Hyatt v. Miller

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ASHEVILLE DIVISION

CIVIL CASE NO. 1:19-cv-00250-MR-WCM

MARCUS HYATT, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) MEMORANDUM OF

) DECISION AND ORDER

JEFF MAY, )

)

Defendant. )

________________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff Hyatt’s Application to

Award Attorneys’ Fees [Doc. 144].

I. BACKGROUND

On January 20, 2018, officers from the Buncombe County Sheriff’s

Office (“BCSO”), acting on a tip, conducted a traffic stop of a car driven by

Brandon Pickens in which the Plaintiff Marcus Hyatt was a passenger.

Plaintiff Hyatt was detained for the next several hours while officers searched

the car and its occupants for illegal narcotics. After completing the search of

the car, the officers procured a search warrant and conducted a strip search

of Plaintiff Hyatt in a nearby convenience store bathroom. Ultimately, Plaintiff

Hyatt was not found to be in possession of any controlled substances, and

he was released without charges.

At the same time that Plaintiff Hyatt was being detained, his girlfriend,

Plaintiff Ashley Barrett, was stopped by BCSO officers in a separate traffic

stop on suspicion that she was attempting to dispose of controlled

substances at the couple’s apartment. Following a search of Plaintiff

Barrett’s vehicle and the couple’s apartment, no controlled substances were

found, and Plaintiff Barrett was also released without charges.

The Plaintiffs brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

North Carolina state law, challenging the officers’ actions during the

respective traffic stops and searches. Specifically, Plaintiff Hyatt asserted

claims for false imprisonment, false arrest, and assault and battery under

state law and for unlawful search and seizure under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

BCSO deputies J.D. Lambert, Jeff May, and Katherine Lewis. Plaintiff Hyatt

also asserted a claim for unreasonable sexually invasive search in violation

of the Fourth Amendment under § 1983 against Defendants Lambert and

May. Plaintiff Barrett asserted claims for false imprisonment and false arrest

under state law and for unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment

under § 1983 against Defendants Lambert and Lewis. The Plaintiffs also

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asserted a claim for action under the bond against Defendant Miller and

Defendant Western Surety Company.1

The Court held a jury trial in this matter from March 17, 2021 to March

25, 2021. The jury was able to return only a partial verdict and deadlocked

as to a number of issues. The parties stipulated their acceptance of the jury’s

verdict as to the issues on which they could unanimously agree and for the

Court to serve as the finder of fact as to any issues on which the jury reached

an impasse. Following the trial, and in accordance with the parties’

stipulation, the Court subsequently entered an Order memorializing the jury’s

findings and setting forth findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect

to the issues on which the jury had deadlocked. [Doc. 142]. In that Order,

the Court dismissed Plaintiff Barrett’s claims in their entirety. With respect

to Plaintiff Hyatt’s claims, the Court entered Judgment in favor of Plaintiff

Hyatt against Defendant May in the amount of $50,000 on Plaintiff Hyatt’s §

1983 claims for unreasonable search and seizure and on Plaintiff Hyatt’s

1 Plaintiff Barrett also asserted state law claims for trespass to property and § 1983 claims

for unlawful search, but these claims were dismissed on summary judgment. [Doc. 99].

The Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against the Defendants in their official capacities were

dismissed as well. [Id.].

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state law claims for false imprisonment/false arrest, assault, and battery and

dismissed the remainder of the Plaintiff’s claims. [Doc. 143].

Plaintiff Hyatt now moves the Court to award him $261,563.25 in

attorneys’ fees as a “prevailing party” pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.2 [Doc.

148]. Defendant May does not contest that Plaintiff Hyatt is the prevailing

party in this matter and is entitled to an award of fees, but he asks the Court

to use its discretion and significantly reduce the requested award. [Doc.

146].

