Griffin v. Maximus Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

CHARLOTTE DIVISION

3:22-cv-477-RJC-DCK

TIMOTHY GRIFFIN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) ORDER

)

MAXIMUS INC., )

)

Defendant. )

____________________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of the Amended Complaint. [Doc.

6]. The Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. [Doc. 5].

I. BACKGROUND

On September 14, 2022, the pro se Plaintiff filed the instant case alleging employment

discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. [Doc. 1]. Before

the Complaint was reviewed for frivolity, the Plaintiff attempted to amend the Complaint in a

piecemeal fashion, which was denied, and the Plaintiff was granted the opportunity to amend. [See

Doc. 5]. The Amended Complaint [Doc. 6] is now before the Court for initial review.

The Plaintiff names as the Defendant Maximus Inc., which appears to have its principal

place of business in McLean, Virginia. [Id. at 3]. The Plaintiff claims that he was hired to work

in its Sandy, Utah location in 2019, and continued to work there until that location closed; and he

appears to claim that he now works for Maximus remotely from Charlotte.1 [Id. at 3-4, 8; see Doc.

1 The Plaintiff appears to assert that this Court has venue pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) because he presently

teleworks from Charlotte, and Maximus’ acts are continuing. [See Doc. 6 at 5. Cf. id. at 4 (describing his “Place of

Employment” as Salt Lake County, Utah)].

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2 at 2]. He alleges discrimination based on his race (Black), gender/sex and sexual orientation

(heterosexual male). [Doc. 6 at 5]. He appears to assert claims of failure to hire, failure to promote,

harassment, and retaliation which, he claims, are ongoing. [Id. at 4-5]. He seeks $250,000 in

damages, attorney’s fees,2 and injunctive relief.3 [Id. at 8].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Where a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review a complaint to

determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious; fails

to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who

is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). The Court must determine whether

the Complaint raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly baseless

factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,

327-28 (1989).

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires “a short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93

(2007). The statement of the claim does not require specific facts; instead, it “need only ‘give the

defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Id. (quoting

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The statement must assert more than

“labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must

state a plausible claim for relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A pro se complaint must be construed

2 It is unclear why the Plaintiff is seeking attorney’s fees, as he is presently unrepresented.

3 The Plaintiff seeks “properly administered paternity tests for his child support cases...” because he would be making

$100,000 or more per year “if [his] real estate license hadn’t been taken because of the frivolous child support that

Maximus collects on….” [Doc. 6 at 8].

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liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, the liberal construction

requirement will not permit a district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in the complaint

which set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901

F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

III. DISCUSSION

1. Discrimination

Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against any individual because of such

individual’s “race, color, religion, sex or national origin….” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The elements

of a Title VII discrimination claim are: (1) membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory work

performance; (3) adverse employment action; and (4) different treatment from similarly situated

employees outside the protected class. Perkins v. Int’l Paper Co., 936 F.3d 196, 207 (4th Cir. 2019)

(citing Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010)). Constructive

discharge may constitute an adverse employment action under Title VII. See EEOC v. Consol

Energy, Inc., 860 F.3d 131, 143 (4th Cir. 2017); Munday v. Waste Mgmt. of N. Am., Inc., 126 F.3d

239, 244 (4th Cir. 1997) (to prove constructive discharge under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that

the employer’s actions were deliberate, and that the working conditions were intolerable).

The Plaintiff claims that he has “reason to believe” that, because he is a Black heterosexual

male, he has been subjected to discrimination and harassment “[in] the form of unwarranted

warnings, frivolous write-ups and bogus complaints.” [Doc. 6 at 6]. The Plaintiff recounts a

number of bizarre incidents of alleged discrimination, including that:4 a coworker repeatedly

4 The Court will not attempt to recount each individual act alleged in the Complaint.

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cleared his throat near Plaintiff, which was “torture[] and sexual[] harass[ment]”5 [id. at 6, 9, 15-

16]; the Plaintiff’s supervisor sent the Plaintiff a total of 5 electronic notes referring to the Plaintiff

as “her” and “she” in order to “heckle [the Plaintiff] and belittle this case” [id.]; a supervisor

