Raybon v. Williamson

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

STATESVILLE DIVISION

CIVIL CASE NO. 5:21-cv-00169-MR

JIMMY DANIEL RAYBON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

LARRY WILLIAMSON, et al., ) ORDER

)

Defendants. )

_______________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of the pro se

Amended Complaint [Doc. 20]. A pro se Motion to Amend is also pending.

[Doc. 19]. The Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. [Doc. 8].

I. BACKGROUND

The pro se Plaintiff filed this civil rights action addressing incidents that

allegedly occurred at the Alexander Correctional Institution.1 The Complaint

passed initial review on retaliation claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against Defendants FNU Hice, Tass Jansen, and Larry Williamson, and the

1 The Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at the Pamlico Correctional Institution.

Plaintiff was granted the opportunity to amend.2 [Doc. 10]. The Amended

Complaint is now before the Court for initial review. [Doc. 20].

The Plaintiff again names Hice, Jansen and Williamson as Defendants.

He additionally names: FNU Marshall, an Alexander CI case manager, and

Jane Doe,3 an Alexander CI nurse, in their individual and official capacities.

He asserts violations of the First and Eighth Amendments. [Id. at 3]. As

injury, the Plaintiff claims that: he was fired from his prison job; his personal

property was “trashed” and damaged; he was moved from medium custody

to close custody, where he was attacked and injured by another inmate; he

has persistent back pain; he had nightmares, anxiety and depression for

“weeks;” and he suffered a substance abuse relapse. [Id. at 17]. He seeks

a declaratory judgment; compensatory and punitive damages; court costs

and fees; injunctive relief; and any other relief the Court deems just and

proper. [Id. at 20].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because the Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must

review the Amended Complaint to determine whether it is subject to

2 The pending Motion to Amend [Doc. 19] is therefore denied as moot.

3 “NCDPS Prisons Medical Nurse” and “Unknown Nurse” in the Amended Complaint.

[Doc. 20 at 12].

dismissal on the grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious [or] fails to state a

claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore,

under § 1915A the Court must conduct an initial review and identify and

dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if it is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune to such relief. 28 U.S.C. §

1915A.

In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether a complaint

raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly

baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se

complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a

district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his Complaint which

set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

III. DISCUSSION

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was

“deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,

and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.”

Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999).

A. Official Capacity Claims

The Plaintiff again purports to sue Defendants, who are state officials,

in their individual and official capacities. [Doc. 20 at 2-3, 12]. The Plaintiff’s

claims for damages against Defendants Hice, Jansen, and Williamson in

their official capacities were previously dismissed with prejudice and

therefore cannot be reasserted. [See Doc. 10 at 4-5, 15-16]. The official-

capacity claims for damages against Defendants Marshall and the Jane Doe

nurse are dismissed with prejudice for the same reasons.

B. Retaliation

The Plaintiff again claims that Defendants Hice, Jansen, and

Williamson retaliated against him. [Doc. 20 at 14-15, 17-18]. The Plaintiff’s

claims for retaliation against these Defendants passed initial review of the

Complaint. [See Doc. 10 at 5-7]. The Amended Complaint has likewise

stated a plausible retaliation claim against these Defendants and this claim

survives initial review.

C. Failure to Protect

The Plaintiff again asserts a claim for failure to protect against

Defendants Williams, Jansen, and Hice, and he additionally asserts it against

Defendant Marshall. He claims that these Defendants “each … possessed

enough facts and common knowledge to know without a doubt, that the close

custody units are much more dangerous than the medium custody unit,” and

that they were “deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s health and safety … when

they wantonly and intentionally … [had] him moved to [the close custody

housing] unit where they knew there existed a disproportionately greater risk

of violence….” [Doc. 20 at 19]. He further claims that discovery will

demonstrate that assaults “often erupted” on the close custody unit at

Alexander CI whereas there were no assaults on the medium custody unit

while the Plaintiff was at that facility [id.], and that an inmate whom Plaintiff

believes to be a “known predator” physically assaulted the Plaintiff, and

attempted to sexually assault him, the day after Plaintiff was moved to the

close custody unit [id. at 15-16].

The Plaintiff’s speculative allegations are insufficient to state a claim

for failure to protect for the same reasons that this claim was dismissed on

initial review of the Complaint. [See Doc. 10 at 8-9]. The Plaintiff’s present

claim for failure to protect is dismissed for the same reasons.

D. Deliberate Indifference to a Serious Medical Need

The Plaintiff claims that his injuries from the inmate attack included

abrasions and bruising throughout his body and “wounds” on his stomach,

back, and knee that resulted in “scarring” [Doc. 20 at 17]; that the Jane Doe

nurse “screened” the Plaintiff after the attack, bandaged some of his wounds

“without properly cleaning them,” denied Plaintiff’s request for pain

medication although he was “clearly in pain,” and denied his request for his

chronic high blood pressure medication although his reading of “150s/90s”

was “clearly high” [id. at 16-17]; that high blood pressure medication “was

with-held from Plaintiff for the next several days,” which resulted in “blinding

headaches and blurred vision” [id.]; and that the pain and soreness from his

injuries remained “intense” for a couple of weeks [id. at 17].