II. DISCUSSION

Title 42 of the United States Code, Section 1988 provides that “[i]n any

action or proceeding to enforce a provision of [42 U.S.C. § 1983], the court,

in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's

fee as part of the costs . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). A plaintiff constitutes a

“prevailing party” if he “succeed[s] on any significant issue in litigation which

achieves some of the benefit [he] sought in bringing suit.” Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). It is undisputed that Plaintiff Hyatt is a

“prevailing party” and thus entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees under §

1988.

2 The Plaintiff indicates in his motion that he intends to seek a separate award of costs

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920. [Doc. 144 at 4].

4

“The starting point for establishing the proper amount of an award is

the number of hours reasonably expended, multiplied by a reasonable hourly

rate.” Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 31 F.3d 169, 174 (4th Cir.

1994). The burden is on the fee applicant to justify the reasonableness of

the requested fee. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897 (1984).

In exercising its discretion in the application of this lodestar method,

the Court is guided by the following factors:

(1) the time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and

difficulty of the questions raised; (3) the skill required

to properly perform the legal services rendered; (4)

the attorney’s opportunity costs in pressing the

instant litigation; (5) the customary fee for like work;

(6) the attorney’s expectations at the outset of the

litigation; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client

or circumstances; (8) the amount in controversy and

the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation

and ability of the attorney; (10) the undesirability of

the case within the legal community in which the suit

arose; (11) the nature and length of the professional

relationship between attorney and client; and (12)

attorneys’ fees awards in similar cases.

Grissom v. The Mills Corp., 549 F.3d 313, 321 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Spell

v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1402 n.18 (4th Cir. 1987)). “Although the Court

considers all of the factors, they need not be strictly applied in every case

inasmuch as all of the factors are not always applicable.” Firehouse

Restaurant Group, Inc. v. Scurmont LLC, No. 4:09-cv-00618-RBH, 2011 WL

5

4943889, at *12 (D.S.C. Oct. 17, 2011) (citing EEOC v. Service News Co.,

898 F.2d 958, 965 (4th Cir. 1990)).

In opposing the Plaintiff’s fee request, Defendant May addresses only

one of these factors: the reasonableness of the time and labor expended by

Plaintiff Hyatt’s counsel. While the Defendant states that “many of the [other]

lodestar factors weigh against the Plaintiff’s fee request,” [Doc. 146 at 2], he

offers no argument regarding these other factors. Nevertheless, the Court

endeavors to address each of these factors in turn.

A. Time and Labor Expended

The Court begins its lodestar analysis with considering the time and

labor expended by the Plaintiff’s attorneys. “In determining the appropriate

number of hours to be included in a lodestar calculation, the district court

should exclude hours ‘that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise

unnecessary.’” Doe v. Kidd, 656 F. App’x 643, 656 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting

in part Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434).

Plaintiffs Hyatt and Barrett were represented by three attorneys in this

action: Chad R. Donnahoo of Asheville, North Carolina; Brian D. Elston of

Asheville, North Carolina; and John R. Sutton, Jr., of Candler, North

Carolina. Mr. Donnahoo recorded 336.95 hours in work expended on the

prosecution of this action. After reviewing the appropriate case law and his

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billing statement, however, Mr. Donnahoo reduced his billing by 45.0 hours

(to a total of 291.95 hours) to account for some activities for which he felt it

was important to be present but for which his participation was not

necessary (e.g., depositions for Defendants taken by Mr. Elston and/or Mr.

Sutton). Mr. Donnahoo contends he should be compensated at $300.00

per hour; therefore, Mr. Donnahoo seeks $87,585.00 as a reasonable

attorney fee in this action. [See Doc. 144 at 2; Doc. 144-3: Donnahoo Decl.].

Attorney Brian D. Elston recorded 178.75 hours in work expended on

the prosecution of this action. After reviewing the appropriate case law and

this billing statement, Mr. Elston reduced his billing by 21.25 hours (to a total

of 157.50 hours) to account for some activities for which he felt it was

important to be present but for which is participation was not necessary

(e.g., depositions for Defendants taken by Mr. Donnahoo and/or Mr. Sutton).

