The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
STATESVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL CASE NO. 5:22-cv-00098-MR
SHELBY REID LENTZ, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. )
)
FNU HONEYCUTT, et al., ) ORDER
)
Defendants. )
_______________________________ )
THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of the pro se
Complaint. [Doc. 1]. The Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. [Doc. 8].
I. BACKGROUND
The pro se Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
addressing incidents that allegedly occurred at the Alexander Correctional
Institution, where he is presently incarcerated. The Plaintiff names as
Defendants: FNU Honeycutt, the warden of Alexander CI; FNU Dye, the
assistant warden of Alexander CI; and Todd Ishee, the North Carolina
Department of Public Safety (NCDPS) secretary. He asserts violations of
the First Amendment and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 et seq. [Doc. 1 at 3]. He seeks
injunctive relief, damages, and a jury trial. [Id. at 5].
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because the Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must
review the Complaint to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the
grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious [or] fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore, under § 1915A
the Court must conduct an initial review and identify and dismiss the
complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune to such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether a complaint
raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly
baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se
complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a
district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his Complaint which
set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
III. DISCUSSION
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was
“deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,
and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.”
Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999).
The Plaintiff claims that he is a Sunni Muslim member of the Salafee
Reform movement for whom “congregational prayer is an obligation”; that
Defendants Honeycutt and Dye refuse to permit Muslim Religious Services
because of a modified lockdown, yet they are allowing outside yard and
education classes; that the Plaintiff is not being allowed “to fulfill [his]
obligation to establish the Friday Jumu’ah Prayer or weekly Ta’alim study
group”; and that Defendant Ishee “allows Defendants Honeycutt and Dye to
continue violations of [his] religious rights” [Doc. 1 at 3].
To sustain a free exercise claim under the First Amendment, a plaintiff
must show that he held a sincere religious belief, and that the official action
or regulation substantially burdened his exercise of that belief. Hernandez
v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989). A prison policy that substantially
burdens an inmate’s ability to practice his religion withstands a First
Amendment challenge when it is “reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests.” O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349
(1987) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). Claims brought
under the First Amendment are subject to a less demanding standard of
proof than claims brought under RLUIPA, with RLUIPA claims requiring
“strict scrutiny instead of reasonableness.” See Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 199
n.8.
Taking the allegations as true for the purposes of initial review, and
construing all inferences in the Plaintiff’s favor, the Court concludes that the
Plaintiff has stated claims under the First Amendment and RLUIPA that are
sufficient to pass initial review.
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, the Plaintiff’s First Amendment and RLUIPA claims have
passed initial review against the Defendants.
In light of the Court’s determination that this case passes initial review
in accordance with this Order, the Court will order the Clerk of Court to
commence the procedure for waiver of service as set forth in Local Civil Rule
4.3 for Defendants Honeycutt, Dye, and Ishee, who are alleged to be current
or former employees of NCDPS.
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1. The Complaint [Doc. 1] passes initial review against Defendants
Honeycutt, Dye, and Ishee for violations of the First Amendment
and RLUIPA.
2. The Clerk shall commence the procedure for waiver of service as
set forth in Local Civil Rule 4.3 for Defendants Honeycutt, Dye, and
Ishee, who are alleged to be current or former employees of
NCDPS.
The Clerk is respectfully instructed to mail the Plaintiff an Opt-In/ Opt-
Out form pursuant to the Standing Order in Misc. Case. No. 3:19-mc-00060-
FDW and a copy of this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: September 28, 2022
Martifi Reidinger ee
Chief United States District Judge AS