Mitter v. Henderson County

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ASHEVILLE DIVISION

1:22-cv-00256-MR

SHAQUIL MITTER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) ORDER

)

LIBBY LNU, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

________________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint, [Doc. 11], filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e) and 1915A, and Plaintiff’s letter, [Doc. 10]. Plaintiff is proceeding

in forma pauperis. [Docs. 4, 8].

I. BACKGROUND

Pro se Plaintiff Shaquil Mitter (“Plaintiff”) is a pretrial detainee at the

Henderson County Detention Center in Hendersonville, North Carolina. He

filed this action on December 2, 2022, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against

Defendants Henderson County, the Henderson County Sheriff’s Office

(“Sheriff’s Office”), and the Henderson County Detention Center (the “Jail”).

[Doc. 1]. Plaintiff’s Complaint failed initial review and these Defendants were

dismissed. [Doc. 9]. The Court allowed Petitioner to amend his Complaint to

state a claim for relief in accordance with the Court’s Order. [Doc. 9 at 5-6].

Plaintiff was advised that an amended complaint would supersede his

original Complaint and that piecemeal amendment would not be allowed. [Id.

at 6]. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is now before the Court on initial review.

[Doc. 11].

In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff names the following Defendants:

(1) Libby LNU, identified as the head nurse; (2) FNU Moody, identified as a

Sheriff’s Office Deputy; and (3) FNU Kane, identified as a Sheriff’s Office

Correctional Officer, all in their individual and official capacities. [Id. at 1-3].

Plaintiff alleges as follows. On October 13, 2022, at 8:00 a.m., Plaintiff was

given Tylenol by Defendant Libby LNU1 for a toothache. Plaintiff realized he

may have been given medication to which he was allergic, such allergy

having been documented in his medical chart. Almost instantly, Plaintiff

started getting hives. Plaintiff also experienced blood in his stool and vomit.

Plaintiff’s symptoms were ignored for almost 20 hours. Finally, Defendant

Kane checked on Plaintiff, saw blood in Plaintiff’s stool, and called EMS.

“They” told Defendant Moody that Plaintiff needed to be sent to the

emergency room. [Id. at 5].

1 Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint also suggests that “Officer Joe” may also have been

involved in giving Plaintiff Tylenol. [See Doc. 11 at 5]. Plaintiff, however, makes no further

allegations regarding “Officer Joe” and does not name him as a Defendant.

For injuries, Plaintiff claims he suffered dangerously elevated blood

pressure, inflamed organs, and pain and was subjected to “cat scans and

horifying procedures.” [Id. (errors uncorrected)].

For relief, Plaintiff seeks $20 million and payment for all medical

expenses. Plaintiff brings his Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but he

does not identify what constitutional right he contends was violated. [Doc.

11 at 3]. Rather, he seeks relief for “neglect [and] misdiagnosing [him].”

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must

review the Amended Complaint to determine whether it is subject to

dismissal on the grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious [or] fails to state a

claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore,

under § 1915A the Court must conduct an initial review and identify and

dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if it is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune to such relief. 28 U.S.C. §

1915A.

In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether the Amended

Complaint raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon

clearly baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional

scenarios. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore,

a pro se complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.

519, 520 (1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not

permit a district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his Amended

Complaint which set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller

v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

III. DISCUSSION

“To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the

violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States

and must show that the deprivation of that right was committed by a person

acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on an alleged lack of or

inappropriate medical treatment fall within the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.2 Estelle v. Gamble, 429

2 Because the Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee at the relevant times, his deliberate

indifference claims are properly brought under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process

Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment. See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463

U.S. 239 (1983). However, the Fourth Circuit has long applied the Eighth Amendment

deliberate indifference standard to pretrial detainees' deliberate indifference claims. See

Moss v. Harwood, 19 F.4th 614, 624 n.4 (4th Cir. 2021) (noting that, “under Kingsley v.

Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015), pretrial detainees

bringing excessive force claims under the Fourteenth Amendment are no longer required

to satisfy the analogous subjective component that governs the Eighth Amendment

excessive force claims of convicted prisoners ... [however] the Supreme Court has not

extended Kingsley beyond the excessive force context to deliberate indifference claims,

... and neither has our court....”); Mays v. Sprinkle, 992 F.3d 295, 300-02 (4th Cir. 2021)

U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, a

plaintiff must show a “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs” of the

inmate. Id. “Deliberate indifference requires a showing that the defendants

actually knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious injury to the

detainee or that they actually knew of and ignored a detainee’s serious need

for medical care.” Young v. City of Mt. Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 575-76 (4th

Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). “To establish that a health care provider’s

actions constitute deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, the

treatment must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to

shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Miltier v.

Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 1990).

Allegations that might be sufficient to support negligence and medical

malpractice claims do not, without more, rise to the level of a cognizable §

1983 claim. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695

(4th Cir. 1999) (“Deliberate indifference is a very high standard—a showing

of mere negligence will not meet it.”). To be found liable under the Eighth

Amendment, a prison official must know of and consciously or intentionally

disregard “an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S.

(declining to decide whether a pretrial detainee must satisfy the subjective component of

the Eight Amendment deliberate indifference standard).

at 837; Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 167 (4th Cir. 1998). “[E]ven if a

prison doctor is mistaken or negligent in his diagnosis or treatment, no

constitutional issue is raised absent evidence of abuse, intentional

mistreatment, or denial of medical attention.” Stokes v. Hurdle, 393 F. Supp.

757, 762 (D. Md. 1975), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1250 (4th Cir. 1976).

Suits against an officer in his official capacity “generally represent only

another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an

agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099 (1985)

(1985) (quoting Monell v Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436

U.S. 658, 690 n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035 (1978)). The Office of Sheriff is

not liable under § 1983 for an employee’s acts “unless action pursuant to

official municipal policy of some nature caused [the] constitutional tort.”

Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120-21, 112 S.Ct. 1061,

1066 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2036). That is, “[f]or a

governmental entity to be liable under section 1983, the official policy must

be the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Moore v. City of

Creedmoor, 345 N.C. 356, 366, 481 S.E.2d 14, 21 (1997) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). “Thus, the entity’s ‘policy or custom’ must have

played a part in the violation of federal law.” Id. (quoting Monell, 436 U.S.

658, 694, 98 S.Ct. at 2037-38). Plaintiff here does not allege that any official

policy was the moving force behind or otherwise played a part in any

constitutional violation. The Court, therefore, will dismiss Plaintiff’s official

capacity claims against all Defendants.

As to the individual capacity claims, taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true

and giving him the benefit of every reasonable inference, Plaintiff has

nonetheless failed to state a claim under § 1983 against any Defendant.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant LNU gave Plaintiff medication that he is

allergic to despite the allergy being documented in his medical chart. While

these allegations might support a claim for negligence, they do not support

a claim for deliberate indifference. That is, Plaintiff has not alleged that any

Defendant “actually knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious

injury” to Plaintiff. See Young, 238 F.3d at 575-76. Moreover, while Plaintiff

alleges that his medical needs were ignored for 20 hours, he does not allege

that any named Defendant was aware of his condition and failed to act.

Rather, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Kane called EMS when he checked

on Plaintiff and saw blood in Plaintiff’s stool and that Defendant Moody was

told that Plaintiff needed to go to the emergency room. Plaintiff’s individual

capacity claims, therefore, will also be dismissed.

The Court, however, will allow Plaintiff one more chance to amend his

Complaint to properly state a claim for relief in accordance with the terms of

this Order.

IV. PLAINTIFF’S LETTER

Also before the Court is an improper letter filed by Plaintiff. [Doc. 10].

In this letter, Plaintiff makes various requests for assistance and information,

including a request for counsel in this matter. [See id.]. It is not the duty of

the Clerk’s Office or this Court to educate and advise Plaintiff on how to

prosecute this action. The Court will strike Plaintiff’s letter. Plaintiff is

admonished that he should familiarize himself with the Order of Instructions

[Doc. 3], the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of this

Court before filing further documents with this Court.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint fails initial review. The Court will allow Plaintiff thirty

(30) days to again amend his Complaint, if he so chooses, to properly state

a claim upon which relief can be granted against a proper defendant. Any

amended complaint will be subject to all timeliness and procedural

requirements and will supersede the original and first Amended Complaint.

Piecemeal amendment will not be permitted. Should Plaintiff fail to timely

amend his Complaint in accordance with the terms of this Order, the Court

will dismiss this action with prejudice. See Green v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,

790 Fed. App’x 535, 536 (4th Cir. 2020).

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Plaintiff shall have thirty (30)

days in which to again amend his Complaint in accordance with the terms of

this Order. If Plaintiff fails to so amend his Complaint, the matter will be

dismissed with prejudice in accordance with the terms of this Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs claims against Defendants

in their official capacities are DISMISSED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs letter [Doc. 10] is

STRICKEN from the record in this matter.

The Clerk is respectfully instructed to mail Plaintiff a blank prisoner §

1983 form.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: March 7, 2023

Martifi Reidinger ee

Chief United States District Judge AS