Inscoe v. NC Department of Public Safety

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ASHEVILLE DIVISION

CIVIL CASE NO. 1:22-cv-00243-MR

ASHLEE INSCOE,1 )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT )

OF PUBLIC SAFETY, et al., ) ORDER

)

Defendants. )

_______________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of the pro se

Complaint [Doc. 1]. The Plaintiff has paid the full filing fee.

I. BACKGROUND

The pro se Plaintiff filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et

seq., and North Carolina law, addressing incidents that allegedly occurred at

the Avery-Mitchell Correctional Institution.2 The Plaintiff originally filed this

1 According to the North Carolina Department of Public Safety’s website, the Plaintiff’s

name is William M. Inscoe. See https://webapps.doc.state.nc.us/opi/viewoffender.do?

method=view&offenderID=0568587&searchOffenderId=0568587&searchDOBRange=0

&listurl=pagelistoffendersearchresults&listpage=1 (last accessed Nov. 17, 2022); Fed.

R. Evid. 201.

2 The Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at the Nash Correctional Institution.

action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North

Carolina; the case was transferred to this Court on November 16, 2022.

[Doc. 3].

The Plaintiff names as Defendants the North Carolina Department of

Public Safety (NCDPS), and the following NCDPS employees in their official

and individual capacities: Eddie Buffaloe, the NCDPS secretary; Charlotte

Jordan-Williams,3 the NCDPS Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) director;

Ronnie L. Honeycutt,4 the Avery-Mitchell CI warden; James B. Watson, an

Avery-Mitchell CI PREA compliance correctional captain; Derick Fox, an

Avery-Mitchell CI correctional lieutenant; James Waldroop, an Avery-Mitchell

CI unit manager; FNU Goforth and Edna Silver,5 Avery-Mitchell CI

correctional sergeants; FNU Hicks, Shawn Buchanan, Chris Miller, and

Russel Carver, Avery-Mitchell CI correctional officers; and “J. Doe(s),”

NCDPS employees. [Doc. 1 at 3-9].

3 Also “Williams” in the Complaint. [Doc. 1-1 at 32].

4 Also “Huneycutt” in the Complaint. [See, e.g., Doc. 1-1 at 32].

5 Also “Silvers” in the Complaint. [Doc. 1-1 at 33].

The Plaintiff describes herself as an “intersex woman”6 who with

diagnoses of “hermaphroditism/intersex, … cryptorchidism and gender

dysphoria” who is genetically female, but was raised as male, has primary

and secondary female sex characteristics, has spent most of her life as a

female, has undergone gender affirming surgery, and has been on estrogen

hormone replacement therapy for almost 25 years. [Doc. 1-1 at 6-7, 36].

She claims that NCDPS inter alia failed to properly train health care, custody,

and administration staff, has refused to transfer her to a female prison for the

past three years, and forced her into an unsafe communal living situation

with 33 male inmates at Avery-Mitchell CI. [See Doc. 1-1 at 10-11]. She

claims that she has endured constant harassment and sexual propositioning

by inmates and staff, unreasonable strip searches by male guards, and a

sexual assault by Officer Carver. The Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment,

injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, prejudgment interest,

all fees and costs, a jury trial, and any further relief that the Court deems just

and proper. [Doc. 1 at 1; Doc. 1-1 at 39-40].

6 “Intersex” is defined as “having physical characteristics intermediate between a true

male and a true female,” that “usually results from extra chromosomes or a hormonal

abnormality during embryological development.” https://www.britannica.com/science

/intersex (last accessed Nov. 17, 2022); Fed. R. Ev. 201.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Although the Plaintiff has paid the full filing fee, the Court must conduct

an initial review and identify and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the

complaint, if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted; or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune

to such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether the Complaint

raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly

baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se

complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a

district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his Complaint which

set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

III. DISCUSSION7

A. Parties

The Plaintiff names “J. Doe(s)” NCDPS employees as Defendants.

[Doc. 1 at 9]. John Doe suits are permissible only against “real, but

unidentified, defendants.” Schiff v. Kennedy, 691 F.2d 196, 197 (4th Cir.

