The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
STATESVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL CASE NO. 5:19-cv-00162-MR
VAN BRETT PIERRE WATKINS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) MEMORANDUM OF
vs. ) DECISION AND ORDER
)
DERRICK COPELAND, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
_______________________________ )
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment [Doc. 58].
I. BACKGROUND
The incarcerated Plaintiff Van Brett Pierre Watkins (“Watkins” or
simply, “the Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed this action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 addressing incidents that allegedly occurred at the Alexander
Correctional Institution.1 The unverified Complaint was dismissed on initial
review, but the unverified Amended Complaint passed initial review for the
use of excessive force against Defendants Derrick A. Copeland, a
correctional sergeant; and Shelby N. Howell, Nicholaus P. Teague, and
1 The Plaintiff is presently housed at the North Carolina Central Prison.
Christopher A. Johnson,2 correctional officers.3 [Doc. 12: Am. Compl.; Doc.
13: Order on Initial Review]. The Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive
damages.
The Defendants have now filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and
supporting Declarations. [Doc. 58: MSJ; Docs. 59-1, 59-2, 59-3, 59-4:
Declarations]. The Court notified the Plaintiff of the opportunity to respond
to Defendants’ Motion and to present evidence in opposition pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56. [Doc. 62: Roseboro4 Order]. The Plaintiff filed a verified
Response to which he has attached records, and a verified Supplemental
Response.5 [See Doc. 63: MSJ Response; Doc. 64: Supp. MSJ Response].
The Defendants filed a Notice informing the Court that they do not intend to
reply. [Doc. 65: Notice]. Having been fully briefed, this matter is ripe for
disposition.
2 Johnson is identified as an “unknown … officer” in the Amended Complaint. [Doc. 12:
Am. Compl. at 12].
3 All of the Defendants’ titles are the ones they held at the time of the incident at issue.
Neither the Complaint nor the Amended Complaint is verified. [Doc. 1: Complaint; Doc.
12: Am. Compl.].
4 Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975).
5 This pleading is titled “Reaffirm.”
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is
genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). A fact is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under
governing law. Id.
The movant has the “initial responsibility of informing the district court
of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)
(internal citations omitted).
Once this initial burden is met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving
party. The nonmoving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 322 n.3. The nonmoving party may not
rely upon mere allegations or denials of allegations in his pleadings to defeat
a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 324. Rather, the nonmoving party
must oppose a proper summary judgment motion with citation to
“depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or
declarations, stipulations …, admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials” in the record. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(a). Namely, the
nonmoving party must present sufficient evidence from which “a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at
248. To that end, only evidence admissible at trial may be considered by the
Court on summary judgment. Kennedy v. Joy Technologies, Inc., 269 F.
App’x 302, 308 (4th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
When ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must view the
evidence and any inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Facts, however, “must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a
‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127
S.Ct. 1769, 1776 (2007). As the Supreme Court has emphasized,
“[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under
Rule 56(c), the opponent must do more than simply
show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts …. Where the record taken as a whole
could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’”
Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986)
(footnote omitted). “[T]he mere existence of some
alleged factual dispute between the parties will not
defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for
summary judgment; the requirement is that there be
no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-28, 106 S. Ct.
2505 (1986). When opposing parties tell two
different stories, one of which is blatantly
contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury
could believe it, a court should not adopt that version
of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for
summary judgment.
Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Viewing the forecast of evidence in the light most favorable to the
Plaintiff, the following is a summary of the relevant facts.
On January 6, 2019, the Plaintiff was the subject of an unprovoked
attack by another inmate in the Alexander CI dining hall. [Doc. 63: MSJ
Response at ¶¶ 2, 6-8; Doc. 64: Supp. MSJ Response at ¶ 1; Doc. 59-2:
Copeland Decl. at ¶ 7(b)]. A “Code 4” was called and staff responded to
break up the disturbance. [Doc. 59-1: Howell Decl. at ¶ 7(c); Doc. 59-3:
Teague Decl. at ¶ 7(a); Doc. 59-4: Johnson Decl. at ¶ 7(a)].