“touched [Plaintiff’s] butt as Plaintiff reached for the door,” but the Plaintiff did not report the

incident [id. at 6, 10]; a female janitor told the Plaintiff that the bathroom was closed, whereas the

janitor had allowed other employees to go into the restroom, and “Spanish” janitors filed bogus

complaints about Plaintiff6 [id. at 10, 19]; “the men [Plaintiff] works with are racists [and] have

no penis,” and they wanted to steal Plaintiff’s penis because “he is black anyway, so it doesn’t

matter” [id. at 15]; a male supervisor who “seemed gay” required the Plaintiff to leave his lunch

in his desk, locker, or in the refrigerator due to a security policy and when the Plaintiff refused, he

was “written up for not complying” [id. at 18]; the Plaintiff “feel[s] like they were trying to put

something into [his] food” [id.]; and the Plaintiff arrives to work early, but was told that he is not

allowed to clock in before his shift starts, so he is owed overtime pay [id. at 18-19].

The Plaintiff has failed to allege facts supporting satisfactory work performance, an adverse

employment action, or different treatment from similarly situated employees outside the protected

class. He has, therefore, failed to state a claim for discrimination.

2. Failure to Hire

To establish a case for discriminatory failure to hire, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he

belonged to a protected class; (2) he applied for, and was qualified for, a job for which the employer

5 The Plaintiff rejects Maximus’ explanation that the employee’s throat clearing was due to a recent COVID-19

infection. [Doc. 6 at 9].

6 The Plaintiff admits that he said “yuk” when a certain female janitor walked by to “defend [him]self” from her. [Doc.

6 at 10].

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was seeking applicants; (3) he was rejected despite his qualifications; and (4) after his rejection,

the position remained open and the employer continued to seek similarly-qualified applicants, or

filled the position with an applicant outside the protected class. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); EEOC v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 243 F.3d 846, 851 (4th Cir.

2001).

The Plaintiff claims “failure to hire” without providing any factual allegations to support a

failure to hire claim. [Doc. 6 at 5-6]. Further, this claim necessarily fails because the Plaintiff was,

in fact, hired by the Defendant and he remains employed there. This claim is therefore dismissed.

3. Failure to Promote

A claim for discriminatory failure to promote under Title VII and the ADA requires a

plaintiff to prove that: (1) he is a member of a protected group; (2) he applied for the position at

issue; (3) he was qualified for the position; and (4) the delay occurred under circumstances giving

rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. See Lyons v. City of Alexandria, 35 F.4th 285, 289

(4th Cir. 2022) (citing Brown v. McLean, 159 F.3d 898, 902 (4th Cir. 1998)).

The Plaintiff claims that he applied for over 80 jobs, some of which were entry-level,

because Maximus had already discriminated against him based on race, sex, or sexual orientation.

[Doc. 6 at 11-12]. He claims that: he was subjected to discriminatory write-ups and complaints

that were meant to sabotage his career advancement [id. at 8, 12]; he has applied for other positions

but he was not interviewed or hired for them, even though they are entry-level positions and he

has associate’s, bachelor’s, and master’s degrees [id. at 6, 8]; someone applied for a bilingual job

in the Plaintiff’s name, and the Plaintiff is not bilingual [id. at 11]. The Plaintiff admits that he

applied “indiscriminately” to a number of positions and that his resume “needs work,” and he also

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appears to acknowledge that he was disciplined for saying “yuk” to a janitor, and for refusing to

comply with company policies [id. at 10, 12, 17-18].

The Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that he was qualified for the positions at issue,

or that the failure to promote him occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of

unlawful discrimination. Therefore, his claim for failure to promote is dismissed.

4. Harassment

To state a claim of unlawful harassment under Title VII, a plaintiff must prove that the

harassment creates an objectively hostile or abusive work environment and that the putative victim

subjectively perceives the environment to be abusive. See Conner v. Schrader–Bridgeport Int’l,

Inc., 227 F.3d 179, 192 (4th Cir. 2000). To demonstrate sexual harassment and/or a racially hostile

work environment, a plaintiff must show that: (1) there is unwelcome conduct; (2) that is based on

the plaintiff’s sex and/or race; (3) which is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the plaintiff’s

conditions of employment and to create an abusive work environment; and (4) which is imputable

to the employer. Id.