1982). The designation of a John Doe defendant is generally not favored in

the federal courts; it is appropriate only when the identity of the alleged

defendant is not known at the time the complaint is filed and the plaintiff is

likely to be able to identify the defendant after further discovery. See Roper

v. Grayson, 81 F.3d 124, 126 (10th Cir. 1996); Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d

637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). “[I]f it does not appear that the true identity of an

unnamed party can be discovered through discovery or through intervention

by the court, the court could dismiss the action without prejudice.” Schiff,

691 F.2d at 198 (footnote omitted). The Plaintiff has provided no information

from which the Court can conclude that she would likely be able to identify

any John and/or Jane Doe Defendants through discovery. Accordingly, the

claims against the Doe Defendants are dismissed at this time.

7 The Court will not attempt to address all of the individual allegations contained in the

57-page Complaint. However, the allegations are liberally construed and the Court will

address the claims reasonably suggested by the allegations.

Further, the body of the Complaint contains allegations against

numerous individuals who are not named as defendants in the caption as

required by Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. [See, e.g.,

Doc. 1-1 at 12, 25, 32 (referring to Jon Peiper, Officer Jimenson, and

“Defendants … Ishee, [and] Harris”)]; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) (“The title of

the complaint must name all the parties”); Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d

551 (7th Cir. 2005) (“to make someone a party the plaintiff must specify him

in the caption and arrange for service of process.”); Perez v. Humphries, No.

3:18-cv-107-GCM, 2018 WL 4705560, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 1, 2018) (“A

plaintiff’s failure to name a defendant in the caption of a Complaint renders

any action against the purported defendant a legal nullity”). The allegations

directed at individuals not named as Defendants are dismissed without

prejudice.

The Plaintiff also uses vague terms and pronouns rather than

identifying the individual(s) involved in each allegation. [See, e.g., Doc. 1-1

at 13, 23 (“DPS,” “DPS staff,” “staff, lieutenants, captains, sergeants”)]. Such

claims are too vague and conclusory to proceed insofar as the Court is

unable to determine the Defendant(s) to whom these allegations refer. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a “short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”); Simpson v. Welch, 900 F.2d

33, 35 (4th Cir. 1990) (conclusory allegations, unsupported by specific

allegations of material fact are not sufficient); Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309

F.3d 193, 201-02 (4th Cir. 2002) (a pleader must allege facts, directly or

indirectly, that support each element of the claim). Further, these allegations

are nullities to the extent that refer to non-parties, and they are insufficient to

proceed insofar as they refer to Doe Defendants who are not likely to be

identified through discovery, for the reasons discussed supra.

B. Section 1983

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that she was

“deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,

and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.”

Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999).

A state official can be sued in a § 1983 suit in three ways: in his

personal capacity, his official capacity, or in a more limited way, his

supervisory capacity. King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 223–24 (4th Cir.

2016). For personal liability, “it is enough to show that the official, acting

under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right.” Kentucky

v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). In an official-capacity suit, however,

“[m]ore is required”: the suit is “treated as a suit against the entity,” which

must then be a “‘moving force’ behind the deprivation,” King, 825 F.3d at 223

(quoting Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981)); thus, the entity’s

“‘policy or custom’ must have played a part in the violation of federal law,” id.

(quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658,

694 (1978)). Meanwhile, a supervisor can be liable where (1) he knew that

his subordinate “was engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and

unreasonable risk of constitutional injury;” (2) his response showed

“deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive

practices;” and (3) that there was an “affirmative causal link” between his

inaction and the constitutional injury.” Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th

Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Liberally construing the allegations and drawing all reasonable

inferences in the Plaintiff’s favor, the Plaintiff has sufficiently stated the

following claims as to pass initial review that: Defendants Buffaloe,

Buchanan, Carver, Fox, Goforth, Hicks Honeycutt, Jordan-Williams, Miller,

Silver, Waldroop, and Watson violated the Eighth Amendment by exposing

her to a substantial risk of serious harm; Defendants Buffaloe, Buchanan,

Carver, Fox, Goforth, Hicks, Honeycutt, Jordan-Williams, Miller, Silver,

Waldroop, and Watson violated the Fourth Amendment for subjecting her to

unreasonable searches; Defendants Fox, Goforth, Honeycutt, and Waldroop

violated the First Amendment by retaliating against her;8 and Defendants

Buffaloe, Buchanan, Carver, Fox, Goforth, Hicks, Honeycutt, Jordan-

Williams, Miller, Silver, Waldroop, and Watson violated the Fourteenth

Amendment by denying her equal protection.9

C. ADA

To state a claim under the ADA a plaintiff must show that: (1) she has

a disability; (2) she was otherwise qualified to receive the benefits of a public

service, program, or activity; and (3) she was denied the benefits of such

service, program, or activity, or was otherwise discriminated against, on the

basis of the disability. See Nat’l Fed. of the Blind v. Lamone, 813 F.3d 494

(4th Cir. 2016); Doe v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir.

