Cannady v. Polk County Jail

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ASHEVILLE DIVISION

CIVIL CASE NO. 1:22-cv-00163-MR

LAMAR CANNADY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

POLK COUNTY JAIL, et al., ) ORDER

)

Defendants. )

_______________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of the pro se

Complaint. [Doc. 1]. Also pending are Plaintiff’s “Subpoena Request for

Witness & Discovery Order” [Doc. 9], “Motion to Seize & Secure Evidence

from Facility by Outside Agency” [Doc. 12], and “Motion to Submit Evidence”

[Doc. 13]. The Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. [Doc. 8].

I. BACKGROUND

The pro se Plaintiff, who is a pretrial detainee at the Polk County Jail

for felony second-degree murder drug distribution, filed this civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 addressing various topics including the

circumstances of his arrest, his criminal investigation and prosecution, and

the conditions of his confinement.1 [Doc. 1]. He names as Defendants in

their official capacities: the Polk County Jail; the Polk County Sheriff’s Office

(PCSO); Rutherford County SBI;2 Timothy Wright,3 the sheriff of Polk County;

and Caleb Edwards,4 a detective. [Doc. 1 at 1-3]. He asserts claims for

“[f]reedom of speech/ false imprisonment/ right to affective counsel/

excomunication/ denial of proper med. treatment/ mail tampering/ denial of

self counsel/ targeting/ prejudice/ racial profiling/ contamination of meds/

harmful – improper d.s. of meds” [Id. at 3] (errors uncorrected). As injury,

the Plaintiff claims “[m]ental anguish; med: vomiting/ sick to stomach/

unknown other.” [Id. at 5]. He seeks $30,000,000 in damages. [Id.].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because the Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must

review the Complaint to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the

grounds that it is “(i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which

relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who

1 This information is gleaned in part from the Polk County Sheriff’s Office website. See

http://68.235.248.252/dcn/inmatedetails?id=umd%252bx147KoA%253d&bid=lor6DTbyv

0ec5J9fIwKOXw%253d%253d (last accessed Oct. 12, 2022); Fed. R. Evid. 201.

2 State Bureau of Investigations.

3 Also referred to as “Right” in the Complaint. [Doc. 1 at 3].

4 Also referred to as “Edwads” in the Complaint. [Doc. 1 at 1].

is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see 28 U.S.C. §

1915A (requiring frivolity review for prisoners’ civil actions seeking redress

from governmental entities, officers, or employees).

In its frivolity review, a court must determine whether a complaint

raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly

baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se

complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a

district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his complaint which set

forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

III. DISCUSSION5

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was

“deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,

and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.”

Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999).

5 The Complaint, which was written lightly in pencil, is partially illegible. It is also rife with

bald legal conclusions, pronouns, and unattributed and nonsensical allegations that do

not warrant discussion at this juncture. [See, e.g., Doc. 1 at 26 (“I have brought to the

attn. of being non-leathaly (I hope) poisend to the only C.O. here I trust regarding who to

trust and he tells me not to;” “I avoid as much as possible to avoid notice taken, and never

pressurize to dispence”) (errors uncorrected)].

The body of the Complaint refers to individuals who were not named

as defendants in the caption as required by Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. [See, e.g., Doc. 1 at 12-13 (referring to a “nurse” and

“COs” and a “Capt.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) (“The title of the complaint must

name all the parties”); Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d 551 (7th Cir. 2005)

(“to make someone a party the plaintiff must specify him in the caption and

arrange for service of process.”); Perez v. Humphries, No. 3:18-cv-107-

GCM, 2018 WL 4705560, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 1, 2018) (“A plaintiff’s failure

to name a defendant in the caption of a Complaint renders any action against

the purported defendant a legal nullity”). The allegations directed at

individuals not named as Defendants are therefore dismissed without

prejudice.

The Plaintiff attempts to name the Rutherford County SBI as a

Defendant. The SBI is a state agency. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-915.

