Beatty v. Warren

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ASHEVILLE DIVISION

CIVIL CASE NO. 1:22-cv-00105-MR

GARY LEE BEATTY, JR., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

FNU WARREN, et al., ) ORDER

)

Defendants. )

_______________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of the pro se

Complaint. [Doc. 1]. The Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. [Doc. 9].

I. BACKGROUND

The pro se incarcerated Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 addressing an incidents that allegedly occurred at the Craggy

Correctional Center.1 He names as Defendants: Roy Cooper, the governor

of North Carolina; Todd E. Ishee, the North Carolina Department of Public

Safety (NCDPS) commissioner of prisons; Timothy D. Moose, the NCDPS

chief deputy secretary; FNU McEntire and D. McMahan, associate

superintendents at Craggy CC; FNU Warren, a correctional captain; Michall

1 The Plaintiff is now incarcerated at the Richmond Correctional Institution.

McGee, a correctional sergeant; Donald Grindstaff and FNU Trantham,

correctional officers; and Randy S. Mull, a disciplinary hearing officer (DHO).

He raises claims of “discrimination, due process, cruel & unusual

punishment.” [Doc. 1 at 6]. As injury, he claims he is “[p]hysically not able

to work because of the injuries due to restrictions…. Injuries to property,

injuries to account, injuries to mental health.” [Id. at 8]. He seeks damages,

injunctive relief, and a jury trial. [Id. at 6, 35].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because the Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must

review the Complaint to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the

grounds that it is “(i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which

relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who

is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see 28 U.S.C. §

1915A (requiring frivolity review for prisoners’ civil actions seeking redress

from governmental entities, officers, or employees).

In its frivolity review, a court must determine whether a complaint

raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly

baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se

complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a

district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his complaint which set

forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

III. DISCUSSION

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was

“deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,

and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.”

Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999).

A. Parties

The Plaintiff appears to assert claims on behalf of himself as well as

others. [See, e.g., Doc. 1 at 28 (12 other prisoners); id. at 35 (“thousands of

inmates”); id. at 34 (“tax payers”)]. As a pro se inmate, the Plaintiff is not

qualified to prosecute a class action or assert a claim on behalf of others.

See Myers v. Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Schls., 418 F.3d 395, 400 (4th Cir. 2005)

(“An individual unquestionably has the right to litigate his own claims in

federal court.... The right to litigate for oneself, however, does not create a

coordinate right to litigate for others”); Hummer v. Dalton, 657 F.2d 621, 625

(4th Cir. 1981) (prisoner’s suit is “confined to redress for violations of his own

personal rights and not one by him as knight-errant for all prisoners”);

Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (“it is plain error

to permit [an] imprisoned litigant who is unassisted by counsel to represent

his fellow inmates in a class action”). Therefore, to the extent that the Plaintiff

has attempted to assert claims on behalf of others, they are dismissed.

The body of the Complaint contains allegations against individuals who

are not named as defendants in the caption as required by Rule 10(a) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. [See, e.g., Doc. 1 at 25, 27 (referring to

Jeremy Gurreant, Timothy D. Moore, and Brandeshawn Harris)]; see Fed.

R. Civ. P. 10(a) (“The title of the complaint must name all the parties”); Myles

v. United States, 416 F.3d 551 (7th Cir. 2005) (“to make someone a party the

plaintiff must specify him in the caption and arrange for service of process.”);

Perez v. Humphries, No. 3:18-cv-107-GCM, 2018 WL 4705560, at *1

(W.D.N.C. Oct. 1, 2018) (“A plaintiff’s failure to name a defendant in the

caption of a Complaint renders any action against the purported defendant

a legal nullity”). The allegations directed at individuals not named as

Defendants are therefore dismissed without prejudice.

