Opinion

Dale v. State of North Carolina 26th Judicial District

Court
District Court, W.D. North Carolina
Filed
Jan 25, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 24.9%

when a district court dismisses all claims independently qualifying for the exercise of federal jurisdiction, it “ordinarily dismiss[es] all related state claims.”

How later courts described this case

  • when a district court dismisses all claims independently qualifying for the exercise of federal jurisdiction, it “ordinarily dismiss[es] all related state claims.”
  • “when a complaint is incurable through amendment, dismissal is properly rendered with prejudice and without leave to amend”
  • noting that “[u]nrelated claims against different defendants belong in different suits,” to prevent prisoners from dodging the fee payment or three-strikes provisions in the Prison Litigation Reform Act

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

CHARLOTTE DIVISION

CIVIL CASE NO. 3:22-cv-00597-MR

DAMETRI DALE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 26th )

JUDICIAL DISTRICT, et al., ) ORDER

)

Defendants. )

_______________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of the pro se

Amended Complaint.1 [Doc. 12]. Also pending is the Plaintiff’s pro se

“Motion for the Issuance and Service of Summons and Complaint….” [Doc.

11]. The Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. [Doc. 7].

I. BACKGROUND

The pro se Plaintiff, a prisoner of the State of North Carolina, has

recently filed at least five civil rights actions in this Court, several of which

appear to suffer from serious deficiencies and/or contain duplicative claims.2

1 The Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint before the original Complaint [Doc. 1] had

been reviewed for frivolity.

2 See Case Nos. 1:22-cv-234-MR; 1:22-cv-259-MR; 3:22-cv-597-MR; 3:22-cv-641-MR;

3:22-cv-642-RJC-DSC; see also Case No. 3:22-cv-580-MR (seeking habeas relief).

Case Nos. 1:22-cv-234 and 1:22-cv-259 address incidents that allegedly occurred at the

He filed the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming the following

Defendants: the State of North Carolina’s 26th Judicial District; Spencer

Merriweather, III, the Mecklenburg County District Attorney; Kathryn Boswell

and Kristen McNeal, Assistant District Attorneys; and Anthony Reno, a

Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department (CMPD) investigator. He asserts

claims under the “United States Constitution, rights life and liberty, fair trial,

due process of law, abusive attacks upon his honor, reputation and private

and family life, … false imprisonment [and] violation of discovery/Brady

material.”3 [Doc. 12 at 5]. He claims that Defendant Reno conducted an

inadequate investigation and fabricated evidence against him; that Reno,

Boswell, and McNeal presented false evidence to a grand jury to secure his

indictment; that Defendants McNeill and Boswell knowingly presented false

evidence at his July 2022 trial, withheld evidence to which the Plaintiff was

entitled, and obtained a wrongful conviction; and that Merriweather was on

Foothills Correctional Institution, and Case Nos. 3:22-cv-597, 3:22-cv-641, and 3:22-cv-

642 address alleged improprieties with regard to the Plaintiff’s criminal prosecution.

3 The Plaintiff also cites “18 USC Ch. 79; perjury”; however, “[n]o citizen has an

enforceable right to institute a criminal prosecution.” Lopez v. Robinson, 914 F.2d 486,

494 (4th Cir. 1990); see Brown v. Rowan Cnty. Det. Ctr., 2012 WL 5338574 (M.D.N.C.

Oct. 30, 2012) (“an inmate does not state a constitutional claim by alleging that he was

denied the right to press criminal charges); Brown v. United States, 2019 WL 3753193,

at *6 (E.D.N.C. May 10, 2019) report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 3783271

(E.D.N.C. Aug. 12, 2019) (recognizing that the criminal statute for perjury does not give

rise to a private cause of action).

2

actual and constructive notice of McNeal and Boswell’s misconduct, but

failed to act. [Id. at 7-9]. For injury, he claims that he has suffered: mental

breakdowns; physical, verbal, and mental abuse in prison; and harm to his

personal and professional reputation. [Id. at 8-9]. He seeks damages,

injunctive, and a declaratory judgment. [Id. at 9-10]. For injury, he claims

that he “has suffered from physical, verbal, mental and emotional abuse,”

and harm to his personal and professional reputation. [Id. at 6-7]. He seeks

damages and any declaratory relief that the Court deems appropriate. [Id.

at 9].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because the Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must

review the Complaint to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the

grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious [or] fails to state a claim on which

relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore, under § 1915A

the Court must conduct an initial review and identify and dismiss the

complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune to such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether the Complaint

raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly

3

baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se

complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a

district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his Complaint which

set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

III. DISCUSSION

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was

“deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,

and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.”

Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999).