The Plaintiff claims that: the coworker who cleared his throat near the Plaintiff was

sexually harassing him [Doc. 6 at 6, 15-16]; the janitor who told him he could not use the bathroom

while she was cleaning it, and those who filed bogus complaints about him are “Spanish” [id. at

10, 19]; the supervisors who enforced policies against him were “Spanish,” “seemed gay,” or both,

and did so to harass him [id. at 17-18]; and the men who were trying to steal the Plaintiff’s penis

justified it in their minds because the Plaintiff is Black [id. at 15-16].

These frivolous allegations fail to demonstrate the existence of any of the elements of a

hostile work environment claim. This claim is therefore dismissed.

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5. Retaliation

The elements of a retaliation claim under Title VII are: (1) engagement in a protected

activity; (2) adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link between the protected activity and

the employment action. Mackey v. Shalala, 360 F.3d 463, 469 (4th Cir. 2004); see Burlington

Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006) (the employment action must be

“materially adverse”).

The Plaintiff appears to claim that: a few days after he filed his a charge of discrimination

with the Utah Labor Commission’s Anti-Discrimination Division, he was moved to a desk near a

coworker who is disruptively loud, and who used a standing desk so that she was “watching [his]

every move” [Doc. 6 at 6, 16]; another coworker was moved near him who would show everyone

his monkey keychain that makes a noise at the push of a button [id. at 17]; and the Plaintiff’s

“vacation time was taken but, ([he] believe[s]) returned after extensive argument” [id. at 17].

The Plaintiff has failed to identify any adverse employment action, or a causal link between

his discrimination charge and the allegedly adverse action. Accordingly, this claim is dismissed.

6. Miscellaneous Claims

The Plaintiff makes a number of allegations about “criminal and identity theft aspects that

tie into” his employment discrimination case. [Doc. 6 at 6]. He claims inter alia that: Maximus

employees might have opened a bank account in the Plaintiff’s name so they can steal his identity

[id. at 13]; Maximus is collecting frivolous child support payments without investigating the

paternity claims, and this caused the Plaintiff to lose his real estate license which deprived him of

hundreds of thousands of dollars of income [id.]; a Maximus employee who tried to “radicalize”

the Plaintiff was somehow involved in tampering with the Plaintiff’s storage locker [id. at 13-14];

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it is possible that Maximus employees are entering his apartment to tamper with his home security

cameras, laundry, microwave, smoke detectors, and food [id. at 14-15]; Maximus employees “have

been cyber and other stalking [Plaintiff] in an effort (among other things) to either keep [Plaintiff’s]

identity stolen and [Plaintiff] enslaved, or to kill [him] and keep whatever they could” [id. at 15];

and “little to no ultraviolet light enters [Plaintiff’s] head,” which is keeping him enslaved [id. at

16].

These claims are not cognizable in the instant Title VII employment case and are dismissed.

Further, the Plaintiff’s bizarre filings are so outlandish and unmoored from reality that the

Court finds this entire action to be frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i); Denton v.

Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (“a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the

facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible....”); McLean v. United

States, 566 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009), abrogated on other grounds by Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez,

140 S. Ct. 1721 (2020) (“Examples of frivolous claims include those whose factual allegations are

‘so nutty,’ ‘delusional,’ or ‘wholly fanciful’ as to be simply ‘unbelievable.’”). Accordingly, this

action is dismissed without further leave to amend, as it is clear that no amendment would cure the

deficiencies noted herein. See United States ex rel. Carson v. Manor Care, Inc., 851 F.3d 293, 305

n. 6 (4th Cir. 2017) (“when a complaint is incurable through amendment, dismissal is properly

rendered with prejudice and without leave to amend”) (citation omitted).

IV. CONCLUSION

The Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice as frivolous and for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Amended Complaint [Doc. 6] is DISMISSED

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WITH PREJUDICE as frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(@)-(i).

The Clerk is instructed to close this case.

Signed: November 15, 2022

Robert J. Conrad, Jr. 9,

United States District Judge “ee