Chambers v. Ishee

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

STATESVILLE DIVISION

CIVIL CASE NO. 5:23-cv-00005-MR

PATRICK J. CHAMBERS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

TODD ISHEE, et al., ) ORDER

)

Defendants. )

_______________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of the pro se

Complaint. [Doc. 1]. The Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. [Doc. 8].

I. BACKGROUND

The pro se Plaintiff, a prisoner in the North Carolina Department of

Adult Corrections (NCDAC),1 filed the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983 addressing incidents that allegedly occurred at the Alexander

Correctional Institution.2

1 The Plaintiff is serving a life sentence for first-degree murder. See https://webapps.doc.

state.nc.us/opi/viewoffender.do?method=view&offenderID=1234898&searchOffenderId

=1234898&searchDOBRange=0&listurl=pagelistoffendersearchresults&listpage=1 (last

accessed April 11, 2023); Fed. R. Evid. 201.

2 The Plaintiff filed this action from the Pasquotank Correctional Institution, where he is

still incarcerated.

He names as Defendants Todd Ishee, the commissioner of the North

Carolina Department of Public Safety (NCDPS)3 and the following Alexander

CI staff: FNU Dye, the warden/superintendent; Richard Bates, a medical

provider; Lisa Huffman a “CHA;”4 Cheryl Kaufman, Iris Saine, FNU Towery,

and McKensie Houston, nurses; FNU Slater, FNU Caban, and FNU Velasco,

correctional officers; FNU Roberts, a correctional sergeant; and John/Jane

Doe, the correctional officer who was on duty at the Big Seg Red Unit booth

around 3:50 p.m. on September 30, 2021. The Plaintiff, who claims to have

chronic hypertension, asserts claims under the Eighth Amendment for

deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. As injury, he claims:

Yes, I passed out and lost consciousness, due to the

medication I was placed on it made me have stomach pain,

decreased sexual ability and desire, swelling and redness of my

eyes, and trouble breathing and irregular heartbeating.

[Doc. 1 at 10] (errors uncorrected). He seeks injunctive relief, damages for

“monetary” and “emotional distress,” punitive damages, and nominal

damages. [Id. at 12].

3 Now NCDAC.

4 Correctional Healthcare Assistants, referred to as “CHA I” and “CHA II,” are unlicensed

nursing staff. See NCDAC Comprehensive Health Services Policy and Procedure, § P-

9(II)(B).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because the Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must

review the Complaint to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the

grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious [or] fails to state a claim on which

relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore, under § 1915A

the Court must conduct an initial review and identify and dismiss the

complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune to such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether a complaint

raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly

baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se

complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a

district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his Complaint which

set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

III. DISCUSSION

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was

“deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,

and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.”

Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999).

Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on an alleged lack of or

inappropriate medical treatment fall within the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To be found liable under the Eighth Amendment, a

prison official must know of and consciously or intentionally disregard “an

excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

837 (1994); Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 167 (4th Cir. 1998).

To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment for deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs of the inmate, an inmate must show

that “the defendants actually knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of

serious injury to the detainee or that they actually knew of and ignored a

detainee’s serious need for medical care.” Young v. City of Mt. Ranier, 238

F.3d 567, 575-76 (4th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). A “serious medical need”

is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or

one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the

necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir.

2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). An official acts with deliberate

indifference if he had actual knowledge of the prisoner’s serious medical

needs and the related risks but nevertheless disregards them. DePaola v.

Clarke, 884 F.3d 481, 486 (4th Cir. 2018). The prison official “must both be

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial

risk of serious harm exists, exists, and he must also draw the inference.”

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. “[E]ven if a prison doctor is mistaken or negligent

in his diagnosis or treatment, no constitutional issue is raised absent

evidence of abuse, intentional mistreatment, or denial of medical attention.”

Stokes v. Hurdle, 393 F. Supp. 757, 762 (D. Md. 1975), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1250

(4th Cir. 1976). “Mere delay is … not enough” to support a deliberate

indifference claim. Moskos v. Hardee, 24 F.4th 289, 298 (4th Cir. 2022). The

objective prong of the deliberate indifference inquiry requires a plaintiff to

show that the alleged delay put him at a “substantial risk” of “serious harm.”

Id. (quoting Moss v. Harwood, 19 F.4th 614, 625 (4th Cir. 2021); Scinto, 841

F.3d at 225). “A commonplace medical delay such as that experienced in

everyday life will only rarely suffice to constitute an Eighth Amendment

violation, absent the unusual circumstances where the delay itself places the

prisoner at ‘substantial risk of serious harm,’ such as where the prisoner’s

condition deteriorates markedly or the ailment is of an urgent nature.”

Moskos, 24 F.4th at 298.

To establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that

the defendants “acted personally” to cause the alleged violation. See

Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977) (citation omitted). As

such, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in actions brought

under § 1983. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).

A supervisor can only be liable where (1) he knew that his subordinate “was

engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of

constitutional injury;” (2) his response showed “deliberate indifference to or

tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices;” and (3) there was an

“affirmative causal link” between her inaction and the constitutional

injury.” Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

The Plaintiff does not make any allegations whatsoever about

Defendants Houston and the John/Jane Doe booth officer. The Plaintiff’s

allegations are so vague and conclusory that they fail to satisfy the most

basic pleading requirements. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a “short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”);

Simpson v. Welch, 900 F.2d 33, 35 (4th Cir. 1990) (conclusory allegations,

unsupported by specific allegations of material fact are not sufficient);

Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 201-02 (4th Cir. 2002) (a pleader

must allege facts, directly or indirectly, that support each element of the

claim). The claims against Defendants Houston and John/Jane Doe are,

therefore, dismissed without prejudice.

