Opinion

Vang v. Mitchell

Court
District Court, W.D. North Carolina
Filed
Oct 28, 2022
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 24.9%

noting that § 1915(e) “governs IFP filings in addition to complaints filed by prisoners”

How later courts described this case

  • noting that § 1915(e) “governs IFP filings in addition to complaints filed by prisoners”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ASHEVILLE DIVISION

CIVIL CASE NO. 1:22-cv-00232-MR-WCM

PAKUJA CRYSTAL VANG, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) MEMORANDUM OF

vs. ) DECISION AND ORDER

)

VALDESE WEAVER, )

)

Defendants. )

___________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the pro se Plaintiff’s Application

to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs. [Doc. 2].

I. BACKGROUND

On October 25, 2022, the Plaintiff filed the present civil action against

Valdese Weaver, her former employer; Melissa Mitchell, a safety manager;

Scott Coe, a plant manager; Brittany Herman, a human resources officer;

and Nancy Yang, a plant coordinator, purportedly asserting claims pursuant

to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.

(“ADA”). [Doc. 1].

The facts alleged in this case appear to be identical those alleged in

her prior civil action, No. 1:22-cv-00119-MR-WCM, which was dismissed for

failure to prosecute.1 In her Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that she suffered

disability discrimination by the Defendants in the form of the termination of

her employment, retaliation, and “prevention of medical treatment &

negligence causing permanent injuries.” [Doc. 1 at 4]. Specifically, the

Plaintiff alleges that on September 11, 2020, while employed at Valdese

Weavers, she suffered nerve damage and other injuries while carrying a box

of cardboard cones weighing 25-35 pounds. [Id. at 6]. After reporting her

work injuries, she received medical treatment and was placed on work

restrictions. [Id.]. She alleges that when she returned to work six days later,

she was forced to perform tasks that violated these restrictions, thereby

injuring herself further. [Id.]. The Plaintiff alleges that on September 23,

2020, she was denied workers’ compensation benefits, but that on

September 24, 2020, she was approved for 12 weeks of leave under the

Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). [Id.]. She alleges that her FMLA

leave was extended for a period of six months “due to having a work note

unable to come back to work due to injuries.” [Id.]. She alleges that she was

terminated from her employment on March 24, 2021. [Id.].

1 The Plaintiff appealed that decision, and that appeal remains pending.

2

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because the Plaintiff is seeking to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in

this case, the Court must examine the pleadings to determine whether this

Court has jurisdiction and to ensure that the action is not frivolous or

malicious and states a claim upon which relief can be granted. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii); see also Michau v. Charleston County,

S.C., 434 F.3d 725, 728 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting that § 1915(e) “governs IFP

filings in addition to complaints filed by prisoners”). A complaint is deemed

frivolous “where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke

v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The Fourth Circuit has offered the

following guidance to a court tasked with determining whether a complaint is

frivolous under § 1915(e):

The district court need not look beyond the

complaint’s allegations in making such a

determination. It must, however, hold the pro se

complaint to less stringent standards than pleadings

drafted by attorneys and must read the complaint

liberally. Trial courts, however, are granted broad

discretion in determining whether a suit is frivolous or

malicious.

White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 722-23 (4th Cir. 1989). While the complaint

must be construed liberally, the Court may “pierce the veil of the complaint's

factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are

3

clearly baseless,” including such claims that describe “fantastic or delusional

scenarios.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 328.

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[a]

pleading states a claim for relief must contain (1) a short and plain statement

of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction ... [and] (2) a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a)(1), (2). A complaint fails to state a claim where it offers merely

“labels and conclusions,” “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action,” or “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.”

See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

III DISCUSSION

A. IFP Application

The Plaintiff seeks to proceed with this action without the prepayment

of fees and costs. [Doc. 2]. Upon review of the Plaintiff’s Application, the

Court finds that the Plaintiff has adequately demonstrated that she is unable

to make prepayment of the required fees and costs. Accordingly, the

Plaintiff’s Application will be granted.

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B. Parties

The Plaintiff has named several individuals, in addition to her former

employer, Valdese Weaver, as defendants in this action. The ADA, however,

does not provide for a cause of action against defendants in their individual

capacities. See Jones v. Sternheimer, 387 F. App’x 366, 368 (4th Cir. 2010).

As such, the Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Melissa Mitchell, Scott

LNU, Brittany LNU, and Nancy Yang are dismissed with prejudice.