Neither a State nor its officials acting in the official capacities are “persons”

under § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

Thus, civil rights suits against a state, its agencies, and its officials sued in

their official capacities for damages are barred absent a waiver by the State

or a valid congressional override. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169

(1985). The Rutherford County SBI office is, therefore, dismissed from this

action with prejudice.

The Plaintiff also attempts to name the Polk County Jail as a

Defendant. However, a jail is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

Brooks v. Pembroke Jail, 722 F.Supp. 1294, 1301 (E.D.N.C. 1989).

Accordingly, the Polk County Jail is dismissed from this action with prejudice.

The Plaintiff names as Defendants the PCSO, Sheriff Wright, and

Detective Edwards in their official capacities. Suits against sheriffs in their

official capacities are in substance claims against the office of the sheriff

itself. Gannt v. Whitaker, 203 F.Supp.2d 503, 508 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 26, 2002).

To succeed on such a claim, a plaintiff must allege that a Sheriff’s Office

policy or custom resulted in the violation of federal law. See Monell v. New

York City Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (holding that in an

official capacity suit, the entity’s “policy or custom” must have played a part

in the violation of federal law); Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 818-

20 (1985) (discussing same). A sheriff’s office may also be liable under §

1983 for a failure to implement proper policies and procedures where the

policy has a “specific deficiency ... such as to make the specific violation

almost bound to happen, sooner or later, rather than merely likely to happen

in the long run.” Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting

Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1390 (4th Cir. 1987)).

Here, the allegations are so vague, conclusory, and confusing that the

Court is unable to glean any cognizable claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)

(requiring a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief”); Simpson v. Welch, 900 F.2d 33, 35 (4th Cir. 1990)

(conclusory allegations, unsupported by specific allegations of material fact

are not sufficient); Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 201-02 (4th Cir.

2002) (a pleader must allege facts, directly or indirectly, that support each

element of the claim). The Plaintiff fails to identify any policy or custom that

resulted in the alleged violation of his rights. Instead, it appears that he is

attempting to hold Sheriff Wright responsible for his employees’ actions on a

respondeat superior theory. [See Doc. 1 at 23 (“as chief of police, … he

should know the qualifications of the ones he has signed seat to, as well as

their possible intent….”)]. The doctrine of respondeat superior does not

apply to actions brought under § 1983. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.

Accordingly, the claims against these Defendants are dismissed without

prejudice.

The Plaintiff is cautioned that any claims relating to his ongoing

criminal proceedings appear to be barred by abstention principles. [See,

e.g., Doc. 1 at 14-18 (asserting discovery violations and challenging the

criminal investigation). The Supreme Court held in Younger v. Harris, 401

U.S. 37 (1971), that a federal court should not interfere with state criminal

proceedings except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.

Id. at 43-44. Under the abstention doctrine, abstention is proper in federal

court when (1) there is an ongoing state court proceeding; (2) the proceeding

implicates important state interests; and (3) the petitioner has an adequate

opportunity to present the federal claims in the state proceeding. Emp’rs

Res. Mgmt. Co. v. Shannon, 65 F.3d 1126, 1134 (4th Cir. 1995). Here, the

Plaintiff has not shown that his case presents those “most narrow and

extraordinary of circumstances” that would qualify as an exception to

Younger abstention and necessitate federal intervention. See Gilliam v.

Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996). Should Plaintiff believe that his

claims are not barred by Younger, he may attempt to so demonstrate in an

Amended Complaint.

