1 (W.D.N.C.

Oct. 1, 2018) (“A plaintiff’s failure to name a defendant in the caption of a

Complaint renders any action against the purported defendant a legal

nullity”). The allegations directed at individuals not named as Defendants

are therefore dismissed without prejudice.

V. CONCLUSION

In sum, Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against Defendant

Harvey in her individual capacity survives initial review.

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference

claim against Defendant Harvey in her individual capacity survives initial

review in accordance with this Order. Plaintiff’s remaining claims are

DISMISSED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Lowell Griffin, Henderson

County Detention Facility, and City of Hendersonville are DISMISSED as

Defendants in this matter.

The Clerk is instructed to mail one (1) blank summons to Plaintiff to fill

out and identify Defendant Libby Harvey, and then return the summons to

the Court. Plaintiff is required to provide the necessary information for the

U.S. Marshal to effectuate service on this Defendant. When the Court

receives the summons from Plaintiff, the Clerk shall direct the U.S. Marshal

to effectuate service upon Defendant Harvey.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: April 25, 2023

Martifi Reidinger ee

Chief United States District Judge AS