The Eighth Amendment encompasses a right to medical care for

serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976).

To state a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, a

plaintiff must show that he had serious medical needs and that the defendant

acted with deliberate indifference to those needs. Heyer v. United States

Bureau of Prisons, 849 F.3d 202, 210 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Iko v. Shreve,

535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008)). A “serious medical need” is “one that has

been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so

obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a

doctor’s attention.” Iko, 535 F.3d at 241 (internal quotation marks omitted).

To constitute deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, “the

treatment [a prisoner receives] must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate,

or excessive to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental

fairness.” Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 1990), overruled on

other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 825 (1994). However,

mere negligence or malpractice does not violate the Eighth Amendment.

Miltier, 896 F.2d at 852. To be found liable under the Eighth Amendment, a

prison official must know of and consciously or intentionally disregard “an

excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Johnson

v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 167 (4th Cir. 1998).

The Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that he had a serious medical

need. He vaguely describes his physical injuries as “wounds,” “abrasions,”

and “bruising”; however, this is insufficient to establish that the injuries were

objectively sufficiently serious. Moreover, according to the Plaintiff’s own

allegations, the nurse did not ignore his injuries. He alleges that she cleaned

and bandaged his wounds. The Plaintiff’s dissatisfaction with the quality of

the treatment, and his disagreement with her refusal to provide pain

medication, do not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. See generally

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 225 (4th Cir.

2016) (“mere ‘disagreements between an inmate and a physician over the

inmate’s proper medical care’ are not actionable absent exceptional

circumstances.”).

Further, the Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that his elevated blood

pressure reading was sufficiently serious. While high blood pressure can

certainly constitute a serious medical need, the Plaintiff admits that he had a

prescription for blood pressure medication, indicating that his chronic

condition was not being ignored. See Barnes v. Bilak, 2018 WL 2289232 (D.

Md. May 17, 2018) (stating that “hypertension is a serious medical need and

the failure to treat the same, if done with the requisite intent, would present

a colorable Eighth Amendment claim”). He has failed to explain, however,

why the single reading of “150s/90s” indicated the existence of an

emergency requiring immediate additional treatment by the Jane Doe nurse.4

His disagreement with her refusal to immediately dispense blood pressure

medication is insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim. See Scinto,

841 F.3d at 225.

To the extent that the Plaintiff complains that he did not receive his

blood pressure medication for several days following the attack, and that the

4 The American Heart Association defines a “hypertensive crisis” requiring immediate

medical attention as a systolic number higher than 180 and/or a diastolic number higher

than 120. https://www.heart.org/en/health-topics/high-blood-pressure (last accessed Oct.

17, 2022); see Fed. R. Evid. 201.

pain from his injuries persisted for several weeks, he has failed to allege that

such was attributable to, or even known by, the Jane Doe nurse; that these

conditions were sufficiently serious; or that the Jane Doe Nurse was

deliberately indifferent to these conditions.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s claims that the Jane Doe nurse was

deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs are dismissed.

E. Relief

In addition to damages, the Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive

relief. The Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot

because the Plaintiff has been transferred to another prison and the

conditions about which he complains appear to be unlikely to recur. See

Incumaa v. Ozmint, 507 F.3d 281, 286-87 (4th Cir. 2007) (“the transfer of an

inmate from a unit or location where he is subject to [a] challenged policy,

practice, or condition, to a different unit or location where he is no longer

subject to the challenged policy, practice, or condition moots his claims for

injunctive and declaratory relief.”). Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s requests for

declaratory and injunctive relief are dismissed.

IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, the Plaintiff’s retaliation claim has passed initial review against

Defendants Hice, Jansen, and Williamson. The claims asserted against

Defendants Marshall and Jane Doe in their official capacities are dismissed

with prejudice. The remaining claims are dismissed without prejudice.

In light of the Court’s determination that this case passes initial review

in accordance with this Order, the Court will order the Clerk of Court to

commence the procedure for waiver of service as set forth in Local Civil Rule

4.3 for Defendants Hice, Jansen, and Williamson, who are alleged to be

current or former employees of NCDPS.

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:

1. The retaliation claims against Defendants Hice, Jansen, and

Williamson have passed initial review.

2. The claims against Defendants Marshall and Jane Doe in their

official capacities are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

3. The remaining claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

4. The Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend [Doc. 19] is DENIED as moot.

5. The Clerk shall commence the procedure for waiver of service as

set forth in Local Civil Rule 4.3 for Defendants FNU Hice, Tass

Jansen, and Larry Williamson, who are alleged to be current or

former employees of NCDPS.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Martiff Reidinger ey,

Chief United States District Judge ely

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