McClellan v. Cothron

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ASHEVILLE DIVISION

CIVIL CASE NO. 1:20-cv-00189-MR

IAIAN EVANS MCCLELLAN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) MEMORANDUM OF

vs. ) DECISION AND ORDER

)

TODD SCHETTER, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

___________________________ )

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment, [Doc. 78], and Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration,

[Doc. 88], which the Court construes as a motion for extension of time to

respond to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Pro se Plaintiff Iaian Evans McClellan (“Plaintiff”) brings this action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his civil rights while incarcerated

at Marion Correctional Institution (“Marion CI”) in Marion, North Carolina.

[Doc. 1]. Plaintiff thrice amended his Complaint, none of which were verified.

[Docs. 15, 18, 28; see Doc. 1]. Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint survived

initial review as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim

against Defendants Todd Schetter and Caleb Davis. [Doc. 29]. Plaintiff’s

other claims and the remaining Defendants were dismissed. [Id. at 13].

Plaintiff alleged that Defendants Schetter and Davis failed to protect Plaintiff

from an attack by another inmate when Schetter directed that a group of

inmates be released from their cells to the shower area before securing

another group in their cells and that Defendant Davis executed this directive

without confirming the shower area was clear. [Doc. 28 at 5].

On October 6, 2022, Defendants moved for summary judgment

pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. [Doc. 78]. In

support of their summary judgment motion, Defendants submitted a

memorandum, the Affidavits of Defendants Schetter and Davis, and

Plaintiff’s offender information sheet and infraction history. [Docs. 80, 81-1

to 81-4]. The Court entered an order in accordance with Roseboro v.

Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the requirements

for filing a response to the summary judgment motion and of the manner in

which evidence could be submitted to the Court. [Doc. 83]. In response,

Plaintiff submitted a memorandum, his own Affidavit, grievance records,

various prison records related to the incident, and “Opposing Statements of

Material Facts, Which Can Be Disputed,” which includes Defendants’

discovery responses.1 [Docs. 87, 87-1, 89, 89-1, 89-2].

This matter is now ripe for adjudication.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is

genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). A fact is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under

governing law. Id.

The movant has the “initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)

(internal citations omitted).

Once this initial burden is met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving

party. The nonmoving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there

1 Plaintiff moved for additional time to file the Opposing Statements of Material Facts [Doc.

88], which the Court grants here.

is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 322 n.3. The nonmoving party may not

rely upon mere allegations or denials of allegations in his pleadings to defeat

a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 324. Rather, the nonmoving party

must oppose a proper summary judgment motion with citation to

“depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or

declarations, stipulations …, admissions, interrogatory answers, or other

materials” in the record. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(a). Namely, the

nonmoving party must present sufficient evidence from which “a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

248; accord Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, Md., 48 F.3d 810, 818 (4th

Cir. 1995).

When ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must view the

evidence and any inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Facts, however, “must be

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a

‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380

(2007). That is, “[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule

56(c), the opponent must do more than simply show there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts…. Where the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,

there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted).

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The forecast of evidence, in the light most favorable to the non-movant,

is as follows.

On June 14, 2018, at approximately 7:30 p.m., Plaintiff, who was a

Lower F Unit Group Two inmate, was taking a shower at Marion CI.2 [Doc.

87-1 at 5: McClellan Aff.; Doc. 89-1 at 13]. While Plaintiff was in the shower,

Defendant Schetter radioed the control booth and directed Defendant Davis

to release Group Three inmates into the dayroom. [Doc. 87-1 at 5, 18].

Rather than visually inspecting the shower area and dayroom to ensure no

Group Two inmates remained before releasing Group Three inmates,

Defendants relied on the control panel, which reflected that all Group Two

inmates’ cell doors were secure. [Id.]. Meanwhile, Group Three inmate,

Joshua Carter, realizing that Plaintiff remained in the shower area, waited

outside the shower area, and attacked Plaintiff with a homemade weapon

when Plaintiff exited the shower area. [Id.; see Doc. 87-1 at 21]. Plaintiff

2 The Lower F Unit at Marion CI is a Rehabilitative Diversion Unit (RDU). [See Doc. 89 at

1]. Lower F Unit shower facilities are accessed through and/or considered a part of the

dayroom.

suffered injuries to his face, back, and left shoulder during the attack. [Doc.

87-1 at 5].