The Plaintiff also uses vague terms and pronouns rather than

identifying the individual(s) involved in each allegation. [See, e.g., Doc. 1 at

24-25, 27, 30, 33-34 (referring to “they,” “staff in Raleigh” and “staff”)]. Such

claims are too vague and conclusory to proceed insofar as the Court is

unable to determine the Defendant(s) to whom these allegations refer. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a “short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”); Simpson v. Welch, 900 F.2d

33, 35 (4th Cir. 1990) (conclusory allegations, unsupported by specific

allegations of material fact are not sufficient); Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309

F.3d 193, 201-02 (4th Cir. 2002) (a pleader must allege facts, directly or

indirectly, that support each element of the claim). Further, to the extent that

these allegations refer to non-parties, they are nullities for the reasons

discussed supra.

B. Conditions of Confinement

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of

punishment and from inhumane conditions of confinement. Williams v.

Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996). “The Eighth Amendment ‘does

not prohibit cruel and unusual prison conditions.’” Thorpe v. Clarke, 37 F.4th

926, 940 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1381

(4th Cir. 1993)). “It asks instead whether the conditions of confinement inflict

harm that is, objectively, sufficiently serious to deprive of minimal civilized

necessities.” Id. (citation omitted). Extreme deprivations are required.

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992).

To establish an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must satisfy both

an objective component–that the harm inflicted was sufficiently serious–and

a subjective component–that the prison official acted with a sufficiently

culpable state of mind. Williams, 77 F.3d at 761. In conditions of

confinement cases, the requisite state of mind is deliberate indifference.

Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 225 (4th Cir. 2016). To prove deliberate

indifference, the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to support a claim that

prison officials knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm.

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994). A plaintiff must also allege “a

serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the

challenged conditions.” Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1381 (4th Cir.

1993).

The Plaintiff claims that he is being housed separately from other

inmates and that he is being denied privileges, including contact visits, a job,

educational classes, and programs, because he is not vaccinated for

COVID-19. [Doc. 1 at 20-21, 30-31, 33-34].2 The conditions that the Plaintiff

alleges are not objectively serious enough to rise to the Eighth Amendment

2 The Plaintiff also claims that the unfair disciplinary procedure constitutes cruel and

unusual punishment. [Doc. 1 at 31]. However, he has not alleged any facts to support

an Eighth Amendment claim in this regard. It is more appropriately analyzed as a due

process claim. See Section C, infra.

level. Nor has the Plaintiff plausibly alleged that any adequately serious or

significant physical or emotional injury resulted from the challenged

conditions. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims regarding

the conditions of his confinement are dismissed without prejudice.

C. Due Process

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides that no

person shall be deprived of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of

law.” U.S. Const. Amend XIV. The first inquiry in any due process challenge

is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a protected interest in property

or liberty that was accomplished by state action. Tigrett v. The Rector and

Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 290 F.3d 620, 628 (4th Cir. 2002); Stone v. Univ.

of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 855 F.2d 167, 172 (4th Cir. 1988). To prevail on a

procedural due process claim, an inmate must first demonstrate that he was

deprived of “life, liberty, or property” by governmental action. Bevrati v.

Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 502 (4th Cir. 1997). Although prisoners are afforded

some due process rights while incarcerated, those liberty interests are

limited to “the freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the

sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the

Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and

significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Moreover,

changes “in a prisoner’s location, variations of daily routine, changes in

conditions of confinement (including administrative segregation), and the

denial of privileges [are] matters which every prisoner can anticipate [and

which] are contemplated by his original sentence to prison.” Gaston v.

Taylor, 946 F.2d 340, 343 (4th Cir. 1991).

First, the Plaintiff claims that that he was denied due process when

certain property was confiscated from him when he entered Craggy CC.

[Doc. 1 at 22-23]. The Plaintiff fails to explain how any Defendant violated

due process in this regard. Indeed, he has attached to the Complaint

property inventory forms for all of the confiscated items. [See Doc. 1-8 at 1-

4]. His mere disagreement with the confiscation of such items does not state

a plausible due process claim.