1995).

Here, the Plaintiff claims that she is a qualified person with a disability

under the ADA pursuant to her medical diagnoses; that the correctional

Defendants discriminated against her, denied her reasonable

8 The Complaint also suggests a claim for interference with the mail, but the Plaintiff has

failed to name as defendants any of the individuals who allegedly violated the First

Amendment in that regard.

9 With respect to Defendants Buffaloe, Honeycutt, Jordan-Williams, and Watson, it is not

entirely clear from the Plaintiff’s Complaint whether these Defendants are being sued in

their individual capacities for acts of personal wrongdoing or whether they are being sued

in their official or supervisory capacities. The Court finds that the parameters of the

Plaintiff’s claims in this regard would be best addressed in the context of a Rule 12 motion

to dismiss rather than on initial review.

accommodations, denied her DPS programs, services, and activities

because she is intersex; and that the supervisory personnel are failing to

provide adequate training to staff in responding to intersex inmates. Liberally

construing the Plaintiff’s claims, the Court concludes that she has sufficiently

asserted a claim so as to pass initial review against Defendants Buffaloe,

Buchanan, Carver, Fox, Goforth, Hicks, Honeycutt, Jordan-Williams, Miller,

Silver, Waldroop, and Watson.10

D. Supplemental Jurisdiction

Federal district courts may entertain claims not otherwise within their

adjudicatory authority when those claims “are so related to claims ... within

[federal-court competence] that they form part of the same case or

controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). To exercise supplemental jurisdiction, a

court must find that “[t]he state and federal claims ... derive from a common

nucleus of operative fact” where a plaintiff “would ordinarily be expected to

try them all in one judicial proceeding.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs,

383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).

10 Like the Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims, it is not entirely clear whether the Plaintiff is pursuing

ADA claims against Defendants Buffaloe, Honeycutt, Jordan-Williams, and Watson in

their individual capacities or their official/supervisory capacities. Again, the Court finds

that this issue would be best addressed in the context of a Rule 12 motion to dismiss

rather than on initial review.

Here, the Plaintiff asserts that her rights under North Carolina

Constitution Article 1, § 27 are being violated for the same reasons that the

Defendants violated her Eighth Amendment rights. [See Doc. 1-1 at 37].

The Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims passed initial review, and the

Plaintiff’s § 27 claims will likewise be allowed to proceed against NCDPS and

Defendants Buffaloe, Buchanan, Carver, Fox, Goforth, Hicks Honeycutt,

Jordan-Williams, Miller, Silver, Waldroop, and Watson at this time.

IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, the Complaint has passed initial review against Defendants

Buffaloe, Buchanan, Carver, Fox, Goforth, Hicks, Honeycutt, Jordan-

Williams, Miller, Silver, Waldroop, and Watson, and the Court exercises

supplemental jurisdiction over the Plaintiff’s claims under the North Carolina

Constitution against those Defendants as well as against NCDPS, as

described in this Order. The remaining claims are dismissed without

prejudice.

In light of the Court’s determination that this case passes initial review

in accordance with this Order, the Court will order the Clerk of Court to

commence the procedure for waiver of service as set forth in Local Civil Rule

4.3 for NCDPS, and Defendants Buffaloe, Buchanan, Carver, Fox, Goforth,

Hicks, Honeycutt, Jordan-Williams, Miller, Silver, Waldroop, and Watson,

who are alleged to be current or former employees of NCDPS.

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:

1. The § 1983 and ADA claims have passed initial review against

Defendants Buffaloe, Buchanan, Carver, Fox, Goforth, Hicks,

Honeycutt, Jordan-Williams, Miller, Silver, Waldroop, and Watson,

and the Court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's

claims under the North Carolina Constitution against those

Defendants as well as against NCDPS, as described in this Order.

2. The remaining claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

3. The Clerk shall commence the procedure for waiver of service as

set forth in Local Civil Rule 4.3 for NCDPS and Defendants Buffaloe,

Buchanan, Carver, Fox, Goforth, Hicks, Honeycutt, Jordan-

Williams, Miller, Silver, Waldroop, and Watson, who are alleged to

be current or former employees of NCDPS.

IT IS SO ORDERED. | Signed: January 16, 2023

Sos

Chief United States District Judge AS

12