Defendants Schetter and Davis never gave Plaintiff a direct order or

warning to lock down or get out of the shower area before Plaintiff was

attacked. [Doc. 87-1 at 5]. Defendant Schetter and Davis should have

known that offenders in different groups are never supposed to be in the day

room or shower area at the same time. [Id.]. Defendants Schetter and Davis,

however, had no knowledge that Plaintiff and Carter had any contention with

each other or that Carter posed a risk to Plaintiff’s safety. [Doc. 81-1 at ¶¶

6, 8: Schetter Dec.; Doc. 81-2 at ¶¶ 6, 8: Davis Dec.].

Nonetheless, Defendants Schetter and Davis violated prison policy by

failing to ensure all Group Two inmates were securely in their cells before

releasing Group Three inmates. [Doc. 89 at 1; see Doc. 87-1 at 2, 5].

Offenders in different groups are allowed to cross paths only during

necessary movement within the prison and only under direct officer

observation. [Doc. 87-1 at 5].

An investigation of the incident was conducted. [See Doc. 87-1 at 15].

Security Risk Group (SRG) Intelligence Officer Adam Hergenrother

attempted to speak with Plaintiff and Carter regarding possible SRG activity.

Because neither inmate is classified as SRG and because both refused to

speak to Hergenrother, he concluded that the incident was not SRG-related.

[Id.].

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Failure to Protect

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual

punishments,” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, and protects prisoners from the

“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,

319 (1986). Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on an alleged failure to

protect fall within the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and

unusual punishment. The negligent failure to protect an inmate from assaults

by other prisoners, or by other prison guards, does not rise to the level of an

unconstitutional violation. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986).

To show deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must show that the prison official

had actual knowledge of an excessive risk to the plaintiff’s safety. Danser v.

Stansberry, 772 F.3d 340, 346 (4th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). In other

words, the prison official “must both be aware of facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and

he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837

(1994). Violation of a prison policy by prison officials, however, does not

establish a constitutional violation. See Riccio v. Cty of Fairfax, 907 F.2d

1459, 1469 (4th Cir. 1990) (“If state law grants more procedural rights that

the Constitution would otherwise require, a state’s failure to abide by that law

is not a federal due process issue.”).

The forecast of evidence shows that Defendants failed to ensure that

no RDU Group Two inmates remained in the shower area before releasing

RDU Group Three inmates into the dayroom. The forecast of evidence also

shows that, as a result of this failure, Plaintiff was attacked by another RDU

inmate with a homemade weapon and that Plaintiff was injured. The forecast

of evidence also shows that Defendants’ failure violated prison policy.

While the forecast of evidence shows that Plaintiff and Carter were

housed in the RDU, there is no forecast of evidence that Carter had a history

of violence. Moreover, Plaintiff fails to present a forecast of evidence that

Defendants knew Plaintiff and Carter were at odds, or that Carter posed a

threat to Plaintiff’s safety. Since the forecast of evidence fails to include

anything tending to prove this essential element of Plaintiff’s claim, the

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the claim that they were

deliberately indifferent to an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s safety. Though it is

undisputed that neither Plaintiff nor Carter were SRG-classified, the Court

cannot extrapolate from the forecasted evidence that the Defendants were

aware of any particular risk to Plaintiff from Carter (or any Group Three

inmate). No genuine issue of fact remains as to this claim. The Court,

therefore, will grant summary judgment for Defendants Schetter and Davis.

B. Qualified Immunity

“Qualified immunity protects officers who commit constitutional

violations but who, in light of clearly established law, could reasonably

believe that their actions were lawful.” Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531

(4th Cir. 2011) (en banc). “To determine whether an officer is entitled to

qualified immunity, the court must examine (1) whether the plaintiff has

demonstrated that the officer violated a constitutional right and (2) whether

that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” E.W.

ex rel. T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 178 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation

marks omitted). The doctrine of qualified immunity “gives government

officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments and

protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the

law.” Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 100 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Here, because Plaintiff has not forecasted evidence that Defendants

violated a constitutional right, Defendants are also entitled qualified immunity

on Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims. The Court, therefore, grants

summary judgment for Defendants on this ground as well.

VI. CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment is granted.

ORDER

IT 1S, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment [Doc. 78] and Plaintiff's Motion [Doc. 88] are GRANTED.

The Clerk is respectfully instructed to terminate this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: March 12, 2023

— i

< Reidinger Ls,

Chief United States District Judge lll

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