Second, the Plaintiff asserts that he was denied due process regarding

a disciplinary infraction. [Doc. 1 at 23]. He appears to claim that Defendants

Grindstaff and Trantham falsely accused him of using profanity [id.]; that he

was not provided with staff assistance or the opportunity to present evidence

[id. at 24]; that he would have been punished more severely had he “f[ou]ght”

the disciplinary charge [id. at 25]; that Defendant Mull was not impartial and

found the Plaintiff guilty without proof [id. at 24-27]; and that the Plaintiff was

punished with a $10 fine [id. at 25, 33-34]. He further complains that

Governor Cooper has not revised NCDPS’s prison disciplinary system

pursuant to the recommendations of the Task Force for Racial Equity

Criminal Justice (TREC). [See id. at 16, 27, 29, 34-35].

“[C]onstitutional procedural due process protections extend to prison

disciplinary proceedings that could adversely impact an inmate’s liberty

interests – such as the loss of good time….” Lennear v. Wilson, 937 F.3d

257, 268 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974)).

An inmate charged with a disciplinary violation implicating a protected liberty

interest must receive: (1) advance written notice of a claimed violation at

least 24 hours before any disciplinary hearing; (2) the ability of the prisoner

to call witnesses and present documentary evidence at the disciplinary

hearing; and (3) a written statement of the evidence relied upon by the

factfinder and the reasons for the disciplinary action taken. See Dilworth v.

Adams, 841 F.3d 246, 253 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-66).

To provide constitutionally sufficient substantive due process, a disciplinary

offense finding must be “supported by some evidence in the record.”

Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985).

To the extent that the Plaintiff claims that he was subject to a false

misconduct charge, he does not have a constitutional right to be free from

false disciplinary reports. See Lewis v. Viton, No. 07-3663, 2007 WL

2362587, at *9 (D.N.J. Aug. 14, 2007) (“The act of filing false disciplinary

charges does not violate a prisoner’s constitutional rights.”). The Plaintiff’s

claims that he did not receive due process in the disciplinary proceeding fails

because the Plaintiff pleaded guilty to the disciplinary infraction. [See Doc.

1 at 25; Doc. 1-6 at 2 (Offense and Disciplinary Report noting Plaintiff’s guilty

plea)]. His claim of insufficient evidence fails because his plea, standing

alone, constitutes was adequate evidence of his guilt. See, e.g., DeShields

v. Dill, No. CV TDC-21-0971, 2022 WL 4226386, at *5 (D. Md. Sept. 13,

2022). Nor is Governor Cooper’s alleged failure to implement TREC’s

recommendations constitutionally redressable. The Plaintiff’s due process

claims are therefore dismissed without prejudice.

D. Retaliation

The First Amendment right to free speech “includes not only the

affirmative right to speak, but also the right to be free from retaliation by a

public official for exercising that right.” Suarez Corp. v. McGraw, 202 F.3d

676, 685 (4th Cir. 2000). Prison officials may not retaliate against an inmate

for exercising a constitutional right. See Hudspeth v. Figgins, 584 F.2d

1345, 1347 (4th Cir. 1978). In order to state a colorable retaliation claim

under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) he engaged in protected First

Amendment activity, (2) the defendant took some action that adversely

affected his First Amendment rights, and (3) there was a causal relationship

between his protected activity and the defendant's conduct.” Martin v. Duffy,

977 F.3d 294, 299 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors

George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 500 (4th Cir. 2005)). Bare or conclusory

assertions of retaliation are insufficient to establish a retaliation claim.

Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994). In the prison context,

retaliation claims are treated with skepticism because “[e]very act of

discipline by prison officials is by definition ‘retaliatory’ in the sense that it

responds directly to prisoner misconduct.” Id.

The Plaintiff claims that Defendant Grindstaff “wrote [him] up for asking

for a grievance” the day after his property was confiscated. [Doc. 1 at 22-

24]. Taking the Plaintiff’s allegations as true and giving him the benefit of

every reasonable inference, the Court finds that the Plaintiff’s retaliation

claim survives initial review as not clearly frivolous.

E. Equal Protection

To state an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must allege that he has

been treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated, and

that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful

discrimination. See Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001).

In doing so, the plaintiff must set forth “specific, non-conclusory factual

allegations that establish an improper [discriminatory] motive.” Williams v.

Hansen, 326 F.3d 569, 584 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Trulock v. Freeh, 275

F.3d 391, 405 (4th Cir. 2001)).