Moreover, to the extent that the Plaintiff is attempting to challenge his

bond and/or pretrial detention, such are not cognizable in the instant § 1983

case. [See, e.g., Doc. 1 at 13 (complaining that his bond was set at

$400,000)]; see Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (“when a

state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical

imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to

immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole

federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.”); 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Thus, to the

extent that the Plaintiff is seeking to challenge his bond or confinement, he

must do so, if at all, in a separate civil action.6

The Plaintiff’s pending “Subpoena Request for Witness & Discovery

Order [Doc. 9] and Motion to Seize & Secure Evidence from Facility by

Outside Agency [Doc. 12]7 appear to be premature Motions seeking

discovery that have been misdirected to the Court.8 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)

(as a general matter, a party must make initial disclosures at or within 14

days after the parties Rule 26(f) conference); LCvR 26.1 (“Official Court-

ordered and enforceable discovery does not commence until issuance of the

scheduling order.”); LCvR 26.2 (“The parties shall not file any initial

disclosures, designations of expert witnesses and their reports, discovery

requests or responses thereto, deposition transcripts, or other discovery

material unless: (1) directed to do so by the Court; (2) such materials are

6 The Court will instruct the Clerk to mail the Plaintiff a blank § 2241 form. The Court

makes no determinations about the potential merit or procedural viability of such an

action.

7 This document is partially illegible.

8 The Motions do not seek leave to engage in early discovery or contain any justification

for such a request.

necessary for use in an in-court proceeding; or (3) such materials are filed in

support of, or in opposition to, a motion or petition.”). Should the Plaintiff file

an Amended Complaint that passes initial review, the Plaintiff will have the

opportunity to engage in discovery in due course. The present discovery

Motions are denied.

Finally, the Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Submit Evidence [Doc. 13],

along with medical records that have been docketed under seal [Doc. 14].

In his Motion, the Plaintiff appears to complain that he was denied the

opportunity to obtain the documents with a lawyer’s assistance, which is

discriminatory, and he alludes to other alleged violations of his rights. [Doc.

13 at 1]. The Plaintiff states that he “would like this submission to not only

show the events that take place in a local county facility, but also serve as a

full power of attorney to [his] daughter … in case of [his] untimely demise.”

[Id.].

The Motion is granted insofar as the medical records have been

docketed in the record of this case. However, the Motion is denied to the

extent that the Plaintiff is attempting to amend the Complaint in a piecemeal

fashion. The Plaintiff’s speculative attempt to grant his daughter power of

attorney to continue this action in the unlikely event that he should die before

this action concludes, is also denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against any Defendant

and the Complaint is dismissed. The claims against Polk County Jail and

Rutherford County SBI are dismissed with prejudice, and the remaining

claims are dismissed without prejudice. The pending discovery Motions are

denied, and the Motion to Submit Evidence is granted in part and denied in

part.

The Court will allow the Plaintiff thirty (30) days to file a superseding

Amended Complaint, if he so chooses, to correct the deficiencies identified

in this Order and to otherwise properly state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. Any Amended Complaint will be subject to all timeliness and

procedural requirements and will supersede the Plaintiff’s prior filings.

Piecemeal amendment will not be allowed. Should the Plaintiff fail to timely

file an Amended Complaint in accordance with this Order, this action will be

dismissed without prejudice and without further notice to Plaintiff.

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:

1. The Complaint [Doc. 1] is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).

2. The Claims against the Polk County Jail and the Rutherford County

SBI are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

3. The remaining claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

4. The Plaintiff’s “Subpoena Request for Witness & Discovery Order”

[Doc. 9] and “Motion to Seize & Secure Evidence from Facility by

Outside Agency” [Doc. 12] are construed as premature, misdirected

Motions seeking discovery and are DENIED.

5. The Plaintiff’s Motion to Submit Evidence [Doc. 13] is GRANTED IN

PART and DENIED IN PART as stated in this Order.

6. The Plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days in which to amend his

Complaint in accordance with the terms of this Order. If the Plaintiff

fails to file a superseding Amended Complaint in accordance with

this Order and within the time limit set by the Court, this action will

be dismissed without prejudice and without further notice to the

Plaintiff.

The Clerk of Court is respectfully instructed to mail the Plaintiff a blank

§ 1983 prisoner complaint form, a blank § 2241 form, and a copy of this

Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: October 30, 2022

Martiff Reidinger ey

Chief United States District Judge MES

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