C. Disability Discrimination2

The ADA prohibits a covered employer from discriminating against “a

qualified individual on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To state

a claim for disability discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must allege that

(1) she had a disability as defined in the ADA; (2) she was a “qualified

individual”; and (3) her employer took an adverse action on the basis of her

disability. See Gentry v. East West Partners Club Mgmt. Co., 816 F.3d 228,

236 (4th Cir. 2016); Martinson v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 104 F.3d 683, 686 (4th

Cir. 1997). A qualified individual is “an individual who, with or without

reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the

2 The Court construes the Plaintiff’s claims of wrongful termination and “prevention of

medical treatment & negligence causing permanent injuries” as claims for disability

discrimination.

5

employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. §

12111(8).

The Plaintiff fails to state any plausible facts to establish the essential

elements of a disability discrimination claim against her former employer.

Specifically, the Complaint contains no allegations from which the Court

could infer that she was qualified to perform the essential functions of her

job, with or without reasonable accommodations. Finally, the Plaintiff has

failed to assert any plausible allegations that Valdese Weaver took any

adverse action against her because of her disability. Accordingly, the

Plaintiff’s claims for disability discrimination fail to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.

D. Retaliation

To state a claim for retaliation under the ADA, a plaintiff must allege

(1) that she engaged in protected conduct; (2) that she suffered an adverse

employment action; and (3) that a causal link exists between her protected

conduct and the adverse action. Jones v. HCA, 16 F. Supp. 3d 622, 635

(E.D. Va. 2014).

Here, while the Plaintiff asserts a claim for retaliation, she has pled no

facts to establish such a claim. She has not alleged that she engaged in any

protected conduct, or that any causal link exists between such conduct and

6

the adverse employment actions she allegedly suffered. As the Plaintiff has

failed to state any factual allegations in support of her claim, the Plaintiff’s

retaliation claim is dismissed.

E. Damages

In her Complaint, the Plaintiff requests as relief the appointment of an

attorney to represent her and “protection” from her previous attorney who

“caused [her] some mental trauma.” [Id. at 8]. She also seeks the right to

appeal the denial of her workers’ compensation claim. [Id.]. Additionally, she

seeks the following relief:

I want the right to change my social security number

due to not being able to get correct medical treatment

or having any disability. I want over $500,000 and

the correct amount for pain and suffering for the

ongoing past year and now. I want my credit bill,

medical bills, and everything to be fixed. The right to

have disability because I suffer greatly and have lost

some arthritic bone loss in my spine due to these

issues on purpose. The correct medical treatment

and the right to live fully again without fear. I want

justice for the Doctors and all medical providers who

laugh, mock and falsely report in my medical records.

I want the correct consequence of the Doctors and

medical care provider who didn’t care to help me and

let me suffer purposefully. The correct consequence

of what the Valdese Weaver has done is permanent

to my body. If it leads to death I will post all my

evidence on social media as a failure of a Justice

system.

7

[Id.]. Other than her request for compensatory damages, the Plaintiff cannot

receive any of the relief that she requests through this action, such as

appealing the denial of her workers’ compensation claim, changing her

Social Security number or seeking “consequences” for the medical providers

who allegedly mistreated her. Further, she is not entitled to the appointment

of counsel in this matter. Should the Plaintiff file an amended complaint,

within the parameters outlined below, her request for relief should be limited

only to those remedies available to her under the law.

IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, the Court will allow the Plaintiff’s Application, but has

concluded that the Complaint fails to state any claim upon which relief may

be granted. The Plaintiff’s claims against the individual Defendants will be

dismissed with prejudice. Before dismissing the Plaintiff’s claims against the

Defendant Valdese Weaver, however, the Court will allow the Plaintiff an

opportunity to amend her Complaint to state a claim against this Defendant.

In her amended complaint, the Plaintiff must set forth plausible factual

allegations to establish the essential elements of her claims. The amended

complaint must contain all of the Plaintiff’s claims and allegations; piecemeal

amendment of the Complaint will not be permitted.

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ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:

1. The Plaintiff's Application to Proceed in District Court without

Prepaying Fees or Costs [Doc. 2] is GRANTED;

2. The Plaintiff's claims against the Defendants Melissa Mitchell,

Scott LNU, Brittany LNU, and Nancy Yang are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE;

3. The Plaintiff's claims against the Defendant Valdese Weaver are

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and

4. __ The Plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days in which to amend her

Complaint in accordance with the terms of this Order. If the Plaintiff fails

to amend the Complaint in accordance with this Order and within the

time limit set by the Court, this action will be dismissed without

prejudice and without further notice to the Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: October 27, 2022

Se ee

Chief United States District Judge AS

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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