Dekattu v. Burnette

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

NGOMANI DEKATTU, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 3:22-CV-00265

)

RODERICK BURNETTE, JENNIFFE )

INMAN, SHERAIN TEEL, and JENNY )

LEISER, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM ORDER

THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, District Judge.1

At the time of the filing of this action, pro se Plaintiff

Ngomani Dekattu was a pretrial detainee at the Mecklenburg County

Jail, where he had been awaiting a final supervised release

revocation hearing in his criminal case, Case Number 3:22-cr-

00073-TDS-DCK-1.2 His amended complaint (Doc. 9) seeks relief

pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed’l Bureau

1 Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Middle District of

North Carolina, designated on September 19, 2022, by the Chief Judge of

the Fourth Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 292(b). (Doc. 15.)

2 Dekattu’s criminal case, 3:22-cr-00073-TDS-DCK-1, was opened on March

16, 2022, when jurisdiction over Dekattu’s supervised release was

transferred from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of New York to this court. (Doc. 1 in case no. 3:22-cr-00073-

TDS-DCK-1.) Dekattu was appointed counsel, and a United States

Magistrate Judge entered an Order of Detention on April 14, 2022. (Doc.

8 in case no. 3:22-cr-00073-TDS-DCK-1.) The criminal case was originally

assigned to the Honorable Frank D. Whitney but was reassigned to the

undersigned by designation on September 19, 2022. (Doc. 30 in case no.

3:22-cr-00073-TDS-DCK-1.) After a hearing, Dekattu’s supervised release

was revoked on November 3, 2022. (Doc. 35 in case no. 3:22-cr-00073-

TDS-DCK-1.) Dekattu was sentenced to time-served and continued on

supervision for two years. (Id.)

of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), asserting that the Defendants,

three federal probation officers and a probation lab supervisor,

violated his federal civil rights by falsifying supervision

violations against him. The amended complaint is before this court

for preliminary review, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and

1915A. For the reasons set forth below, the amended complaint

will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted. Also pending before the court is a “Request Urging

the Courts to Remove Personal Address from Order Filed July 5,

2022” (Doc. 14), that is construed as a motion to redact. This

motion will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Dekattu filed this action on June 13, 2022. (Doc. 1.) The

court struck the complaint because it appeared to have been signed,

at least in part, by a non-lawyer.3 (Doc. 4). Dekattu was granted

30 days to amend his complaint but was admonished that “to the

extent that [he] is seeking to challenge his probation or is

seeking the immediate release from custody, he must do so, if at

all, in a separate civil action” seeking federal habeas corpus

relief. (Id. at 4).

3 At that time, this case was assigned to the Honorable Martin Reidinger,

Chief United States District Judge.

Soon thereafter, Dekattu filed the present amended complaint4

pursuant to Bivens, naming the following as Defendants in their

individual and official capacities: Rodrick Burnette, a U.S.

probation officer; Jenniffe Inman and Sherain Teel, United States

supervisory probation officers; and Jenny Leiser, a United States

probation office lab supervisor. (Doc. 9 at 2-3). Dekattu alleges

that his “Federal Constitutional Rights and Human Rights was [sic]

violated 1, 4, 5, 8 Amendment, and Corporate Punishment was used”

against him (id. at 15), all of which has caused him to “suffer

mental stress and distress, personal injury, and los[s] of

employment.” (Id. at 15-16.) Specifically, Dekattu claims that

the Defendants falsified allegations that he violated the terms of

his supervised release.5 (Id. 17-18.) As a remedy, he seeks

4 The amended complaint consists of two non-identical complaint forms

(Doc. 9 at 1-16) and an unverified “Affidavit of Truth and Complaint for

Violation of Civil Rights” (id. at 17-18).

5 At the November 3, 2022 supervised release revocation hearing, Dekattu

was sentenced to time-served based on his admission at the hearing to

using marijuana on November 23, 2021, and December 29, 2021, during his

supervision, which dates were set out in violation number 1 of the

petition for revocation, and his request for a time-served sentence.