Mr. Elston contends he should be compensated at $300.00 per hour;

therefore, Mr. Elston seeks $47,250.00 as a reasonable attorney fee in this

action. [See Doc. 144 at 2-3; Doc. 144-4: Elston Decl.].

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Attorney John Sutton recorded 430.13 hours in work expended on the

prosecution of this action. After reviewing the appropriate case law and this

billing statement, Mr. Sutton reduced his billing by 15.50 hours (to a total of

414.6 hours) to account for some activities for which he felt it was important

to be present but for which his participation was not necessary (e.g.,

depositions for Defendants taken by Mr. Donnahoo and/or Mr. Elston). Mr.

Sutton contends he should be compensated at $300.00 per hour; therefore,

Mr. Sutton seeks $124,380.00 as a reasonable attorney fee in this action.

[Doc. 144 at 3; Doc. 144-2: Sutton Decl.].

Additionally, the Plaintiff’s attorneys utilized the services of Mr.

Sutton’s legal assistant/paralegal, Laurie Mathis, who recorded a total of

28.1 hours in work expended on the prosecution of this action. Attorney

Sutton contends that Ms. Mathis should be compensated at a rate of $90.00

per hour; therefore, Attorney Sutton seeks a paralegal/legal assistant fee of

$2,529.004 for the work performed by Ms. Mathis. [Doc. 144 at 3-4; Doc.

144-2: Sutton Decl. at 14-15].

3 The Plaintiff’s Motion states that Sutton recorded 445.60 hours in work [Doc. 144 at 3];

however, his billing records indicate that he recorded a total of 430.1 hours. [Doc. 144-2

at 13].

4 In the Plaintiff’s Motion, the Plaintiff seeks recovery of only $2,416.50 for Ms. Mathis’

work; however, this appears to be a mathematical error, as multiplying Ms. Mathis’ hours

worked (28.1) by an hourly rate of $90.00 equals $2,529.00.

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The Defendant objects to the Plaintiff’s fee request on the grounds

that many of the billing entries are vague; that the Plaintiff’s attorney

engaged in block billing; that some of the billing is duplicative; and that the

fees sought related to unsuccessful claims (including claims of the

unsuccessful Plaintiff) are unreasonable.5 [Doc. 146 at 3-7].

1. Vague Billing

The Defendant argues that Mr. Sutton’s billing entries are “so lacking

in detail that it is impossible for this Court to analyze what task was

performed, let alone whether the time spent for that task was reasonable.”

[Doc. 146 at 3].

The Defendant cites a number of examples from Mr. Sutton’s billing

records that he contends lack sufficient detail. For example, on July 31,

5 In support of his brief opposing Plaintiff Hyatt’s fee request, Defendant May’s counsel

submits a spreadsheet that he prepared using Mr. Donnahoo, Mr. Elston and Mr. Sutton’s

submitted timesheets, and he refers to this spreadsheet in discussing certain time entries.

[Doc. 146-2]. A review of this spreadsheet reveals, however, that it does not accurately

reflect all of the time entries made by Plaintiff’s attorneys. As just one example, defense

counsel’s spreadsheet represents that on June 17, 2020, Mr. Donnahoo claims 1.25

hours with the following narrative description: “provide documents for review and general

deposition discussion.” [Doc. 146-2 at 4]. In fact, however, the full narrative description

for Mr. Donnahoo’s June 17, 2020 billing entry reads as follows: “Initial meeting with

Plaintiff Barrett re: upcoming deposition; provide documents for review and general

deposition discussion.” [Doc. 144-3: Donnahoo Decl. at 31-32 (emphasis added)]. As

such, it does not appear that defense counsel’s spreadsheet is an accurate summary of

counsel’s billing records. As such, the Court will disregard defense counsel’s

spreadsheet and will instead reference only the actual timesheets prepared and

presented by Plaintiff Hyatt’s attorneys.