When officers arrived, the Plaintiff did not put up his hands or take a
defensive fighting stance; he was pepper sprayed while yelling that he was
innocent. [Doc. 63: MSJ Response at ¶¶ 6-8; Doc. 64 Supp. MSJ Response
at ¶ 1]. Officer Howell “beat[ ]” the Plaintiff after he was “cuffed.” [Doc. 63:
MSJ Response at ¶ 9; Doc. 64: Supp. MSJ Resp. at ¶ 7].6
As the officers escorted the Plaintiff out of the dining hall, the Plaintiff
was “driven in[to]” stools and tables; he was “forcibly” placed on the floor
while officers attempted to pick him up to carry him; and he was “dropped to
the floor again” because he was “to[o] heavy for the out of shape prison
guards.” [Doc. 63: MSJ Response at ¶¶ 13-15]. On the walk to the restrictive
housing unit, the leg irons were “cutting/hurting” the Plaintiff’s ankles. [Doc.
63: MSJ Response at ¶ 15].7
Once at restrictive housing, the Plaintiff was placed in the shower for a
strip search and decontamination. Officer Johnson sprayed the Plaintiff with
mace in the shower, even though the Plaintiff “posed no threat” to officers or
himself. Officer Johnson told the Plaintiff to “beg” if he wanted to be
6 The Defendants deny the Plaintiff’s version of events, stating that the Plaintiff and the
inmate who attacked him defied verbal commands and continued to fight and resist
restraints even after OC pepper spray was administered; that the Plaintiff was struck with
a baton in a “green zone area” to break up the fight; and that no staff member used baton
strikes after the Plaintiff was restrained with handcuffs. At this stage of the proceedings,
however, the Court must view the forecast of evidence in the light most favorable to the
Plaintiff.
7 The Defendants deny intentionally running the Plaintiff into steel tables or stools. The
Defendants admit that the Plaintiff was lowered to the ground so that they could attempt
to carry him using a four-man carry protocol; however, they deny that he was ever
dropped or that any excessive force was used upon him during this incident.
decontaminated. [Doc. 63: MSJ Response at ¶¶ 18-19; Doc. 64: Supp. MSJ
Response at ¶ 6].8
Among the exhibits filed by the Plaintiff is an Investigating Officer’s
Report indicating that a disciplinary charge against the Plaintiff for the
January 6, 2019 incident was dismissed because the Plaintiff was “defensive
during the incident and never [was] the aggressor.” [Doc. 63-1: Plaintiff’s
MSJ Ex at 139].
Although the parties refer to video of the incident, and to still images of
the Plaintiff’s injuries, no such evidence has been filed with the Court. [See
Doc. 59: MSJ Memo. at 10; Doc. 64: Supp. MSJ Response at ¶ 3].
IV. DISCUSSION
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual
punishments,” U.S. Const. Amend. VIII, and protects prisoners from the
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,
319 (1986). To establish an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must
8 According to the Defendants the Plaintiff became “verbally aggressive and non-
compliant” during the strip search and decontamination shower because the Plaintiff felt
the process was not moving fast enough. [Doc. 59-4: Johnson Decl. at ¶ 7(h)]. They
further contend that the Plaintiff was observed pulling an unknown substance from his
rectum area, removing it from a wrapper, and quickly swallowing it, an act which the
Plaintiff denies. The Defendants further deny that Officer Johnson made the Plaintiff beg
for water or that any of the Defendants used excessive force at any time during this
incident. At this stage, however, the Plaintiff’s version of events must be accepted as
true.
satisfy both an objective component (that the harm inflicted was sufficiently
serious) and a subjective component (that the prison official acted with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind). Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761
(4th Cir. 1996). In adjudicating an excessive force claim, the Court must
consider such factors as the need for the use of force, the relationship
between that need and the amount of force used, the extent of the injury
inflicted, and, ultimately, whether the force was “applied in a good faith effort
to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically for the very
purpose of causing harm.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21.
The Plaintiff has presented a sufficient forecast of evidence from which
a reasonable jury could conclude that he was subjected to excessive force
by the Defendants in violation of his constitutional rights. Moreover, because
genuine disputes of material fact exist regarding whether the Defendants
violated the Plaintiff’s constitutional right to be free from excessive force, the
Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity at this time. See E.W. ex
rel. T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 178 (4th Cir. 2018); Hudson v. McMillian,
503 U.S. 1, 5-10 (1992). Accordingly, the Court concludes that, on the record
presently before it, the Defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Therefore, the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment is denied.
The Court intends to refer this case to a United States Magistrate
Judge for the purpose of conducting a Judicial Settlement Conference. Any
party not wishing to participate in a Judicial Settlement Conference shall file
written objections within fourteen (14) days of this Order.
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment [Doc. 58] is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any party not wishing to participate in
a Judicial Settlement Conference shall file written objections so informing the
Court within fourteen (14) days of this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: November 4, 2022
Sos Cy
Chief United States District Judge Ale