(See Doc. 33 at 1 (Notice of Proposed Resolution) (noting that the

Government and Dekattu recommend a sentence of time-served based on

Dekattu’s admitted marijuana use referenced in violation 1 and the

Government’s agreement not to proceed on the remaining alleged

violations) and Doc. 35 (judgment), both in case number 3:22-cr-00073-

73-TDS-DCK-1.)

In the amended complaint filed in the instant case, Dekattu claims that

the Defendants fabricated false supervised release violation reports

against him on various dates from January 2022 to April 2022. (See Doc.

9 at 5.) These allegedly fabricated supervised release violations –

which the Government agreed not to proceed on as part of Dekattu’s agreed

damages, his immediate release, and the termination of his

supervision.6 (Id. at 5.)

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

Dekattu is “a prisoner seek[ing] redress from a governmental

entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity” within the

meaning of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), obligating

this court to review his amended complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).7

upon recommended sentence of time-served - did not form the basis of

Dekattu’s revocation. Accordingly, as to his claim for damages, a

judgment in Dekattu’s favor would not necessarily imply the invalidity

of the revocation of his supervised release under Heck v. Humphrey. 512

U.S. 477 (1994). See Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751-52 (2004)

(per curiam) (if a “prisoner's challenge threatens no consequence for

his conviction or the duration of his sentence,” “[t]here is no need to

preserve the habeas exhaustion rule and no impediment under Heck”)

(cleaned up).

6 Because Dekattu is no longer a pre-trial detainee and was given a

custodial sentence of time-served, (Case No. 3:22-cr-00073-TDS-DCK-1,

Doc. 35), his request for “immediate release” is now moot. Furthermore,

to the extent that he seeks to have his current term of supervised

release “extinguished,” he must seek relief pursuant to his direct appeal

and, thereafter, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, rather than through a Bivens action.

See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, (1973); Heck, 512 U.S. at 481

(“Presier . . . held that habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a

state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement

and seeks immediate or speedier release”); Abella v. Rubino, 63 F.3d

1063, 1066 (11th Cir. 1995) (in § 2255 case, applying Preiser to dismiss

civil rights claims for injunctive relief under Bivens as means to

overturn conviction).

7 The PLRA defines a “prisoner as “any person incarcerated or detained

in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or

adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary

program.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c). Although Dekattu is no longer

incarcerated, because he was a pretrial detainee at the time he filed

the amended complaint in July 2022, his pleading is reviewed under the

PLRA. See Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e

The court must screen his prisoner complaint and in forma pauperis

filing and “shall,” at any time, sua sponte dismiss any claims

that (i) are frivolous or malicious, (ii) fail to state a claim

for relief, or (iii) are against a defendant who is immune. See

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915(A); Michau v. Charleston Cnty.,

S.C., 434 F.3d 725, 727 (4th Cir. 2006).

The dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court in

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 554 (2007), governs dismissals for failure to

state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A. See

De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 524 (4th Cir. 2013). Thus, to

survive an initial review under §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915(A), a

complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Courts

liberally construe pro se pleadings filed in civil rights cases

and hold them to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).

The liberal construction requirement, however, does not

permit a district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts

hold that only individuals who, at the time they seek to file their civil

actions, are detained as a result of being accused of, convicted of, or

sentenced for criminal offenses are ‘prisoners’ within the definition

of . . . 28 U.S.C. § 1915.”) Even if it were not, because he is seeking

to proceed in forma pauperis, his pleading is also subject to review

under § 1915(e)(2).

in the complaint which set forth a claim that is cognizable under

federal law. See Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5

(4th Cir. 2008); accord Atherton v. District of Columbia Off. Of

Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (noting that after

Iqbal and Twombly, a “pro se complainant must plead factual matter

that permits the court to infer more than the mere possibility of

misconduct”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

B. Bivens Claims

Here, Dekattu styles his claims under Bivens. In Bivens, the

Supreme Court “recognized for the first time an implied private

action for damages against federal officers alleged to have

violated a citizen’s constitutional rights.” Corr. Serv. Corp. v.

Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 (2001). In that case and two subsequent

cases, the Supreme Court allowed individuals alleging certain

Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment violations to proceed under

this implied cause of action. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396–97

(finding remedy for Fourth Amendment violation related to use of

unreasonable force during warrantless search and seizure); Davis

v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248–49 (1979) (same for violation of

equal protection component of Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause);

Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 17–19 (1980) (same for violation of

Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause).

“In the years since those cases were decided, however, the

Supreme Court’s approach to implied damage remedies has changed

dramatically to the point that ‘expanding the Bivens remedy is now

a disfavored judicial activity.’” Annappareddy v. Pascale, 996

F.3d 120, 133 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S.

Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017)). “To inform a court’s analysis of a

proposed Bivens claim,” the Supreme Court has “framed the inquiry

as proceeding in two steps.” Egbert v. Boule, 142 S. Ct. 1793,

1803 (2022). First, a court should consider “whether the case

presents ‘a new Bivens context’ — i.e., is it meaningfully

different from the three cases in which the Court has implied a

damages action.” Id. (quoting Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1859-1860).

Second, if the claim does arise in a new context, “a Bivens remedy

is unavailable if there are ‘special factors’ indicating that the

Judiciary is at least arguably less equipped than Congress to

‘weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to

proceed.’” Id. (quoting Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1858).

Last term in Egbert, the Supreme Court emphasized that this

two-step inquiry boils down to “a single question: whether there

is any rational reason (even one) to think that Congress is better

suited to ‘weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages

action to proceed’”; if so, Bivens does not afford relief. 142 S.

Ct. at 1803 (quoting Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1858). Bivens is thus

unavailable where “Congress has provided alternative remedies for

aggrieved parties in [the plaintiff's] position.” Id. at 1806.

The nature of an alternative remedy, moreover, is of no moment

because “[s]o long as Congress or the Executive has created a

remedial process that it finds sufficient to secure an adequate

level of deterrence, the courts cannot second-guess that

calibration by superimposing a Bivens remedy.” Id. at 1807.

It is a fundamental proposition that a Bivens action may not

be brought against a federal employee in his or her official

capacity. Doe v. Chao, 306 F.3d 170, 184 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Bivens

action does not lie against . . . officials in their official

capacity”); Randall v. United States, 95 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir.

1996) (“Any remedy under Bivens is against federal officials

individually, not the federal government”); Kim v. United States,

632 F.3d 713, 715 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“It is well established that

Bivens remedies do not exist against officials sued in their

official capacities.”) Therefore, before proceeding further, the

court is constrained to conclude that each of Dekattu’s claims

asserted against the Defendants in their official capacity is not

cognizable and will therefore be dismissed with prejudice. As to

the claims made against the Defendants in their individual

capacity, for the reasons below, Dekattu’s amended complaint fails

to state a claim at this stage.