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2018, Mr. Sutton billed 1.50 hours for “Prep for meeting/court-continued”;

on September 24, 2019, he billed 3.00 hours for “Consult Bill Wilke,” a

person unknown to the defense; and on April 2, 2020, he billed 2.00 for

“Review Draft Discovery, email from Donnahoo.” [Doc. 144-2 at 9-10].

Additionally, Mr. Sutton reported expending 164.75 hours between 2/15/21

and 3/16/21 in trial preparation, with many of these entries being described

as only “Trial prep.” [See Doc. 144-2 at 12]. The Defendant also argues

that it appears from Mr. Sutton’s billing that he spent at least 23.75 hours in

preparing for jury selection, which the Defendant argues is unreasonable.

With respect to these latter entries, however, a careful review shows that

Mr. Sutton was spending time preparing for jury selection along with

completing other tasks related to trial preparation, such as preparing cross-

examinations.6 Nevertheless, the Court agrees that some of Mr. Sutton’s

billing entries are unduly vague and that this warrants a minor reduction of

his requested fee. Accordingly, in the exercise of its discretion, the Court

will reduce Mr. Sutton’s time by a total of forty (40) hours.

6 The Defendant argues that it is unreasonable for Mr. Sutton to have claimed time for

preparing for the cross-examination of a witness when he did not in fact examine that

witness at trial. Given that the division of labor at trial can often change at the last minute,

the Court does not find the time spent by Mr. Sutton in preparing to examine this witness

to be unreasonable.

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2. Block Billing

Next, the Defendant argues that “the vast majority” of counsel’s billing

entries are block-billed, and that this practice warrants an across-the-board

reduction of their requested fees. [Doc. 146 at 4-5].

The term “block billing” refers to the practice of grouping tasks

together in time entries rather than making separating entries for each

discrete task. See McAfee v. Boczar, 738 F.3d 81, 90 (4th Cir. 2013). Block

billing inhibits the Court from “discern[ing] with precision how . . . hours were

billed and precisely why those hours were needed.” Dyer v. City of

Gastonia, No. 3:15-cv-00033-MOC-DCK, 2016 WL 4443190, at *5

(W.D.N.C. Aug. 19, 2016). “Because of the obligation to maintain billing

records with sufficient detail that the court may review and determine the

reasonableness of individual activities, block billing entries are disfavored in

attorney's fees award cases.” Denton v. PennyMac Loan Servs., LLC, 252

F. Supp. 3d 504, 525 (E.D. Va. 2017). Where block billing prevents an

accurate assessment of the reasonableness of the fee request, courts may

decline to award fees for hours that are not sufficiently documented, or they

may reduce the overall fee award by a fixed percentage or amount. Project

Vote/Voting for Am., Inc. v. Long, 887 F. Supp. 2d 704, 716 (E.D. Va. 2012).

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While some of counsel’s entries are block-billed, the Court does not

find that the practice was excessive or that the manner in which these billing

entries were made prevents the Court from determining the appropriateness

or reasonableness of counsel’s claimed fee. Moreover, two of the examples

of block billing cited by the Defendant, i.e., Mr. Donnahoo’s September 1,

2020 and September 25, 2020 entries [Doc. 146 at 4], have been withdrawn

by Plaintiff’s counsel. [See Doc. 147 at 3 n.2]. For all of these reasons, the

Court declines in its discretion to reduce the fee award due to the occasional

use of block billing.

3. Tasks Performed by Multiple Timekeepers

Next, the Defendant challenges the billing entries made with respect

to services performed by more than one attorney. As the First Circuit has

stated: “As a general matter, the time for two or three lawyers in a courtroom

or conference, when one would do, may obviously be discounted . . . . A trial

court should ordinarily greet a claim that several lawyers were required to

perform a single set of tasks with healthy skepticism.” Lipsett v. Blanco, 975

F.2d 934, 938 (1st Cir. 1992) (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted). Therefore, “a court should not hesitate to discount hours if it sees

signs that a prevailing party has overstaffed a case.” Guillemard-Ginorio v.