The Plaintiff claims that he is being discriminated against because he

is not vaccinated for COVID-19 in that: he is being housed separately from,

and does not enjoy the same privileges as, vaccinated inmates [Doc. 1 at

18-20, 31, 33-34]; and he is being treated differently from unvaccinated staff

[id. at 20-21]. The Plaintiff has failed to allege that he is being treated

differently from any other similarly situated, unvaccinated inmate. Nor does

he allege that any Defendant has acted with a discriminatory motive.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s equal protection claims are dismissed.

F. Prison Policy

The Plaintiff complains about violations of prison policy. [Doc. 1 at 31].

However, a mere policy violation does not rise to the level of a § 1983 claim

absent a plausible allegation of an underlying constitutional violation. See

generally Jackson v. Sampson, 536 F. App’x 356, 357 (4th Cir. 2013)

(unpublished) (holding that “prison officials’ failure to follow internal prison

policies are not actionable under § 1983 unless the alleged breach of policy

rises to the level of constitutional violation”). Therefore, the Plaintiff’s claims

regarding the violation of prison policies, by themselves, fail to state a § 1983

claim and they are dismissed.

G. Supervisory Liability

“It is well settled that ‘supervisory officials may be held liable in certain

circumstances for the constitutional injuries inflicted by their subordinates.’”

Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 235 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Shaw v.

Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994)). A supervisor can be liable where

(1) he knew that his subordinate “was engaged in conduct that posed a

pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury;” (2) his response

showed “deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged

offensive practices;” and (3) there was an “affirmative causal link” between

her inaction and the constitutional injury.” Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

The Plaintiff claims that Governor Cooper and Defendant Ishee should

be held accountable for the unfair prison disciplinary procedures [Doc. 1 at

16, 25-27, 33-34] and the discriminatory COVID-19 polices [id. at 17, 29].

The Plaintiff has failed to state any § 1983 claim that has passed initial review

regarding the COVID-19 policies or disciplinary due process as discussed in

Sections B and C, supra. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s supervisory claims

based on those allegations necessarily fail. Waybright v. Frederick Cnty.,

Md., 528 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 2008) (“supervisors and municipalities

cannot be liable under § 1983 without some predicate ‘constitutional injury

at the hands of the individual [state] officer,’ at least in suits for damages.”)

(quoting City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986)).

H. Sentence

The Plaintiff complains that the COVID-19 policy and disciplinary

policies are making it difficult for him to “work[ ] down” his sentence, and that

he will not be able to “make [his] minimum” sentence. [Doc. 1 at 20-21, 30,

34]. However, “when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration

of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that

he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that

imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” Preiser

v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); see generally 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Thus, to the extent that the Plaintiff is seeking to challenge the fact or

duration of his confinement, he must do so, if at all, in a separate civil action.3

3 The Court makes no determinations about the potential merit or procedural viability of

such an action.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Complaint passes initial review with respect to the Plaintiff’s claim

against Defendant Grindstaff for retaliation, and the remaining claims are

dismissed without prejudice.

The Court will allow the Plaintiff thirty (30) days to amend his

Complaint, if he so chooses, to correct the deficiencies identified in this Order

and to otherwise properly state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Any Amended Complaint will be subject to all timeliness and procedural

requirements and will supersede his prior filings. Piecemeal amendment will

not be allowed. Should Plaintiff fail to timely amend his Complaint in

accordance with this Order, the matter will proceed only on the claim

described in this Order.

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:

1. The Complaint passes initial review against Defendant Grindstaff

for retaliation.

2. The remaining claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

3. The Plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days in which to amend his

Complaint in accordance with the terms of this Order. If Plaintiff fails

to amend the Complaint in the instant case in accordance with this

Order and within the time limit set by the Court, this action will

proceed only on the claim identified in this Order.

The Clerk of Court is respectfully instructed to mail the Plaintiff a blank

§ 1983 prisoner complaint form, a blank § 2254 form, an Opt-in/Opt-out form,

and a copy of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: January 9, 2023

Martifi Reidinger ee

Chief United States District Judge AS

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