1. Supervisory Liability Claims

In the amended complaint, Dekattu names four defendants, each

of whom he purports to sue in both their official and individual

capacity: Rodrick Burnette, a U.S. probation officer; Jenniffe

Inman and Sherain Teel, United States supervisory probation

officers; and Jenny Leiser, a United States probation office lab

supervisor. (Doc. 9 at 2-3, 17-18.) Even liberally construed,

however, the complaint’s allegations make it apparent that each of

Dekattu’s allegations is made against Burnette – not the other

named Defendants. Nowhere in either the complaint or in the

accompanying “Affidavit of Truth” does Dekattu allege personal

involvement or even awareness by Inman, Teel, or Leiser. (See

Doc. 9 at 17-18.) To the extent that Dekattu is seeking to impose

supervisory liability on these three Defendants, that claim

necessarily fails. In the Fourth Circuit, there is no supervisory

liability under Bivens absent a showing “that the supervisor had

actual or constructive knowledge that her subordinate was engaged

in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of

constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff” and that the

supervisor's response showed “deliberate indifference to or tacit

authorization of the alleged offensive practices,” causing the

plaintiff's injury. Wilkins v. Montgomery, 751 F.3d 214, 226 (4th

Cir. 2014); see also Baker v. United States, 645 F. App'x 266, 269

(4th Cir. 2016).

Here, the amended complaint is completely devoid of any

allegation to plausibly establish that the supervisory defendants

had constructive knowledge that Burnette was engaged in conduct

that posed “a pervasive and unreasonable risk” of constitutional

injury to Dekattu. See Jones v. Alvarez, No. 1:19CV930, 2021 WL

796509, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 2, 2021). Accordingly, the claims

against Defendants Inman, Teel, and Leiser will be dismissed for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

In the affidavit accompanying the amended complaint, Dekattu

also makes allegations against the U.S. Probation Office itself.

(See Doc. 9 at 18.) Any such claim is not cognizable, as it is

well-established that a plaintiff cannot bring a Bivens suit

against a federal agency. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484-

86 (1994); Humphrey v. U.S. Prob. Dep't, 221 F.3d 1334 (6th Cir.

2000); Fuller-Avent v. U.S. Prob. Office, 226 F. App’x 1, 4 (D.C.

Cir. 2006).

2. Claims Against Burnette

a. First Amendment Claim

The remaining claim is against Burnette. Dekattu first claims

that Burnette violated his First Amendment rights. (Doc. 9 at 4,

14, 15). Read generously, Dekattu’s complaint ostensibly raises

a First Amendment retaliation claim. In various places in the

affidavit accompanying his complaint, Dekattu claims that Burnette

intimidated, threated, and harassed him. (Doc. 9 at 17-18.) He

also asserts that Burnette created “false” supervised release

violation reports against him and then “deprived” him of the

ability to “file a formal complaint . . . prior to [the] Supervised

Release Violation Report.” (Id.)

His claim fails for two reasons. First, nowhere does Dekattu

allege that he was engaged in protected speech, nor does he claim

that certain adverse actions were taken against him because of

that speech. See Simpson v. Welch, 900 F.2d 33, 35 (4th Cir. 1990)

(conclusory allegations, unsupported by specific allegations of

material fact, are not sufficient to state a claim). Although pro

se litigants are entitled to a significant degree of latitude when

it comes to pleadings, the liberal construction requirement “does

not mean overlooking the pleading requirements under the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.” See Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d

605, 618 (4th Cir. 2020). Second, and dispositive, is the fact

that the Supreme Court has held that “there is no Bivens action

for First Amendment retaliation.” Egbert, 142 S. Ct. at 1807;

Earle v. Shreves, 990 F.3d 774, 781 (4th Cir. 2021) (pre-Egbert

case declining to extend Bivens to include First Amendment

retaliation claims); see also Reichel v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658,

663 n.4 (2012) (noting that the Supreme Court has “never held that

Bivens extends to First Amendment claims”).

Accordingly, Dekattu’s First Amendment claim will be

dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.

b. Eighth Amendment Claim

Dekattu also claims that Burnette violated his Eighth

Amendment rights, apparently by subjecting him to corporal

punishment. (Doc. 9 at 15).8 Preliminarily, the court notes that

a federal pretrial detainee’s right to be free from cruel and

unusual punishment implicates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amendment. See Bell v. Wolfish,

441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979); Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383, 388

(4th Cir. 2001). This is because “the State does not acquire the

power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned until

after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance

with due process of law.” Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671

n. 40 (1977). This distinction can matter, moreover, because the

“language of the two Clauses differs, and the nature of the claims

often differs. And, most importantly, pretrial detainees (unlike

convicted prisoners) cannot be punished at all, much less

‘maliciously and sadistically.’” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576

U.S. 389, 400 (2015) (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,

671 n. 40 (1977)). For this reason, Dekattu’s Bivens claim under

the Eighth Amendment fails.