Contreras, 603 F. Supp. 2d 301, 318 (D.P.R. 2009) (citation omitted).

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First, the Defendant cites to a two-hour meeting on May 15, 2020,

between Mr. Elston, Mr. Donnahoo, and Major Munday, a retired North

Carolina state trooper whom the Plaintiffs had retained and designated as

an expert witness. The Defendant contends that any counsel fees related

to Major Munday should be reduced or eliminated because Major Munday

“was patently unqualified to be an expert in this case, and they never called

him for trial.” [Doc. 146 at 5-6]. Regardless of whether the Plaintiffs

ultimately called Major Munday as a trial witness, the fact remains that he

was their designated expert. The Court does not find two attorneys meeting

with an expert witness for two hours to be unreasonable, and the Court

declines to reduce counsel’s requested fee on this basis.

Next, the Defendant objects to the Plaintiff’s attorneys claiming fees

for intra-attorney conferences and communications. [Doc. 146 at 6]. Having

reviewed the attorneys’ billing records, the Court does not find the time

spent by the Plaintiffs’ attorneys in conference among themselves to be

excessive and therefore will not reduce the requested fee award on this

basis.

The Defendant also objects to the Plaintiff seeking fees for all three of

his attorneys attending trial, and he requests that the Court reduce all fees

for trial attendance by 33%. [Doc. 146 at 6-7, 8]. However, the Plaintiffs

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have already reduced their billing entries to account for any unnecessary

duplication. For example, Mr. Donnahoo reduced his bill by 45 hours “on

some activities where [he] felt it important to be present but not necessary

to bill [his] time…” [Doc. 144-3 at 6 ¶ 17]. Mr. Donnahoo’s timesheet clearly

shows that he either did not bill or that he reduced his bill for various

activities where the lead activity was undertaken by another attorney on the

team. Mr. Donnahoo did not bill for participating in the Initial Attorney’s

Conference [id. at 40 (12/20/19)] or in the depositions of Plaintiff Hyatt [Id.

at 32 (6/16/20)]; Defendant May [id. at 29 (7/6/2020)]; Defendant Lambert

[id. at 27 (7/15/20)]; and Defendant Miller [id. at 26 (7/21/20)]. Furthermore,

Mr. Donnahoo carefully edited his time spent at the trial: of the thirty-four

and one half (34.5) hours listed on his timesheet for time spent at the trial,

Mr. Donnahoo did not bill eighteen hours at all and significantly reduced his

time accordingly given his more limited role than that of Mr. Elston and Mr.

Sutton. [Id. at 11-13].

Mr. Elston reduced his bill by 21.25 hours. [Doc. 144-4 at 5 ¶ 16]. Mr.

Elston did not bill for the following activities: the deposition of Defendant

Stockton [id. at 13 (7/17/20)]; the mediation [id. at 12 (9/23/20)]; and

reviewing some draft documents [id. at 11 (2/20/21)]. Mr. Elston was the

lead trial attorney, and he appropriately billed his time for the trial.

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Mr. Sutton reduced his bill by fifteen and one-half (15.5) hours. [Doc.

144-2 at 11]. Mr. Sutton did not bill for the depositions of Major Munday [Id.

(7/30/20)] and Defendant Miller [Id. (7/21/20)]. Like Mr. Elston, Mr. Sutton

played a significant role at the trial, and he appropriately billed his time for

the trial.

Counsel’s timesheets reflect that counsel made a concerted effort to

avoid the duplication of effort and adjusted their billing entries accordingly.

As such, the Court concludes that it is unnecessary to further reduce billing

entries related to this issue.

4. Fees related to Third Amended Complaint

The Defendant further argues that the Plaintiff should not recover any

fees related to the preparation of and litigation related to the Plaintiffs’ Third

Amended Complaint. [Doc. 146 at 8]. Plaintiff Hyatt’s counsel concedes

that these fees should not be recovered. Counsel concedes that their fee

award should be reduced by $5,400 (representing 18 hours of time

expended). [Doc. 147 at 9]. Accordingly, counsel’s claimed hours will be

reduced by 18 hours.