As a threshold matter, the State of North Carolina’s 26th Judicial

District, which is an arm of the State, is not a proper Defendant in a § 1983

action. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7A-60 (“The State shall be divided into

prosecutorial districts…. There shall be a district attorney for each

prosecutorial district….”); 7A-3 (consolidating all courts within North Carolina

into unified “General Court of Justice); 7A-4 (the General Court of Justice

consists of an appellate division, a superior court division, and a district court

division). Neither the State of North Carolina nor its agencies constitute

4

“persons” subject to suit under Section 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State

Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). Furthermore, the Eleventh Amendment bars

Plaintiff’s suit for money damages against the State of North Carolina and its

various agencies. See Ballenger v. Owens, 352 F.3d 842, 844-45 (4th Cir.

2003). As such, the Plaintiff’s claim against the State of North Carolina’s 26th

Judicial District fails, and this Defendant will be dismissed.

The Plaintiff also names the district attorney and two assistant district

attorneys as Defendants. However, prosecutors are absolutely immune as

individuals from Section 1983 liability for acts arising out of the exercise of

their official functions. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976). This

immunity applies only to the extent that prosecutors serve as advocates for

the State. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993).

Therefore, a prosecutor’s administrative and investigative duties that do not

relate to the preparation for the initiation of a prosecution or for judicial

proceedings are not entitled to absolute immunity. Id. It appears that the

Plaintiff’s claims relate solely to the prosecutors’ actions as advocates with

regard to the Plaintiff’s criminal prosecution. As such, Defendants

Merriweather, Boswell, and McNeal are entitled to immunity and the claims

against them are dismissed.

5

Even if these Defendants were not immune from suit, the Plaintiff’s

claims appear to be barred by abstention principles. In Heck, the United

States Supreme Court held as follows:

[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions

whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence

invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction and

sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by

executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to

make such determination, or called into question by a federal

court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A

claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or

sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable

under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a

§ 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment

in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his

conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be

dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction

or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court

determines that the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not

demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment

against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in

the absence of some other bar to the suit.

Id. at 485-87 (footnotes omitted). Success on the Plaintiff’s present claims

would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence in the

underlying criminal matter. The Plaintiff, however, has not alleged that his

conviction has been reversed or otherwise invalidated. Therefore, his claims

against Defendants Merriweather, Boswell, and McNeal appear to be barred

by Heck.

6

The claims against Defendant Reno are alleged to have occurred in

2017, well outside the applicable three-year statute of limitations. See

Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); Tommy Davis Const., Inc. v.

Cape Fear Pub. Util. Auth., 807 F.3d 62, 66-67 (4th Cir. 2015). It thus

appears that they are time-barred. Moreover, the claims against Defendant

Reno with regard to his grand jury testimony are barred by absolute witness

immunity. Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 367 (2012).

To the extent that the Plaintiff asserts a defamation claim under North

Carolina law, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, as no

federal claim has passed initial review. See Artis v. Dist. Of Columbia, 138

S.Ct. 594, 595 (2018) (when a district court dismisses all claims

independently qualifying for the exercise of federal jurisdiction, it “ordinarily

dismiss[es] all related state claims.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Accordingly,

the defamation claim is dismissed without prejudice.

The Plaintiff’s pending “Motion for the Issuance and Service of

Summons and Complaint…” [Doc. 10] is denied because the Complaint has

not passed initial review.

Finally, the Plaintiff is directed to carefully review the Order of

Instructions [Doc. 3] before filing any further documents with the Court. He

is admonished that he may not bring multiple unrelated claims against

7

unrelated defendants in any single action. See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 18,

20; George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that

“[u]nrelated claims against different defendants belong in different suits,” to

prevent prisoners from dodging the fee payment or three-strikes provisions

in the Prison Litigation Reform Act). He is further cautioned that the

repeated filing of frivolous or duplicative actions may result in the

imposition of sanctions and/or a prefiling injunction that would limit the

Plaintiff’s ability to file further lawsuits in this Court.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the Plaintiff’s

Complaint fails initial review. The claims against the State of North

Carolina’s 26th Judicial District are dismissed with prejudice, and the

remaining claims are dismissed without prejudice. This entire action is

dismissed without leave to amend, as it is clear that no amendment would

cure the deficiencies noted herein. See United States ex rel. Carson v.

Manor Care, Inc., 851 F.3d 293, 305 n. 6 (4th Cir. 2017) (“when a complaint

is incurable through amendment, dismissal is properly rendered with

prejudice and without leave to amend”) (citation omitted); See also, Lomax

v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S.Ct. 1721, 1725 n.4.

8

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:

1. The claims against the State of North Carolina’s 26" Judicial

District are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

2. The remaining claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

3. The Plaintiff's pro se “Motion for the Issuance and Service of

Summons and Complaint...” [Doc. 11] is DENIED AS MOOT.

The Clerk is respectfully instructed to terminate this civil action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: January 25, 2023

Martifi Reidinger ey

Chief United States District Judge Ale

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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