Here, however, even if analyzed under the Fifth Amendment’s

Due Process Clause, Dekattu’s claim fails to satisfy the most basic

pleading requirements. Aside from one vague reference to being

8 In the affidavit accompanying the amended complaint, Dekattu claims

that “corporate punishment was used against me.” (Doc. 9 at 15.) The

court assumes Dekattu meant “corporal punishment,” which is ordinarily

considered “physical punishment . . . that is inflicted on the body.”

Punishment, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

“violated” by Defendants on “or about April 7, 2022” (which

ostensibly refers to a violation of his supervised release),

Dekattu sets forth no specific instance of “corporal punishment,”

much less any specific allegations plausibly alleging that the

“force” used against him “was objectively unreasonable” in light

of “the legitimate interests that stem from the government's need

to manage the facility in which the individual is detained.”

Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 396–97 (cleaned up).

In short, Dekattu’s Eighth Amendment claim – which the court

construes as resting on the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause

- “is exactly the kind of ‘naked assertion’ that is insufficient

to state a claim.” Weidman v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 776 F.3d 214,

221 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Accordingly,

this claim will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted.9

9 Even had Dekattu alleged more facts, it is unclear – and perhaps

doubtful – whether Bivens would provide a cause of action under the Fifth

Amendment Due Process Clause. Although the Supreme Court authorized a

Bivens action under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause in Davis v.

Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), this does not mean that all Fifth Amendment

claims have a Bivens remedy. See Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1863 (rejecting

Bivens remedy for prisoner abuse claim based on Fifth Amendment’s Due

Process Clause); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 420 (1988) (denying

a Bivens action under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause for

wrongful denial of Social Security disability benefits); Cantu v. Moody,

933 F.3d 414, 422 (5th Cir. 2019) (“No one thinks Davis — which permitted

a congressional employee to sue for unlawful termination in violation

of the Due Process Clause — means the entirety of the Fifth Amendment's

Due Process Clause is fair game in a Bivens action.”)

c. Fourth and Fifth Amendment Claims

The remaining claims against Burnette, liberally construed,

can be boiled down to two basic theories of liability. The first

theory is that Burnette violated the Fourth Amendment, ostensibly

under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), by knowingly

submitting false information – primarily the results of certain

drug tests showing that Dekattu had used marijuana in violation of

the terms of his supervision – to secure the revocation of

Dekattu’s supervised release. (Doc. 9 at 17 (claiming that

Burnette “has falsified the Toxicology Report . . . and Abbott

Drug Test Report”).) The second theory is that Burnette violated

the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause by fabricating that

evidence to obtain the revocation of Dekattu’s supervised release.

(Id. at 17-18 (claiming that Burnette “has created a false

supervised release violation report against plaintiff”).) See

Massey v. Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 354 (4th Cir. 2014) (recognizing

a “due process right not to be deprived of liberty as a result of

the fabrication of evidence by a government officer acting in an

investigating capacity”) (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted).

Dekattu, however, has alleged no facts - beyond his

subjective, unsupported belief – making plausible the claim that

Burnette falsified evidence to secure the supervised release

revocation. This failure is fatal to his claims. The allegations

do not specify how Burnette falsified evidence against Dekattu.

Nor do they refer to any underlying facts to support the purported

constitutional violations. Instead, Dekattu’s Fourth and Fifth

Amendment claims amount to “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-

harmed-me accusation[s]” that are not pled with enough specificity

to plausibly state a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see Oakley v.

Dyer, No. 2:21-CV-169-Z-BQ, 2022 WL 10676593, at *6 (N.D. Tex.