The Defendant further contends that Plaintiff’s fee award should be

reduced by $6,682.50, the amount of fees incurred by the Defendants in

litigating the motion to strike the Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint. [Doc.

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146 at 8]. The Defendants previously requested an award of fees and costs

related to their motion to strike, and the Magistrate Judge denied that

request on September 25, 2020. [Doc. 64 at 7]. The Defendant did not

appeal the Magistrate Judge’s decision at the time, and the Court declines

to revisit this issue now. The Defendant’s request for a reduction of fees in

the amount of $6,682.50 is denied.

5. Paralegal Fees

As noted above, paralegal Laurie Mathis recorded a total of 28.1 hours

in work expended on the prosecution of this action. Upon careful review of

the billing records, the Court finds that Ms. Mathis’s hours are reasonable

and should be awarded in full.

B. Novelty and Difficulty of the Questions Raised

As for the novelty and difficulty of the questions raised, the Court notes

that this case presented unusual and complex issues that are not present in

the typical, run-of-the-mill law enforcement traffic stop. To the contrary, this

case was extremely fact intensive and dealt with a number of unusual and/or

complex issues, including: the reliance on a confidential informant and an

anonymous tip; the use of Plaintiff Hyatt’s and Brandon Pickens’ criminal

backgrounds in applying for the search warrant; issues pertaining to the

canine sniff of Mr. Pickens’ vehicle; the lack of Defendant Deputies’ body

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camera footage; the fabrication of evidence, including in the search warrant

application; a pre-arrest strip search in a gas station bathroom; the display

of a weapon during that strip search; and the assertion of qualified immunity

and public official immunity with respect to all of the Plaintiff’s claims. The

litigation involved a hotly disputed motion for summary judgment, a jury trial

that lasted over seven (7) days, deliberations that spanned over several

days, a hung jury, and a partial jury verdict. The novelty and difficulty of the

issues in this case weigh in favor of a substantial fee.

C. Skill Required to Properly Perform the Legal Services

This case required a considerable degree of skill and familiarity with

civil rights law and practice. As already noted, there were multiple, significant

factual and legal issues involved, and the Defendants vigorously defended

each and every issue at each stage in litigation. This factor, therefore,

weighs in favor of a substantial fee.

D. Opportunity Costs of Litigation

Under the relevant factors, an “attorneys’ opportunity costs include the

higher rates they would have otherwise charged in other cases and projects.”

Irwin Indus. Tool Co. v. Worthington Cylinders Wis., LLC, 747 F. Supp. 2d

568, 596 (W.D.N.C. 2010). Here, Plaintiff Hyatt’s counsel spent a significant

amount of time working on his case—especially during the weeks leading up

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to trial and attending and participating in a seven (7) day trial. [Doc. 142-3:

Donnahoo Decl. at ¶ 18; Doc. 142-4: Elston Decl. at ¶ 17; Doc. 142-2: Sutton

Decl. at ¶ 27]. Each of Plaintiff Hyatt’s attorneys are local and have firms

consisting only of themselves; they do not have any associates or multiple

staff members to assist them in managing their case load while they were

devoted to Plaintiff Hyatt’s case. The time spent on the Plaintiff’s case came

at the expense of other existing clients, as well as prospective clients looking

to retain counsel. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of a substantial fee.

E. Customary Fee for Similar Work

As the Fourth Circuit has recognized:

Determination of the hourly rate will generally be the

critical inquiry in setting the reasonable fee, and the

burden rests with the fee applicant to establish the

reasonableness of a requested rate. In addition to the

attorney’s own affidavits, the fee applicant must

produce satisfactory specific evidence of the

prevailing market rates in the relevant community for

the type of work for which he seeks an award.

Although the determination of a market rate in the

legal profession is inherently problematic, as wide

variations in skill and reputation render the usual

laws of supply and demand largely inapplicable, the

Court has nonetheless emphasized that market rate

should guide the fee inquiry.