The Plaintiff claims that Defendant Ishee “is legally responsible for the

operation of North Carolina State Prison(s) and the welfare of all the inmates

of that prison.” [Doc. 1 at 2]. The Plaintiff appears to rely on a theory of

respondeat superior, which is insufficient to state a § 1983 claim. See

Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Accordingly, the claims against Defendant Ishee

are dismissed without prejudice.

The Plaintiff claims that Defendant Dye is responsible for overall

functioning of Alexander CI, and that he should be held responsible for staff’s

inadequate and untimely response to his medial needs. [Doc. 1 at 8-9].

These vague and conclusory allegations fail to plausibly allege that

Defendant Dye knew of, and deliberately disregarded, any serious medical

need. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Simpson, 900 F.2d at 35; Dickson, 309

F.3d at 201-02. The Plaintiff also appears to rely on theories of respondeat

superior and negligence, which are insufficient to state a § 1983 claim. See

Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999)

(“Deliberate indifference is a very high standard—a showing of mere

negligence will not meet it.”). Accordingly, the claims against Defendant Dye

are dismissed without prejudice.

As to the medical staff, the Plaintiff claims that Defendants Bates and

Saine were aware that he had high blood pressure, violated prison policy

and/or informed consent rules regarding medication, provided inappropriate

medication, and/or failed to adequately and timely respond to his sick calls

requests. [Doc. 1 at 5-9]. These vague and conclusory allegations fail to

plausibly allege that these Defendant deliberately disregarded a serious

medical need or delayed treatment that subjected him to a substantial risk of

serious harm. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Simpson, 900 F.2d at 35; Dickson,

309 F.3d at 201-02. To the extent that the Plaintiff is attempting to rely on

the theories of respondeat superior, negligence, disagreement with the care

he was provided, and/or prison policy violations, such theories fail to support

a § 1983 claim. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Grayson, 195 F.3d at 695;

Scinto, 841 F.3d at 225; Jackson v. Sampson, 536 F. App’x 356, 357 (4th Cir.

2013) (unpublished) (holding that “prison officials’ failure to follow internal

prison policies are not actionable under § 1983 unless the alleged breach of

policy rises to the level of constitutional violation”). Accordingly, the claims

against Defendants Bates and Saine are dismissed without prejudice.

The Plaintiff claims that Defendant Huffman, who was also part of the

medical staff, disregarded a high blood pressure reading and the Plaintiff’s

complaints of chest pain on the morning of September 30, 2021, and ignored

him when he told her that he needed assistance that afternoon. [Doc. 1 at

6, 8]. Accepting the factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable

inferences in the Plaintiff’s favor, his deliberate indifference claim against

Defendant Huffman passes initial review.

The Plaintiff claims that Defendant Towery, who was part of the

medical staff, failed to timely and adequately respond when correctional

officers informed her that the Plaintiff had declared a medical emergency and

needed assistance. [Doc. 1 at 6, 8]. Accepting the factual allegations as

true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the Plaintiff’s favor, his

deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Towery is minimally

sufficient to pass initial review.

As to Defendants Roberts, Slater, Caban, and Velasco, who are non-

medical correctional staff, the Plaintiff claims that they knew that the Plaintiff

had chronic hypertension [Doc. 1 at 8]; that Defendant Slater witnessed

Huffman take a high blood pressure reading, Plaintiff complain of chest pain

and fast heart rate, Huffman tell the Plaintiff that he would be ok and should

lie down, and Plaintiff ask when Huffman would follow up [id.]; that the

Plaintiff declared a medical emergency to Defendants Slater and Caban at

around 3:50 PM, and they both contacted Nurse Towery [id. at 6]; that the

Plaintiff began hitting the “call button” at around 4:00 PM [id.]; the Plaintiff

lost consciousness [id. at 10]; and that he woke up “later” when Defendant

Roberts and others were placing him on a stretcher [id. at 6]. The Plaintiff

claims that he “had been notifying all ‘state actors’ all day such as c/o Slater”

and these Defendants “failed to respond reasonably to the code blue and

constant declaring of medical emergency.” [Id. at 8]. These claims are too

vague and conclusory to plausibly allege that any of these correctional staff

were aware of a serious medical need and were deliberately indifferent to it,

caused an unnecessary delay that placed him at a serious risk of substantial

harm, or otherwise interfered with the Plaintiff’s medical care. See generally

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05 (non-medical prison employees can be found to

have acted with deliberate indifference if they intentionally delay or deny an

inmate’s access to medical care or intentionally interfere with prescribed

treatment); Iko, 535 F.3d at 242 (noting that “a distant prison official can

generally rely on his medical staff’s examinations and diagnoses”) (citing

Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 854-55 (4th Cir. 1990)). Accordingly, the

claims against Defendants Roberts, Slater, Caban, and Velasco are

dismissed without prejudice.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Complaint passes initial review against Defendants Huffman and

Towery for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, and the

remaining claims are dismissed without prejudice.

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:

1. The Complaint [Doc. 1] passes initial review against Defendants

Huffman and Towery for deliberate indifference to a serious medical

need.

2. The Plaintiff’s remaining claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE.

3. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall commence

the procedure for waiver of service as set forth in Local Civil Rule

4.3 for Defendants Lisa Huffman and FNU Towery who are alleged

to be a current or former employees of the North Carolina

Department of Public Safety.

The Clerk is respectfully instructed to mail the Plaintiff an Opt-In/ Opt-

Out form pursuant to the Standing Order in Misc. Case. No. 3:19-mc-00060-

FDW and a copy of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: April 16, 2023

erie ws

Chief United States District Judge AU,

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