Sept. 12, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:21-CV-

169-Z-BQ, 2022 WL 10656143 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2022) (allegation

that defendant falsified drug test results failed to state a claim

because the plaintiff “set forth no facts — beyond his subjective,

unsupported belief — demonstrating [that the defendant] falsified

his drug test results”); Teixeira v. Hanneman, No. 17-CV-6673-PSG

(KS), 2018 WL 6164309, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2018) (“Plaintiffs'

conclusory allegation that [the defendants] engaged in a

conspiracy with the employees of the drug testing facilities to

falsify evidence, without a single supporting fact, is not enough

to state a claim”).

Consequently, Dekattu’s claims based on the Fourth and Fifth

Amendments will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted.

C. Motion to Redact

In initiating this case, though Dekattu was detained at the

Mecklenburg County jail, he included his Charlotte home address in

the complaint and four summonses. (Doc. 1 at 1; Doc. 1-1). When

the court ordered the complaint struck on July 5, 2022, it

instructed the Clerk of Court to mail a copy of the order to

Dekattu at both his home address and the Mecklenburg County jail.

(Doc. 4 at 5). Dekattu now moves the court to redact his home

address from the court’s July 5, 2022 order because it is available

publicly and “can potentially cause an [sic] safety issue” for

Dekattu and his family. (Doc. 14 at 1).

A court's power over its records is constrained by two

separate legal principles: the public's presumptive common-law

right of access to judicial records, Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns,

Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598, (1978), and the First Amendment's grant

of access to judicial records, Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine,

Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988) (citing Globe Newspaper

Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607, 1982)). “The common-

law presumptive right of access extends to all judicial documents

and records, and the presumption can be rebutted only by showing

that ‘countervailing interests heavily outweigh the public

interests in access.’” Doe v. Public Citizen, 749 F.2d 249, 265-

66 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.,

846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988)). Accordingly, the “redaction

of a judicial opinion is appropriate only when redactions are

necessary and justified to protect a party's legitimate

interests.” Lipocine Inc. v. Clarus Therapeutics, Inc., No. CV

19-622 (WCB), 2020 WL 4569473, at *1 (D. Del. Aug. 7, 2020); see

also Doe v. Exxon Mobile Corp., 570 F. Supp. 2d 49, 52 (D.D.C.

2008) (“[A] district court may deny access to judicial records

only if, after considering the relevant facts and circumstances of

the particular case, and after weighing the interests advanced by

the parties in light of the public interest and the duty of the

courts, it concludes that justice so requires.”) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).

Here, Dekattu requests the redaction of his home address in

the interest of his family’s safety. Considering all the facts

and circumstances, the court discerns no public interest in

Dekattu’s personal address, which is immaterial to the merits of

this action. Redacting his address from the court’s July 5, 2022

order would not affect the public’s interest in this matter in any

meaningful way, while Dekattu has a legitimate and “strong privacy

interest in [his] home address[].” Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps., AFL-

CIO, Loc. 1923 v. U.S., Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 712 F.2d

931, 932 (4th Cir. 1983). Accordingly, Dekattu’s motion to redact

his home address is granted and the Clerk of Court will be

instructed to redact Dekattu’s home address from the July 5, 2022

order (Doc. 4).

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that this action be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as

to the Bivens claims against all Defendants in their official

capacity as well as the claims based on First Amendment retaliation

and the Eighth Amendment, and DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to

the Bivens claims against all Defendants in their individual

capacity pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B) for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Dekattu’s “Request Urging the

Courts to Remove Personal Address from Order Filed July 5, 2022”

(Doc. 14) is construed as a motion to redact and is GRANTED. The

Clerk of Court shall redact Dekattu’s personal address from the

court’s July 5, 2022 order (Doc. 4).

/s/ Thomas D. Schroeder

United States District Judge

November 18, 2022