Robinson v. Equifax Info. Svcs., LLC, 560 F.3d 235, 244 (4th Cir. 2009)

(citing Plyler v. Evatt, 902 F.2d 273, 277 (4th Cir. 1990)). In addition to

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consideration of specific evidence regarding the prevailing market rate, the

Court may rely upon its own knowledge and experience of the relevant

market in determining a reasonable rate. See Rum Creek Coal, 31 F.3d at

175 (“The relevant market for determining the prevailing rate is ordinarily the

community in which the court where the action is prosecuted sits.”).

Here, Mr. Donnahoo, Mr. Elston, and Mr. Sutton seek to be awarded

fees based on the hourly rate of $300.00. Ms. Mathis seeks an hourly rate

of $90.00 for the work she performed as a paralegal.

In support of their request, Plaintiff’s counsel have submitted an

affidavit from attorney Frank Goldsmith, who is experienced in litigating

complex cases in western North Carolina. Mr. Goldsmith opines that the

hourly rates of the Plaintiff’s attorneys are consistent with those in the

community for similar services offered by lawyers with comparable skills.

[Doc. 144-5: Goldsmith Decl.]. Based on the Court’s own experience and

familiarity with the hourly rates charged in western North Carolina, the Court

finds that a rate of $300.00 per hour for the work performed by these

attorneys is reasonable and in keeping with the prevailing rates in this

particular market. The Court further finds Ms. Mathis’s claimed hourly rate

of $90.00 to be reasonable and in keeping with the prevailing rates for

paralegals in this area. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s attorneys’ hours will be

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calculated at the rate of $300.00 per hour, while Ms. Mathis’s hours will be

calculated at the rate of $90.00 per hour.

F. Attorneys’ Expectation at Outset of Litigation

At the outset of litigation, the Plaintiffs’ attorneys agreed to take this

case on a contingency fee basis and to advance litigation expenses, despite

their awareness of the distinct possibility that the Plaintiffs would not recover

anything from the Defendants and therefore the attorneys would recover

nothing. However, now the Plaintiff seeks recovery of fees under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1988, which does not limit an award of attorneys’ fees in a prevailing party

in a § 1983 case to a proportion of the damages awarded. See City of

Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 577 (1986) (“[T]he contingent fee

arrangements that make legal services available to many victims of personal

injuries would often not encourage lawyers to accept civil rights cases, which

frequently involve substantial expenditures of time and effort but produce

only small monetary recoveries.”). Accordingly, the attorneys’ expectations

at the outset of this litigation weigh neither in favor of nor against awarding

the full of amount of fees incurred.

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G. Time Limitations

Aside from otherwise expected deadlines of litigation, there were no

unusual time limitations imposed by Plaintiff Hyatt or this litigation that would

merit any impact in either way on the requested award. Therefore, this factor

weighs neither in favor of nor against the requested award.

H. Experience, Reputation, and Ability of Counsel

All of the attorneys involved in this matter are experienced lawyers with

excellent reputations in the legal community. As such, the Court concludes

that the requested hourly rate of $300.00 for the work performed by these

attorneys is a reasonable rate.

I. Undesirability of the Case in the Legal Community

Complex § 1983 actions are admittedly difficult to litigate. The

complexity of this action was compounded by the fact that there was no body

cam footage of several key issues, meaning that, for many of the important

issues, the case would boil down to Plaintiff Hyatt’s word against the word of

three sworn law-enforcement officers. Additionally, even if Plaintiff Hyatt’s

version of the events were to be accepted, law enforcement officers are

entitled to considerable immunity protections, which could have precluded

recovery altogether. Finally, even if the Plaintiff were to overcome these

immunity protections, the potential for any significant financial recovery was

21

slight. In light of these issues, the Court concludes that this case was

generally undesirable in the legal community, a factor which weighs in favor

of the fully requested fee.

J. Relationship between the Attorneys and Clients

Aside from the customary relationship between Plaintiff Hyatt and his

legal counsel, there is not a unique situation or relationship in this case that

weighs in favor of or against the requested fee award.

K. Fee Awards in Similar Cases

The Plaintiffs cite two civil rights cases in which the plaintiff was a

similar damages award and the court subsequently awarded attorneys’ fees

in excess of the damages award. [See Doc. 144-1 at 14-15 (citing Crawford

v. City of New London, No. 3:11-cv-1371, 2015 WL 1125491, at **1, 10 (D.

Conn. Mar. 12, 2015) (awarding $197,403.75 in attorneys’ fees; plaintiff

previously awarded $50,000 in damages); Mglej v. Gardner, No. 2:13-cv-

00713-CW, 2022 WL 2065588, at **1, 6 (D. Utah June 8, 2022) (awarding

$314,077.00 in attorneys’ fees; plaintiff previously awarded $60,720.00 in

damages)]. The cases cited by the Plaintiff weigh in favor of awarding the

requested fee award.

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L. Amount Involved and Results Obtained

As noted by the Supreme Court, “‘the most critical factor’ in

determining the reasonableness of a fee award ‘is the degree of success

obtained . . . .’” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992) (quoting Hensley,

461 U.S. at 436).

Here, Plaintiff Hyatt prevailed on both his Section 1983 constitutional

claims and his state law tort claims against Defendant May. The Plaintiff,

however, did not succeed on any of his constitutional or state law tort claims

against Defendants Lambert and Lewis, or any of the other officers who were

initially named in this action. Additionally, the Plaintiff was not successful in

his bid to impose liability on the Sheriff of Buncombe County or the surety

company which issued the Sheriff’s bond. Finally, it must be noted that the

ultimate award of $50,000 is far less than the $350,000 that Plaintiff’s

counsel argued for in closing arguments to the jury. For these reasons, the

Court concludes that the results obtained by Plaintiff Hyatt weigh in favor of

reducing the requested fee by 25%.

Additionally, while Plaintiff Hyatt prevailed on at least some of his

claims, Plaintiff Barrett did not. Both Plaintiffs were represented by the same

attorneys in this matter, and counsel’s billing records include some billing

entries that appear to be related only to Plaintiff Barrett. The Defendant

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argues that 5.0 hours should be deducted from counsel’s time in order to

account for Plaintiff Barrett’s unsuccessful claims. [Doc. 146 at 7-8]. The

Court finds that this would be a reasonable deduction, and therefore, 5.0

hours will be deducted from counsel’s overall time.

In total, the Plaintiff’s attorneys claimed 864.05 hours, to be

compensated at the rate of $300.00 per hour. While the Court concludes

that the hourly rate requested is reasonable, the total number of hours should

be reduced by a total of 63 hours to 801.05 hours, in order to account for Mr.

Sutton’s vague billing, the time spent exclusively with respect to Plaintiff

Barrett’s case, the time spent related to the filing and litigation of the

Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint. Further, to account for the limited

success achieved by Plaintiff Hyatt, the Court that an overall reduction in the

hours expended by 25% is appropriate. That would result in a total of 600.8

hours. Multiplying those reduced hours by the reasonable hourly rate

determined by the Court results in a lodestar amount of $180,240.00 with

respect to the work performed by Plaintiff’s attorneys. Additionally, with

respect to the work performed by Ms. Mathis, counsel will be compensated

for Ms. Mathis’ time for 28.1 hours at a rate of $90.00 ($2,529.00), resulting

in a total fee award of $182,769.00. For the reasons stated herein, the Court

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finds and concludes that this lodestar amount constitutes a reasonable

attorneys’ fee in this matter.

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Plaintiff Hyatt’s Application to

Award Attorneys’ Fees [Doc. 144] is GRANTED, and Plaintiff Hyatt is hereby

awarded $182,769.00 in attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: March 29, 2023

a i

Reidinger wey

Chief United States District Judge eA

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